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The main focus of this thesis is to examine Israel’s counter terrorism methods and 
their consequences and to debate the effectiveness of Israel’s counter terrorism policy. By 
stimulating a debate on these issues it is possible to identify a more effective counter 
terrorism policy.  
 
In order to examine Israel’s counter terrorism methods, their consequences and 
effectiveness, it is necessary to first explore the overall concepts of terrorism and counter 
terrorism. Then, because counter terrorism policy is hard to evaluate if one does not look 
at the context which surrounds it, this thesis will therefore explore some aspects of Israeli 
security history which has and continues to influence its counter terrorism policy. 
Furthermore, this thesis will provide an introduction to the general development of 
Palestinian resistance movement which will include a scrutiny of Hamas.  
 
This thesis has selected some of Israel’s counter terrorism methods, and will be 
examining the width and depth of these methods as well as their consequences on the 
Palestinian society in general and on Hamas in particular. In seeking to answer the more 
general question about the effectiveness of Israel’s counter terrorism policy the thesis will 
evaluate this aspect by relying on qualitative and quantitative indicators. 
 
This thesis will show that Israeli counter terrorism methods does reduce the 
capacity of Hamas and as such has prevented certain attacks or incapacitated Hamas’ 
military wing for a limited time; they have, however, had a limited effect in the long run. 
It will be shown that these methods have consequences far beyond reducing the terrorist 
organisation capacity, which deepen the root causes for terrorism and increase the 






1. Introduction................................................................................................................... 5 
 
1. 2 A description of the approach ...................................................................................... 9 
 
1. 3 A tour through the chapters........................................................................................ 14 
 
2. A theoretical approach to terrorism ......................................................................... 16 
 
2. 1 How can terrorism be understood? ............................................................................ 17 
 
2. 2 How can counter terrorism be understood? ............................................................... 23 
2. 2. 1 The counter terrorism equation...................................................................... 24 
2. 2. 2 How to categorise counter terrorism policy................................................... 27 
The military model’s role in countering terrorism................................................ 29 
The criminal model’s role in counter terrorism .................................................... 30 
The expanded criminal justice model’s role in counter terrorism ........................ 32 
2. 2. 3 Counter terrorism and democracy - Security vs. Liberty............................... 35 
 
3. Some aspects of Israel’s security history .................................................................. 38 
 
3. 1 The main pillars of Israeli military doctrine .............................................................. 41 
3. 1. 1 ‘Strategic defence, operational offence’ ........................................................ 43 
3. 1. 2 ‘A nation–in-arms’......................................................................................... 47 
The changing perception of the IDF ..................................................................... 50 
 
3. 2 The evolution of Israel’s counter terrorism strategy.................................................. 53 
The counter terrorism strategy under Prime Minister Begin’s government (1977-
1983) ..................................................................................................................... 55 
The counter terrorism strategy under Prime Minister Shamir and the unity 
governments (1983-1992)..................................................................................... 56 
The counter terrorism strategy under Prime Minister Rabin’s government (1992-
1996) ..................................................................................................................... 57 
The counter terrorism strategy under Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government 
(1996-1999)........................................................................................................... 59 
The counter terrorism strategy under Prime Minister Barak’s government 1999-
2001....................................................................................................................... 60 
The counter terrorism strategy under Prime Minister Sharon’s government (2001-
2006) ..................................................................................................................... 60 
3. 2. 1 Three key categorisations of actions in Israel counter terrorism policy ........ 62 
Israeli offensive action.......................................................................................... 63 
Israeli defensive actions........................................................................................ 64 
Israeli punitive actions .......................................................................................... 65 
 
4. Background on the Palestinian resistance movement ............................................. 67 
Settlements and their connection to the al-Nakbah........................................... 68 
 2 
4. 1. The origins of the Palestinian resistance movement................................................. 71 
1964 - 1979 Towards Recognition and Legitimacy.............................................. 72 
1980 - 1992 From War in Lebanon to the Oslo Accords...................................... 76 
 
4. 2 Islamism as a voice of Palestinian identity represented by Hamas ........................... 80 
History of Hamas .................................................................................................. 83 
Hamas nationalises................................................................................................ 85 
Ideology ................................................................................................................ 88 
Suicide bombings –martyrdom – Istishhadi ........................................................ 90 
 
5. Israeli counter terrorism methods, 1992-2000 ......................................................... 96 
The first Intifada and the emergence of Hamas (1987-1991) ............................. 101 
The peace process (1991-2000) .......................................................................... 104 
 
5. 1 The permit system.................................................................................................... 108 
5. 1. 1 The categorisation of Palestinians into different groups.............................. 109 
5. 1. 2 A lasting change in the work permit policy................................................. 114 
5. 1. 3 The permit system process........................................................................... 119 
5. 1. 4 The magnetic card –and its many uses ........................................................ 122 
 
5. 2 Closure policy .......................................................................................................... 127 
5. 2. 1 The historical dimensions of closure ........................................................... 128 
5. 2. 2 Different types of closure since 1991 .......................................................... 130 
5. 2. 3 Education and economy – two of many factors influenced by the permit 
system and closure policy ....................................................................................... 132 
Effects on education............................................................................................ 134 
The influence of Hamas on students............................................................... 137 
Economic effects................................................................................................. 139 
Economic dependency: the import/ export dimension.................................... 140 
Unemployment................................................................................................ 143 
5. 2. 4. The reaction of Hamas as a multifunctional organization .......................... 146 
Socio-political aspects of Hamas ........................................................................ 147 
Hamas’ operational adaptations.......................................................................... 151 
The West Bank and Gaza dimension .............................................................. 154 
Alternative ways of acquiring weapons.......................................................... 158 
 
5. 3 Deportation .............................................................................................................. 161 
5. 3. 1 The 1992 Deportation .................................................................................. 164 
5. 3. 2 International attention, domestic Palestinian politics, and a new permanent 
relationship.............................................................................................................. 166 
International Attention ........................................................................................ 167 
Domestic Palestinian Politics.............................................................................. 168 
A new and enduring relationship ........................................................................ 171 
 
5. 4 House demolition ..................................................................................................... 174 
5. 4. 1 The framework............................................................................................. 175 
 3 
5. 4. 2 Illegally built houses .................................................................................... 177 
5. 4. 3 Demolition for security reasons ................................................................... 181 
House demolition and the Israeli settlement policy............................................ 181 
Houses connected to terror activity..................................................................... 184 
5. 4. 4 Hamas’ efforts against demolition ............................................................... 187 
 
5. 5 Selective killings...................................................................................................... 190 
5. 5. 1 Putting the policy into practice .................................................................... 192 
5. 5. 2 Advantages of the method ........................................................................... 196 
5. 5. 3 The method’s vulnerability .......................................................................... 198 
5. 5. 4. Hamas’ reaction .......................................................................................... 205 
 
5. 6 Administrative detention.......................................................................................... 207 
5. 6. 1 Arrests .......................................................................................................... 208 
5. 6. 2 Intention and practice................................................................................... 209 
5. 6. 3 The numbers game....................................................................................... 213 
5. 6. 4 The juridical process .................................................................................... 215 
5. 6. 5 Hamas takes advantage ................................................................................ 218 
 
5. 7 Interrogation methods .............................................................................................. 221 
5. 7. 1 The Landau Commission ............................................................................. 222 
5. 7. 2 Practices ....................................................................................................... 224 
Specific methods of physical pressure................................................................ 224 
The moral dilemma............................................................................................. 226 
Does it work? ...................................................................................................... 231 
5. 7. 3 Possible consequences for Hamas ............................................................... 232 
 
6. Israel’s counter terrorism methods, 2000-2006...................................................... 235 
The al-Aqsa Intifada ........................................................................................... 237 
 
6. 1 Permit system and closure policy ............................................................................ 241 
An update on the permit system and closure policy ........................................... 242 
6. 1. 1 Economic effects.......................................................................................... 245 
Unemployment and poverty................................................................................ 248 
Import/export ...................................................................................................... 250 
6. 1. 2 Hamas .......................................................................................................... 252 
6. 1. 3 Is the permit system and closure policy merely a political tool? ................. 256 
 
6. 2 Deportation .............................................................................................................. 262 
The Church of Nativity ....................................................................................... 262 
Deportation from the West Bank to Gaza........................................................... 263 
6. 2. 1 The intention behind the method ................................................................. 266 
6. 2. 2 The ramification of the 1992 deportation seen in al-Aqsa Intifada ............. 268 
 
6. 3 House demolition ..................................................................................................... 270 
6. 3. 1 Security reasons ........................................................................................... 271 
 4 
Suicide bombers.................................................................................................. 274 
An assessment of the method.......................................................................... 277 
 
6. 4 Selective killings...................................................................................................... 281 
6. 4. 1 Incidences of selective killings and the aftermath ....................................... 282 
6. 4. 2 Consequences and considerations................................................................ 285 
 
6. 5 Administrative detention.......................................................................................... 291 
Some changes in the practice.............................................................................. 293 
 
6. 6 The fence.................................................................................................................. 295 
The construction.................................................................................................. 296 
6. 6. 1 The purpose of the fence – security or final border? ................................... 300 
The two-state solution......................................................................................... 304 
 
7. Have these sets of counter-terrorism methods worked? ....................................... 308 
 
7. 1 Quantitative indicators of effectiveness................................................................... 310 
Overall Level of Terrorist Incidents ................................................................... 312 
Injuries and Fatalities.......................................................................................... 317 
 
7. 2 Qualitative indicators of effectiveness..................................................................... 322 
Alterations in the modus operandi ...................................................................... 322 
Change of the operational theatre ....................................................................... 325 
Hearts and minds................................................................................................. 327 
Psychological aspects of terrorism.................................................................. 328 
A barometer on Israeli social attitudes............................................................ 331 
A barometer of Palestinian attitudes ............................................................... 333 
 
7. 3 Final remarks ........................................................................................................... 338 
 
8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 340 
 











Even though terrorism and counter terrorism policy are ancient phenomena, the 
public debate about these issues opens a showcase of different opinions as to what 
terrorism is and how to counter it successfully. This debate seems to have been catalysed 
by the events of September 11th 2001. This thesis does not seek to provide a universal 
definition of terrorism, nor arrive at a final set of counter terrorism methods or policies 
which will grant success, simply because this is not feasible. The main focus of this thesis 
is to examine Israel’s counter terrorism methods and their consequences and to debate the 
effectiveness of Israel’s counter terrorism policy. 
 
Seeing as Israel is a democratic society and due to the scope, intensity, and length 
of their counter terrorism experience, this thesis uses Israel and its efforts to curb Hamas’ 
terror activity as an example in order to contribute to the debate of the complex issues of 
terrorism and counter terrorism. The Israeli case offers several insights regarding counter 
terror strategy and tactics, and could be of value to any other government involved in 
countering terrorist threats, guerrilla or subversive war, or sustained, unconventional 
warfare. At the tactical level, the Israelis can provide some insights with regard to 
countering a resistance movement. 
 
In order to examine Israel’s counter terrorism methods and the consequences, 
there are several issues that need to be studied. Firstly, as terrorism and counter terrorism 
are multifaceted phenomena, it is useful to provide a framework for understanding as to 
what terrorism and counter terrorism are. Secondly, counter terrorism policy is hard to 
evaluate if one does not look at the context by which it is surrounded. Therefore, this 
thesis will explore some aspects of Israeli security history which have and continue to 
influence its policy. Furthermore, this thesis will provide an introduction to the general 
development of a Palestinian resistance movement which will result in a scrutiny of 
                                                 
1 W.B Yeats; www.brainyquote.com, accessed 6 April 2005. 
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Hamas. Thirdly, when examining some of Israel’s counter terrorism methods this thesis 
will focus on how the method is practised, the official intention as to why the method is 
implemented, and how the method affects Palestinian society in general and Hamas in 
particular. In seeking to answer the more general question about the effectiveness of 
Israel’s counter terrorism policy, the thesis will evaluate this aspect by relying on 
qualitative and quantitative indicators. 
 
There exist countless books and articles which address the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Many of them focus on the peace process and/or the two Intifadas, and most of 
them include the issue of terrorism and counter terrorism in some form or another. At the 
same time, much has been written about counter terrorism, either as a theoretical subject 
in itself, or as an overview of some case studies of different nations’ experiences with 
counter terrorism policy. However, there are few works in which the author assesses the 
counter terrorism method in great detail, as often the focus is on the counter terrorism 
policy in general, and not the specific methods. The same is true with regards to the 
consequences and the effectiveness of counter terrorism methods.  
 
Additionally, some academic works have been written regarding how to measure 
the effectiveness of counter terrorism policy, where they explore several methodological 
approaches, and have been designed to measure counter terrorism’s effectiveness. 
Christopher Hewitt measures counter terrorism’s effectiveness using a quantitative time-
series analysis. According to Hewitt, if the amount of terrorist violence decreases over 
time, then counter terrorism policies have been successful.2 David Bonner’s essay entitled 
“United Kingdom: The United Kingdom’s Response to Terrorism” describes four 
measures of effectiveness: the rate of prosecution of terrorist elements, overall level of 
terrorist incidents, death toll, and alterations in terrorist tactics.3 Terrorism specialist 
Martha Crenshaw offers an alternative approach, using both qualitative and quantitative 
indicators. She argues that terrorism declines when there is “physical defeat of the 
                                                 
2 Hewitt, Christopher; The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Politics, University Press of America, Lanham, 
1984.  
3 David Bonner; “United Kingdom: The United Kingdom’s Response to Terrorism,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence, Vol. 4, no. 4, 1992. 
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extremist organization, a decision to abandon the terrorist strategy, and organisational 
disintegration.”4  
 
Although scholars and policy analysts have debated how to measure the 
effectiveness of counter terrorist strategies and tactics, there is limited literature on the 
topic of whether or not Israel’s counter terrorism policy has been successful, and there 
are few studies with respect to how Israel’s counter terrorism policy actually rates in 
relation to these measures of effectiveness. However, some work which has addressed 
these issues includes the Israeli scholar Noemi Gal-Or's essay “Countering Terrorism in 
Israel” that examines the counter terror efforts by the Israeli government. Gal-Or offers a 
history of the terrorist threat in Israel and responses by the Israeli government. She 
asserts that the impact of Israeli counter terrorism measures can be measured by 
empirical, political, and technical/operational criteria (i.e., negotiations and laws). 
Conversely, she shows that terrorism’s impact on Israeli society can only be measured 
using socio-political criteria.5 Gal-Or also claims that the pattern of terrorist activity is 
correlated to political dynamics and counter terror measures, and she offers a qualitative 
analysis of the major anti-Israeli terrorist incidents. Her assessment covers select 
incidents from the period of 1948-1987. Gal-Or does not discuss whether or not the 
Israelis have been successful during peace process years or the al-Aqsa Intifada years. 
Suzie Navot’s essay, “The Supreme Court of Israel and the War Against Terror” 
addresses some of the decisions made by the Israeli government to counter terrorism. She 
sets up her framework of analysis by addressing the tension between “claims of national 
security” and “the principles of human rights.”6 Specifically, Navot addresses: targeted 
killings, evacuations, relocation, and legal measures. Navot’s point was to illustrate the 
legal challenges Israel faces in dealing with Palestinian terror, but, in terms of measures 
                                                 
4 Martha Crenshaw; “How Terrorism Declines” in Clark McCauley (editor); Terrorism Research and 
Public Policy, Portland, Cass Publisher, 1991, p.70. 
5 Noemi Gal-Or, “Countering Terrorism in Israel” in David A. Charters (editor); The Deadly Sin of 
Terrorism, Its Effects on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries,: Greenwood Press, Westport, 
1994. 
6 Suzie Navot; “The Supreme Court of Israel and the War against Terror,” European Public Law, Vol. 9, 
no. 3, 2003. 
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of effectiveness, her report did not show a correlation between government actions and 
changes in terrorist activity. 
 
This thesis has attempted to fill some of the gaps in the work described above and 
contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of counter terrorism. Although counter 
terrorism methods are aimed at countering the threats posed by terrorist organisations, 
and are meant to use methods directed only at such organisations, counter terrorism 
policy does have consequences on a wider population. Therefore, in an effort to assess 
the effectiveness of counter terrorism, a deeper understanding of the practise and 
consequences of the methods is vital. This thesis has therefore addressed Israel’s counter 
terrorism policy by singling out some of their methods. This shows the depth, scope and 
consequences of that particular method on Palestinian society in general and Hamas in 
particular. In order to evaluate Israel’s counter terrorism policy this thesis has chosen to 
do so by using qualitative and quantitative indicators. Again, this is done in an attempt 
not only to assess one aspect of counter terrorism (the decline of terror incidents), but 
also to get a broader picture of the effectiveness. The timeframe of this thesis is divided 
in two; the peace process years (1992-1999) and the al-Aqsa years (2000-2006). Despite 
the fact that these periods share some common characteristic, there exist some distinct 
differences. Throughout the periods in question, Israel’s methods have not drastically 
changed. However, the level and sophistication of violence during the al-Aqsa years is 
not the same as in the peace process years. Although it is arguably unnatural to separate 
terrorism and counter terrorism from what occurs in the political sphere, this thesis will 
strive to keep its focus on terrorism and counter terrorism issues while only touching 
upon the development of the peace process.  
 9 
1. 2 A description of the approach 
 
There are certain challenges in examining Israel’s counter terrorism methods and 
the consequences on Palestinian society and Hamas, and in debating the effectiveness of 
Israel’s counter terrorism policy. Firstly, the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘counter terrorism’ are 
not value-free concepts but rather heavily politicised terms. This encourages an 
environment where information and facts can be distorted or manipulated by their 
sources, and as such it is even more crucial to be critical of your sources. Furthermore, 
the issues of terrorism and counter terrorism are not only politically sensitive, but also 
sensitive with regards to issues of security. It is a field where terror groups, governments 
and military establishments are extremely reluctant to share information and some 
information is classified, effectively placing a restriction on information and facts. 
Therefore, this thesis has relied on human rights organisations and newspaper articles, 
especially when writing about the practices of Israel’s counter terrorism methods. This 
has resulted in some contemplating of facts which might differ from source to source. 
However, instead of focusing on the variable details, this thesis has tried to focus on the 
broader aspects and trends that can be gained from the information available, while being 
aware that all information on the subject may not be provided.  
 
To a large extent, I have used the media as a source for this thesis, which has been 
a challenge, because the media is also used both by the government and by the terrorist 
organisation as a tool in their strategies. The media has a substantial role in influencing 
and shaping public opinion, and can therefore likewise have an impact on governments’ 
decisions. Furthermore, the media has the capacity to multiply the impact of terrorists and 
further their message in a way that terrorists are themselves incapable of doing. 
Additionally, terrorist organisations use the media to communicate their intention and to 
enlarge their scope of audience. Therefore, the media’s role is not an unproblematic one. 
Terrorism provides an endless source of sensational and compelling news which sells. 
Therefore efforts are made to cover attacks as quickly as possible, and in as much detail 
as possible, often broadcasting live footage from the scene of the incident, which later is 
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continually replayed. This might play into the hands of a terrorist organisation, as it 
contributes to spreading the terror message to a wider audience. On the other hand, the 
media can be used actively in counter terrorism policy, by reporting on terror incidents in 
a way which would lessen the terror effect.  
 
From 1992 to 2000, Israel enforced several counter terrorism methods; it engaged 
in conflict resolution, sought to freeze financial support for the terrorist organisations, 
launched a counter terrorism public relations campaign, tried to educate its citizens on 
dealing with terrorism, enforced new domestic legislation to help the security services in 
their fight against terrorism, re-organised its intelligence community so that it was better 
equipped to fight terrorism and re-occupied Palestinian towns. Due to the scope of this 
thesis, it is not possible to assess all of Israel’s counter terrorism methods, although some 
of them nevertheless are addressed indirectly. Therefore, eight counter terrorism methods 
will be examined in this thesis: the permit system, closure policy, deportation, demolition 
of houses, selective killings, administrative detention, interrogation, and the fence.7 These 
methods were selected for the following reasons: firstly, because Israel’s counter 
terrorism methods are structured around three key categorisations, this thesis sought to 
examine at least two methods in each of these three categorisations - defensive actions 
include the permit system, methods of interrogation and the fence; punitive actions 
include closure policy, deportation, and house demolition; and offensive actions include 
selective killings and administrative detention. Secondly, although there are a few 
academic works which debate selective killings, interrogation methods, and the economic 
aspects of the permit system and closure policy, there are very few academic works 
which show the depth and scope of the rest of the chosen methods. Thirdly, these eight 
counter terrorism methods are chosen simply because they are controversial both within 
Israel and internationally, and as such a closer study of them can contribute to the wider 
debate concerning counter terrorism.  
 
                                                 
7 The construction of the fence did not start until 2002, so this counter terrorism method will be explored in 
Chapter 6. 
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Another challenge arises in these studies when seeking to measure the 
effectiveness of Israel’s counter terrorism policy. Despite some research regarding how to 
measure the effectiveness of counter terrorism policy, which is summarised above, there 
still exists an open debate regarding which approach is most valid. A recent US 
Congressional Research Service report addressed the challenge of measuring 
effectiveness. The author of the report stated that governments may place an over-
reliance on quantitative indicators, such as the number of incidents, while ignoring 
qualitative indicators, such as the local support enjoyed by the terrorist organisation. The 
report showed that the problem with quantitative indicators is that they do not take into 
account normative data (such as the underlying sentiments of a terrorist organisation). 
The report indicated that the most important indications of counter terrorism 
effectiveness are measured either qualitatively or quantitatively.8 Another problem when 
it comes to measuring counter terrorism’s effectiveness is with the issue of quantum 
changes in terrorist organisations. Because terrorist organisations often behave in a ‘non-
linear’ matter, simply doing time-series analyses of raw data may ignore data such as 
when terrorists develop radically new strategies and tactics. For this reason, the report 
suggests tracking indicators of ‘quantum’ change in a terrorist organisation as well. These 
include: intelligence, technology, impact on society, targets and their protection, 
alliances, disruption of the organisation, amount of unproductive energy expended, 
sophistication of effort, and morale and momentum.9 Radical changes in one or more of 
these elements may indicate a major shift in the capability and momentum of the terrorist 
organisation.  
 
Counter terrorism does not only seek to reduce the number of terror incidents, but 
also to undermine the intention of the terrorist organisation and strengthen the morale 
among its own public. Therefore, this thesis wishes to provide a broader picture of the 
effectiveness of Israel’s counter terrorism policy by using qualitative and quantitative 
indicators of how to measure the effectiveness. It will focus on three sets of criteria to 
assess the effectiveness. The main criteria within the quantitative indicator that will be 
                                                 
8 Perl, Raphael; “Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness” CRS 
Report for Congress 23 November 2005, www.fpc.state.gov, accessed 20 March 2006.  
9 Ibid. 
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assessed are the overall number of terrorist incidents, fatalities, and injuries. The main 
criteria within the qualitative indicators that will be assessed are Hamas’ decision to alter 
its modus operandi, its change of the operational theatre, and the battle over hearts and 
minds. Although, an assessment of these criteria will not give an absolute conclusion 
regarding the effectiveness, it will provide a broad picture of the tendencies.  
 
There are several approaches which could have been chosen in order to examine 
Israel’s counter terrorism methods and their consequences and to debate the effectiveness 
of Israel’s counter terrorism policy, one of which would entail a series of interviews with 
Israeli and Palestinian officials. However, in taking this approach, there are several 
challenges. First of all, it would be very demanding. Secondly, access to Israeli and 
Palestinian officials of the appropriate levels would be limited. Thirdly, this topic is 
sensitive, because counter terrorism is often a political concept, and due to the security 
restrictions that come with the discussing counter terrorism methods. This results in a less 
objective point of view.  
 
Therefore this thesis makes use of a qualitative literature method. In order to 
explore the issues in this thesis I have strived to gain a necessary knowledge of the views 
of the Israelis and the Palestinians. Obviously, this is a never-ending process and is 
coloured by my own set of values. The elements that are being studied have been chosen 
because I view them as important. Like sociologist Ottar Brox,10 I have great difficulty in 
imagining a researcher who is not engaged in their subject, and I view a researcher’s 
value and commitment to be positive attributes to a study. It is my intent that by 
combining the perspective of the Israeli and Palestinian views with the perspective of 
someone who is inherently viewing the issues from the outside, I might be able to 
describe and refocus on some of the phenomena of terrorism and counter terrorism 
policy. For a researcher to alternate between the desire to study the issues as closely as 
possible while at the same time preserving the objective view, is of course one of the 
difficulties of the qualitative method. Nevertheless, it is vital that a researcher must 
constantly strive for objectivity. Consequently, this emphasises the importance of being 
                                                 
10 Brox, Ottar; Praktisk samfunnsvitenskap, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1991. 
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critical about sources, especially since this thesis is a literature study, and as such I refer 
to the opinion of others. The issue of objectivity becomes even clearer when analysing 
terrorism and counter terrorism in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. There is not only the 
debate on what terrorism is, but the conflict is also based upon fundamentally different 
views, influenced by history, religion and the identity of two people. This thesis focuses 
primarily on the issue of Israel’s counter terrorism, and I have frequently found it 
difficult to find the right balance between using Israeli and Palestinian sources when 
addressing this issue, and occasionally using more Israeli sources than desired. In part it 
is natural to seek Israeli sources when examining Israel’s counter terrorism methods and 
policy, because presumably they are most knowledgeable about their own policies. 
Furthermore, these sources also give a sense of the Israeli’s intentions and the desired 
effect of their policies. However, it is likely that their views on the Palestinian/Israeli 
conflict will be reflected in their writing. This is a weakness in this thesis. With respect to 
examining the effects Israeli counter terrorism methods have had on the Palestinian 
society and on Hamas, I therefore find myself relying on sources such as human rights 
organisations, Palestinian think tanks and newspapers, which of course also give their 
own biased views on the conflict. 
 
In an attempt to obtain the broadest spectrum of sources I have attended numerous 
lectures on a wide range of subjects, followed different media channels, travelled to the 
region and to Israel specifically, listened and talked to academics and individuals from 
the military establishment on both Israeli and Palestinian sides and academics 
representing the outside view. This thesis draws upon different sources originating from 
categories such as international relations, psychology, sociology, history, religious 
history, and the military. Sources include academic books, journals, international 
newspapers, as well as Israeli ones, opinion polls, statistics, human rights reports, official 
statements by political and military officials, and military documents. Obviously the field 




1. 3 A tour through the chapters 
 
The aim of Chapter 2 is to provide the framework for the rest of the thesis. As 
such it will enlighten the continuing debate on the basic question: what is terrorism and 
counter terrorism? In an effort to understand what terrorism is, this chapter will address 
this question from different perspectives, and provide an introduction to the root causes 
of terrorism. It will then continue to explore the psychological aspect of terrorism. 
Furthermore, this thesis will study the counter terrorism equation and suggest different 
ways of how to categorise counter terrorism policy: military -, criminal -, or the expanded 
criminal justice model. On a broader level this aspect will touch upon a wider debate: 
how does a democracy balance security for its citizen and protect itself, while preserving 
the corner stone of the society, namely liberty, about which this thesis seeks to provide 
the main arguments.  
 
Neither terrorism nor counter terrorism exist in a vacuum. They are actions that 
are constantly influenced by history, culture, religion, and politics. Therefore, chapter 3 
will explore some aspects of Israel’s security history. It will study how the military 
doctrine has influenced its counter terrorism policy and how certain elements, such as a 
‘nation in arms’, could represent a challenge in the future of counter terrorism. It will 
provide an overview of the development of Israeli counter terrorism policy from 1997 
until 2006, as well as exploring three categories of actions within the Israeli counter 
terrorism policy. Chapter 4 will concern itself with the development of the Palestinian 
resistance movement in general and will explore Hamas as a representative of a 
Palestinian resistance movement, in greater detail.  
 
Chapter 5 will scrutinize several Israeli counter terrorism methods used by the 
Israeli government during the period of Rabin’s second election as Prime Minister in 
1992 until 2000. The methods that will be examined include the permit system, closure 
policy, deportation of suspected terrorists or anyone who aids them, demolishing of 
houses, selective killings, the use of administrative detention and interrogation methods. 
The purpose of this chapter is to enable a deeper understanding of each and every method 
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and the process of their functions. As such, this chapter intends to examine these 
measures individually, in order to see clearly the nature and mechanisms of each method, 
while exposing the numerous complex and different consequences, both tactically and 
strategically on the Palestinian society at large, and on the Hamas organisation 
specifically. Chapter 6 will then strive to give an update on the same counter terrorism 
measures, but this time within the framework of the al-Aqsa Intifada, 2000-2006. It will 
illustrate that some of the methods have been reintroduced while others have been 
altered. Questions such as: to what extent do politics play a role in deciding how to 
confront terrorism, what is done to enhance security, and what is done in the name of 
security to enhance domestic politics, will be reflected upon. 
 
Counter terrorism policy consists of methods which are being implemented where 
the ultimate goal is to hinder and deter future terror attacks. In order to assess the 
effectiveness of counter terrorism, Chapter 7 will reflect upon what constitutes a 
successful counter terrorism policy. This section will also assess the effectiveness of 
Israeli counter terrorism method, while considering the differences in the definitions of 
success, by using qualitative and quantitative indicators.  
 
Finally, what will be discovered is that Israel has developed its counter terrorism 
policy to take a proactive stance, which can be categorised as hard-line, concerning itself 
little with the ‘root causes’ of terrorism. Although, in some cases, these counter terrorism 
methods have been successfully managed to reduce the capacity of a terror organisation, 
especially in short-term, the policies have only increased the motivation and confirm the 
intention to continue using terrorism as a method to achieving political goals.  
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2. A theoretical approach to terrorism 
 
“Terror is like water.  




The aim of this chapter is to provide the framework for the rest of the thesis. 
Therefore, it will look more closely at the concept of terrorism, as well exploring the 
complexity of counter terrorism. In an effort to understand what terrorism is, this chapter 
will address this question from different perspectives. For example: is there a difference 
between a freedom fighter and a terrorist? It seems that this question often arises when 
the general public discusses Hamas. Furthermore, what is often heard in the same debate 
is how the conditions in the West Bank and Gaza and Israel’s policies often create a 
breeding ground for terrorism. Therefore, this chapter will give an introduction to the root 
causes of terrorism. It will then continue to explore the psychological aspect of terrorism, 
which might indicate why the act of violence creates terror.  
 
This chapter will then move on to study what counter terrorism is. It does so by 
exploring what some of the aims of counter terrorism can be, and by studying the counter 
terrorism equation. This chapter will then go on to suggest different ways of how to 
categorise counter terrorism policy. Broadly speaking, terrorism can either be viewed as 
an act of war, an act of crime, or, as this chapter will explore, somewhere in between. 
Different points of view instigate different models for counter terrorism in practise; 
military -, criminal -, or the expanded criminal justice model. It is with the 
implementation of these methods that an important question will arise: how does a 
democracy balance security for its citizen and protect itself, while preserving the corner 
stone of the society, namely liberty?  
 
                                                 
11 Statement by Jacob Perry, former head of Shin Bet. Zacharia, Janine; “Perry: Arafat maybe losing his 
grip”, 17 July 2002 www.jpost.com, accessed 17 July 2002. 
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2. 1 How can terrorism be understood?  
 
The international community, policymakers, academics, and students alike, have 
all wrestled, and will continue to do so, with the difficulties of clearly defining the 
concept of terrorism as a basis for theoretical explanation. The main reason for this 
endless debate is that terrorism is not a value-free concept, but rather a term where 
“political sympathies affect interpretations of actions as legitimate or illegitimate and the 
term ‘terrorist’ is often meant to imply ‘illegitimate’.”12 Therefore, its use will vary since 
different people can and will interpret an act differently depending on their perspective, 
sympathies and what they seek to obtain. Thus, the process of finding a universal 
definition quickly becomes a part of a wider debate over moral values and ideologies. 
Although one should be aware of this aspect when defining terrorism, it is an argument 
that has been stretched too far when summed up in the cliché ‘one man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter’. According to this view the action is considered to be 
irrelevant, because the aim justifies the means. In the words of Professor Paul Wilkinson; 
“It is important to understand that even in situations where the justice of a particular 
cause, claim or grievance is widely recognised and supported, it does not follow that any 
means, however extreme and unjust, is thereby justified in pursuit of such an end.”13 
Boaz Ganor explains that, in fact, there are no contradictions in the concepts of ‘terrorist’ 
and freedom fighter’.    
 
“The statement that a particular organisation is a terrorist organisation is based on 
the way in which the organisation’s members behave in their attempt to achieve 
the objectives they have set themselves, while freedom fighter refers to the goals 
the organisations wish to achieve. Therefore, a situation is possible wherein a 
terrorist organisation can also be a national liberation movement working to 
liberate their homeland from the yoke of foreign conqueror.” 14 
 
                                                 
12 Crenshaw, Martha; “Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts” in Crenshaw, Martha (editor), Terrorism 
in Context, The Pennsylvania State University, Pennsylvania, 1995, p.8. 
13 Wilkinson, Paul; “Ethical Defences of Terrorism –Defending the Indefensible” Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Vol. 1, no 1, 1989, p.12. 
14 Ganor, Boaz; The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle; A guide for decision makers, Transaction Publishers, 
London, 2007, p.14. 
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Terrorism is not the only method of working towards radical goals, and at some 
stage it must be weighed up against alternative strategies available to the group. Why is 
terrorism attractive to some, but unattractive to others? “There are relatively clear ethical 
rules for the use of violence in support of a struggle against oppression, injustice, or 
occupation; as a last resort, when non-violent, deliberative means have been exhausted, 
and when armed forces obey the rules of war.”15 This, of course, provides some 
limitations on how to legitimately conduct the fight for freedom. Rather than attacking 
civilians, the military is the only legitimate target, and thus one stands stronger in ones 
claim of justice. Therefore, while it is possible to justify armed struggle in defence of 
self-preservation, it is possible to do so only under four conditions. First, the group’s just 
claims must have been met by violence. Secondly, the failure to accommodate these 
claims must be systematic, enduring, and unlikely to change. Thirdly, the claims must be 
fundamental to the survival of the group. Fourthly, the struggle must observe the laws of 
war and the rule of civilian immunity.16  
 
“Those who observe such rules deserve the name of freedom fighters. Those who 
do not are terrorists. It is a relativist canard to suppose that there is no real distinction 
between the two, or that the distinction is simply dependent on one’s political point of 
view. The problem with the distinction is not whether it is clear in theory, but whether it 
is meaningful in practice. Has any freedom fighter actually succeeded in avoiding 
becoming a terrorist? Has any armed struggle successfully resisted the temptation of 
deliberately targeting civilians?”17 
 
Terrorism is a question of what people (or groups, or states) do, rather than who they are 
or what they are trying to achieve, and is the violent result of a carefully considered 
process.  
 
“Rather than being seen as indiscriminate or senseless, terrorism is actually a very 
deliberate and planned application of violence. In this respect, terrorism can be seen as a 
concatenation of five individual processes, designed to achieve sequentially, the 
                                                 
15 Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil, Edinburgh University Press, Ltd, Edinburgh, 2004, p.95. 
16 Ibid., p.103. 
17 Ibid., p.95. 
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following key objectives: 1) Attention 2) Acknowledgement – and to some extent 
sympathy 3) Recognition 4) Authority 5) Governance.”18 
 
Sadly, in many situations the fastest way for a person to obtain their key objectives 
quickly, is through the use of violence. “The fast way is to kill as many civilians as 
possible to get the world to take notice, or to provoke the other side into a downward 
spiral of repression that will brand them as unjust oppressors in the eyes of the world at 
large.”19  
  
There are five general key factors that seem to reappear in the countless 
definitions of terrorism. First, terrorism is not an ideology but a method. It is a tool that 
players at the individual, group, or state level decide to pursue in order to accomplish 
their goals. Secondly, terrorism contains the promise or threat of violence to be delivered 
in a systematic and deliberate way in order to create terror. The mere threat of a terrorist 
attack is therefore terrorism in itself. Thirdly, the seemingly random and unpredictable 
choices of victims, which are often directed at a wider audience, are civilians and usually 
symbolic in value. Fourthly, in order to fulfil the tactical goal of terrorism, creating an 
extremely fearful state of mind in a wider audience, all of the above factors need to be 
combined and implemented. When this fourth factor is achieved terrorists are closer to 
accomplishing their fifth factor which is their strategic goal, namely politics. Terrorism is 
a violent form of politics and precisely because terrorism is political it represents such a 
complex danger.20 In addition to these helpful key factors, it is still useful to propose a 
working definition of terrorism for the sake of this thesis: “Terrorism involves the 
deliberate killing and injuring of randomly selected non-combatants for political ends. It 
seeks to promote a political outcome by spreading terror and demoralization throughout a 
population.”21 This definition is the same definition that the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-
Finding Committee, ‘The Mitchell Plan’, used.  
 
                                                 
18 Hoffman, Bruce; “The modern Terrorist Mindset: Tactics, Targets and Technologies”, 1997, p.93 in 
Howard, Russell D. and Sawyer, Reid L. (editors); Terrorism and counterterrorism –understanding the new 
security environment, The McGraw-Hill companies, Connecticut, 2002.  
19 Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil, Edinburgh University Press, Ltd, Edinburgh, 2004, p.101. 
20 Ibid., p.82. 
21 Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee The Mitchell Plan, 30 April 2001, www.state.gov, accessed 10 
May 2007. 
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As this definition touches upon, terrorism has another vital aspect, namely the 
psychological side. The way to terrorists’ ultimate political goal runs through a vital 
interim objective—the creation of a sensation of uncontrollable fear in the target 
community. Thus, terrorism is a means of installing in every individual the fear that the 
next terror attack may have their name on it. Terrorism works to undermine the sense of 
security and to disrupt everyday life so as to harm the target country’s ability to function. 
The goal of this strategy is to drive public opinion to pressure decision-makers to 
surrender to the terrorists’ demands. Therefore, the target population becomes a tool in 
the hands of the terrorist in advancing the political agenda in the name of which the 
terrorism is perpetrated. This threat undermines the ability of the civilian population to 
live a normal life. When every action has to evolve planning for how best to survive a 
potential terror attack, the daily routine becomes fraught with anxiety. Terrorism uses the 
victim’s own imagination against them. The terror organisation knows from the outset 
that it will not achieve its goals purely by means of terror attacks. It must enlist the help 
of its victims in gaining its objectives. Of course, statistically these fears are not grounded 
in reality. The likelihood of being harmed in a terror attack is less than the likelihood of 
being harmed in a traffic accident or even an accident in the home or workplace. 
Nonetheless, by using psychological manipulation, the terrorists succeed in creating 
disproportionate anxiety in relation to the actual threat, frequently with help from the 
media that sensationalises the situation. Often, the knowledge that one is being 
manipulated, and how this is being done, is itself a powerful weapon for countering such 
manipulation. The aim of the terrorist is to confuse the wider audience about who is the 
victim. The terrorist organisation does this by challenging whether or not the individuals 
who died in the bomb attack are truly the victims, or whether the true victim is the society 
that the terrorist claim to represent. The ability of a small group of individuals to 
manipulate public opinion, and thus the main policies of a state, is precisely what makes 
terrorism a strategic threat to democratic societies.  
 
When seeking to answer the question of what terrorism is, the debate sometimes 
can turn to why terrorism appears in the first place. One can debate and make lists to 
hypothesise the root causes of terrorism or motivating factors behind acts of terror. Tore 
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Bjørgo has done just this and made distinctions between preconditions of terrorism and 
precipitants of terrorism. He explains: “Preconditions set the stage for terrorism in the 
long run, whereas precipitants are the specific events or phenomena that immediately 
precede or trigger the outbreak of terrorism”.22 He goes further, and categorizes the 
various causes into: structural causes, facilitating - or accelerator causes, motivational 
causes, and lastly, triggering causes.23 A list of preconditions of terrorism might include: 
poverty, unemployment, religion, large gaps in societal classes, little or no press freedom, 
little or no personal freedom, disputes over land area and/or sovereignty and lack of 
recognised human rights. Additionally, a list of precipitants might include: job loss, death 
of a friend or a family member, an arrest of a friend or a family member, hindrance of 
personal freedom, new direction of personal ideology, and a sense of stigmatisation and 
loss of hope. Such perceived acts of injustice, regardless of whether they are unjust, 
depend on the intensity and duration of this feeling. They are important in order to 
understand why an individual engages in acts of terror, and in this context it becomes 
vital to act against the ‘root causes’ of terrorism. Such policy has to have a long-term 
outlook with the main motivation not being to counter terrorism, but rather to act as an 
instigator for a more decent and honourable society. When forming a counter terrorism 
policy it is important to be aware of Tore Bjørgo’s findings. When developing a counter 
terrorism policy it is difficult to take account of the many individual psychological 
processes which might act as precipitants for terrorism. However, an effective and 
successful counter terrorism policy must strive towards not increasing the preconditions 
of terrorism, as this could increase the motivation and determination among the general 
public to choose terrorism as a method to achieve their political goals. Awareness around 
these issues might help to diminish, although probably not end terrorism, in the long-
term. In this thesis, the value of addressing the ‘root causes’ of terrorism will become 
evident, especially in chapter 7. However it will not serve as a focal point, because 
ultimately, organised terrorism would not be chosen as a method if it was not perceived 
to be a successful one; hence the focus will be on strategies to reduce the likelihood of 
success. 
                                                 
22 Bjørgo, Tore; Root Causes to Terrorism; Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, Routhledge, London, 2005,   




As mentioned earlier, terrorism is a strategy in order to achieve a set of objectives 
which are often of a political nature. Strategy requires logical thought process and 
deliberate and calculated actions, often centralised by a group or a set of leaders. Thus, 
rationally speaking, if their methods of terror do not result in the desired outcome, 
organised terrorism would cease to exist.  
 
“Terrorism is often rationalized as a valid response to its ‘root causes’ –mainly 
repression and desperation. But the vast majority of repressed and desperate people do 
not resort to the wilful targeting of vulnerable civilians. The real root cause of terrorism is 
that it is successful – terrorists have consistently benefited from their terrorist acts. 
Terrorism will persist as long as it continues to work for those who use it.[…] It is of 
course the terrorists themselves who bear the full moral responsibility for their murderous 
deeds, but since we cannot directly control their actions, except by our own 
counteractions, it is our policy towards terrorism that will determine whether their 
terrorism succeeds or fails.”24  
 
It is in this light that counter terrorism methods will be dealt with in this thesis.   
 
 
                                                 
24 Dershowitz, Alan M.; Why Terrorism Works, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002, p.2. 
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2. 2 How can counter terrorism be understood?  
 
Just as terrorism is a loaded and diffuse concept, so is counter terrorism. 
Preventing terrorism is a positively loaded statement, because as there is consensus that 
terrorism is undesirable, who would then disagree that counter terrorism is not desired? 
However, once this is agreed upon, there are still issues which need to be explored, one 
of which is what should counter terrorism policy achieve?  
 
The most obvious answer to this question is that the main goal of counter 
terrorism should be to eliminate terrorism. This one can achieve by either eradicating the 
terrorist organisation, or by removing the enemy’s incentive to commit terror acts. Seeing 
as it is terrorism one is dealing with, the incentive is to be found in the political sphere, 
and as such it can also be resolved there. However this might entail resolving a 
controversial issue at the cost of heavy political concession.25 This goal is very ambitious, 
and so a government might realise that it is unobtainable. Therefore, another goal of 
counter terrorism policy might be to reduce the damage caused by terrorism. This could 
either be achieved by reducing the number of attacks, minimising property damage, 
forcing the terror organisation to change their modus operandi, or to change their 
operational theatre.26 Another goal of counter terrorism policy could simply be to prevent 
the escalation of terrorism. According to Boaz Ganor, this could be achieved in two 
ways: 1) ensuring that the conflict does not spread, by hindering the terror organisation’s 
growth and development by reducing their capacity to recruit new members or train 
already existing members. This issue also includes preventing the organisation from 
gaining political achievements in the international arena and obstructing the 
strengthening of the organisation’s political objectives and efforts. 2) Making certain the 
scope of attacks does not escalate by preventing an increase in the number of attacks 
and/or victims and/or stopping more serious types of attacks.27  
                                                 





Regardless of whether the goal of the counter terrorism policy is one of these 
goals or all three, the ultimate aim is to reduce the likelihood of another attack. This is 
done by structuring the counter terrorism policy around the counter terrorism equation.  
 
2. 2. 1 The counter terrorism equation 
 
From the outset it seems fairly clear what counter terrorism is; it can be 
understood as a set of methods which includes numerous activities directed towards 
fighting terrorism. However, the complexity of this issue becomes clear when attempting 
to answer the question of what a successful counter terrorism policy entails. When 
attempting to go beyond the initial answer, which is to hinder acts of terror, it becomes 
more complex and one discovers that in order to reduce the threat of terrorism one has to 
direct the counter terrorism methods towards minimising the terror organisation capacity 
and intention, called the counter terrorism equation. Therefore it is necessary to tailor a 
counter terrorism policy towards minimising terrorists’ capacity and lessening their 
motivations for conducting terror attacks. Boaz Ganor has structured some of the factors 
which have a direct impact, positively or negatively, on the level of the organisation’s 
motivation to commit terror attacks into four main groups:28  
 
The first group of influences is the impact of pressures brought to bear on the 
organisation, which can again be categorised into four different elements.29 First, the 
population, who is supposedly being represented by the organisation, can put pressure on 
the organisation to either show their resistance to carrying out an attack at that specific 
time, or it can demand that the attacks be stopped all together. Secondly, internal 
pressures that arise from differences of opinion regarding ideological direction, tactical 
goals or political vs. military steps and personal competition and rivalries can result in a 
lessening of motivation. Thirdly, inter-organisational pressures as a result of rivalry 
between various organisations which operate in parallel within the same supporting 
population can effect the organisation’s motivation. Fourthly, pressure brought to bear on 
                                                 
28 Ibid. p. 32. 
29 Ibid. 
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the organisation by sovereign states, which can entail either state sponsorship of terrorism 
– those who are able to put pressure on the organisation directly - or an external state that 
is able to put pressure on the state who sponsors the organisation, thus in reality putting 
pressure on the group indirectly.  
 
The second group of influences are actions carried out by the nation coping with 
terrorism which again Boaz Ganor categorises into 5 different groups.30 First, the scope 
and nature of offensive and defensive actions taken by the nation against the terrorist 
organisation, meaning the frequency of offensive measures and the degree to which they 
succeed in damaging the organisation’s infrastructure, as well as an increase in 
motivation for revenge that might be caused as a result of such activity. Secondly, 
activities by the nation coping with terrorism can effect the motivation of the 
organisation. These activities may include conducting tactical or strategic negotiations 
with the terrorist organisation, and the country’s readiness to make minor or substantial 
political concessions. Thirdly, the country’s attitude towards the terrorist organisation’s 
supporting population. Examples of this attitude can include humanitarian actions, the 
extent to which defensive and offensive actions are affecting the civilian population, 
which again would influence the public support towards the terrorist organisation, and 
thus the scope and nature of its terror attacks. Fourthly, public statements by political 
leaders and heads of security networks are likely to be perceived by the terrorist 
organisation as provocations. However, moderate statements may be perceived as a 
weakness, and could influence the nature of terror attacks. Fifthly, the degree to which 
the nation can formulate a deterrent force against the terrorist organisation will influence 
its motivation. Deterrence is likely to have a moderating effect on the scope and nature of 
terror attacks, because it reduces the organisation’s motivation to perpetrate attacks for 
fear of retaliation.  
 
The third group of influences are irrational emotional motives that are usually 
based on the emotions and feelings of the organisations’ leaders, terror activists, and their 
supporters. According to Boaz Ganor this group of motives should include the 
                                                 
30 Ibid., p.34. 
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‘boomerang effect’, meaning the desire for revenge following an effective offensive 
action against the organisation.31  
 
The fourth group of motives that can influence the scope and nature of terrorism 
are anniversary dates. Some organisations tend to perpetrate attacks at specific times in 
order to mark a historic event.32  
 
As well as taking into account motivating factors, it is equally important for the 
counter terrorism policy to be directed towards factors that influence a terrorist 
organisation’s capability. The one factor that influences all aspects of capability is the 
organisation’s ability to organise itself. This entails an appropriate leadership that is 
united and has a clear command and control line throughout its organisation. When this is 
in place the organisation enhances its chances of obtaining other factors that increase its 
capability, such as its ability to recruit new members and the quantity and qualities of its 
members. This factor is again linked to the organisation’s ability to conduct training, of 
both indoctrination and operational art, in order to activate them and send them out to 
perpetrate attacks. This may depend on the quality of trainers and whether or not the 
organisation has a place where they can train. Another factor that increases the 
organisation’s capacity is its ability to obtain weapons and explosives, which again is 
related to freedom of movement. In addition to obtaining weapons more easily, freedom 
of movement will allow the organisation to co-ordinate between different cells, to collect 
financial resources, which again can be used to pay for logistical needs, or provide for, or 
‘win over’, the population which the organisation claims to represent.  
 
By examining the factors that may influence a terrorist organisation’s motivation and 
capability it becomes evident that “terrorism is a political-military action that requires 
simultaneous use of military means, together with state-political-social- economic 
                                                 
31 Ibid., p. 36. 
32 Ibid. 
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measures.”33 The question then becomes: to what degree should the military component 
play a part in the counter terrorism policy?  
 
2. 2. 2 How to categorise counter terrorism policy  
 
There is a scholarly controversy about how to categorise a government’s counter 
terror actions and policies. Scholars Ronald Crelinstein and Alex Schmid contend that the 
most common way to differentiate amongst counter terrorism response options is to 
separate them into ‘soft line’ and ‘hard line’ responses. Soft line responses address the 
root causes of the terrorist activity, whereas hard line responses address the actions taken 
by the terrorist organisations.34 Crelinstein and Schmid illustrate a second method for 
separating out counter terror policies: to divide them into domestic criminal justice 
matters or to treat them as an external “form of war or low-intensity conflict.”35 A state 
that views counter terrorism as a criminal justice matter will target terrorists with an 
internally-focused police force. However, a state that views counter terrorism as a form 
of war will target terrorists with a foreign-focused paramilitary organisation. In this 
regard, Israel is in a unique situation. Most of the terrorist activity that takes place within 
Israeli borders is conducted by individuals that are neither Israeli citizens nor foreign 
fighters. Most of Israel’s terrorist incidents come from the Palestinians; a people living on 
Israeli controlled territory but not part of the Israeli nation-state. Several other scholars 
have sought to provide a framework for assessing counter terrorism. Christopher Hewitt 
lists six specific categories of counter terror policies a government can adopt: ceasefires, 
negotiations, improved economic conditions, collective punishments, the use of security 
forces, and political reforms.36 Similarly, in her essay, “Institutional Responses to 
Terrorism, The Italian Case,” Donatella Della Porta, uses changes “in legislation, the 
policy of the police apparatus, and the actual activities of the security forces and courts in 
                                                 
33 Ibid., p.38. 
34 Crelinstein, Ronald D. and Schmid, Alex P.; “Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year 
Balance Sheet”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 4, no. 4, 1992. 
35 Ibid., p.310. 
36 Hewitt, Christopher; The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Politics, University Press of America, Lanham, 
1984. 
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order to assess a state’s response to terrorist attacks.”37 She analyzes counter terrorist 
strategies by addressing changes in government policy. RAND scholars Bruce Hoffmann 
and Jennifer Morrison-Taw take a slightly different approach. Instead of listing the types 
of policies a government can use, they list four elements which are necessary for a 
counter terrorist campaign to be successful. They assert that there must be “effective 
overall command and coordination structure, legitimising measures must be taken by the 
government to build public trust and support, coordination between intelligence services, 
and foreign collaboration among governments and security forces.”38 Their approach 
measures the performance of the organisation countering terrorism as a precondition for 
the effectiveness of the policy.  
 
However, if one is to summarize, the current body of literature in this field 
suggests that there are five basic types of response available to a state in combating 
terrorism: 1) the political democratic preventive approach – seeking to quell socio-
economic factors which may give rise to social or political unrest through proactive 
political measures; 2) the international cooperation approach – working with other 
nations to develop networks through which they may share intelligence, effective 
prevention procedures, as well as assist in the prosecution of trans-national terrorist 
organisations; 3) the military response –suspending civil law and replacing the police 
force with a military deployment and military courts; 4) the criminal justice model –
utilizing the standing police and judiciary to capture, prosecute, and pre-empt terrorists; 39 
5) the expanded criminal justice model.40 These five approaches are by no means 
mutually exclusive, nor can a democracy confine itself to only one of these approaches. 
The first two types of responses, the political democratic pro-phyla tic approach as well 
as the international cooperation approach, exhibit general characteristics. As such they 
should be viewed as necessary elements in an ongoing process of counter terrorism, as 
                                                 
37 Porta, Donatella Della; “Institutional Responses to Terrorism, The Italian Case”, in Schmid, Alex P. and 
Crelinstein, Ronald D. (editors); Western Responses to Terrorism, Frank Cass, London, 1993, p.156. 
38 Hoffmann, Bruce and Morrison-Taw, Jennifer; “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism”, 1992 
www.rand.org, accessed 6 May 2007. 
39 Wilkinson, Paul; “Track II: Security and Terrorism in the 21st Century”, Center for the Study of 
Terrorism and Political Violence, www.st-and.ac.uk, accessed 17 September 2002 
40 Pedahzur, Ami and Ranstorp, Magnus; “A tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism in Liberal 
Democracies: The case of Israel” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, no 2, 2001.  
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opposed to being thought of as concrete, independent, and decisive responses to 
terrorism. When crystallized and condensed, what is left of the five basic types of 
responses, are three different models of counter terrorism policy: military, criminal 
justice, or expanded criminal justice model. 
 
The military model and criminal justice model are two different models of counter 
terrorism, based on how societies fundamentally view terrorism – as an act of war or a 
criminal act. The last model, the expanded criminal justice model, has taken its roots 
from the criminal justice model, but bends its framework and extends its limits of 
performance. This model has stretched its parameters in order to include the many grey 
areas of a counter terrorism methods that are practised, but which is not covered in either 
the war or the criminal model, resulting in some sort of a hybrid solution that places itself 
somewhere in between.  
 
The military model’s role in countering terrorism 
 
The military model views terrorism as an act of revolutionary warfare and places 
stronger emphasis on the restraint of terror and less weight on how this is done. Here, 
military Special Forces have the responsibility of responding to terrorism. With a wide 
range of military options at their disposal, the term ‘war on terrorism’ is played out in 
practise.  
 
There are different rules in times of war than in times of peace. Killing other 
combatants is no longer viewed as a crime; rather, it is required and legitimate. Terrorists 
often class themselves as soldiers at war and as such with the prerogative to break civil 
laws. However, even in war there are rules outlawing the use of certain weapons and 
tactics. The rules of war grant civilians who are not associated with ‘valid targets’ at least 
a theoretical immunity from targeted attacks. Taking hostages is prohibited as well as 
violence against those held captive. Although these rules are sometimes violated, those 
responsible for the violations have to stand military trial and risk the punishment that 
follows from being a war criminal. However, such violations do not in any way diminish 
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the validity of the rules of war. Terrorists, some say, should be dealt with as soldiers who 
commit war time atrocities, because even enemy combatants have rights under the 
Geneva Conventions. Even terrorists retain their human rights, since these are inherent in 
being human and hence irrevocable. Others think this approach values consistency more 
than justice. Justice, in some peoples’ view, to the victims of terror attacks requires that 
terrorist be treated as ‘enemies of the human race’ and thus they should not be entitled 
human rights.41  
 
Although the military approach certainly can be effective, it is not without a 
number of major pitfalls which can threaten the basic principle of a democracy. It is naive 
to assume that simply because the military is controlled by a civilian government, the 
military automatically function in a manner which is also committed to the same 
principles. An army may well be seen as the last line of defence, and soldiers are trained 
to function in an environment that does not have the time to determine guilt in a court of 
law, to obtain search warrants, or to prepare evidentiary cases to be presented to a court. 
Democratic military establishments are trained to identify and immobilize the enemy 
under the rules of war.42 The wide deployment of armed and uniformed military troops 
implies an extremely serious terrorist threat, which could easily be used by the terrorists 
to their own propaganda advantage and as such manipulate the circle of violence. 
Additionally, in using military tactics there is a higher risk that the government 
eventually will end up alienating the civilian public –an alienation that might lead to 
sympathy for the terrorists, resulting in the well known phrase ‘the medicine is worse 
than the disease.’   
 
The criminal model’s role in counter terrorism 
 
As argued previously, terrorism is defined by the nature of the act rather than the 
identity of the perpetrators and cannot be ‘legitimised’ simply by reference to a political 
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cause. It is therefore vital that in working to counter this threat, liberal democratic 
governments strive to uphold the rule of law in order to maintain their legitimacy. “To 
believe that depriving citizens of their individual rights and suspending the democratic 
process is necessary to maintain ‘order’ is to put oneself on the same moral plane as the 
terrorists who believe that the ‘end justifies the means’.”43 Thus, any liberal response to 
terrorism has to rest on a commitment to uphold and maintain the rule of law, even if this 
is at the expense of effective counter terrorism measures.  
 
“The very notion of crime, even in the most primitive legal systems, implies the 
moral responsibility of individuals for their actions and hence for any violation of 
the legal code. We cannot make a general rule that terrorists are to be exempted 
from criminal responsibility unless we are either prepared to plead their 
irresponsibility on the grounds of insanity or are willing to allow the whole moral 
and legal order to be undermined by deferring to a terrorist.”44  
 
 
Terrorists commit criminal actions such as murder, kidnapping, and arson, and 
every liberal society has laws to punish criminals. So a major element of the criminal 
counter terrorism model has been to de-legitimize terrorists, to get society to see them as 
criminals, and to use the rule of law against them. This should be headed by the police 
with actions that are naturally restrained by the state’s criminal legal system. An 
additional benefit of using the police is that they normally already have legitimacy in the 
eyes of the majority of the civilian population. They have a deep knowledge of local 
conditions and are familiar with the law and the techniques of criminal investigations.  
 
Although the pitfalls of crime models are considered to be fewer than with the war 
model, there are certain dangers that threaten a liberal society’s own viability. If the 
police and the judicial authorities lack the necessary legal powers, how can innocent 
people be protected? A society, as a result of political pressure or increased violence, can 
come to increase the powers of the police and lengthen the emergency laws both in width 
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and in time – leading ultimately to a police state with the an adverse limitation on civil 
liberties.  
 
The expanded criminal justice model’s role in counter terrorism 
 
 It is precisely the delicate tightrope described above that the expanded criminal 
justice model seeks to address. This model “acknowledges that the war against terror may 
often stray from liberal standards and employ means not necessarily accepted as 
principles of criminal law enforcement, but at the same time still significantly differs 
from the rules of war and customary military methods.”45 The expanded criminal justice 
model views terrorism as something more than an ordinary criminal act, but as less than 
an act of war. It labels terrorism as an ‘exceptional phenomenon’. As such, it needs 
exceptional methods and laws in order to counter it.  
 
This model seeks to include not only the black and white areas that the war and 
criminal model stand for, but also those many shades of grey that a democracy will 
invariably have to face. These shades of grey consist of an expanded range of police and 
intelligence powers that may include: wider power to arrest, the ability to detain without 
going to trail, the freezing of assets suspected of being linked to terrorism, broader phone 
and wire tapping powers, as well as the removal of citizenship. The key here is that these 
powers, which might be thought of as being better placed within the war model, are 
regulated by law and the justice apparatus, and should thus in theory prevent the 
opportunity for an abuse of the extended powers. Dr. Pedahzur and Dr. Ranstorp have 
developed the table below and have placed the expanded criminal justice model in 
between the war model and criminal justice model, showing that the expanded criminal 
justice model draws upon elements of both theories.  
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Criteria War model Expanded criminal 
justice model 
Criminal justice model 
General feature Terrorism is regarded as 
a tactic exercised in 
guerrilla activities or 
even acts of rebellion 
Terrorism is regarded as 
an exceptional 
phenomenon that is not 
necessarily an act of 
war, yet also deviates 
from the standard 
definition of a felonious 
crime 
Terrorism is regarded as 
a crime 
State aims and means Apprehending terrorists 
and the elimination of 
terrorism  
Arrests and penalization 
of terrorists  
Arrests and penalization 
of terrorists while 
adhering to the ‘rule of 
law’ and liberal 
democratic standards 
with respect to the 




The exercise of military 
force and military 
strategies with the 
intention of eradicating 
terrorism in a certain 
society will lead the 
country significantly 
away from acceptable 
democratic standards  
The expansion of the 
concept of the rule of 
law by adopting special 
legislation in the battle 
against terrorism and 
administrative 
regulations will divert 
the regime away from 
liberal acceptability, yet 
will not completely 
violate democratic 
boundaries 
The use of this model 
corresponds with the 
elements to the liberal 










The expansion of 
constitutional 
boundaries by adopting 
administrative 
The state responds to 
terrorist incidents in 
compliance with state 
criminal law and is 




constitutional or legal 
consideration is solely 
secondary  
regulations or special 
laws in the fight against 
terrorism, and the 
differential treatment by 
the court system of 
offences defined as 
terrorist  
subject to constant 
judiciary regulation  
Operational aspects Forces respond to 
terrorism are the army 
and special units. The 
nature of their response 
resides in military 
doctrine.  
Forces responding will 





units. The nature of the 





methods used by secret 
services. All this with 
the intention of bringing 
suspects to trail. 
The forces responding 
will be the police. The 
nature of the response is 
circumscribed by the 
standard rules of 
authority accorded to an 




A democracy that fights terrorism will find itself forced to change strategy to 
comply with the changing threat and the public demand for security. A state might find it 
useful to enforce a strategy leaning towards the war model on some occasions, while 
keeping itself within the limits of the criminal model at other times. This ability to change 
is precisely what experts of counter terrorism policy are referring to when they state that 
a great deal of flexibility is crucial in the fight against terrorism, precisely due to the 
terrorists’ ability to change their character. The strength of the expanded criminal justice 
model is that it provides a framework in order to make the transition from a criminal to a 
war model policy more transparent and thus adhering to the natural balance and checks 
procedures, securing a solid counter terrorism policy and attempting to maintain the 
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values of democracy. However, its strengths could potentially also becomes its weakness. 
The stretching of the criminal model methods to include an expanded range of police and 
intelligence powers is not something that is granted over night and might over time 
include more and more practises. This time-consuming expansion of the government 
powers can blur the line between what the public are willing to give up regarding their 
civil liberties for the sake of security, the so called governance dilemma.  
 
2. 2. 3 Counter terrorism and democracy - Security vs. Liberty 
 
The governance dilemma, as Boaz Ganor sees it, is the dilemma which derives 
from the desire to reach maximum effectiveness from counter terrorism policy, while 
maintaining the nation’s human rights and civil liberties. Counter terrorism policy in a 
democratic society has to find a balance between what is necessary and what is 
appropriate. In this debate, there are those who worry that too much emphasis on civil 
liberty rights will tie the hands of a democracy. Others insist that if civil liberty rights are 
reduced, even for a few individuals, then democracy betrays its own identity. For one 
side, what fundamentally matters is that democracies prevail. For the other, what matters 
more is that democracies prevail without betraying what they stand for. “They 
[democratic societies] have a clear duty to protect the life and property of citizens and to 
uphold the law. Their central dilemma is that by taking harsh measures to deal with the 
emergency they may destroy the very fabric of freedom under the law which they have a 
duty to defend.”47 However, at what point in a democratic society does the general 
survival of a state take precedence over citizens’ rights? In dealing with terrorism, what 
works is not always right, and what is right might not always work. Nonetheless the 
response to terrorism in a society needs to be credible. The general public has to be 
convinced that the state’s proposed action is both necessary and will be effective in 
producing results – both with respect to its performance in combating terrorism and in 
protecting civil liberties. In a democracy, government sensitivity to its public is its 
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strength and weakness when it comes to how to counter terrorism. Strength, because the 
public will hold their government responsible for their actions while it steers the political 
development, ultimately giving the citizens some degree of power and influence. A 
weakness because the government is required to do everything in its power to protect the 
lives of its citizens, otherwise the voting public will think that its leaders have not done 
their utmost to thwart terrorist attacks, and they will not last long in office. “All battles 
between terrorists and the state are battles for opinion, and in this struggle ethical 
justifications are critical. […] The political costs of under reaction are always going to be 
higher than the cost of overreaction – then at least they can always claim they did their 
best.”48  
 
The demand for security and the government obligation to provide it touches upon 
another aspect of counter terrorism policy – the danger of playing into the hands of the 
terrorist group. Often there exists an element in the terrorism strategy that depends on the 
brutality of counter terrorism methods. This the terror group will use in order to justify 
their retaliation while manipulating the citizens’ and world’s perception as to what the 
conflict is truly about and who is truly the violent party. Terror groups frequently make a 
cost/benefit analysis of their actions, determining whether they find it beneficial to 
provoke a government response to their action, often hoping that the response would be 
seen as disproportionate to the terrorist attack in order to legitimise their own actions. 
“Terrorists may think that it will demonstrate the justice of their claims, and enhance the 
attractiveness of the political alternative [which] the terrorist represent.”49 A government 
response could have two effects; it could either deter dissidents or, seeing that counter 
terrorism methods often affect the general public, increase the public support of the 
terrorist group because the public see a direct connection with the government’s counter 
terrorism methods and their own suffering. Here a perception that the government is 
unjust could become a motivating factor to continue supporting the terror organisation. If 
the government is portrayed as unjust and unfair it could even turn or alter the 
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international community’s point of view of the terror group. However, profiting from 
government repression depends on the lengths to which the government is willing to go 
to in order to contain disorder, and on the population’s tolerance for both insecurity and 
repression. Therefore, the tolerance level of the public that supports the terror group, as 
well as the public that agree with society’s counter terrorism policy, is crucial in 





3. Some aspects of Israel’s security history 
 
“Beginnings are notoriously important because divergences that are small at the start of the journey 




Throughout history, survival has been a defining aspect of Jewish history. 
Therefore, it is little wonder that security became a key focal point in Israel’s history and 
continues to have an impact on its politics today. Israeli citizens feel they have lived 
under siege since the creation of Israel, believing that if they lost even a single war, it 
would not only be the end of the state, but probably the end of them all.51 “As one Israeli 
put it: ‘The Zionist founders, in their great wisdom, decided to plop the country down in 
the midst of 100 million mostly hostile Arabs.’ So what did they expect to happen?”52  
 
The sense of being constantly under threat was the fundamental reason why 
security was so essential in the early days of Israel. Focussing on something indisputably 
serious in life is bound to influence its development. When the whole society essentially 
has the same focus, it creates a collective purposefulness that only certain types of 
hardship can create. Despite successes in a series of wars, changing security threats and 
the growth of the state means that security continues to be the central issue in Israeli 
society, although this issue no longer has the same meaning. Arguably, there is no longer 
a danger threatening Israel’s existence. This claim is substantiated by the fact that Israel 
has grown strong in her own right, enjoys the friendship of powerful state players, has 
entered peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, and has withdrawn from Lebanon. 
However, likewise, its existence has become more vulnerable due to the kind of weapons 
of mass destruction harboured by some of the states engaged in proxy wars with Israel. 
Yet what is clear is that the threat has changed, and although the threat of terrorism might 
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not be an existential threat, it is a concern that needs to be addressed. Therefore, the 
perceptions, lessons and conclusions that have contributed to Israel’s attitude to security 
over the past three decades will be discussed in this section. The manner in which Israel’s 
experience has moulded its citizens, how Israel has placed emphasis on settlement 
policies, shaped the military service and the society, will be examined with respect to the 
country’s counter terrorism strategy.  
 
Israel faced security issues even before the state of Israel was created. At that 
time, the Jewish people considered themselves a lonely race, a perception that remains to 
this day. The Holocaust only manifested this feeling further; in 1945 when World War II 
ended, about six million Jews, more than one-third of the entire Jewish population in the 
world, had perished. World War II was not fought to save the Jews. However, what the 
Holocaust did was convince Jewish survivors in all parts of the world that there was a 
need for a Jewish state. In other words, it was Hitler who finally made Zionism a major 
movement among Jews worldwide. Thus their sense of abandonment only increased their 
unity and eventually their trust in their government. On May 14 1948, David Ben-Gurion 
proclaimed the state of Israel, “a ‘Jewish state established by and for the Jewish 
people’.”53 The very next day, half a dozen Arab countries declared war, and once again 
the Jews found their security threatened, and they developed a sense of independency 
which meant that no other state besides Israel could possibly act in their best interest. 
Israel stood alone and could not depend on other nations or individuals to aid it or to give 
it advice. This sense of independency can at times still be recognised in the country’s 
counter terrorism policy. It has influenced the organisation of Israel’s military apparatus, 
as well as Israel’s apparent disregard of international criticism.  
 
Israel has fought five wars, but it was the wars in 1948 and 1967 that 
geographically shaped Israel’s borders as we know them today and heavily influenced its 
military doctrine. Once the first battles were over in 1949, the Israelis had won half of 
Jerusalem, parts of Galilee, and areas of the Negev Desert. Moreover, no independent 
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Arab state was established in Palestine. The war in 1967 placed the West Bank and the 
Temple Mount of East Jerusalem in Jewish hands. Additionally, these wars resulted in a 
strong emotional reaction from the Israeli citizens. These wars reconfirmed that Israelis 
were enormously proud of their military forces. Living with new borders was interpreted 
as a symbol of their destiny and divine right. The military became heroes, and Israeli 
society embraced the military service that gave them victory. But this victory would also 
spark a Palestinian resistance movement which sought justice, land, and independence. 
Later, this resistance movement used terrorism as a method to achieve its goals, and the 
issue of justice, land and independence is still not solved to this day.  
 
The sense of siege also took a hold on Israeli citizens. Virtually everyone in Israel 
has experienced war. Many have seen combat, and almost everyone has had to endure 
waiting for words from loved ones in battle. Naturally, this shaped the political 
atmosphere and even the government; most of Israel’s Prime Ministers and Defence 
Ministers were once soldiers. Men who have seen death and have likewise sent others to 
their deaths, inflict a callous mood over Israel. In the 1950’s, Abba Eban, a Holocaust 
victim, stated that neither individuals nor communities would be vulnerable again, by 
maintaining that the only way to deal with the Arab world was by leaving no doubt about 
who had absolute military superiority in the region.54 Israel took this declaration to heart, 
and required the effective capacity to win wars decisively. It was not enough to win a 
war, Israel had to send a message of deterrence, they had to have a ‘decisive victory’ 
(hachra’a).55 This statement became a cornerstone of Israeli military doctrine.  
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3. 1 The main pillars of Israeli military doctrine 
 
A doctrine is a belief, or a set of beliefs, especially political or religious, taught 
and accepted by a particular group. It is a set of beliefs that form a general opinion. In 
this way having a doctrine is in itself a crucial aspect, as it is a symbol of a common set 
of beliefs. The principal aim of Israeli foreign policy has been survival, and even though 
the Israeli government has avoided identifying the nation’s security framework as a 
public formal doctrine, there have been discernible principles, to which security policies 
have had to conform. According to Cohen, there are eight fundamental principles:56 1) ‘A 
nation-in-arms’ - whereby an army is created in which every Israeli citizen has to serve; 
2) ‘Strategic defence, operational offence’ - the idea that wars should not be fought inside 
Israel, but rather that the battle or war should be brought to the enemy; 3) ‘Short wars for 
limited ends’ - since Israel is a country with limited resources, it is critical to achieve the 
goals and end the conflict as quickly as possible, hence preventive and pre-emptive 
strategies become paramount; 4) ‘The tank and fighter-bomber team’ – seeing as a war 
with the Arab nations would include the risk of having ground-based Arab armies inside 
Israel, as this has posed the greatest threat in the past, Israel must not only depend on the 
army, but also requires the assistance of a superior air force; 5) ‘Quality versus quantity’ - 
due to Israel’s limitations with respect to both geography and population size, it has had 
to rely on qualitative superiority in technology, motivation and tactical ability, in order to 
be successful; 6) ‘Red lines and punishment’ - Israel’s sensitivity to being caught in a 
surprise attack, has resulted in the formation of ‘red lines’, which if crossed, would result 
in severe reprisals; 7) ‘Self-reliance’ - as a result of lessons learned and based on the 
promise that Israel should not rely on others to guarantee its survival. 8) ‘The search for a 
great-power patron’ - since 1967, the United States has fulfilled this role and has been 
very important in strengthening Israel’s deterrence policy. When examining these 
principals, it is evident that all of them are intended to have a deterrent value at the 
political level.  
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A crucial element of a deterrence process is the establishment of a relationship 
which has a balance of power, because if both parties are equally big and present equal 
amounts of danger and punishment, the fear of the other will keep them in check. 
However, in reality there are several reasons why the ‘weaker’ party might instigate a 
crisis. They might feel they have nothing to lose, or at least that is their perception of the 
situation, and therefore the weaker party regards the crisis as an opportunity, rather than 
something to be avoided. Another consideration is that the intervention of stronger 
external forces might get the UN and the world on their side, in an attempt to gain 
legitimacy and eventually balance out the preserved asymmetry.57   
 
At the outset, the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians indeed appears 
to be asymmetric. One factor affecting this relationship, however, is the support of other 
countries which they can consider allies. Israel was born into a bipolar world, when the 
division of the Middle East between the United States and the Soviet Union remained 
unclear. The apparent changing role of Israel, in which it initially represented itself, and 
then became an ally of the United States, worked well as a deterrent.58 This became 
especially clear with the fall of the Soviet Union, and accordingly, the end of the export 
of competitive military equipment to Arab states. However, over the past years, there 
have been outspoken discussions on how close the relationship between the United States 
and Israel really is. Critics have stated that the desire to maintain a good relationship with 
the United States, as well as the peace process attempts, have resulted in a limitation of 
Israel’s freedom of action. 59 This is further complicated by the fact that the United States 
finds it difficult to balance its own relationship with the Arab world effectively, due to an 
interest in ‘regional stability’ and oil. Israel, on its own, in comparison to Palestine, has 
by far the upper hand both economically and militarily. However, as previously 
mentioned, it is perception that counts. Israelis do not regard this situation as a balancing 
act between only themselves (a state) and the Palestinians (non-state). Instead they 
                                                 
57 Moghadam, Assaf; “Diplomacy and Force in the Middle East Crisis: Israeli Crisis Management 
Strategies, September-December 2000” www.ciao.net, accessed 20 March 2003.  
58 Inbar, Efraim and Sandler, Shmuel; “Israel’s Deterrence Strategy Revisited”, Security Studies, no. 2 
1993/94. 
59 Ibid.  
 43 
believe that their small country, both in size and numbers, is alone against the massive 
allied belt of the Arab world. It could be argued that this perception held true in the past. 
However, more recently, the Palestinians have become aware of the lack of intervention 
by the Arab world during the first and second Intifada. Among the Palestinians, there is a 
deep scepticism as to whether their fellow Arab brothers can be relied on to fight a 
military battle in their defense. In this respect, the Palestinians indeed categorise their 
relationship with the Israelis as an asymmetrical one. 
 
There seem to be two particular principles that Cohen lists that enlighten how 
terrorism affects Israeli society today and gives another dimension to Israel’s counter 
terrorism strategy: the principles of ‘Strategic defence, operational offence’ and ‘A 
nation-in-arms’. These two principles will be discussed separately. With respect to 
‘Strategic defence, operational offence’, it is arguable that the settlement policy 
originated from this principle, although it is not certain whether it explains the current use 
of this policy. Moreover, the settlement policy touches upon one of the key reasons for 
Palestinian resistance; sovereign land. Hence, an introduction to this topic will be given 
in this section, highlighting some of the dilemmas. The development of the principle ‘A 
nation-in-arms’ over time will be examined in depth, seeing as it is the military service 
who enforce the government’s counter terrorism policy. Furthermore, this principle has 
had an impact on how Hamas chooses its targets, and therefore it is necessary to explore 
how Israel can stick to it in practice. 
 
3. 1. 1 ‘Strategic defence, operational offence’ 
 
Israeli security has greatly, and is continuously, influenced by geography and 
demographics. Although Israel won the War of Independence in 1948 and gained more 
land than initially offered by the UN Partition Resolution of 1947, it was still faced with 
troublesome borders. “The state’s width varied from just a few miles at its narrowest to 
just a few score miles at its widest. All of its major population centres, industrial assets, 
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and military facilities were potentially within easy reach of Arab armies.”60 The 
realisation of Israel’s geographical limitations made the state base itself on a military 
doctrine that would prevent future full-scale wars from being fought on home soil, and 
instead transferred the fighting to the enemies’ backyards. Thus, the IDF have stressed 
the importance of preventative and pre-emptive war. This is why Israel has developed a 
very traditional military system with emphasis on the air force, as well as dividing the 
military infrastructure into three commands: North (Galilee), Central (the Triangle of 
Arab towns in central of Israel south east of Haifa), and South (The Negev Desert). 
Israel’s lack of geographic depth improved partially with the outcome of the 1967 Six-
Day War, although these areas brought with them problems of their own, especially 
smaller conflicts. The importance of no combat within Israel’s borders further explains 
why fighting terrorism inside the state itself proves such a challenge. Bombs go off in 
Jerusalem, the heart of the country, in Haifa, the very north, and in Tel Aviv, the 
metropolitan city. The very fact that a bomb can explode anywhere amplifies the terror 
and increases the difficulty of protecting Israeli citizens. Terror groups have managed to 
achieve what the Arab military could not, i.e. to bring the violence into Israel’s backyard. 
It is one thing to fight wars on your enemies’ soil or alongside your border, but it is quite 
another to have to endure violence in your own neighbourhood. It makes a society 
vulnerable and cripples its normal routine. However, it can also radicalise the citizens and 
motivate them to protect their home. As a consequence, Israel introduced two interlinked 
strategies: increasing its population, and expanding its borders geographically.  
 
Israel understood the importance of demographics at an early stage. Having 
people living on the ground was not only an essential survival technique for the Israeli 
economy, but also became an important element of the security policy. There are several 
reasons for this, but three Israeli rationale stands out. Firstly, the state had to manifest 
their right of existence. Secondly, Israel had to survive as a Jewish state, and to be 
independent. Thirdly, the population of Israel had to be large enough to defend itself 
against the neighbouring Arabs nations, who were superior through sheer numbers of 
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people. In 1948, Israel only had a Jewish population of 600-650,000 people.61 Former 
Minister of Defence, Shimon Peres, illustrated the Israeli mindset after the 1973 war, 
proclaiming:  
 
“The state of Israel’s basic problem is the extreme disproportion in forces and 
potential between herself and her neighbours, in the framework of continuous 
state of belligerency. Twenty-one states against one state, 155 million Arab 
people against 2.9 million; 1.3 million men under arms and permanently 
mobilized against half-a-million –mostly reserves; an area of 12.5 square km. 
against 88, 000 square km.”62  
 
Israel understood that it was vital for them to encourage Jews to immigrate to Israel. The 
idea was that people would defend the land they lived on more vigorously than if they did 
not have any emotional ties to it. Besides, knowing the land thoroughly became a major 
tactical advantage. As a consequence, the principle that every Jew could come to Israel 
and make a home was manifested in the “Law of Return”. This law effectively stated that 
one could become a citizen of Israel without having to go through a waiting period or a 
complicated bureaucratic process. In fact the only requirement was to show proof of 
being Jewish, hence, even at this point Israel was linking citizenship with religion. 
Security and immigration was therefore closely linked from the outset, in the Israeli mind 
set.  
 
The immigration policy that began after the 1948 war has continued to be a 
heavily debated part of Israel’s strategy, both domestically63 and internationally. This is 
partly because the immigration policy is closely interlinked with the settlement 
policy.When the author Shipler met with Sharon for the first time, Sharon elaborated on 
this fact:  
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“He pulled out a map and gave me his reason for wanting Jewish families to settle 
in these rugged hills. His argument had nothing at all to do with the Bible. 
‘Security is not only guns and aircraft and tanks’ he said. ‘Security first of all is 
motivation –motivation to defend a place. If people live in a place, they have the 
motivation to defend themselves, and the nation has the motivation to defend 
them. The fact that you are present that you know every hill, every mountain, 
every valley, every spring, every cave; the curiosity to know what is on the other 
side of the hill –that is security. If you have all the guns and tanks in the world, 
you cannot do anything if you aren’t motivated, if you don’t know the area, if you 
don’t feel that it is yours.’”64 
 
Since 1967, first as a tool to control the growth of Palestinian residences, but later 
also as part of a larger settlement policy, Israel has implemented a settlement policy in 
Gaza and the West Bank. Between 1967 and 1997, 143 Israeli settlements were 
established in Gaza and the West Bank alone.65 In August 2005, when Israel started to 
withdraw from Gaza, there were 21 settlements which housed 8 700 settlers. When the 
withdrawal was completed Israel still had 133 settlements in the West Bank and 22 
settlements in East Jerusalem, housing around 239 700 settlers and 22 respectively66   
 
Most Israeli settlements are situated in previously ‘rural’ locations, inserted 
between Palestinian villages and often on hilltops. Settlers are subject to Israeli criminal 
law, whereas Israeli military orders and Palestinian criminal law are applied to 
Palestinians in Israeli courts.67 Settlers pay Israeli taxes and receive Israeli benefits and 
services. Furthermore, they are protected from the Palestinians by the Israeli military, and 
they are not bound to any closure, curfews, or permits policy. Outside East Jerusalem, 
Palestinians are prohibited from entering settlements unless they have a permit. As with 
other Israelis, settlers serve in the military and are armed, and additionally they have the 
legal power to arrest Palestinians.68  Today these settlements are now a constant reminder 
for the Palestinians of Israel’s occupations, for orthodox Jews they represent that the 
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biblical land of Israel is theirs, for Israel it represents a security risk and financial cost 
and for the peace process the settlements represent a problem which must be solved.   
 
3. 1. 2 ‘A nation–in-arms’   
 
The armed forces are a vital part of Israel. They have not only shaped Israel’s 
history and become an essential instrument in Israel’s counter terrorism policy, but have 
also formed the identity of the Israeli psyche and therefore influenced the society. 
Ultimately, and precisely because Israel is a democracy, it is the Israeli identity, norms 
and values that determine which counter terrorism methods are acceptable and those 
which are not. During this balancing act, Israelis are defining who they are and what kind 
of people they would like to become. It could therefore be argued that the ultimate 
symbol of the Israeli identity is their armed forces.  
 
Together with the establishment of the state of Israel, came the establishment of a 
single, unified armed force, which was responsible to the nation’s elected government. 
On May 28, 1948, the Provisional Government of the State of Israel issued the Defence 
Army of Israel Ordinance No. 4. With this ordinance, signed by Prime Minister David 
Ben-Gurion, the IDF, which comprised ‘land forces, a navy and an air force’, was born.69 
The tremendous task of creating a unified IDF70 took almost seven months, from 28 May 
until 7 November 1948.71 The call for military registration took immediate effect; even 
immigrants who had not yet reached the country, had already been drafted. By the end of 
1948, almost 200,000 males and females had been registered for service, staking out the 
decree that both sexes were to serve in the military.  
 
Israel was faced with the delicate situation of how to balance and maintain a 
substantial professional army without adding unbearable pressure to a struggling 
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economy. The solution was to have what has been called a ‘nation-in-arms’. This means 
universal conscription for both men and women, with appropriate official exemptions 
accorded to minorities, and certain religious sectors. However, the military personnel 
shortage could never be resolved; the small professional army would be able to defend 
the borders in peacetime, but in the event of war, it would be necessary for full national 
mobilization, hence the answer to the problem was the establishment of a reserve army. 
Today, Israel has three main organisational frameworks: the conscript army (from the age 
of 18 until 21) which men join for 36 months and women for 21 months,72 the reserve 
army, and the professional army. In effect, 65 percent of the combat units in the IDF are 
reserve units. An Israeli Jewish male serves in the reserve system from the end of his 
conscript service until he is approximately 51 years old. 73 In principle, and by law, all 
eligible men are summoned to the reserves once a year, for a period that averages 36 days 
for soldiers and 42 days for officers. Combat soldiers are transferred at the age of 35 from 
front-line units to logistic units off the battlefield.74 During an emergency period, such as 
in a state of war, Israeli reservists may spend several months in service. On average, an 
Israeli Jewish male devotes five to six years of his life to the military service.75 The 
extensive impact the military has had on every Israeli’s life, in comparison to other 
societies, has created a large pool of experienced and trained soldiers who can be quickly 
mobilized during a crisis. However, it also has had unintended consequences by blurring 
the line between non-combatants and combatants. On April 16, 1993, Hamas carried out 
their first suicide bombing, whereby the bomber drove an explosive-laden van, and 
parked between two buses at Mehola Junction, a rest-stop on the Jordan Valley Highway, 
and detonated. The blast killed the driver and another Palestinian, and injured many 
civilians.76 Although no civilians died, many were injured, and the attack symbolised a 
shift in Hamas’ strategy. The second suicide bomb attack ever carried out by Hamas 
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occurred on April 6 1994, where nine Israeli students died. Hamas justified this attack by 
challenging the status of its victims, and claims the right to attack such targets, by 
declaring ‘there are no civilians in Israel’ and ‘Israel is a military society’.77 Since then 
Hamas has used this line of argument to legitimise the killing of Israeli civilians.    
 
The notion of ‘a nation-in-arms’ serves yet another purpose. Ben-Gurion realised 
the army would become the most important melting pot for the young generation of 
immigrants, and, even today, it plays a vital role in the integration of immigrants into 
Israeli society. Immigrants from all over the world not only meet each other there and 
attend the obligatory language classes, but the military service provides the setting for 
them to meet settled Israelis and the chance to form a common bond. The army service 
connects Sephardic and Ashkenazi, modern Orthodox and secular beliefs, thus becoming 
a key part of socialization. Israeli children usually stay in the same group throughout 
school and during military service.  
 
“This is done deliberately. There is thus from the start an effort to create a sense 
of mutual obligation, a sense of community, a sense of camaraderie, and a sense 
of general equality. By the time eighteen-year-olds get into the army, they already 
know intimately those who go in with them, and they already know by second 
nature how to function and think as a unit.”78  
 
Besides providing a mutual understanding and common bond, the success of the army is 
deeply respected and admired by the Israelis, and serving in the military gives a sense of 
status. A professional soldier in Israel used to have a very high status, and doing your 
duty could open up doors when seeking employment elsewhere, particularly after serving 
in an elite unit or as aircrew in the air force. Some soldiers elaborated on this in an 
interview:   
  
“‘The IDF exposes the draftee to experiences he would not normally have,’ said 
Sarah. ‘There is mixing in so far as in the IDF you come across people who have 
not done their matriculation (high school graduation). Outside the army you don’t 
come across such people, but in the army you do.’ How important was the IDF to 
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you in strictly personal terms? ‘Crucial’ Ana replied. ‘Only when the military 
service is done, can you get along with your life’. ‘The IDF is important for jobs’, 
said Micah. ‘Certain jobs are given only to those who served in the IDF. Also if 
you haven’t served in the IDF you are not entitled to certain social security and 
mortgage benefits’. ‘You could say there is a clear dividing line between those 
who have done the IDF service and those who have not’ said Eli ‘IDF personnel 
enjoy social esteem, whereas the non-IDF are marginalized’.” 79 
 
Nevertheless, this status and admired image has slowly changed, and with it, the 
reality of ‘a nation-in-arms’. The next section will offer some plausible reasons for this 
deterioration of image, and the real future of ‘a nation-in-arms’ will be discussed.  
 
The changing perception of the IDF 
 
The military force is the organisation that has provided the Israeli community 
with security, and is today the enforcer of its government’s counter terrorism policy. Due 
to the soldiers’ many sacrifices and commitment to their government, the IDF have 
enjoyed unquestionable support from the general public. Their losses and successes have 
unified the public. This may be why the Israelis show such interest in military successes, 
and also in their failures. This is because the general public identify with the IDF, i.e. it 
could have been them.  
A generation ago, training accidents, suicides, and operational failures were 
ignored by the Israeli media, and their tragic consequences were suffered in silence by 
the victims’ families. The army was sacred; no one dared weaken it, or thus weaken 
Israel by exposing it to scrutiny, or suggesting that it could be flawed. This is no longer 
the case. These days, accidents or deaths are usually explored and investigated. This 
change came about in the wake of the Lebanon invasion, which was arguably the first 
war Israel did not have to fight for the survival of the nation. However, it was the 
hijacking of a bus in 1984 that crystallised the change nationally. On April 12, four 18-
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year-old Palestinians from Gaza climbed into a commuter bus heading south from Tel 
Aviv towards Ashkelon.  
 
“The Bus carried thirty-five passengers, once the bus had reached the highway the 
Palestinians pulled knives and hijacked the bus. Their aim was to get to Egypt and 
there negotiate the release of 500 Palestinian prisoners. However, they let one 
pregnant woman go and she alerted the security officials who set up a road block 
and managed to stop the bus and some of the passengers managed to run into 
safety including its driver a Jew from Middle East (real name) who was badly 
beaten by the security forces who thought he was one of the terrorists. The 
terrorists were still in the vehicle and the Israeli Special Forces stormed the bus. 
When the incident was finished, the Israeli military reported to its citizens that all 
four of the hijackers were killed, two immediately and two who ‘died on their 
way to the hospital’. However, this was not the real story. Two terrorists, cousins 
Majdi and Subhi Abu Jumaa had been taken out of the bus alive. They were led 
across the road to a field where a makeshift base and interrogation centre had 
been set up for preliminary questioning in order to determine whether or not they 
had booby trapped the bus with explosives. The security men reportedly beat and 
threatened the prisoners in an effort to gain this information. The two terrorists 
died with fractured skulls, so many that the Israelis who investigated the incident 
had trouble determining precisely who landed the fatal blows.”80 
 
 
Due to the imposed censorship, the complete story and the picture of the two 
terrorists being led away from the bus, alive and in handcuffs, was not published in Israel. 
However, it was finally published by The New York Times. Israelis were disgusted by 
the murders. There were those who worried this incident would undermine the 
longstanding policy of capturing terrorists alive, keeping them alive, and avoiding the 
death penalty even after conviction. This was a policy that was thought to encourage 
terrorists to surrender and release their hostages without feeling that they had no 
alternative but to fight to the death and take innocents with them. The defence minister 
initiated an investigation and concluded that “some security-forces personnel may have 
broken the law.”81 Ironically, had these terrorists died in the army’s assault on the bus, 
the public’s disgust would not have existed. Instead, it would have been considered a fair 
                                                 




part of a deadly game. But the pictures of policemen beating the terrorists to death 
provoked a new wave of careful self-criticism.  
 
“Some wondered whether lawlessness and violence, so long a part of the Middle 
East, were working their way into the soul of Israel. Some Israelis of the old 
guard, who helped build the country on the ideals of humaneness, felt that the 
ground had shifted under their feet. They asked themselves whether the bloody 
tactics that had been accepted by mainstream Palestinians were coming gradually 
to be acknowledged as legitimate by important streams of Israeli Jews.” 82  
 
Even though the military is still highly regarded in Israel, and soldiers and career officers 
still receive great respect, the unconditional awe has been replaced with guarded 
scepticism. This allows for changes and new directions to be taken, and has resulted in a 
change in the motivation for serving in the IDF, which has manifested itself in the fact 
that less and less are choosing to enter military service and increasingly more groups of 
people are exempt. Ultimately, could this change mean that the notion of ‘nation-in-arms’ 
is no longer valid.   




3. 2 The evolution of Israel’s counter terrorism strategy 
 
The history of Israeli counter terrorism precedes the existence of the state. The 
perpetual state of emergency that exists in Israel is based on British Defence Regulations 
from 1945 (State of Emergency).83 These measures placed certain types of offences under 
the jurisdiction of the military courts and allowed for harsher punishment for terrorism 
related offences. With the end of the War of Independence, many expected the British-
imported state of emergency law to be replaced with a Constitution and a civil counter 
terrorist law. Indeed, it was not the professed intention of Israel’s first Prime Minister, 
David Ben-Gurion, to maintain the harsh emergency regulations of the mandate. His 
Justice Minister, Yaakov Schapiro, had even condemned the regulations as being ‘worse 
than the Nazi laws’84. The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance of September 23, 1948 was 
created with the intention of replacing the Emergency Regulations. However, when the 
State of Israel was established, it was continually threatened by its neighbours. An Israeli 
constitution or Bill of Rights never came about, and the Emergency Regulations are 
therefore still in effect today in the West Bank and Gaza.85 
 
Although the ultimate goal of any counter terrorism strategy is to eradicate 
terrorism, the goal of the Israeli counter terrorism strategy has changed over time, from 
eradication, to minimising the level of terrorism so it does not influence the national 
agenda, to letting the terrorist know that this was an unacceptable method, and finally to 
preserving the psychological resilience of the civilian population.86 Whatever the goal, 
Israel has used, the knowledge and experience gained in its military doctrine was used to 
develop its counter terrorism strategy.  
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When studying Cohen’s list of principles that make up Israel’s military doctrine87, 
these principles (with the exemption of the last one) also apply to the way Israel has 
approached counter terrorism. The principle of ‘Strategic defence, operational offence’ 
holds true in a counter terrorism strategy because the effects of terrorism lessen when an 
attack is carried out further away from home. Although most governments have 
understood that the principle of ‘Short wars for limited ends’ is more problematic when 
facing terrorism as a phenomenon they do, however, rely on methods which are pre-
empting and preventative in nature in order to thwart a single terror attack or terrorism 
campaign. Even though it is not common to fight terrorism by ‘The tank and fighter-
bomber team’ principle, Israel does sometimes carry out military operations, using 
armoured units and air support, in order to lay siege to parts of the West Bank or Gaza. 
Additionally, the air force has been involved in enforcing the method of target killings. 
The principle behind ‘Quality vs. Quantity’ is central for the Special Forces unit which is 
responsible for the delicate counter terrorism operations and undercover intelligence 
work. When fighting terrorism, it is not necessarily wise to publicise where the 
government places the principles of ‘Red lines and punishment’, as it can lead to acts of 
terrorism which are purposely placed beneath the ‘red line’. However, that such a line 
exists is only natural. When fighting terrorism, a government has to react to the terror 
activity, while at the same time heed to its values of a democratic state. There is seldom 
international agreement on how to do this, and if Israel oversteps the line, the 
international community will criticise Israel’s methods. Israel has implemented the 
principle of ‘Self-reliance’ in its counter terrorism strategy and is seldom willing to 
moderate its measures due to international outcry. Furthermore, although terrorism does 
not know any borders and Israel co-operates internationally to some extent in 
intelligence, they have seldom asked for assistance in their counter terrorism operations, 
either abroad or at home.  
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The counter terrorism strategy under Prime Minister Begin’s government 
(1977-1983)  
 
In the late 1960s until the early 1980s Israel experienced terror attacks against 
their interests abroad, and as a response Israel started to develop their counter terrorism 
strategy. The PLO and the Black September terror-campaign throughout the 1970s 
managed to bring the Palestinian question in the forefront, which forced Israel to become 
more offensive in their counter terrorism strategy. This was a time where Israel was still a 
young nation, where many of its inhabitants remembered the Holocaust and there was a 
‘never again shall the Jews rely on anyone else to keep them safe’ atmosphere. 
Regardless of what other nations or critics said it was only Israel, as a state, which would 
secure the future of Jews. This belief was shared by Menachem Begin, who was elected 
Prime Minister in May 1977, and it was echoed in his offensive counter terrorism actions. 
His counter terrorism policy would focus on Lebanon and during his rule there were two 
major IDF operations.88 The first one was ‘Operation Litani’, which was carried out in 
1978 as a reaction to an attack by PLO, which was at that time based in Lebanon. Nine 
PLO members arrived in rubber dinghies between Haifa and Tel Aviv and took positions 
on the coastal highway. Then they opened fire on a bus and passing vehicles, seized the 
bus and a passing car and continued towards Tel Aviv shooting from the bus.89 The PLO 
members managed to kill 37 individuals, before they themselves where killed by the 
IDF.90 Two days later, March 14th, IDF crossed the Lebanese border and ‘Operation 
Litani’ had begun. Then Israeli Defence Minister, Ezer Weizman, said the invasion was 
designed to “clean up once and for all terrorist concentrations in southern Lebanon.”91 As 
they later would experience there existed no so concentrations, but rather the PLO had 
spread out throughout the southern Lebanon. The IDF did manage, however, to drive the 
PLO away from the northern border of Israel, which allowed the South Lebanese Army 
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(SLA) to strengthen its power.92 This operation was going to be a model for future 
operations into Lebanon.  
 
The second major counter terrorist operation during Prime Minister Begin’s rule 
was called ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’ and was carried out in 1982. According to 
Israeli accounts this counter terrorist operation was initiated after the PLO had used its 
southern bases in Lebanon to launch attacks on Israeli settlements. Begin answered to this 
aggression by assembling the IDF forces on the northern border. However, it was not 
until the assassination attempt on Israel’s Ambassador to England by Abu Nidal that the 
IDF launched ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’ with orders to expel the terrorists embedded 
on Israel’s northern border.93 The IDF eventually reached as far north as the capital Beirut 
in an attempt to drive the PLO forces out of the country. At first it seemed that the 
operation was a success; Yasser Arafat and the PLO were forced to leave Lebanon in 
1982. However, the operation turned into a long-term conflict, which was viewed by 
many as a disaster.94 Regardless, the counter terrorism policy of Begin had shown that 
there were few limits to what Israel would do in order to protect the welfare and security 
of Israel.  
 
The counter terrorism strategy under Prime Minister Shamir and the unity 
governments (1983-1992) 
 
Shamir’s government and the unity governments were established after the PLO’s 
military forces in Lebanon had been defeated and dispersed to various countries. The 
main counter terrorism challenges would not come from PLO in Lebanon, but rather from 
new challenges which had started to emerge; first of all there was the activity of Amal 
and Hizballah in Lebanon, as well as the growing Islamic fundamentalist in Gaza and the 
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West Bank.95 In order to deter attacks from these groups, Israel did conduct operations in 
Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank. Parallel, as a defensive action, Israel began spending 
U.S. financial aid to upgrade its forces.96 Israel wanted an advantage “over its potential 
enemies by pursuing qualitative superiority; advantage in terms of superior motivation, 
initiative, tactical proficiency, improvisational skills, and technology.”97 In hostage 
situations, these governments continued the policies of their predecessors; when a 
military solution was not viable, they were ready to make the needed political 
concessions to the terrorists. However, in terms of wider political negotiations with the 
Palestinian terrorist organisations, Shamir’s government and the unity government upheld 
and even radicalised their predecessor’s hard-line, i.e., they enforced no negation with 
terrorist organisations.98 It was this policy, which was even manifested in the law, which 
prohibited all communication with the PLO. Still, other cabinet members, such as 
Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin, maintained that, while using military actions, Israel 
must also engage in political negotiation.  
The counter terrorism strategy under Prime Minister Rabin’s government 
(1992-1996)  
  
 The Israeli counter terrorism strategy under Prime Minster Yitzhak Rabin took a 
new turn. The Oslo Accords and the establishment of the autonomous Palestinian 
Authority meant Israel had to formulate a new counter terrorism policy. When the Labor 
Party gained power, the atmosphere in Israel changed radically. The party was open to a 
territorial compromise, and recognized that the Palestinian problem was at the heart of 
the conflict.99 This government’s policy dissociated the peace process from its counter 
terrorism actions, meaning that the peace process continued even after terror attacks 
happened in Israel. Counter terrorism methods were upheld regardless of the formal and 
informal restrictions imposed by the peace process. In other words, this government 
sought to diminish the terrorist organisations’ capacity, while at the same time trying to 
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address their motivations and the ‘root causes’ of terror. However, the Oslo process did 
not prove to be efficient enough or appear to address the crucial issues. The Islamic 
groups adopted suicide bombing as a new terror tactic, and they justified it because, 
despite Oslo, the Israeli settlement activity continued. The Oslo process, and the 
handover of territory to the Palestinians, led to a major increase in the dimensions and 
frequency of terrorism, with the focus shifting from the territories to targets inside 
Israel.100 Rabin made threats to Arafat for not curbing the violence carried out by Hamas 
and other Islamic fundamentalist groups, and, despite his previously declared policy, 
implied that terrorism would harm the peace process. But he did not follow-up the 
threats, and instead a ‘ritual’ was developed; closure was imposed, followed by threats of 
suspending the peace talks. The Palestinian Authority would make some effort to fight 
terrorism and Israel would come around. Additionally, within the Knesset, there were 
internal disagreements. The Likud Party argued that Rabin had capitulated by giving 
away territory to the Palestinians. In doing so, the IDF pulled forces out of those areas, 
thereby losing valuable intelligence and resources. The Labor Party, on the other hand, 
did not want to disturb the peace process, and thus restricted the IDF in their handling of 
counter terrorism. But, the terrorist attacks continued with no end in sight. Moreover, 
even the attempt to move ahead with the peace process, regardless of terrorism, proved a 
failure, because the public could not accept this strategy and demanded that the 
Palestinians meet expectations and thwart terrorism.101 Public safety and security was 
Israel’s number one priority, and the people elected the Likud Party, led by Benjamin 
Netanyahu. The terrorist attacks, and the responses to them under Rabin, caused the 
leaders in the Israeli government to change their view of terrorism, i.e. to view it as a 
strategic problem instead of a tactical one.102 However, this further complicated the 
relationship between terrorism and democracy; hence the IDF and the Israeli government 
had the complete backing of the people, but had to keep in mind the nation’s democratic 
values. 
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The counter terrorism strategy under Prime Minister Netanyahu’s 
government (1996-1999)  
 
During Netanyahu’s election campaign it became evident that he wanted to 
introduce a new counter terrorism policy –a policy which emphasised security first and 
peace second. During his time in government Israel did see a decrease in terrorist attacks. 
Compared to the 21 suicide bombings that took place under the previous government, 
only three suicide bombings occurred during Netanyahu’s government.103 Broadly 
speaking during Netanyahu’s three years in power, around 25 Israelis were murdered in 
terrorist attacks inside Israel, compared to around 175 people during the previous 
government.104 The reason for this increase is debatable. The Likud party themselves 
argued that the success came down to two factors; first of all Netanyahu was willing to 
pressure the Palestinian Authority harder, and he was quite clear that if the Palestinian 
Authority did not comply, there would be consequences. Secondly, he indeed 
implemented those consequences. Often these consequences included economic 
punishment. By taking these actions, Netanyahu managed to show the international 
community, the Israelis and Palestinians that if terrorism didn’t stop, it would cost the 
Palestinian society dearly.105 This Israeli counter terrorism strategy unified the political 
and military leaders. “Experience showed that when Israel did not respond firmly to 
Palestinian terrorism, more terrorism followed, and when Israel took appropriate military 
steps, the number and severity of terrorist attacks were reduced.” 106 Another explanation 
of why the sudden decrease occurred could be due to the lack of motivation by the 
fundamentalist Islamic organisations. These groups realised that the peace process was 
irrespectively heading to a standstill, and felt no need to waste resources on terror attacks 
to obstruct a process that was already effectively dead. Regardless of the tough military 
actions, Netanyahu found himself adopting political resolutions which he had previously 
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been opposed to; the Hebron Agreement was signed in 1997 and with the signing of the 
Wye Agreement in 1998, Israel withdrew from 13 percent of the West Bank.107  
 
The counter terrorism strategy under Prime Minister Barak’s government 
1999-2001 
 
Ehud Barak became Prime Minister in May 1999. It soon became evident that he 
wanted to pursue the same idea that Rabin once had; that the end to terrorism could not 
be achieved without peace. He attempted achieve this by pulling out of south Lebanon in 
May 2000, and subsequently entered peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority at 
Camp David, U.S., that summer. There, it was claimed that he proposed the handover of 
94 percent of the West Bank and almost all of the Gaza Strip to Palestinian 
sovereignty.108 Apparently, Arafat walked out of the negotiations when he realised that 
Israel was not going to heed to UN resolution 242, concerning the return of the 
Palestinian refugees. Naturally there was also the issue of Jerusalem. In September, the 
al-Aqsa Intifada broke out, and Ariel Sharon won the elections on February 6, 2001. 
Again, it was the Palestinian violence that persuaded the Israelis to vote for Likud, due to 
the promise of enhanced personal security that Sharon promised.109  
 
The counter terrorism strategy under Prime Minister Sharon’s government 
(2001-2006)  
 
The election of Sharon as Prime Minister received quite a reaction, especially 
from the Arab world. In September 1982, Sharon was the Defence Minister and had 
command responsibility for the massacre perpetrated by Christian militiamen in the 
Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila in Lebanon. Sharon promised a swift and 
                                                 
107 Ganor, Boaz; “Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Policy: 1983-1999”, www.ict.org.il, Accessed 15 April 2007. 
108 The Israeli Camp David II Proposals of Final Settlement, July 2000, www.mideastweb.org, Accessed 19 
July 2008. 
109 Morris, Benny; Righteous Victims, John Murray, London, 1999. 
 61 
decisive solution to the problem of Palestinian terrorism.110 He supported an aggressive 
campaign against the Palestinian Authority, terror organisations and the use of methods 
such as target killings and deportation, and the use of administrative detention increased. 
In Sharon’s own words: “They [Palestinians] must be beaten. We have to cause them 
heavy casualties, and then they will know that they cannot keep using terror and win 
political achievements.”111 The political objective behind this military escalation was to 
disregard the Oslo accords, complete the re-conquest of the territories, topple the 
Palestinian Authority, undermine the Palestinian leadership, and replace Yasser Arafat.112 
A survey conducted by the Tel Aviv University's Jaffe Center in May 2004 found that 80 
percent of Jewish Israelis believed that the IDF had succeeded in countering the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada,113 indicating widespread support for Sharon's hard-line policy. In January 2005, 
Sharon assured his brigade commanders that there would be no political-handcuffing in 
the attempt to end terrorism.114 However, in August 2005, Sharon did propose a 
disengagement plan. It entailed the removal of the permanent Israeli presence in Gaza 
and from four settlements in the northern West Bank. According to a survey done in 
September 2004, if a referendum had been held, 58 percent of the population would have 
voted in favour of the disengagement plan.115 However, Sharon's policies caused a rift 
within the Likud Party, and Sharon left Likud to form a new party called Kadima in 
November 2005. He became the first Prime Minister of Israel who belonged neither to 
Labor nor Likud, the two parties that have traditionally dominated Israeli politics. The 
new party created by Sharon, with Olmert as its leader, won the majority of Knesset seats 
in the 2006 elections, and is now the senior coalition partner in the Israeli government. 
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3. 2. 1 Three key categorisations of actions in Israel counter 
terrorism policy 
 
 As presented in this section, the strategic goal of Israel’s counter terrorism policy 
has changed over the years. In the 1960s the goal was to eradicate terrorism. Attempts 
were made to destroy the terror organisations’ infrastructure and Israel arrested many of 
its members. In the 1970s the policy had shifted towards deterring terror organisations 
from committing terror attacks. Israel did so by targeting their leaders and punishing their 
activists. In the 1980s Israel began to realise that, due to the opinions of the international 
community and being a democratic state, it could not abolish the terrorism by military 
means alone. Therefore the government settled for a more realistic goal: to minimize the 
damage resulting from terrorism. However, what has remained throughout Israel’s entire 
counter terrorism strategy is its combined use of offensive, defensive, and punitive 
actions with psychological and political elements.  
 
These actions, offensive, defensive, and punitive, can be distinguished from each 
other by the timeframe in which they are used. “An offensive action is directed mainly at 
averting terrorist attacks before they are carried out, while still in the planning stage, 
defensive actions are aimed at disrupting efforts to carry out an attack when they are 
already in various stages of implementation.”116 A punitive action is, as the name 
suggests, carried out after an act of terrorism is committed. These actions seek to 
diminish the threat of terrorism, which again could be divided into intention and 
capability. How these actions influence capability is perhaps more evident than how they 
influence the intention.  
 
However, in all of these actions there are elements of deterrence, which seek to 
affect intention, although the level and strength of it may vary. With respect to some 
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methods, as for example the use of house demolition, deterrence is stated as a main goal. 
With other measures, such as target killings, deterrence is simply a by product. The 
effectiveness of Israel’s counter terrorism method in diminishing the terrorist 
organisation’s capability and intention will be evaluated in chapter 7. Before examining 
specific counter terrorism measures that fall into the three categories of actions which 
Israel implemented from 1987 until 2006, a short introduction to the actions is in order.  
 
Israeli offensive action 
 
Offensive actions are carried out where the terrorists deploy and operate, often in 
areas which are not controlled by the security forces. One of the goals of offensive action 
is to prevent the materialization of planning or to stop the training phase of a terrorist 
attack from taking place. There is seemingly no practical difference between a standard 
offensive operation and an attempt to intercept and foil a specific terrorist act based on 
advance intelligence. The offensive measures are meant to diminish the capability of the 
terrorists by putting pressure on the organisation, forcing it to compartmentalise its 
activities, to hide and frequently change bases of operations, and constantly to seek new 
weapons. An offensive action sends the message that terrorism is being taken seriously 
and will not be tolerated. This may hold a deterrent value and may weaken the terrorists’ 
motivation and in some cases their intention. Offensive actions taken by Israel may 
include seizing weapons, storage facilities and towns, recruiting and running 
collaborators, and targeted killings. Additionally, the government must contemplate when 
these measures should be enforced. Should it be a continuous campaign, a pre-emptive 
operation, as a reprisal or undertaken at all?117 As illustrated in section 5.5.in this thesis, 
on selective killings, the use of offensive action also holds a disadvantage118. First, the 
risk of a boomerang effect. This means that the offensive action might motivate the 
terrorist organisation and its supportive public further, and in this way a new attack may 
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be planned. Secondly, the government faces the ‘democratic dilemma’119, particularly 
when the action involves harm to those who are not directly involved in terrorism. This 
might result in a negative reaction from the international community.  
 
Israeli defensive actions  
 
Defensive action covers all the steps taken within a nation’s borders, and it 
includes all barriers put in place to prevent terrorists from attempting to carry out attacks. 
Defensive measures are intended to stop terror attacks either by disrupting the terrorists 
from proceeding to their targets or by minimising the potential damage of an attack. 
Defensive measures can also be implemented when the government has specific 
intelligence on an expected attack. Here it is possible for the government to impose 
roadblocks, tighten checkpoints, close down streets, or provide extra protection in front 
of a building. This means that the capacity of a terrorist organisation to carry out their 
attack has to be expanded. A defensive action also holds a deterrent value, when a 
terrorist realises that they cannot easily overcome the defensive security measures, or 
thinks that they might even be caught. However, while it might not prevent a terror attack 
from taking place, the government might be able to delay the specific attack or force the 
terrorist to choose an alternative target, which might not have such severe consequences. 
The building of the fence in the West Bank is clearly one example of a defensive action 
Israel has implemented. Additionally, the permits system and the conscious decision to 
educate the public, their effort to integrate the public in a ‘warning system’, could be 
interpreted as defensive actions. Hence, it is important that this measure is used in 
conjunction with the other two key measures. If a government should disproportionately 
invest more in defence measures, they might risk fulfilling one of the terrorist’s interests, 
namely to paralyze a society, without them having to do anything. Additionally, 
implementing defensive measures places a heavy burden on a country’s budget, and 
although it might be considered worthwhile in terms of preventing a specific attack, the 
effect of this kind of investment in the long-term and what that entails for the country 
should be evaluated. On the surface, defensive action does not compromise liberal 
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democratic values, if only because it is passive and it is often viewed as self-defence. But 
in reality, as seen in Israel, some defensive actions infringe on the rights of individuals 
and groups in society, and place certain restrictions on civilians. The attempt to locate a 
terrorist in a large crowd is like searching for a needle in a haystack, and requires security 
checks on very large groups of people. In doing so, innocent individuals that are 
stereotyped face harassment.  
 
Israeli punitive actions  
 
Punitive actions punish the perpetrators, the architects, co-conspirators, and 
anyone else involved in terror attacks. Punitive actions are intended to reduce the terrorist 
organisation’s capability, by removing dangerous people from society and thus ensuring 
the public welfare, to take revenge on those responsible for or involved in carrying out 
attacks and to deter others from similar activities, to reduce the terrorist organisation’s 
intention. Additionally, punitive actions enable the government to give the public a 
message of effective counter terrorism policy. In the relationship between the terrorist 
organisation and the state, the state is usually forced to be the side that responds, but with 
respect to punishment, the state can appear as the side that takes the initiative.120 In most 
cases, punitive actions can be divided into offensive punishment or judicial punishment. 
Offensive punishment is punishment of the leadership or the activist in a terrorist 
organisation, by using offensive actions. Juridical punishment is the punishment of 
terrorists who have been caught prior to carrying out attacks, in the process of an attack 
or after an attack, and punishment of their enablers. The Israeli punitive actions within 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip permit capture, placing individuals in administrative 
detention, enforcing closure, and deportation of terrorists or of those who enable 
terrorism. Additionally, it is a recurring practice in the West Bank and Gaza for Israel to 
demolish houses of persons who have committed offences or who are suspected of 
having committed such offences. In particular, the homes of persons who have carried 
out suicide bombings within Israel or against settlers or soldiers are demolished in the 
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aftermath of such attacks. From this list it is evident that punitive actions can also have a 
direct or indirect effect on people who are not involved in the terrorist activity and as 
such are sometimes defined as ‘collective punishment’, which appears to conflict with 
liberal democratic values. Although the aim of collective punishment is to isolate the 
terrorist, cutting him off from public support, this might not always be successful, as the 
inconvenience and disturbance caused to the entire population might increase public 
support for the terrorist organisation, especially in the long-term. The punitive measures 
that the IDF and the Israeli Supreme Court institute are considered illegal actions by the 
UN and the international community. Nevertheless, Israelis consider these punitive 
actions as essential for deterring future terrorists.  
 67 
 
4. Background on the Palestinian resistance movement  
 





In order to assess fairly the effect of the counter terrorism methods applied by 
Israel, one needs a comprehensive understanding of the group at which Israel aims its 
methods. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict there are several groups that could be 
examined. However, in this thesis, the focus will be directed towards Hamas. Chapter 5 
will provide a closer assessment of what Israeli counter terrorism methods entail, as well 
as how these methods affect Palestinian society in general, and more specifically Hamas. 
To be able to discuss how the Israeli counter terrorism methods affect Palestinian society 
and Hamas, and to try to assess if the methods have a deterrent effect on terrorism, a 
closer look at Hamas as an organisation is necessary. This way, a deeper awareness of 
reaction and counter reaction is provided. What is the ideology, what is the history, and 
what is the group’s uniqueness and appeal? Moreover, it is important to recognize what 
kind of setting Hamas came from, as this background has been fundamental to the way in 
which the organisation has developed and will evolve in the future. To gain a fair grasp 
of this will also help one to understand the limitations as well as the successes of Israeli 
counter terrorism policy.  
 
It would be naive to examine Hamas in isolation, because Hamas is only one part 
of a bigger Palestinian picture. It is crucial to understand the role Hamas has played and 
continues to play in the Palestinian struggle for independence. It is necessary to establish 
the origins and understand the environment in which the group has evolved. What is it 
about Hamas that enables them to continue to exist? This chapter will therefore give a 
background of the Palestinian resistance movement in order to comprehend the future 
direction of this conflict. It summarizes the political history of Palestine from 1947, and 
                                                 
121 Fatah leader Salah Khalef (Abu Iyad). Hoagland, Jim; “A Community of Terror,” 15 March 1973, 
www.washingtonpost.com, accessed 16 September 2003. 
 68 
gives a synopsis of the major decisions made by Palestinian leaders since the UN’s 
partition of the region.  
 
Nearly four million Palestinian Arabs and six and a half million Israeli Jews 
currently occupy the territory that became known, after the First World War, as the 
Palestine Mandate.122 Since the re-emergence of Jewish settlers to the area in the early 
20th century, there has been contention between the two groups for control of both the 
land and society. The Palestinian Arabs claim that it is their land, and they have a right to 
reject foreign occupation. Israeli Jews believe that the land is their historic home, and that 
they deserve to maintain its control. Since the UN’s partition of Palestine in 1947 and the 
establishment of Israel in 1948, the Israelis have won wars against Egypt, Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, but they continue to have an ongoing struggle with the 
indigenous Palestinian population. In 1949, after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Israel agreed 
to armistices with neighbouring Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. The frontier of the 
state of Israel agreed to at this time is generally referred to as the ‘Green Line.’ The 
Green Line has been a major source of contention for displaced Palestinian refugees, as 
well as Israeli settlers that desire to occupy areas outside the Green Line. The displaced 
Palestinian refugee population poses grave security concerns for neighbouring countries. 
Disputes over Israeli settlements in the predominately Palestinian areas of Gaza in the 
south and on the West Bank of the Jordan River are at the heart of the Arab-Israeli peace 
process.  
 
Settlements and their connection to the al-Nakbah 
 
Certain events that took place during the 1948 war, the war that Palestinians call 
al-Nakbha (the Catastrophe) are crucial for understanding why identity and nationality 
became increasingly important to Palestinian society. Not only were the names of Arab 
villages changed in areas where Israel was created, which Arabs perceived as an attempt 
to erase their history and identity, but the war in 1948 created refugee camps on a large 
scale. Today the refugee camps stand in sharp contrast to the settlements; they symbolise 
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what could have been and strengthen the Palestinians’ craving for independence and 
nationhood.  
 
The British handed the Palestinian ‘problem’ over to the UN in 1947. The UN 
responded with the partition plan: areas were allocated to create a Palestinian State, in 
addition to a Jewish one. As a response to this ruling, Haganah, a predecessor of the IDF 
force, developed a strategy known as Tochnit Daled, or Plan D. Its aim was to acquire the 
areas allocated by the UN, as well as the previously established Jewish areas, in order to 
create a Jewish state before the expected invasion by Arab armies began.123 Moreover, 
Plan D was generated to ensure a permanent Jewish majority and to acquire the Arab 
areas for Jewish immigrants to settle in. The Zionist leadership could not envision a 
Jewish state where a minority of Jews ruled over a majority of Arabs. The question was 
how the Zionist movement could achieve a Jewish majority. The answer was security in 
numbers, and the alternative to a Jewish-immigration was to ‘remove’ the Arabs. 
Therefore, under Plan D, Jewish fighters would threaten to make all of Palestine as no-
man’s land and seize many Arab villages. In most cases the Arabs living in these villages 
would be expelled.124 Many Holocaust victims simply moved into vacated Arab houses. 
 
Sources differ on the actual number of refugees involved in the so called ‘transfer’ 
of Palestinians out of lands seized by Israel, mainly due to the political connotation of 
these figures. Generally, it is believed that the total number from 1947 to 1948 was 
between 427,000 and 750,000. The UN mediator for Palestine only counted 472,000, of 
which 360,000 required aid. The official Israeli count from the same time period was 
520,000, and the Israeli historian Benny Morris, who has undertaken more recent studies 
to seek the answer to this question, estimated 700,000.125 This last estimate is generally in 
line with those made by historians, representing both sides, implying that Plan D marked 
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the start of the mass movement of roughly 85 percent of the Arab population within the 
borders of Israel.126  
 
The question of whether Palestinians voluntarily fled or were forced to flee by the 
Israelis has also been widely argued and researched, but this issue is outside the 
boundaries of this thesis. This is a never-ending disagreement: Israel has long claimed 
that all the Palestinians who ‘transferred’, did so voluntarily, and as a result accepts no 
responsibility for the outcome. The international community supports the Palestinian 
claim that they had to flee for their lives, which is manifested in UN resolution 194, 
which states the refugee’s right to return. Whatever the reasons for the Palestinians 
fleeing and the number of refugees, the al-Nakbah horrified the Palestinians, affected 
their way of life drastically, and still continues to do so. The land issue and the right to 
return are believed to be the root causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Consequently, 
the settlements became the very symbol of this injustice, and serve as a provocation, only  
reinforcing the refugees’ motivation. The dream of al-Awda, the return, has sustained 
Palestinian refugees for decades. Displaying the key to their house and a yellowed deed 
to their land, the stories of villages where sweet life was once lived are often repeated to 
children and grandchildren as a means to keep the memory and their past alive, but also 
with a promise that one day they would all return to their land: 
 
“My religion tells us that one day we will defeat the Jews and regain our land. I 
don’t think I will be around to see it. I just hope that my grandchildren do. I have 
made sure that my grandchildren know everything about their land and that their 
urge to go back is as strong as mine. I have taught them that it is only there that 
they can find peace and self-respect, working on their own land and not living 
where they are not welcomed.”127 
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4. 1. The origins of the Palestinian resistance movement  
 
Although the 1948 war, al-Nakbah, and the 1967 war, called by the Palestinians 
al-Naksah (the Setback), were clearly strategic setbacks for the Palestinian resistance 
movement, they were also occasions for deepening and unifying the nationalist 
movement. The credibility of pan-Arabism within the Palestinian movement dropped 
drastically because of these events, and the nationalist movement benefited from this. 
Palestinians started to think that if they wanted liberation they had to liberate themselves. 
Within the Palestinian areas, the greatest initial growth of nationalism was in Gaza. This 
is probably due to how Egypt had ruled Gaza, merely governing it instead of annexing it 
as Jordan had done with the West Bank. Instead, Egypt had separated the Palestinians in 
Gaza from the Egyptians and kept a flame of Palestinian identify flickering. Therefore, 
many Palestinians thought that the way to enforce this nationalistic view was through the 
models of Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Che Guevara in Latin America. It was precisely 
this line of thought that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Munazzamat al-
Tahrir Filastiniyyah), which was founded in 1964, adapted.  
 
The Palestinian resistance movement has been led by several groups. The first 
organised movement towards Palestinian nationalism came soon after Israel claimed its 
sovereignty as a nation-state. This organisation, known as the Movement of Arab 
Nationalists (MAN), embraced Egyptian President Gamel Abdul Nasser’s visions of pan-
Arab Nationalism and sought to liberate Palestine.128 From the 1960s through the 1990s, 
the PLO emerged as the most powerful representative of the Palestinian people. At its 
core, the PLO’s resistance efforts seek to challenge the Jewish presence in Palestine. The 
PLO’s terrorist tactics exploit the fears of the Israeli civilian population as an attempt to 
undermine their government, challenge their alliances, and affect their economy. The 
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tactics they employ often include guerrilla warfare, sabotage, hostage-taking and terror 
attacks.129   
 
Since its founding, the PLO has constantly evolved its diplomatic and military 
strategy to remain in power. Internally, the PLO has had to contain competition from 
like-minded organisations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP), as well as resident political elites in the West Bank and Gaza and rival 
organisations such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). From a military 
standpoint, external actors categorise the PLO’s military branches and competing rivals 
as terrorist organisations because their aims tend to be political, religious or ideological, 
and they promote fear by targeting non-combatants.130  Diplomatically, the PLO has been 
in a predicament. For much of its existence it has operated as an exiled government. 
Externally, the PLO has had to maintain strategic relationships with Arab neighbours, 
great powers, and intergovernmental organisations, yet, internally, they have struggled to 
maintain the support of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, as a non-state actor, PLO 
members were not given recognition as representatives of a sovereign nation. 
 
1964 - 1979 Towards Recognition and Legitimacy 
 
The PLO was founded on May 28, 1964. The PLO’s purpose was to act “as a 
mobilizing leadership of the forces of the Palestinian Arab people to wage the battle of 
liberation, as a shield for the rights and aspirations of the people of Palestine and as a 
road to victory.”131 The PLO was originally the idea of Nasser, as he sought to use the 
Palestinians’ cause to further his visions of pan-Arab nationalism.132 Led by Ahmad 
Shukeiri, the organisation organised terrorist raids from the Gaza Strip and sought to 
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undermine Jordan’s monarchy.133 However, after Israel’s victory in the 1967 war, the 
Palestinians were less inclined to believe that Arab unity would be the key to their 
liberation from Jewish control.134 Following the 1967 war, there was an effort by the 
Palestinians to emphasise the importance of a Palestinian identity over an Arab 
identity.135 After 1967, the conflict was redefined by Palestinian strategists, in order to 
shift the focus away from Arab and towards Palestinian concerns.136  
 
 In 1968, the Palestinians created a national charter which declared Palestine as 
the homeland of the Palestinian people. Internally, the period between 1967 and 1974 
was characterised by tension between the exiled PLO leadership and the West Bank’s 
local political elite.137 PLO rivals jockeyed for power and influence with their 
constituents. In order to contain rival groups, the PLO sought to reduce their influence or 
absorb them into the PLO’s wider movement.138 The two major groups were Fatah, a 
secret resistance group founded in 1954 by Yasser Arafat, and George Habash’s Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In 1967, Fatah joined forces with the PLO, 
followed by the PFLP in 1968.139 Fatah’s first attempted military operation was 
conducted by al-Asifa (the Storm) on January 1, 1965, and was directed against the Israeli 
National Water Project. The operation failed.140 In 1969, Arafat was elected as the PLO’s 
third chairman, and his support for guerrilla warfare led to his exile from Jordan in 1971, 
where Fatah had established a large armed presence. Also, Arafat and the PLO were 
unable to establish a presence in West Bank and Gaza. His exiled status and the 
fragmentation of the PLO’s leadership, created obstacles towards gaining recognition and 
momentum for the nationalist movement. Arafat’s main objective was to maintain control 
of the PLO and legitimise himself with the masses by developing extensive social 
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institutions, medical facilities, welfare, and educational programs.141 His second objective 
was to maintain a base of operations. Fatah’s organisers believed that operating within 
Israeli-controlled territories made them susceptible to Israel’s intelligence network and 
effective countermeasures.142 In order to escape Israeli intelligence, Arafat operated 
outside of the West Bank and Gaza, yet political and military pressure from neighbouring 
Arab states did not protect Fatah’s leadership or communications network. Instead, 
Arafat’s operations remained furtive and subtle.  
 
This period saw a substantial progression in military strategic thought and force 
planning. In 1965, the PLO created the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). Originally 
modelled after the Algerian National Liberation Front’s (FLN) conventional army, the 
PLA looked to the Algerian revolution as an example of successful guerrilla warfare. By 
1971 the PLO’s official military organisation had been divided into two major factions. 
The bureaucratised faction of the PLA maintained links to Arab governments, and 
desired a more Westernized approach to military organisation. A second, subordinate 
faction, the Palestine Liberation Forces (PLF), organised into auxiliary commando 
groups.143 The PLF looked to guerrilla strategists for strategy and doctrine; thus the 
Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF)’s model for guerrilla warfare began to 
compete with the Algerian model as an example for how to fight revolutionary war. The 
Vietnamese model was aimed at mass participation in armed violence, whereas the 
Algerians organised as a “closely knit cadre of revolutionaries.”144 Most of Fatah’s 
leadership preferred the Vietnamese model of recurrent strikes designed to attack enemy 
morale. The more revolutionary-minded PFLP did not believe the region’s terrain or the 
PLO’s resources were sufficient for sustained operations. They preferred the Algerian 
approach of small-scale, efficient raids and quality operations.145  
 
                                                 




144 Ibid, p. 41 
145 Amos, John; Palestinian Resistance; Organisation of a Nationalist Movement, Pergamon Press, New 
York, 1980. 
 75 
Arafat sided with the PFLP and chose the Algerian FLN’s approach. During the 
late 1960’s and early 1970’s the PLO authorised a large number of organised guerrilla 
attacks. Although the PLO had absorbed its two major rivals, the PFLP and Fatah, the 
organisation could not contain internal competition for power and control. In the early 
1970s, the PFLP authorised the skyjacking of several commercial aircraft and joined 
more non-PLO radicals in a guerrilla campaign against the Jordanian Army. After the 
PLO lost the showdown with Jordan, it relocated in Lebanon and carried on activities 
against Israel from south Lebanon. In order to contain the internal rivals, PLO created its 
own terrorist cell, Black September. Black September challenged the rivals by 
conducting their own spectacular terrorist attacks, including several skyjackings and the 
murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972. 
 
Externally, the post-1967 Middle East was influenced by the Cold War balance of 
power politics. The United States supported Israel, and the Egyptians and the Syrians 
looked to the Soviet Union for support. In 1967 the UN issued Resolution 242, which 
called for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict.”146 The PLO expressly rejected the resolution because it did not require the 
Israelis to return all of the territory seized during the 1967 war or recognise the national 
rights of the Palestinians. In 1974, the PLO was recognised by the Rabat Arab Summit as 
being the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”147 and by the UN 
General Assembly as the principal “party in the establishment of a just and durable peace 
in the Middle East.”148 Throughout this period, the PLO made official statements 
regarding their statehood and sovereignty through annual meetings of their parliamentary 
body, the Palestinian National Council (PNC). Furthermore, the PLO managed to put the 
Palestinian claim on the international agenda in a speech given by Arafat at the UN on 
November 13, 1974: “Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s 
gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let the olive branch 
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fall from my hand”.149 Nine days later, on November 22, the United Nations General 
Assembly granted the PLO observer status. On January 12, 1976, the UN Security 
Council voted to allow the PLO to participate in a Security Council debate without voting 
rights, a privilege usually restricted to UN members states.150 During the 1970s more 
nations had official diplomatic relations with the PLO than with Israel, and in 1976, 
Palestine was admitted as a member of the Arab League. In 1977, during the thirteenth 
session of the PNC, the PLO resolved, “to pursue the struggle to recover our people’s 
national rights, and first and foremost, their right to return, to exercise self-determination, 
and to establish their independent national state on their own land.”151 
 
1980 - 1992 From War in Lebanon to the Oslo Accords 
 
 
By 1980, the PLO had emerged as a legitimate actor in both the occupied 
territories and a force in world politics.152 Although the world recognised the PLO as a 
true authority, internally the organisation faced several challenges. Foremost was the 
problem of the PLO’s continually exiled leadership. This prevented the PLO from 
directly pursuing operations against the Israelis and maintaining a day-to-day presence 
with the Palestinian people. A second problem was the tension created by the PLO’s 
presence in Lebanon. Arafat maintained legal bases of operation in both countries, but 
waves of Palestinian refugees strained the two nations both economically and politically. 
 
By the early 1980s, the PLO appeared to be developing into a ‘regular’ army.153 
The PLO also instituted a system of ranks, modern organisational units, and combat 
doctrine. By 1982, the PLO had acquired a significant inventory of both light and heavy 
weapons. These included assault rifles, machine guns, anti-tank weapons, armoured 
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vehicles, howitzers, multiple rocket launchers, personnel carriers, and missile 
launchers.154 PLO members were also reported to have trained on Mig-23 and Mig-21 jet 
fighters in Libya.155 Yet, in terms of force planning, the PLO’s military doctrine was 
mainly reactive and defensive. Despite substantial growth, the Palestinian military lacked 
the capability to resist a modern conventional force. Their primary tactic was to launch 
rocket attacks or guerrilla raids into Israel’s northern settlements from Lebanon. The PLO 
lacked complete operational control over its competing organisations and rival factions; 
the dispersed militia was spread between multiple urban centres with “virtually no 
localized centralized command.”156   
 
In June 1982, the Israelis launched a full-scale invasion into Lebanon. The “first 
aim of Sharon's plan was to destroy the PLO’s military infrastructure in Lebanon and to 
undermine it as a political organization.”157 Operationally, the PLO demonstrated a lack 
of command and control during the invasion.158 Furthermore, its ‘regular’ army 
organisation did not match its revolutionary aims, which rendered the heavy weapons 
ineffective.159 After an intense bombing campaign and occupation, by September 1982 
nearly all of the PLO’s leadership had been evacuated from their stronghold in Beirut. 
After the Lebanese conflict, Arafat was exiled to Tunis, although he maintained control 
of the PLO through a series of deft political manoeuvres. Externally, he faced pressure 
from his Arab neighbours. The Syrians attempted, unsuccessfully, to “set up a puppet 
Palestinian organisation.”160 In order to balance Syrian antagonism, Arafat looked to 
Jordan for support. In February 1985, Jordan’s King Hussein and Arafat announced a 
joint policy designed to establish a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan 
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River. In November 1988, under Arafat’s direction, the PNC proclaimed an independent 
Palestinian state to be established on the West Bank and Gaza.161  
 
This announcement came during a period when the Middle East was subject to 
ripple effects of a declining Soviet Union. The waning Soviet empire looked to the 
United States for support, and sought to distance itself from the radical Arab regimes it 
had propped up in the past.162 US policy makers backed Israel, authorised financial 
support for Egypt and protected the oil-rich countries of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The 
United States also supported the settlement of Soviet Jewish immigrants to Israel. With 
only one superpower on the scene, the PLO worked through the UN to condemn Israel’s 
oppression and to insist upon a plan for peace. From a diplomatic standpoint, the PLO’s 
efforts were effective. By the mid-1990s more states recognized the PLO’s declaration of 
independence than recognised Israel’s right to exist.163 On the other hand, the PLO had 
little control over the internal politics of the West Bank and Gaza during their exile. The 
surge in Islamic fundamentalism, competition for power, and new rivals such as Hamas 
and the PIJ, drastically altered the capability of the PLO to execute a single military 
strategy. 
 
In 1993, the PLO secretly negotiated the Oslo Accords with Israel. The Accords 
granted the Palestinians right to self-government in Gaza and the West Bank through the 
creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Much hope was attached to this agreement by 
Israelis, Palestinians and the world alike. Not only did Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, 
become the President of the PA, but he was also its Prime Minister, the commander of the 
armed forces and president of the legislative council. Additionally, he had the power to 
appoint, promote and fire members of the judiciary.164 Therefore, the executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers of the PA were unified in one person –Yasser Arafat. It 
amounted to installing a one-man, one-party system, resulting in a Palestinian joke that 
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surfaced around the Palestinian election of 1996: “Yes there is democracy in the 
Palestinian Territories. I have one vote, and that one vote is Arafat’s.”165 
 
On 9 September 1993, Arafat issued a press release stating that the PLO 
recognised the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security. In letters 
exchanged between Arafat and Rabin, in conjunction with the 1993 Oslo Accords, Arafat 
agreed that the clauses in the PLO Charter, which states that Israel has no right to exist 
and should be removed by violence, would be removed. On 26 April 1996, the 
Palestinian National Council voted to nullify or to amend all such clauses, and called for 
a new text to be produced. A new text of the Charter has never been produced, and this is 
the source of continuing controversy. 
 
Although the idea of Palestinian nationalism is strong, Palestinians are yet to 
enjoy independence. Islam represents an alternative and offers a sense of identity, “a set 
of cultural values that offset the psychological dislocation and cultural threat of their new 
environment.”166 It is this identity that Hamas takes advantage of .  
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4. 2 Islamism as a voice of Palestinian identity represented 
by Hamas   
 
With the devastating military defeat at the hands of Israel in 1948 and 1967, in 
addition to high levels of corruption and despotism throughout Arab regimes, many 
Arabs found themselves still in search of an identity. In seeking an explanation for their 
situation many Arabs turned to religion. Many Muslims regarded Western values and 
thoughts, secular in nature, to be a disorder which was spreading throughout the Arab 
world. Their military failure was explained as God’s punishment for turning away from 
religious purity and Islam. For them “the idea of ethnic nationality as the basis of political 
identity was seen as strictly European […] a product of the late 18th and 19th centuries, 
associated with the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars and the romantic 
movement.”167 The logical first step for the Arabs in their recovery was therefore not 
nationalism but rather to return to Islam.  
 
Rebuilding the community and addressing the balance of power between Islam 
and the West would therefore have to begin with a call to all Muslims to return to and 
reaffirm their faith in its fullness and to be born again in the straight path of God. Only 
upon their return would it be possible to confront Israel effectively and successfully. One 
group who embraced such thinking was Hamas, a religious movement which emerged 
out of the middle-class of society. With its origins in the doctrine of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the faction sought to revitalise Islamic values into the everyday life of the 
Palestinian people. In a general sense, the faction was part of a broader movement, which 
the West has termed “Islamic fundamentalism.”168 The fundamentalist movement gained 
significance in the 1970s,169 which may have been due to the concurrent resurgence in 
Christian fundamentalism in the West and a coincident decline in the secularism of the 
modern nation-state. This movement included ideas about “jahiliyya, (the era of 
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ignorance170) of the indivisible sovereignty of God, and the duty of jihad (struggle) to 
restore the shari'a (Islamic law) to its rightful place in society.”171 Most of the 
movement’s religious scholars believed that “the only authentic source for survival, let 
alone revival, of Islam was the Qur’an.”172  Hamas signifies the importance of the role of 
Islam in the struggle for independence: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until 
Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.”173 The nationalists were 
blamed for the failure to liberate themselves because the nationalists had led the young 
generation astray from pure faith. Islamists regarded the nationalists as traitors to the 
Muslim faith; they were considered to be worse than infidels.174  
 
Within Palestine, the two central parties that emerged from the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement were Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). As with their 
contemporaries across the Middle East, these organisations fused religion and politics. 
During the first Intifada, in the late 1980s, Hamas and the PIJ resorted to violence to 
achieve their goals. Due to its exiled status, the PLO found it difficult to control the 
fundamentalists, and increasingly, Hamas and the PIJ competed with PLO-sanctioned 
military actions. 
  
In the eighties there were signs of growing Islamisation in the West Bank and 
Gaza. The fundamentalists enforced new norms of behaviour in the Palestinian streets. A 
consequence of this was the increasing number of women who started to wear their veil 
as well as men who grew their beards. Moreover, the new norms also called for new 
behaviour: “Movie houses were shut down; shop windows displaying models of women 
in dresses were vandalized; cafés selling alcoholic beverages were set alight; people who 
used the left hand in eating were beaten (contrary to the tradition of the Prophet).”175 
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However, the most obvious institutional expression of the growing Islamist 
movements was the increasing number of mosques founded and built during this time in 
Gaza and the West Bank, mostly owned by the Muslim Brotherhood. The number of 
mosques in Gaza more than doubled between 1967 and 1987.176 The West Bank also 
experienced a mosque boom, with forty new mosques built annually.177 Ironically, many 
of these mosque where built with Israeli financial aid. During the 1970s and early 1980s 
the Muslim Brotherhood turned away from violence. Consequently, the Israeli 
government, advised by the Shin Bet, recognised that PLO and the nationalist movement 
were evolving to become a powerful force in Gaza and West Bank. Therefore, in an 
effort to counter the nationalistic ideology, Israel decided in the mid-1970s to encourage 
the growth of the Islamic Centre by tacitly and actively assisting in its growth.178 
Brigadier-General Yitzhak Segev, the then military governor of the Gaza Strip, told how 
he had helped finance the Islamic movement: “The Israeli Government gave me a budget 
and the military government gives to the mosques”.179 However, soon mosques did not 
only serve as places of worship, but also came to represent places of learning and a 
provider of social services which effectively helped create a community in line with the 
Brotherhood’s policy of da’wa,180 proselytisation.  
 
Furthermore, during this time it was not only mosques that increased in number 
and that were under the influence of the Brotherhood. There was also an increase in the 
number of schools of Islamic learning. The significance of these institutions of learning 
developed as they became the centre stage of Palestinian politics. The student elections, 
usually in competition with the PLO, represented by Fatah, and the Islamists, mainly 
represented by Hamas, serve as a barometer of public opinion. PLO represented by Fatah 
remained the dominant political power at most Palestinian universities in the 1980s, 
while the Islamists represented a powerful counterforce or an opposition.181  
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History of Hamas  
 
The roots of Hamas are deeply anchored in the Egyptian Islamic organisation al-
ikhwan al-muslimun, the Muslim Brotherhood. Founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, it 
was committed to the struggle against foreign domination and the achievement of the 
Islamification of society along Sunni lines. It opened its first branch in Gaza City in 
1945, followed by an office in Jerusalem the next year.182 The Brotherhood’s connection 
to Palestine began in 1935 when Hassan al-Banna sent his brother, Abd al-Rahman al-
Banna there.183 Furthermore, the Brotherhood played a visible role in Israel’s war of 
independence, sending numerous armed volunteers to fight with the Palestinians. For 
their efforts they gained substantial status. Due to internal Egyptian politics, the Egyptian 
government launched a campaign against the Brotherhood in the 1950’s that even 
extended into Gaza, effectively forcing the organisation underground. However, the 
situation for the Brotherhood in the West Bank was different. Jordan had annexed the 
area in 1950 and the local Brotherhood was integrated into society and functioned as a 
loyal opposition supporting the Hashemite monarchy, despite its political differences.  
 
The founding of the Islamic Center, al-Mujamma’ al-islami in Gaza in 1973 by 
the Muslim Brotherhood was an evident sign of the Brotherhood’s institutionalization. 
“The Islamic Center became the base for the development, administration, and control of 
religious and educational Islamic institutions in the Gaza Strip.”184 This voluntary 
organisation was divided into seven different committees consisting of preaching and 
guidance, welfare, education, charity, health, sports, and conciliation.185 All of these 
committees were headed by Sheik Ahmad Ismail Hassan Yassin, and much of the 
Brotherhood’s expansion in the Palestinian areas was due to his organisational skills. He 
was born in 1936 near Ashkelon, and was one of the many thousands of refugees who 
fled to Gaza in 1948. In 1952 he was crippled in a sporting accident and since then was 
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bound to a wheelchair. As with Hassan al-Banna, Sheikh Yassin was a school teacher.186 
Later on he would become the founding father of Hamas and serve as its spiritual leader. 
Yet already in 1983 Sheikh Yassin encouraged the members of Islamic Center secretly to 
collect firearms that were then distributed among operative leaders. It was this activity 
that led to Yassin’s arrest in 1984 resulting in a thirteen-year jail sentence. However, due 
to a prisoner exchange agreement between Israel and the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine –General Command (PFLP-GC), he was released less than a year later,187 
when Israel released 1,150 Palestinians in exchange for a handful of Israeli soldiers 
captured in Lebanon. 188 
 
Most likely, it was Yassin’s prison experience that instigated the foundation in 
1986 of Jihad and Da’wa, Munazzamat al-jihad wal-da’wa, abbreviated to Majd (Arabic 
for glory).189 The purpose of this organization was two-fold. The first was to collect 
information about collaborators who worked for the Israelis, and the second was to 
enforce an internal jihad within the Palestinian society. The organisation wanted to 
impose Islamic rules on the society, making sure that Palestinians became observant, and 
on the occasions where they did not, to impose appropriate punishment. “This unit 
carried out violent activities, including arson, kidnapping, rough interrogation and […] 
also executed suspected collaborators with Israel.”190 These cornerstones were eventually 
to become key elements of Hamas.  
 
As pointed out above, despite the establishment of Israel and its occupation of 
Gaza and the West Bank, Israel’s existence was not the Brotherhood’s main concern. Its 
focus was on da’wa,191 and internal jihad, rather than jihad against intruders. The 
Brotherhood concentrated mainly on “the upbringing of an Islamic generation” through 
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religious schools, charity associations, and social clubs.192 Their goal was, through 
religious education, to “instil true Islam in the soul of the individual” and bring about an 
Islamic “cultural renaissance to embark on the path of liberation” 193 which was to be led 
by a new generation. This ideology was indeed integrated into the mindset of the new 
generation emerging under Hamas. 
 
Hamas nationalises  
 
Hamas as an Islamic movement is deeply influenced by the wider trends of 
Islamist thought. Yet it is also a Palestinian movement, shaped by the symbols and 
rhetoric of Palestinian nationalism. These two elements did not always blend so naturally 
together within Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood. Traditionally, al-Banna, the founder 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, rejected nationalism as a secular, exclusivist, and selfish 
value. He saw it as a foreign implant, designed to break down Islamic unity in order to 
speed western takeover of Islamic lands. Rather, it was al-Banna’s opinion that religion 
provides people with true love for his homeland and the force to fight for it.194 He went 
on to talk about circles of identity, in which patriotism and Arab nationalism ultimately 
lead to Islamic unity in one supra-territorial and supra-racial homeland.195 However, 
Hamas realised early on, due to the political atmosphere, that in order to seek approval in 
a wider constituency, it had to present itself not just as a religious alternative to the 
secular PLO leadership and the ideas of the West, but also as a national one. “Hamas 
infused religion with nationalism. This entailed a new interpretation, anchored in Muslim 
history, of the parameters of the struggle against Israel.”196 Islam, as it turned out 
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“provided a national identity”, according to Ernest Gellner “notably in the context of the 
struggle with colonialism.”197   
 
As a symbol of the integration of Palestinian identity into Islamic ideology, 
Hamas integrated Islamism with nationalism in its emblem. The original emblem of the 
Muslim Brotherhood shows the Koran amidst two crossed swords, with the word wa-
aiddu (make ready), written beneath. In the emblem modified by Hamas, the map of 
Palestine replaces the Koran. Hamas goes further in order to show how Islamism and 
nationalism meet in the most revealing major ideological text, the Hamas Charter, which 
consists of thirty-six articles. Rooted in contemporary Islamist ideological tradition, the 
Covenant insists that Islam provides the answer to all questions, and suggests that 
capitalism, colonialism, communism, imperialism, the West, Zionism, and Jewry are all 
components of a comprehensive policy in order to discredit Islam and eliminate the 
Palestinian people. Herein, the secular state is the very symbol of all of these ills, and 
therefore it must be replaced by an Islamic policy.  
 
Furthermore, the charter serves as a valuable source when exploring how Hamas 
has come to grip with nationalism and Islamism. Although the Charter defines Hamas as 
an Islamic movement which draws its “ideas, terminology and concepts” from Islam, it 
continues to declare that “Hamas is a distinctive Palestinian movement” striving “to hoist 
Allah’s flag on every piece of land in Palestine.”198 Thus, it synchronizes Hamas’ 
immediate goal with that of any other national movement through the liberation of 
Palestine from the Jews. However, whereas the PLO stresses national liberation, Hamas 
describes itself as additionally struggling to defend “the Muslim person, Islamic culture, 
and Muslim holy sites, first and foremost among them al-Aqsa Mosque.”199 According to 
Hamas, it is precisely the al-Aqsa Mosque that represents one of several elements of 
Islamic sanctity of Palestine, which the Charter repeatedly calls the “land of al-Isra’ wal-
Miraj”. 200 The Isra’ and Miraj, Hamas maintains, distinguish Palestine from all other 
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Islamic areas and makes it the inheritance of all Muslims. According to Hamas, when the 
Muslim armies conquered Palestine, the Caliph Umar ibn al-Kattab decided not to divide 
the conquered land among the victorious soldiers, but to established it as a waqf, an 
inalienable religious endowment.201 This way, the relationship between Islamism and 
nationalism is not only complete, but it is also a legitimate strategy of Hamas towards 
Israel. As a waqf, Palestine does not belong only to the Palestinians or the Arabs, but to 
the entire Muslim nation until the day of resurrection. Furthermore, the Charter states that 
the land can ‘only’ be liberated by jihad.202 The movement rejects ‘so-called peaceful 
solutions’ as incapable of restoring Palestinian rights.203 This way, Hamas argues against 
any compromise with Israel, saying that no Muslim party or leadership, Palestinian or 
otherwise, has the right to concede even an inch of Palestine, neither in this generation 
nor in any generation in the future. Moreover, Hamas stresses that only under the 
dominion of Islam can Muslims, Christians and Jews live in peace and security.204 But in 
doing so, Hamas offers few concrete indications on how it intends to achieve an Islamic 
Palestine and what it would look like. 
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There are three main elements in the relationship between religion and the state 
which Hamas has utilised for its own ideology. First, Islam has become a political 
religion, with an aim to reverse the traditional relationship between the two spheres so 
that politics becomes submissive to religion and not the other way round. In this context, 
the state is perceived merely as a vehicle for achieving security and order, to provide an 
environment where Muslims can attend to their religious duties.205 This is, of course, 
reflected in Hamas ideology as well as strategy. Secondly, Islam is a religion that 
stresses, above all, the collective enforcement of public morals. Islam is indeed very 
much a social religion seeking to organise the practices of social life and above all details 
of family life.206 This serves as a key element in the ideology and tactics of the Muslim 
Brotherhood as well as those of Hamas. Thirdly, an element in the tactics of Hamas that 
is grounded in the religion of Islam is the notion of jihad. The term jihad has a number of 
meanings which include the effort to lead a good life, to make society more moral and 
just, and to spread Islam through preaching, teaching or armed struggle. Muslim clerics 
distinguished ways ‘in which the duty might be fulfilled: by the heart, by the tongue, by 
the hands and by the sword’.207 In its most generic meaning, jihad signifies the battle 
between evil and good. Finally, jihad means the struggle to spread and to defend Islam. 
Regardless of which interpretation of the meaning of the word jihad, Hamas has utilised 
them comprehensively throughout its operations.  
 
‘Inshallah’, God willing, is an expression often used in Arabic, which in itself 
shows that Islam bases itself on a long-term strategic plan, a plan which is already 
determined by Allah. Time is not of the essence. This is emphasised in the concept of 
tsaber [sic]208 which Hamas has adopted as part of its strategy. This means that when 
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facing a stronger opponent, a direct confrontation –the implementation of jihad, is best 
saved until the circumstances are suitable in order to achieve the ultimate goal.209 
Moreover, through da’wa, the ground for jihad is prepared. The strategy of da’wa is to be 
practiced at all times, yet when jihad is not feasible or too risky, da’wa represents the 
only appropriate plan.210 Furthermore, the strategy of tsaber [sic] opens up the possibility 
of legitimately ending or pausing jihad, without deviating from the original strategy.211 
Besides, it is difficult for any state to legitimise a crackdown on an organisation which is 
only practising da’wa.  
 
“Tsaber [sic] offers the framework for the setting of both ultimate and interim 
goals. It also legitimizes the shifting balance between violent and non-violent 
action. Thus, it allows for the suspension of Jihad, and concentration on the non-
violent Dawa campaign. Both Jihad and Dawa, in any event, are designed to 
serve an interim goal of advancing the long-term, ideological objective.”212 
 
Hamas manoeuvres within the limitations and options presented by these opportunities 
and constraints, while constantly being aware of mood-swings, needs, and desires in 
Palestinian society. At the same time, Hamas is always mindful of political opportunities 
and power relations. This allows Hamas to shift the focus between da’wa and jihad as it 
sees fit, seeing as they are two sides of the same coin. “Thus the struggle at any time, the 
available means, can be perceived and presented as the practical application of 
ideological imperatives. This approach implies ideological rigidity and tactical 
flexibility.”213 Within the concepts of tsaber [sic] and da’wa there is a difference in time 
perspective. Often tsaber [sic] is an approach that indicates a long-term strategy, while 
da’wa is the practice of today. Jihad is the tool that is used today in order to achieve a 
future goal. This allows  
 
“Hamas [to] demonstrate its flexibility by differentiating between the short term 
objective of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and the long-term goal 
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of establishing a Palestinian Islamic state on the territory of Palestine that would 
replace Israel.”214  
 
Suicide bombings –martyrdom – Istishhadi 215 
 
Successful counter terrorism methods must be tailor made to target the whole of 
the organisation. Despite this, it is normally the military aspect of Hamas which is 
focused upon when considering counter terrorism methods. As such, it is natural to offer 
some broad outline of its violent development. Additionally, it is not enough to have 
knowledge of the details of Hamas’ suicide attacks in order to counter this method 
effectively. What is also required is an understanding of what makes Hamas choose this 
particular method: in order to make it a less attractive method for a terror group to use, it 
is necessary to have a basic understanding of what makes it attractive in the first place. 
 
From its inception Hamas founded a military wing which was named after Sheikh 
‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam. He was himself a Palestinian, who in the early 1930s led a group 
which assassinated Jewish and British officials in Haifa. In 1935, al-Qassam was killed 
by British forces in a battle which he had intended to be the beginning of a grand-scale 
guerrilla war. His nationalistic status and “his fall in battle against the British turned 
Qassam into a national symbol and role model of self-sacrifice and dedication to the duty 
of war against foreign intruders in the land of Islam.”216 The military wing of Hamas has 
a separate infrastructure and leadership from the rest of the organisation. Furthermore,  
 
“Izzeldin al-Qassem is not the only armed part of Hamas. There are other, smaller 
groups. These groups work semi-independently of the leadership. These groups 
belong to a part of Hamas’ structure called al-Jihad Al-‘Askari (the military 
apparatus). This part is divided into three groups: al-Mutaradun [sic] (“the 
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hunters”), al-Aidin (“the returnees”) and al-Khilayah al-Siriyah (“the secret 
cells”).” 217 
 
Although in principle autonomous, the Qassam Brigades are known as a disciplined outfit 
whose commanders implement policies devised by the Hamas leadership rather than their 
own. 
 
Hamas has legitimised its use of violence in the Hamas Charter where it states: 
“There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except through struggle (jihad).”218 As a 
product of the ideological concept of tsaber Hamas views “the best way to conduct the 
fight with the Zionist enemy is…to keep the embers of conflict burning until the 
conditions for a decisive battle with the enemy are complete.”219 As such, Sheik Yassin 
argued that if Palestinians resorted to violence, it was because Israel only understood the 
language of violence and force, so for the Palestinians it was self-defence, “the gun is the 
only means that would be used in addressing the enemy.”220 
 
The first Hamas suicide bombing took place on April 16, 1993221 and since then it 
has become a powerful tool which has been manifested in Hamas’ self-proclaimed motto:  
“God is its goal;  
The messenger is its Leader.  
The Quran is its Constitution.  
Jihad is its methodology,  
and Death for the sake of God is its most coveted desire.”222 
 
Historically, there have been many martyrs; Jesus was a martyr and so was the founder of 
Shi’a Muslim tradition, Hussain. Suicide attacks as a method are not a new concept; the 
phenomenon appeared among the Jewish Sicaris in the first century, among the Moslem 
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Hashishiyun in the eleventh century, and among the Asians in the eighteenth century.223 
However, “modern” suicide terrorism is unique, and unlike its predecessors. In the last 
two decades suicide attacks have been carried out by one or more persons who have been 
aware of their role as “human time-bombs.” The word martyr comes from a Greek term 
for ‘witness’, meaning a witness to one’s faith.224 In most cases martyrdom is regarded 
not only as a testimony to the degree of one’s commitment, but also as an implementation 
of a religious act, exclusively an act of self-sacrifice. The death of the perpetrator is the 
key to the success of the attack, and they know in advance that success depends entirely 
on this death. Therefore a “modern” suicide attack can be defined as: “a violent, 
politically motivated attack, carried out in a deliberate state of awareness by a person 
who blows himself up together with his chosen targets. The pre-meditated certain death 
of the perpetrator is the pre-condition for the success of the attack.”225 
From a terrorist group’s point of view, there are some evident benefits in choosing 
suicide bombing as a method of achieving its objectives. A suicide attack is not very 
complicated or hard to carry out, and it is a low-cost operation. Indeed, it is a rather 
primitive and crude method which allows the perpetrator to choose his target and the 
timing of the bomb explosion. This guarantees a maximum number of casualties, in 
contrast to a remotely controlled bomb. Because it is so difficult to counter a suicide 
bomber once they have set off on their mission, once commenced the attack is often 
successful. Even if the security services manage to detect the suicide bomber and 
intercept them prior to reaching their final destination, they can still choose to activate the 
bomb prematurely and cause casualties, damage, or at the very least, terror. If the aim of 
a terror group is to carry out a terror attack inside enemy territory, one crucial, but 
complex and problematic aspect of a successful attack is the ability to secure an escape 
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route.226 Suicide attacks require no escape plan, and the group runs a very low risk of the 
perpetrator being caught and passing valuable information to the security services.  
When Hamas first started to launch suicide attacks, the suicide bomber did not 
volunteer, but rather Hamas had to recruit them. Some of the elements in this recruitment 
process have changed during the years, and today Hamas has individuals who seek them 
out in order to carry out an attack. Regardless of what the practice is today, from a 
counter terrorism point of view it is still valuable to understand what kind of 
organisational skills go into such an attack. The individual might be recruited either by 
other family members who are already in the organisation, or from mosques or other 
Islamic education centres.227 Then, the individual will undergo lengthy training. Some 
may be taken to a graveyard and told to lie down inside one of the graves for several 
hours in order to overcome the fear of death.228 Additionally, in order to test their 
performance as well as prepare them for the pressured situation they are asked to be in, 
they may be asked to undertake something illegal. In the West Bank this has often been 
to smuggle something from one area controlled by the Palestinian security services to an 
area controlled by the Israelis.229 Usually, the individual will not know when or where the 
mission is to be carried out when they ‘disappear’ from their home and family, often 
forty-eight hours before the attack. Then the bomber is held in a special apartment where 
they undergo the final mental and physical preparation, which often includes shaving 
their facial hair in order to create a more western look. They also receive a thorough 
understanding of the operational aspects of their mission, and write a will as well as 
record a propaganda videocassette.230 The individual will either receive the suicide bomb 
vest or belt before they leave the apartment, or someone else will smuggle the bomb out 
of Gaza or the West Bank only to hand it over inside Israel proper.231 The bomb is often 
made out of homemade explosive or TNT, and contains around 3-15 kilograms of 
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explosives which are often packed with peaces of iron and nails in order to cause more 
damage.232 
 
Then Hamas member Imad Faluji233 explains the practice of suicide bombers as 
being letters to Israel, telling the Israelis that their “security does not lie with Egypt, nor 
with Libya, nor with Arafat, but with us,” meaning Hamas.234 Moreover, it seems that 
Hamas has found more than just a tool for communicating with Israel. It is clear that they 
have understood what hurts Israel the most. Public opinion can absorb the individual dead 
settler or the shooting of an IDF soldier in the territories. However, the reaction is 
entirely different when a bomb goes off in the heart of a city in the middle of the country. 
Suicide bombing as a method of terror strikes a weak spot in Israeli society. Terrorists 
use suicide attacks to instil a feeling of helplessness in the population—the notion that 
they have no way of protecting themselves against such attacks. These feelings strike a 
blow to public morale, creating fear and panic. As Ismail Haniya, a Hamas leader 
explains: “Jews love life more than any other people, and they prefer not to die.”235 Dr. 
Ramadan Shalah, secretary-general of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, summarized the 
choice of using suicide attacks as a method:  
 
“Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and its army 
is trained to a very high standard.... We have nothing with which to repel killing 
and thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us 
only our lives... human bombs cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear bombs.”236 
 
Due to its simplicity and the difficulty in countering this method of attack, suicide 
bombing has become a hallmark for Hamas. Since the first attack in 1993, they have 
expanded and improved their tactics to include double and triple suicide bombings as 
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well as the use of female suicide bombers –making it even harder for Israeli security 
services to prevent and intercept them.237  
 
 
How Hamas has managed to adapt and react to some of Israel’s counter terrorism 
methods will be explored as the next chapter will study the practise of Israel’s counter 
terrorism methods and its consequences for the Palestinian society and Hamas.  
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5. Israeli counter terrorism methods, 1992-2000 
 
“The first line of defence is in the minds of men.”
238
  
                 
In this chapter, some of the counter terrorism methods from Israel’s large 
repertoire will be examined, all of which were used by the Israeli government between 
1992 and 2000. This is an interesting time period because it was the end of the Intifada, 
and also the time when Hamas was established; the peace process had started and there 
was an increase in the number of terror attacks. It was the first time an Israeli government 
attempted to fight terrorism while simultaneously engaging in the peace process 
negotiations. The time period from 2000 to 2006 will be addressed separately in chapter 
6. In this way, the development in counter terrorism methods can be viewed against the 
backdrop of the failing Oslo peace process and the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is not to evaluate whether or not Israel has achieved 
its ultimate goal through these measures i.e. to hinder terrorism, nor is it to determine if 
its methods are legal with respect to international human rights laws. Rather, the aim of 
this chapter is to enable a deeper understanding of some of the counter terrorism methods 
used by Israel, and to examine these measures individually to assess their nature and 
mechanisms. Simultaneously, this chapter will show the highly multifaceted way that 
counter terrorism methods work in practice, and will expose the numerous complex and 
different consequences, both tactical and strategic, on Palestinian society at large and on 
the organisation of Hamas itself. In particular, it will examine how Hamas adapts 
correspondingly, reinventing new tactics in response to the specific counter terrorism 
methods. Although the effectiveness of Israeli counter terrorism policy will not be 
assessed here, how these measures affect Hamas’ capability, intentions, and social-
political stand in the Palestinian community will be addressed.  
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First, the permit system will be studied, a policy which allows Israel ultimately to 
decide who can travel in and out of the West Bank and Gaza, and who may not. This is a 
defensive action which serves as an important preventative mechanism, aiming to stop 
general planning, training, or the implementation of terror attacks. With the permit 
system regulating who is allowed to work, live and travel, Israelis can control the flow of 
individuals in and out of the borders of the West Bank and Gaza. Eventually, this 
mechanism results in a degree of control over Palestinian society as a whole, both in 
terms of economic and social development. The system of permits is strongly interlinked 
with the closure policy, which the Israelis classify as a punitive action with a preventive 
effect, and will be the second focus of this chapter. Both of these methods are used under 
the public principles of deterrence, and therefore run the risk of being viewed as 
collective punishment in the eyes of the international community. In practice, closure, 
means that the borders that separate the West Bank and Gaza from the Israeli main-land 
are sealed. Since the West Bank and Gaza do not share a common border, closure 
additionally affects any travel between the two territories. Depending on the type of 
closure that is implemented, the measure generally leads to a complete stop or severe 
restriction of movement, affecting both humans and commodities. Secondly, the permit 
system and the closure policy have huge ramifications on Palestinian society. As these 
two counter terrorism methods are so closely linked, their effect on Palestinian society, 
both socio-politically and economically, will be examined in the same section as closure 
(5.2), together with the manner in which. Hamas’ re-adjusts and takes advantage of these 
measures.  
 
Thirdly, individual and collective deportation, another counter terrorism method, 
will be examined. Deportation is a punitive action, carried out under the umbrella of 
individual principles of deterrence. The 1992 deportation of 415 Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
members to southern Lebanon is the most notorious example. Although the use of 
deportation has not been so common after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, its 
usage has had a dramatic effect. The severity and comprehensiveness of the specific 
deportation mentioned above, became a turning point for radical Palestinian Islamic 
organisations, and had long lasting effects on Palestinian terrorism, especially as it 
 98 
enabled members of Hamas to reorganise themselves, to enlarge, to form new alliances 
between members from Gaza and different parts of the West Bank, as well as to develop 
a more strategic and tactical relationship with the Lebanese Hizballah. This deportation 
illustrates that Hamas is a highly flexible organisation, still capable of carrying out acts of 
terror, despite most of its leadership being deported. Hamas displayed its strength and 
flexibility on 16 April 2003, only a few months after the deportations, when they 
dispatched the first of a long series of suicide bombers.  
 
Fourthly, another form of counter terrorism method will be included in this 
chapter: the demolition of houses. This measure can be divided into two separate issues; 
the demolishing of houses which are built illegally, and houses which are demolished due 
to security reasons. This includes the demolition of houses due to settlement creation, 
which is a preventative measure, and houses belonging to families of suspected suicide 
bombers, which is a punitive measure. This measure is part of public principles of 
deterrence. The demolition of houses is considered especially hard for the Palestinians, 
due to the strong cultural value that a home has to them, compounded by the high poverty 
rate and the difficulty in obtaining a house-building permit from the Israeli government. 
Hamas, understanding this situation only too well, turns this measure around, and it 
benefits from the support received when providing logistical and financial assistance for 
each martyr family, effectively strengthening the bond between the Palestinian people 
and Hamas.  
 
The method of house demolition is followed by a section on the use of selective 
killings. Selective killing is considered an offensive action, which holds a preventive 
nature, and it belongs within the range of individual principles of deterrence. Even 
though this policy was not used excessively during 1992-2000 (it will be further 
examined in chapter 6), the method played an important part in forming the multifaceted 
Palestinian terrorism picture. Although Israel may cripple Hamas’ tactical ability and 
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prevent terror attacks in the short-term by using this method, Hamas also uses it to 
legitimise an increase in attacks, in the name of revenge of the martyrs.239  
 
The sixth counter terrorism method this thesis will examine is administrative 
detention. After every terror attack, Israel frequently conducts large sweeping arrests and 
interrogations in order to gain intelligence that will help determine who was responsible. 
Often these arrests will lead to administrative detention, which Israel classifies as an 
offensive action. However, as this thesis will reveal, it could actually be classified as a 
punitive action, because of the way that this method is practised. In addition, this measure 
holds a preventative and/or a punitive effect. The use of administrative detention is also 
part of an individual principle of deterrence. Being held in administrative detention 
means that the individual is incarcerated for an unspecified period of time, for reasons 
unknown and undeclared to him, his family or his lawyer. However, what this thesis will 
illustrate is that these detention centres also serve as critical training and educational 
grounds for Hamas. Because the Israelis used to place individuals from different 
organisations together, similar to the internment system used in Northern Ireland, Hamas 
and other Palestinians can share and learn from experiences in this situation, and invent 
and exchange new tactics as well as recruit new young members.  
 
While in detention, the prisoner is often exposed to different methods of 
interrogation, and this will be the seventh and last method examined in this chapter. This 
method is classified as a defensive action, because during interrogations the aim is often 
to get information that can hinder another terror attack or an increase in the organisation’s 
capability. However, during interrogation the boundaries of physical pressure and torture 
are often blurred. Whether or not these unclear boundaries should be acceptable, is 
perhaps the clearest example of the democratic dilemma.  
 
Individually, each of these counter terrorism methods is like a drop in the ocean, 
but used together, they form an aspect of Israel’s policy of an ever-lasting struggle 
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between securing a way of life for its citizens and against jihad. An example of this and 
how different counter terrorism methods are used simultaneously, was the aftermath of 
the incident that happened on October 19, 1994. Residents of Tel Aviv were sitting 
drinking their morning coffee and others shopping on the popular Dizengoff Street, when 
a powerful explosion occurred just before 9 am on board the No. 5 bus.  
 
“I was just sitting in a cafe, minding my own business, when I heard the boom.” 
Avi recollects, “then I heard people calling: ‘Help me, help me!’ So I went to the 
bus and started trying to pull people out. There were people with no heads, cut in 
half, missing arms and legs. I couldn't take it.”240  
 
Later, the Israeli police stated that the IED (improvised explosive devise) was composed 
of 10 to 20 kg of TNT explosives, apparently disguised inside a briefcase, killing at least 
23 and wounding 46.241 The next day, Hamas released a videotape showing that Salah 
Abdel Rahim Nazal Souwi, a 27-year-old wanted Hamas activist from Qalqilya,242 
assumed responsibility for the bombing, claiming that his motivation was to avenge the 
deaths of the three Hamas kidnappers who had abducted Sgt. Nahshon Wachsman on 
October 9, 1994. In the videotape, Mr. Souwi was clearly puzzled and confused regarding 
the killing of the kidnappers, despite the kidnappers effort to ensure they “had kept the 
prisoner soldier Nashon Wachsman alive until the last minute” and the kidnappers offer 
of “humanitarian requests to release our prisoners” as an exchange, which was ignored by 
the Israelis.243 In response to this suicide attack, and acting on what was then Prime 
Minister Rabin’s electoral slogan throughout his prime ministerial campaign in 1992: 
“we will pursue the peace as though there’s no terror, and crush the terror as though 
there’s no peace”244, the Israeli government’s and the IDF’s reactions were both 
immediate and comprehensive.  
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First, Rabin chose to enforce the punitive action of closure, which hermetically 
sealed off the West Bank and Gaza, effectively depriving around 55,000 Palestinians of 
their livelihoods inside the Green Line, and adding additional pressure on the already 
fragile Palestinian economy. To increase the pressure, the Israeli cabinet also voted to 
temporarily bring in 15,000 foreign labourers to permanently replace some of the 
Palestinians workers, who had a working permit.245 Secondly, Rabin announced that a 
multitude of ‘retaliatory measures’ designed to ‘fight Hamas until we have destroyed it’ 
would be comprehensively enforced. This included an extension of administrative 
detention from six to 18 months, the application of ‘greater physical force’ during 
interrogations and the demolition of ‘suspected terrorist’ homes to serve as a 
punishment.246 Additionally, as many as 2,000 Palestinians, mostly Islamist activists, 
were arrested, including several residents from Qalqilya, as well as Salah Soowi’s brother 
Hassan and his cousin Eid. Thirdly, when it became clear that it was indeed Salah Abdel 
Rahim Nazal Soowi who was the suicide bomber (based on blood and tissue comparisons 
from family members), the IDF swiftly demolished his family home in Qalqilya.247 These 
numerous security measures were all implemented individually. However, they are all 
part of a broader counter terrorism policy that is based on core principles of offensive, 
defensive and punitive actions, which seek to diminish the threat of terrorism.  
 
Yet terrorism and counter terrorism do not exist in a vacuum, and it is important 
to have background information in order to understand the social-political situation. In 
the years from 1992 to 2000, the first Intifada had just ended and the peace process had 
begun. Hence, these two periods will be briefly introduced.  
 
The first Intifada and the emergence of Hamas (1987-1991) 
 
The Intifada (shaking off) erupted on 9 December 1987 when Hatem Sissi, a 
resident of the Jabaliya refugee camp, was killed by Israeli troops chasing Palestinian 
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children who were pelting them with stones. This happened the day after an Israeli truck 
had run into a group of Palestinian labourers and killed four of them at the Erez 
checkpoint which separates Gaza from pre-1967 Israel. To the Israelis, this was a traffic 
accident, but the Palestinians believed that it was a deliberate act of revenge for the 
stabbing to death of an Israeli merchant, Shlomo Sakal, in Gaza on 6 December.248 The 
first leaflet issued by the Muslim Brotherhood was released on February 11, 1988 and it 
was signed Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement, but not 
yet using the Arabic acronym Hamas (zeal)). This leaflet made a point of referring to the 
uprising as “a blessed Islamic uprising, as opposed to a national one.”249 Leaflets 
continued to be published under the name of the Islamic Resistance Movement, and it 
was not until August 1988 that Hamas ‘officially’ started to publish under their acronym 
name. The first publication proclaimed they were a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.250 
However, after their founding, they claimed that the date for their establishment was 
really on 8 December 1987, the day before the Intifada began. Such claims symbolise the 
organic relationship between Hamas and the mass rebellion throughout the West Bank 
and Gaza. The underlining implication of this statement is that there would have been no 
Palestinian uprising without Hamas. This can be viewed as a deliberate signal by Hamas 
in order to be seen as the central player in the Intifada. Hamas’ early strategy was to 
undermine the PLO’s credibility and to claim to be the sole legitimate representative of 
the Palestinian people.  
 
The Israelis had been quick to extend legitimacy and status to Hamas in an 
attempt to marginalize the PLO. At the time, Hamas was viewed as a more moderate 
Islamic force which focused on social reform, rather than being an Islamist organisation 
aiming to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine with jihad as the modus operandi. 
Regardless of how Israel regarded the nationalists and the Islamists at that time, it was 
rather peculiar to legalize Hamas, seeing as how Hamas was the self-proclaimed ‘sister’ 
organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation which was not legalized. 
However, following the involvement of a Hamas activist in the kidnapping and murder of 
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two Israeli soldiers in 1989, the relationship between Hamas and Israel changed for 
ever.251 Within a month of the soldiers’ deaths, Israel swept through Hamas with a 
vengeance. Within the year, and eighteen months after the outbreak of the Intifada, the 
organisation was prohibited, and being a member was a punishable offence.252  
 
During the early years of the Intifada, the most common weapons utilised against 
the Israeli army were not guns and bombs, but rather stones, knives, and the occasional 
Molotov cocktail. Apart from being symbolic Islamic methods,253 they were also a 
powerful visual tool; the young Palestinian boy throwing a stone at a soldier from the 
best equipped army in the world. The image cried of heroism and bravery. “From a 
downtrodden, passive people, the Palestinians overnight became, at least temporarily, a 
defiant successfully rebellious one, enjoying a sense of moral superiority over their 
better-armed occupiers.”254 Although the military actions undertaken by Palestinians in 
the first year of the Intifada were riddled with symbolic gestures, Hamas’ share of the 
military activity was relatively limited.255 Assumingly, Hamas at this stage still lacked a 
solid operational infrastructure and therefore gave priority to acquiring arms, mobilizing 
cadres, and training its forces in the use of arms and explosives. But, by the second year 
of the Intifada, 1989, the extent, sophistication and boldness of Hamas’ violent activity 
had risen sharply. The number of violent actions tripled.256 Additionally, Hamas had 
added the kidnapping and the murdering of Israeli soldiers inside Israel to its modus 
operandi portfolio.  Furthermore, Hamas had extended its military activity into the West 
Bank, notably Hebron. By 1993, the range of targets was expanded, to include civilian 
Israeli targets inside Israel, as a reaction against the Oslo peace process between Israel 
and the PLO.  
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The Intifada had only lasted a few weeks when the Israeli army realised that it 
could not extinguish the uprising. Instead, the army settled for the limited goal of 
reducing the disturbances to an ‘acceptable’ minimum.257 Despite the fact that the 
Palestinians’ methods were simple, and in the early days a confident Israeli leadership 
claimed that these ‘episodes’ would quickly pass, the Intifada lasted for almost five years.  
 
The peace process (1991-2000) 
 
There had been many failed attempts to r each a settlement between the 
Palestinians and Israelis that would bring about a lasting peace. However, the Oslo 
negotiations were different due to the decision to hold direct, face to face talks, between 
Israel and the PLO, under the premise that the most challenging issues would be saved 
until last. In parallel with the Madrid Conference in 1991, there was a secret back channel 
which ultimately resulted in the Oslo Accords which were signed on 13 September 1993.  
 
The Oslo Accords refer to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank 
and Gaza, Israel-PLO (also known as DOP I), and subsequent implementing agreements, 
notably the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza, Israel-
PLO (also known as Oslo II) signed September 28, 1995. The Oslo Accords did not 
constitute a peace settlement between Israel and the PLO, but agreements on methods and 
timetables for reaching a lasting solution, and interim institutional and security 
arrangements. The ‘agreement not to agree’ regarding the legal status of the West Bank 
and Gaza explains, on the one hand, how it was possible for the parties to enter into the 
Accords in the first place, but also why they had such opposing approaches to the 
implementation of the agreements. In contrast to their stated commitments in the Oslo 
Accords, the parties did almost everything that they considered politically possible to pre-
empt the outcome of future negations on the permanent status.  
                                                 




The Oslo Accords provided a transitional period of Palestinian interim self-
government in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. A transfer of territory to the Palestinian 
Authority was based on various agreements: the protocol on economic rations (29 April 
1994), the Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (4 May 1994), 
Washington Declaration (25 July 1994), the Agreement on preparatory transfer of powers 
and responsibilities between Israel and the PLO (29 August 1994), the Interim 
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II) (28 September 1995) , the 
Protocol concerning the redeployment in Hebron (15 January 1997), the Wye River 
Memorandum (23 October 1998) and the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum (4 September 
1999)258. Direct negotiations to determine the permanent status of Gaza and the West 
Bank began in September 1999 after a three-year hiatus, but were derailed by the al-Aqsa 
Intifada which broke out a year later.  
 
The peace accord envisioned a timeline and plan for the Israeli forces to withdraw 
from the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinians to control public order and security.259 
The agreement also mandated that the Israelis would maintain responsibility for 
defending the region against external threats, and that the Palestinian Authority would be 
held responsible for preventing acts of violence by Palestinian militants. The Oslo 
process depended upon the “formula of peace-for-security. That is, the process would 
continue as long as the Palestinian Authority cracked down on terrorism and other 
political violence directed at Israel and the Israelis residing in the territories.”260 In itself, 
this is a strange formula; at the one end of the equation there is a quantitative and 
measurable variable, but, at the other, an abstract term, not easily conceptualised or even 
illustrated.  
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Following the peace accords, the Palestinian Authority became the officially 
recognised administrative body for the Palestinian people. However, by signing the Oslo 
Accords, Arafat had effectively accepted that the building of a Palestinian state was under 
the control of the Israeli security services. Furthermore, the accords institutionalised the 
dependence of the West Bank and Gaza on Israel. They gave the Palestinian Authority 
full control of only 18 percent of the West Bank and divided the West Bank into three 
zones: A, B and C. Zone A (the 18 percent) is under the full control of the Palestinian 
Authority, Zone B is under the administrative control of the Palestinian Authority and the 
security control of Israel; Zone C is under the full control of Israel. Zone A is further 
divided into many enclaves, effectively cut off from each other. These enclaves are 
surrounded by areas B and C, giving Israel effective control over the whole of the West 
Bank. Despite this, the Palestinian Authority was designed to provide internal oversight 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and their main objective was to create police and 
security forces. Arafat’s PLO remained in control of foreign relations and the PLA.  
 
After the Israeli/PLO peace accord was negotiated, Arafat returned to Palestine. 
Upon his return, Arafat, and the exiled leadership of the PLO, once again faced resistance 
from the resident governing elite, now in the form of radical Islamic factions, as well as a 
movement within his own Fatah party called tanzim.  Tanzim’s cadre had maintained 
Fatah’s political and military base during their exile. With Arafat’s return, this group “led 
the crusade against general corruption, mismanagement, and lawlessness of the PA’s 
governance”261 and alienated Arafat’s core support base. During this period there was a 
notable increase in the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas for control of the Palestinian 
Authority. The increasing differences between the secular-nationalist Fatah and the 
religious-Islamic elites under Hamas severely affected Arafat’s strategy to maintain 
power.262 Arafat’s disillusioned and fragmented Fatah party was bound to the tenets of 
the Oslo Accords, whereas rival parties had the flexibility to promote their own, more 
radical, agendas. During the 1990s, Hamas’ growing strength and popularity began to 
diminish Fatah’s legitimacy as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. In 1994, 
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the Palestinian Authority’s chief economic advisor, Ahmed Qurei, announced that Fatah 
was bankrupt.263 The financial crisis forced Arafat into a cycle of less than ideal courses 
of action. In order to remain in power, Arafat had to seek aid from outside sources. The 
West was willing to negotiate, but only if he enforced the provisions agreed to in Oslo. 
However, each concession Arafat made to the West led to Fatah’s further alienation from 
the Islamist factions.  
 
In 1994, Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Israeli radical 
that opposed the signing of the Oslo Accords. After Rabin’s death, the position was filled 
by Shimon Peres, who was voted out of office only one year later and replaced by the 
right-wing politician Benjamin Netanyahu. The Israeli political electorate shifted back to 
the left in 1998 with the election of Ehud Barak. Prime Minister Barak initiated a follow-
on round of negotiations with the Palestinians. In July 2000, Barak, Arafat, and Clinton 
met at Camp David to negotiate a permanent peace accord. The talks broke down, and 
although it has never been publicly stated, it was due to disagreements over who should 
control the Temple Mount, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, and territorial 
concessions. At one point during the negotiations, Barak conceded the Palestinians full 
control over the Gaza Strip, most of the West Bank and custodial sovereignty over the 
Temple Mount. Arafat would not negotiate until the Palestinians were guaranteed full 
control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. He also refused to allow the Israelis to have 
control over the Temple Mount,264 which is not only the holiest site in Judaism, but is 
also on the land that surrounds the al- Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site in Islam. On 
September 28, 2000, then Likud party leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in 
an effort to show its significance to Judaism. His visit spawned the beginning of the al-
Aqsa Intifada, a wave of resistance to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, 
in response to the mounting frustration over the failure of the Oslo Accords and 
breakdown at Camp David. That year, the Israeli electorate shifted once again, and in 
January 2001, Sharon took office as Prime Minister. 
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5. 1 The permit system  
 
 The widest Israeli counter terrorism measures are the closure policy and the 
permit system. Israel has enforced a closure policy which forbids almost complete 
movement of Palestinians between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and hinders 
Palestinians from entering Israel and from going abroad. Additionally, Israel has set up 
dozens of random checkpoints, prohibits Palestinians from traveling on dozens of roads, 
and forbids Palestinians without special permits to enter the Jordan Valley and East 
Jerusalem, which are integral parts of the West Bank. This well-developed method serves 
as a crucial mechanism for controlling who is allowed to enter or travel through Israel, 
making it for practical purposes a control mechanism regarding the socio-economic 
development in Gaza and the West Bank. There are several kinds of permits that serve 
different functions, notably business permits, living permits and so forth. However, the 
primary focus of this thesis is on the travel and work permits. These permits are often 
implemented with the aim of operatively preventing a terror attack by hindering the 
logistical transfer of weapons, explosives and terrorist operatives between Gaza and the 
West Bank, but obviously also into Israel proper. The permit system therefore enforces a 
preventive counter terrorism method, aiming to hinder terrorist access to Israel. 
 
Although the permit system has been enforced in some capacity since 1967, and 
increasingly adjusted and professionalized, there are very few academic articles 
addressing whether this policy works in practise and if it is a successful counter terrorism 
method. This may be partly due to changes over the years - not even the Palestinians can 
keep up - and also because the policy has not managed to draw the attention of the 
international community in the same respect as have arrests, torture, or target killings. 
Therefore, this section relies on research undertaken by human rights organisations –
either Israelis, Palestinians, or international organisations. In contrast, the economic 
effects of the permit system and the closure policy on Palestinian society have been 
studied in academia in great detail and received some attention. The timeframe for this 
 109 
topic was concentrated around the early days of 1967 until the beginning of 1980s. 
However, around 1995, a few years after the signing of the Oslo Agreement and when the 
Economic Protocol I of the Interim Agreement was signed, the economic issue become a 
regular research topic. This section will be relying on some of these studies.  
 
The aim of this section is to study how Israel has divided the Palestinians into 
different groups, each group with different rules and regulations for obtaining work and 
travel permits. Furthermore, this section will also examine how the permit process works 
in practise, and it will suggest that this method holds some additionally desired effects for 
the Israelis. The system of permits as a counter terrorism method is closely interlinked 
with the closure policy. Therefore, the effect of the permit system on Palestinian society 
as a whole, both socially and economically, will be studied under the subchapter of the 
closure policy. This also takes into account the effects of the permit system on Hamas as 
a socio-political and military organisation, and how Hamas has managed to adjust, re-
invent and circumvent the permit system.  
  
5. 1. 1 The categorisation of Palestinians into different groups  
 
Following the Six-Day War, in 1967, Israel's military commanders in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip issued orders proclaiming these regions to be closed military areas. 
In 1972, general exit orders were issued.265 These allowed West Bank and Gaza residents 
to leave the West Bank and Gaza freely, enter Israel and East Jerusalem, and pass 
between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Although this policy certainly restricted the 
freedom of movement for the Palestinians, it was not particularly strict, and many people 
where able to travel. This changed to some extent in June 1989 when Israel, for the first 
time, restricted the general exit permits. Israel imposed a magnetic-card system, whereby 
only those with such a card were allowed to leave Gaza.266 In the West Bank, green, as 
opposed to orange, identity cards were issued to Palestinians whom Israel prohibited 
from leaving. However, it was not until January 1991, during the Gulf War, that Israel 
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totally changed the policy it had initially implemented in 1967. The general exit permits 
of 1972 were revoked, and every resident of the West Bank and Gaza wanting to enter 
Israel had to have a personal exit permit.267 By re-structuring the permit policy in this 
manner, the Israeli military authority divided the Palestinians into three different 
hierarchical groups, each with a separate status and different rights of passage.  
 
The first group, which holds the highest freedom of movement, consists of the 
Palestinians that hold an Israeli ID card. Upon the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, 
Israel invited the Palestinians who lived in Jerusalem to apply for Israeli citizenship. 
Although few Palestinian applied, some Palestinians became citizens of Israel. The 
number of Palestinians living in Jerusalem in 1967, including Israeli-Arabs, is disputed, 
varying from 66,000 to 156,000, depending on the source and how Jerusalem is 
geographically defined. Hence it has proven very hard to determine how many 
Palestinians became Israeli citizens in 1967. However, the United Nations estimates that 
there were over 1.1 million Palestinians, including Israeli-Arabs, with Israeli ID cards in 
2003. The Israeli government categorises Israeli citizens by religious and national-ethnic 
affiliation. Each Israeli ID card states in the nationality section whether the citizen is a 
Jew, Arab, Druze, or a member of another ethnic group.268 These cardholders have total 
access to Jerusalem and freedom of movement in most of the West Bank. Even if a holder 
of an Israeli ID card, someone listed as ‘Arab’ is more likely to be questioned, delayed and at 
times denied access.269 
 
The second group of Palestinians consists of those Palestinians living in the area 
around Jerusalem that did not seek citizenship in 1967. A substantial number declined the 
citizenship as they would have had to pledge allegiance to the state of Israel and 
demonstrate a certain knowledge of Hebrew270 –two criteria which where often viewed 
by the Palestinians as turning away from the idea of their right to self-determination in 
the pre-1967 borders. Therefore, Palestinians residing within these newly defined 
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municipal boundaries were given a special Jerusalem residency status. They were 
provided with Israeli-issued ID cards with a blue cover. Until 2002 they were listed as 
‘Arab’ in the nationality section of the ID card. If the Palestinian has a Jordanian 
passport, the citizenship is listed as Jordanian. If they do not hold Jordanian citizenship, 
the section is left blank.271 They are not, therefore, citizens of Israel. Instead they were 
made equivalent under the 1952 Law of Entry into Israel. The Entry Law regulates entry 
into Israel and residency in the country for those who are not Israeli citizens, or do not 
want to convert to Judaism as dictated by the Law of Return enacted in 1950. The Law of 
Entry into Israel provides the Minister of Interior with the authority to grant three types 
of long-term residency permit. The minister can either grant a visitor permit (tourist visa 
or temporary work visa), a temporary resident permit (temporary residency), or a 
permanent resident visa (permanent residency).272 Persons receiving a visitor permit are 
only allowed to work in Israel if specifically permitted. The owners of such a visa are not 
registered in the Population Registrar, are not eligible for an identity card, do not have 
national health insurance, and are not entitled to National Insurance benefits.273  
 
Additionally, there are some restrictive requirements that only apply to 
Palestinian Jerusalemites, but not to Jewish permanent residents or Israeli citizens. For 
example, to leave the country they must obtain an Israeli re-entry visa; otherwise they 
lose their right of return. If they live abroad for more than seven years they will lose their 
residency rights. In 1996 the Israeli government decided that the West Bank and Gaza 
came under the category ‘abroad’ and therefore any Jerusalemite living in the West Bank 
or Gaza for more than seven years would lose their Jerusalem ID cards and thus their 
residence status.274 This has been proven difficult for Palestinian Jerusalemites wanting to 
marry, unless their spouse also holds a blue identity card or Israeli citizenship. While one 
can marry, one then has to live as a ‘divided family’. Israel does not permit them to reside 
together in East Jerusalem until they are granted a request for ‘family reunification,’ 
                                                 
271 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, www.ochaonline.un.org, accessed 
12 August 2004. 
272 Feller, Oded “Denial of Citizenship”, www.acri.org.il, accessed 8 January 2007. 
273 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, www.ochaonline.un.org, accessed 
12 August 2004. 
274 Palestinian Academic Society for Study of International Affairs; “Facts and Figures Jerusalem”, 
www.passia.org, accessed 8 January 2007.  
 112 
which is a long and burdensome process which could take between one to three years.275 
Since there is no free passage for people between Gaza and the West Bank, the spouses 
who reside in the West Bank or Gaza are required to apply for permits in order to enter or 
transit Israel on their way to visit their spouse in East Jerusalem. Such permits are 
generally issued for a three-month period for residents of the West Bank, including 
nights, but for residents of the Gaza Strip only for a one-week to a ten day period, 
without the possibility of spending any of those nights in East Jerusalem.276 When closure 
is imposed these permits are invalid and the families are separated for an unknown period 
of time. However, a married Palestinian Jerusalemite can apply for a blue identity card to 
include the new spouse, and there do not seem to be any publicly stated criteria for 
granting such an application.277 Because the Ministry of Interior is not required to provide 
justification of the rejection of such an application, the process has become arbitrary. If 
the married Palestinian Jerusalemite decides to leave the city to join a spouse, who does 
not carry a Jerusalem residency, he/she risks losing their permanent residency based on 
the ‘centre of life’ standard set by the government. The ‘centre of life’ principle entails 
that the holders of a blue identity card have to show (often repeatedly, using a multitude 
of tax and other documents, and without right of appeal) that their ‘centre of life’ is in 
East Jerusalem.278 Since 1996 the ‘centre of life’ principle has been implemented for 
every blue identity card holder, married or not. The decision to issue residency permits, 
extend them, or shorten them is entirely up to the Minister of Interior. According to the law, 
there are almost no limitations placed upon the Minister of Interior in his assessment of when 
to issue or deny residency permits. Human rights organisations speculate that the new 
regulations for the ‘centre of life’ principle have an ulterior motive, namely that it is a 
pretext for deportation in order to quietly change the demographics on the ground. Due to 
these restrictions and regulations, it is reported that some 6,444 identity cards have been 
revoked between 1967 and 2001.279  
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YEAR # of ID’s  YEAR # of ID’s YEAR  # of ID’s 
1967 105 1979 91 1991 20 
1968 395 1980 158 1992 41 
1969 187 1981 51 1993 32 
1970 327 1982 74 1994 45 
1971 126 1983 616 1995 91 
1972 93 1984 161 1996 739 
1973 77 1985 99 1997 1067 
1974 45 1986 84 1998 788 
1975 54 1987 23 1999 394 
1976 42 1988 2 2000 124 
1977 35 1989 32 2001 56 




Although it has proven difficult to obtain data on the number of blue identity 
cards held each year, the United Nations estimates a total of 215,400 for 2003.281 Human 
rights organisation Bt’selem states that in 2003 alone, 273 blue identity cards were 
revoked.282  When Bt’selem wrote to the Minister of Interior, Eliahu Suissa, in 1996 
asking how many identity cards had been revoked over the past six months, the minister 
replied that his ministry did not keep records on this matter, but “our estimate is that 
some 600 cases are involved.” 283 Additionally, the criteria according to which residency is 
granted are unclear, not governed by clear regulations, not published, and change all the 
time.284 One of the effects of these restrictions on the freedom of movement is the prevention 
of normal emigration flows to and from rural areas.  
 
The third group of Palestinians live in the West Bank. In 2003 there were 2.3 
million residents all holding a West Bank ID card, of orange colour if issued by the 
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Israeli authorities, and green if issued by the Palestinian Authority.285 However, the ID 
number on the Palestinian Authority cards, which is used to regulate access and 
movement, is an independent card, albeit linked with the Israeli computer system.286 
Additionally, Palestinians above the age of sixteen often need a permit to travel from one 
Palestinian city to another even within the West Bank. A permit is also needed to enter 
any Israeli settlement or industrial zone located in the West Bank where they may be 
employed and they cannot enter Jerusalem or Israel without a separate permit. 
 
The 1.3 million Palestinian residents of Gaza in 2004287 are part of the fourth and 
last category, the group that is least advantaged in terms of movement. Israel requires 
they have documentation in order to visit the West Bank, to reside there and of course to 
enter Israel itself, including Jerusalem. To be discovered at an Israeli checkpoint in the 
West Bank without a valid permit could result in deportation, fines, or even 
imprisonment.288  
 
This type of categorisation and restriction of movement has been in effect since 
1991. However, the process of issuing permits has varied throughout the years depending 
on security levels and the political and security development of the peace process. 
 
5. 1. 2 A lasting change in the work permit policy 
 
Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank have been entering Israel proper in 
order to work since shortly after the 1967 Six-Day war when Gaza and the West Bank 
were imbedded into Israel. Until the late 1980s, Palestinian daily commuters to Israel 
represented a third of the employed population and generated more than a quarter of the 
gross national product for the West Bank and Gaza combined.289 Even during the early 
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tumultuous years of the first Intifada, a substantial portion of the Palestinian workforce 
found its livelihood in the Israeli market. On the eve of the Intifada, approximately 
109,000 Palestinians were working in Israel, comprising forty percent of the Palestinian 
workforce.290 The Palestinian workers grew heavily dependent on jobs in various Israeli 
industries, and during the early years, the Israeli economy equally enjoyed cheap and 
willing workers from Gaza and the West Bank, creating an economically inter-dependent 
relationship and a chronic cycle of dependency where the Israeli market dictated the 
survival or demise of the Palestinian economy.  
 
Although the economic relationship had already started to change, it was the 
outbreak of the Gulf War in January 1991 that altered the working arrangement 
permanently. Israel became a target for Iraq and the PLO was one of the few authorities 
in the Middle East to support Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein had creatively pre-
conditioned the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait on Israeli implementation of UN 
resolution 242 and withdrawal to pre-1967 lines, thus linking his fight with that of the 
Palestinians. Many Palestinians regarded the attack on Israel as being part of a larger 
Islamic Jihad against the occupiers of the ‘holy land’.291 Israel reacted to the pro-Iraqi 
support by replacing the institutionalised general exit permit process292 with a required 
personal exit permit, thus restricting the movement of every Palestinian resident of Gaza 
and the West Bank who wanted to enter or travel through Israel.293 This action directly 
resulted in a Palestinian unemployment rate of 15 percent.294  
 
Despite the employer-employee relationship Israel and the Palestinians enjoyed 
prior to the Gulf War, it was clear from the outset that the separation and restrictions on 
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the entry of Palestinian workers into Israel would hurt the Palestinian economy far more 
than the Israeli one. Palestinian workers had a relatively minor role in Israel’s economy. 
Even when Palestinian employment in Israel was at its peak, residents of Gaza and the 
West Bank comprised merely 6 percent of all workers in Israel.295 When they stopped 
coming, Israel imported other labour, especially from Asia and Eastern Europe, and made 
it more lucrative for employers to hire them instead of the Palestinians through specific 
reductions in employer taxes and, because of the closure policy, Palestinians were no 
longer a reliable working force.296 According to data from the Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics, the number of foreign workers in Israel rose from 30,500 in 1994 to 84,000 in 
1997. Meanwhile the number of Palestinian workers fell from 38,300 in 1994 to 26,600 
in 1996, and from as many as 160,000 in 1992.297 Furthermore, foreign workers had clear 
economic advantages over Palestinian workers for Israeli employers. Because of their 
legal status, Palestinian workers cost more to employ than do foreign workers: a foreign 
worker earning the minimum wage of 2085 NIS costs an employer 2098.86 NIS, while a 
Palestinian worker earning that same minimum wage costs an employer 3110.55 NIS, a 
difference of 1011.69 NIS.298 In other words, employing a Palestinian costs an Israeli 
businessman nearly 50 percent more than a foreign worker. Because of the economic 
advantages of foreign workers, even during times when the closure is eased Palestinians 
are unable to work in Israel, because their jobs have been filled. However, the 
Palestinians who were denied working permits had no alternatives to the jobs lost in 
Israel, thus resulting in high unemployment and an increase in the poverty rate inside the 
West Bank and Gaza.  
 
Although Israel, to a large degree, substituted the Palestinians with cheap labour 
from Asia and Eastern Europe, they saw an opportunity to continue using Palestinian 
labour at minimal security risk. The Israeli government made considerable efforts to 
employ Palestinian workforces inside the settlements. This was encouraged by making it 
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easier to obtain work permits for settlement areas than for jobs beyond the Green Line.299 
In fact, workers seeking employment in settlements do not need to be married or older 
than twenty-five, and in addition their travel to work is made much easier. Equally, these 
permits are not cancelled in the event of a total closure.300 According to the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), 9,507 Palestinians were employed in the Israeli 
settlements - 8,441 in the West Bank and 1,066 in the Gaza Strip - during the first three 
months of 2000.301 However, according to worker organizations in Gaza and the West 
Bank and testimonies given to B’tselem, the vast majority of Palestinian workers in the 
settlements receive wages significantly lower than the minimum wage stated in the Israeli 
Labour Law.302 The majority of Palestinian workers in Israeli settlements receive not 
only far less than their Israeli counterparts for the same kind of labour, but also less than 
Palestinians working in Israel itself. While the Israeli minimum daily wage in 2000 was 
set at around NIS 120 (eight hour day), the daily wages for an average fully-employed 
Palestinian worker in the Palestinian economy and for Palestinians employed in Israel in 
1999, were estimated to be NIS 61 and NIS 86 respectively.303 However, most 
Palestinians employed in Israeli settlements only received an average of NIS 35-40 per 
day, especially in Gaza where the maximum daily wage was reportedly NIS 60.304   
 
The policy of employing cheap Palestinian labour in Israeli settlements reduces the 
security risks and allows the Palestinian economy to continue to rely on Israelis to 
provide an income. Additionally, it reinforces the arguments for the continued existence 
of the settlements for the Israelis, but has a marginal overall impact on the political 
dispute. Furthermore, the transfer of workers away from Israel proper to settlements 
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inside Gaza and the West Bank, also shows the great influence Israel has on the 
individual Palestinian, as well as on the Palestinian economy as a whole. Moreover, it 
strengthens the widespread sentiment among Palestinians who regard the settlements as 
symbols of the occupation. As echoed by the sentiments of one Palestinian, “They took 
my family’s land, robbed me of my rights, and now I’m forced to work for them on land 
belonging to my people.” 305  
 
On September 28, 1995, the Economic Protocol between Israel and the 
Palestinians was signed. This Protocol was part of the Interim Agreement on the West 
Bank and Gaza, also referred to as Oslo II. It undertook to help reduce the Palestinians’ 
dependency on Israel, which had developed between 1967 and 1993. However, it failed 
to separate clearly borders between the two economies. Instead, the Oslo II divided the 
West Bank into three categories of land –A, B, and C. The Palestinian Authority was to 
have control of all civil affairs and security issues in Zone A, in Zone B the Palestinians 
were to have control over all civil affairs, and the Israelis over security, and Zone C 
remained under direct Israeli control – for both civil affairs and security issues.306 As the 
Palestinians understood it, area A was gradually to be increased, so that by the end of the 
interim period (originally set for May 1999), it would cover most of the West Bank apart 
from the settlements and military installations. But the transfer of territory depended on 
Palestinian Authority’s cooperation and their ability to provide Israel with security. By 
September 2000, area A consisted of 18 percent, whereas area C covered 60 per cent of 
the West Bank.307  
 
This ‘cantonization’ of the West Bank only reinforced the importance on the 
permit system, institutionalized it, complicated the process of how to obtain a permit, and 
restricted freedom of movement even further –now a Palestinian that lived in area A or B 
had to have a permit to be able to enter area C. Meanwhile, Oslo II’s Protocol Concerning 
Civil Affairs specified that the only legal document entitling a Palestinian to work in an 
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Israeli establishment was a permit issued by the Israeli military authority. Oslo II also 
kept Israel in control of the exit and entry of goods and people among the Palestinian 
areas and with the outside world – affecting of course the import and export of goods and 
even freedom of movement.308 What this agreement did was legitimise the permit system, 
linking it to the peace process and Israeli military considerations. Since the Palestinian 
Authority had signed the agreement, they had indirectly condoned the permit system. 
Although this was probably not a conscious policy move on their part, it did yield some 
benefits. First, it was easier to mould and control a population who’s freedom of 
movement was limited. Secondly, the permit system and closure policy made large 
segments of the population directly dependent on official jobs, increasing personal 
attachment to the Palestinian Authority. Recruitment into the ever growing security 
agencies and civilian ministries became the greatest job-creation project in Gaza.   
 
The change in Israeli policy after the Gulf War resulted in a comprehensive 
permit system that serves to control movement of individuals and commodities, 
essentially requiring that anyone wanting to leave Gaza and the West Bank, whether to 
enter Israel, pass through it, or go abroad, must obtain an exit permit from Israel. A 
young man from Gaza eloquently encapsulated the perceived impact of the permit 
system, when he reflected, “I used to dream about having my own country. Now I dream 
about getting out of the Gaza Strip”.309   
 
5. 1. 3 The permit system process 
 
Although the current policy of closure and permits system has existed since 1991 
and the permanent closure procedure has been in place since 1993, Israel has still not 
established or made publicly clear any consistent, written rules to govern the actual 
permit process. On April 24 1991, the Israeli High Court of Justice recommended that 
“the Civil Administration issue comprehensive and specific directives, which will be 
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publicized, concerning movement of physicians and sick persons during curfew” and that 
“said procedures will serve as standing orders for soldiers stationed at checkpoints.”310 
However, the regulations have still not been made public to Palestinians, who instead 
have operated according to trial-and-error enabling them to collectively gain knowledge 
about the mechanisms of the permit system. The fact that the permit system was not 
predictable in terms of are kind of permits one would ultimately receive, presented an 
added challenge. Some passes permitted an overnight stay in Israel, others required return 
by dusk, a few were for an entire month. Some permits restricted means of transport to 
the special group, taxis; others allowed the use of private cars from door to door. In 
addition, they have learned that obtaining travel or work permits is not easy. Whole 
groups of people are seemingly unable to leave Gaza: men under forty, unmarried men 
over forty, all men who at one time or another have been held under arrest or been 
imprisoned for security reasons, activists in political opposition movements and their 
relatives as well as anyone who is considered a security threat by the Israelis, are rarely 
granted exit permits.311 Most Palestinians in Gaza are affected by these rules, since the 
average age is just under sixteen,312 and since around one third of the population in Gaza 
was arrested under the first Intifada. In practise, this means severe restrictions on 
individuals who have already served prison sentences, as they are continuously held 
responsible for their past actions.  
 
Since Gaza came under the control of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, applying 
for a permit has not become any easier –it has only added additional layers of 
bureaucracy. Leaving Gaza is now further complicated by a multi-tiered procedural 
process. First, a person must submit a written request to the appropriate Palestinian 
ministry. For example, -someone seeking medical treatment to the Health Ministry or a 
worker to the Labour Ministry. Next, the Palestinian officials transfer the exit requests to 
the Palestinian Civilian Liaison Committee (CLO) headquarters, which is staffed by 
Israeli military and civilian officials. These CLO officials examine and evaluate the 
Palestinian applications, comparing them to existing Israeli security services data records. 
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In this process the Palestinian Authority seems to have limited influence, a fact 
recognised by Palestinians, adding to the general and growing dissatisfaction with the 
Palestinian Authority.313 Furthermore, if the application is turned down, it frequently 
returns without any explanation and the reasons for its rejection remain classified. If, 
however, the applicant does receive a reason for its rejection, it is most commonly denied 
due to unspecified security reasons.314  
 
This highly bureaucratic application process with ambiguous standards and 
outcomes is clearly advantageous from an Israeli perspective. First, it allows any of the 
Israeli or Palestinian authorities not to assume responsibility for the outcome of the 
application, especially if an applicant should complain. Instead they can insist that the 
other side is responsible, causing further confusion about how the permit process actually 
works. Secondly, Palestinians often find that with the involvement of the Palestinian 
Authority, their complaints are often dismissed in courts because the mechanisms and 
basis for the permit process is established in the Oslo Accords. This suggests that the 
nature of the permit process serves as a mechanism for political negotiation, since it is 
controlled by political bodies rather than by the individual affected.315 Thirdly, many 
rules are oral and are inconsistently interpreted by different individuals at the Israeli 
Central Coordinating Office and its regional branches, as well as by soldiers at 
checkpoints.316 Fourthly, the lack of official rules dictating the permit process makes it 
hard to estimate how long it takes to obtain a permit, and thus difficult to know when to 
start the application process in due time. When permits are granted, they are usually only 
valid for a limited period of time, ranging from a single entry to a maximum of three 
months. Although permits sometimes include overnight stays, they usually expire early in 
the morning making it impossible to stay overnight and return back in time. Anyone 
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violating this restriction can have his or her permit confiscated, and is subject to a fine 
and imprisonment,317 further creating travel difficulties for families of sick Palestinians, 
businessmen, and lawyers representing Palestinians in prison.  
 
Additionally, there are speculations that applicants are often rejected without 
being thoroughly examined and the approvals of permits are based on political factors 
rather than security reasons. Such claims are seemingly supported with the Israeli 
officials’ willingness to re-evaluate the application when human rights organizations, 
journalists, or diplomats intervene, often resulting in permits being granted, even though 
the same application has been turned down before and seemingly nothing has changed.318 
Such inconsistency leads to a great frustration among the Palestinians with a common 
perception that it is too difficult to obtain a permit and therefore they do not even bother 
to apply for one.319 Even if the applicants were granted a permit, this permit would 
automatically be invalid when the Israelis impose a hermetic closure. As the closure 
gradually begins to ease, those same permit holders must resubmit their applications, 
while the Israelis increase their number of approvals as they see fit.320 However, one 
important factor here is that the vast majority of the population still could not go 
anywhere, since they did not obtain a permit in the first place. 
 
5. 1. 4 The magnetic card –and its many uses  
 
 The magnetic card was introduced in August 1989 as a supplementary form of 
identification for Gazans.321 By means of a computerised magnetic strip, this card gives 
access to the same information as the standard ID (dates of arrests, prison records and 
political affiliations) but was not distributed to released prisoners, former administrative 
detainees, or even to Palestinians who have been brought in for questioning. It was, and 
                                                 
317 Hass, Amira.; “Israel’s Closure Policy: An Ineffective Strategy of Containment and Repression” Journal 
of Palestine Studies, XXXI, no. 3, 2002. 
318 Hass, Amira.; Drinking the sea at Gaza, Hamish Hamilton, London,1996. 
319 Ibid.  
320 Ibid. 
321 It was later also introduced in the West Bank and became a condition for obtaining work permits in both 
areas. B’tselem, “Restriction on Movement”, www.btselem.org, accessed 9 January 2007. 
 123 
still is, only distributed to so-called ‘clean’ Palestinians, and has to be reviewed and 
renewed annually.322 The purpose of this ID card is to have additional control over the 
individuals that the Israelis consider to be a security risk, to weed out Intifada and 
political activists, and other ‘security threats’, and prevent their entry into Israel. An 
estimated 30,000 people were denied the magnetic card on the basis of having a criminal 
background or outstanding debts to Israel. The denials of the magnetic card made it 
impossible to cross the Israeli borderline and seek work legally, resulting in a decrease of 
Palestinian labour in Israel from 70-80,000 in pre-Intifada years to 40-50,000 in 1989.323 
Therefore, the policy of granting magnetic cards does not only affect the whole 
Palestinian society, but it also serves other economic functions. 
  
In addition, the Israelis added information of the individual’s personal financial 
status to this type of ID card. A condition for receiving or renewing the card was that the 
individual had to pay any outstanding taxes or debt to the Israeli government. Of course, 
without the permit, a person could not leave Gaza to work and get paid to in turn pay 
what he owed. Considering that in 1991, before the Gulf War, an estimated 100,000 
Gazans were employed in Israel,324 the influence of this card becomes obvious. During 
the 1990s, the total number of magnetic cards and permits issued was heavily dependent 
on the intensity of the security threat and the implementations of closure. However, 
despite the complicated process of gaining a work permit, seeking jobs inside Israel 
proper is still highly lucrative, because of Gaza’s and the West Bank’s high 
unemployment rate and low wages. By regulating the restriction and number of 
Palestinians who are allowed to work inside Israel and to what time, a cycle of 
dependency with a negative impact on the Palestinian economy is created as it is 
dependent on the Israeli market. If supply of Palestinian labour is greater than demand, 
then Israel has the upper hand to pick and chose, as well as to dictate the price for 
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services provided, although these can be slightly higher than those offered in Gaza and 
the West Bank for the same services. Therefore, the permit system in general and the 
specific issuing of magnetic cards, proves to be an effective way of putting pressure on 
the individual economy on a small scale, and on the entire Gazan society on a much 
larger scale, effectively increasing control over a whole society.  
 
Apart from the economic effects the magnetic card has been known to have, it 
also has a more disputed and controversial function. It has been alleged, through 
numerous interviews undertaken by both Palestinian and Israeli human rights 
organisations, that the Shin Bet occasionally uses its authority to revoke work permits as 
a means to pressure Palestinians into cooperating with the Israeli internal security 
service.325 This practice can be carried out because the magnetic card is the only 
document Palestinians must obtain directly from the Israelis, without mediation of 
Palestinian representatives. Although the practice of providing permits as a means to 
pressure Palestinians for information has been used in various forms since Israeli 
occupation,326 it has increased since the IDF redeployed from autonomous areas of the 
Palestinian Authority. Since the Israelis can no longer move as freely as they previously 
could inside Gaza and in area A of the West Bank to collect information, this pressurizing 
method has become more useful for gaining valuable and real-time intelligence. 
According to the Palestinian Ministry of Labour, Israeli border police stripped 2,400 
workers of their permits or magnetic cards during the first six months of 1998.327 
 
According to interviews with workers performed by a human rights 
organisation,328 the Shin Bet recruitment method is quite standard and straightforward. 
When the chosen worker presents his ID papers at the IDF checkpoints, there is 
apparently something ‘wrong’ with his permit and he is pulled aside to ‘straighten’ things 
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out with a Shin Bet officer. The officer tells the worker that he is ‘refused entry into 
Israel’ and ‘offers his assistance’ in order to help him. However, in exchange, the worker 
must provide information about a particular activity or about specific persons. In case the 
worker refuses, the authority revokes his permit and tells him to return after a certain 
period of time “to determine whether the situation has changed.” 329 Exemplifying this 
process, Nizzar, who had worked inside Israel for sixteen years had ‘something wrong’ 
with his permit and was asked to co-operate, but refused. His permit was revoked and he 
finally got a new permit after three years of applications. Another example is twenty-
eight year old (and married) Wasim, who was not able to renew his permit after a closure 
even after eight years of employment in Israel. When he inquired with the Shin Bet, he 
was told:  
 
“’Your name is on the computer. If you help me I’ll help you and you’ll get a 
permit.’ I told him no. He said to me, ‘there are two pages in the computer, black 
and white. Ask the computer which one you are on.’ ‘You ask it’ I told him. He 
said to me ‘Don’t talk back to a wiser person than you. Go back to the window 
and ask for your magnetic card. If they give it to you, you are a lucky person. If 
you don’t get it come back and I’ll help you.’ Of course I didn’t get my card or 
permit and I am still waiting for 5 years. […] I have never been to prison or been 
arrested in my entire life.”330  
 
Most of the people who refused collaboration and lost their permits had no previous 
trouble gaining a permit, leading Palestinians to believe that their permit refusal had 
nothing to do with their security status, but rather with politics and the need for inside 
intelligence.  
 
Shin Bet are not the only ones putting pressure on collaborators; Hamas and later 
also the Palestinian Authority, have developed a crude policy on how to respond to 
collaborators. In the case of Hamas, this often includes public humiliation in a society 
where honour plays a major role, assassinations, or disguise killings. In an interview with 
Newsweek, Hamas leader Rantisi stated that the only way of dealing with collaborators, 
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according to Islamic Law, is a death sentence.331 According to Anat Kurz and Nathman 
Tal, Hamas even established its own security wing in 1986, Majmouath Jiahd u-Dawa 
(Majd), which became responsible for carrying out such policy, explicitly dealing with 
‘Palestinians suspected of engaging in activities inimical to the principles of Islam’. Such 
behaviour included collaborating with Israelis, which was seen as deserting the 
Palestinian cause.332 Equally, with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, 
the various Palestinian security services raided numerous Palestinian homes, arrested, and 
kept many Palestinians under administrative detention. Many of these ‘collaborators’ 
who were charged by the Palestinian security services ended up with speedy trials 
resulting in lifetime imprisonment or execution.333 
 
The permit system and the policy of closure are deeply interlinked, not only in 
their implementation, but also in their effect on the socio-economic conditions in 
Palestinian society. One of Hamas’ strengths is its capacity to re-adjust and take 
advantage of the Israeli counter terrorism methods. Seeing how interlinked the permit 
system is with the policy of closure, the effects on Palestinian society and how Hamas 
adjusts and readapts to these measures will be studied in greater detail after an 
examination of the process of closure policy.  
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5. 2 Closure policy 
 
 
As discussed previously, the permit process and the policy of closure are deeply 
interlinked, not only in their implementation, but also in the rationale behind the practice. 
The effects of these measures on Palestinian society and Hamas are also similar and will 
therefore be examined together later on in this chapter after a study of the implementation 
of the closure policy.  
 
Closure334 consists of banning all movement of people, affecting labour, 
commodities and elements of production both within and between Gaza and the West 
Bank, as well as these areas and Israel. Closure is a preventive counter terrorism method, 
aimed at preventing terrorists from gaining access to Israel. Arguably, closure is meant to 
serve as a deterrent on potential terrorists and on the Palestinian people collectively, as it 
is often imposed after a terror attack and has a great socio-economic impact on 
Palestinian society.  
 
This section will examine what kind of closure is used, how it has been 
implemented since 1991 and the effects it has on Palestinian society as a whole. First, 
closure has a great impact on social patterns due to the separation of families and limited 
access to religious sites and mosques. Secondly, with the implementation of closure, the 
natural education patterns are also greatly affected. As a direct result of permits and 
closure, travelling to other schools and Universities in the Gaza and West Bank is highly 
limited, resulting in fewer Palestinians obtaining higher education. Notably, an indirect 
result of the implementation of closure is that families cannot afford to send their children 
to school, as an extra pair of hands brings income to the family. Thirdly, the use of permit 
and closure measures has more general and devastating effects on the Palestinian 
economy; as the unemployment rate rises, the percentage of families living in poverty 
increases, and when the border closes, so does the movement of commodities.  
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In addition to examining the effects of the permit system and closure policy on 
Palestinians in general, this section will include a discussion about how, like every other 
counter terrorism method, these effects are directly linked to government policy and 
therefore also indirectly to the policy of the peace process. The question of whether 
closures and the permit system are merely political tools used to provide Israel with a 
politically advantageous position, as opposed to being effective against terrorism, will be 
discussed, especially given that closure was a policy long before the establishment of 
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. How Hamas as an organisation adapts to the 
challenges its military wing faces because of such restrictions, and how its socio-political 
arm confronts and takes advantage of the poor conditions caused by the permit system 
and closure policy, will also be discussed.  
 
5. 2. 1 The historical dimensions of closure 
 
The first closure policy appeared in Article 125 of the Emergency Regulations of 
1945, which was inherited from the British Mandate. It stated that smaller regions of 
Palestine could be declared ‘closed military areas’ for any short or long period of time, 
where no movement in or out was permitted.335 The closure policy has since been 
through many political debates concerning refinement and extension, which has resulted 
in a policy shift that is grounded in the fluctuating nature of the economic links between 
Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank.  
 
The first debate was in 1967, following the Six-Day War, and led to the 
emergence of two views on the economic situation. One side, spearheaded by then 
Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir, argued for an economic separation between Israel, Gaza, 
and the West Bank, whereas the other side, lead by then Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, 
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favoured further economic integration.336 The latter side, advocating economic 
integration, won, and by 1972 the two economies were heavily interlinked, as 
exemplified by the fact that nearly 90 percent of Palestinian trade was with Israel prior to 
the first Intifada. Furthermore, nearly 40 percent of the Palestinian workforce had jobs in 
Israel, creating 25 percent of Palestinian national income.337 Although the two economies 
were interlinked, since the 1967 war, when Gaza and the West Bank came under Israeli 
rule, Israel did not take steps to establish an economic, labour, or health infrastructure in 
Gaza and the West Bank. In 1985, the current Defence Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, openly 
declared Israel’s strategic objective: “there will be no development in the Gaza Strip and 
West Bank initiated by the Israeli government, and no permits given for expanding 
agriculture or industry which may compete with the State of Israel.”338 The permanent, 
general closure, the recurrent total and internal closures and the extensive permit system 
have ensured that Rabin’s objective is still valid. This policy is often sited as being one of 
the many factors leading to the impoverishment of the Palestinian economy, and 
significantly restricted economic activity.   
 
With the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the debate on closure and economic 
inter-dependency once again reappeared, in particular the question of separation versus 
integration. One side supported further Israeli-Palestinian integration, arguing integration 
promoted peace beneficial to both sides. The other side promoted economic separation, 
and argued that integration advanced an already distorted Palestinian economy, heavily 
dependent on Israel. The latter view essentially supported the policy of closure based on 
economic reasons, and it also further implied that a mutual, just and long-lasting peace 
was not possible.  
 
In this section, the kind of closure policy that started in March 1991, when general 
exit permits were revoked, will be discussed. This policy is still in place today – closure 
policy as a counter terrorism method. 
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5. 2. 2 Different types of closure since 1991 
 
There are three different types of closure: general, internal and total. A general 
closure refers to the overall restrictions placed on movement both within and between the 
West Bank, Gaza, and Israel and between the West Bank and Gaza itself. General closure 
has constantly been in place, and it is from this policy that the permit system originated.  
 
It was the revocation of the general exit permit in 1991 that marked the beginning 
of the general and permanent closure policy. The revocation reached its peak two years 
later on March 30, 1993, when, as a response to the killing of nine Israeli civilians and six 
members of the IDF, Israel imposed a general closure on Gaza and the West Bank “until 
further notice.”339 To enforce the closure, Israel gradually placed checkpoints along the 
Green Line separating Israel and the West Bank, between the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem340, and subsequently within Gaza and the West Bank. Permits were required 
for movement between the numerous areas, but these check-points were not systematic 
and there was no clear border per se, making it relatively easy to sneak in and out of 
Israel. In an attempt to hinder such human trafficking, Israeli police began to capture and 
arrest ‘infiltrators’, and military courts imposed heavy fines on those caught without 
proper papers.341 Addressing this implementation of general closure in the Knesset, Rabin 
stated that it could not be a permanent solution. However, he argued that: 
 
“…it did have a profound psychological effect on those under closure. It shattered 
their illusions that terrorism will simply cause us to abandon the territories 
without any word of agreement or arrangement. […] They should realise that they 
will get absolutely nothing without negotiations.”342      
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The second type of closure is internal closure. This type of closure prevents 
Palestinians from the West Bank from visiting Jerusalem, even with a valid permit, and 
prevents or discourages Jerusalemites from travelling to the West Bank or Gaza. Since 
Gaza is isolated from the West Bank, this prohibits anybody from leaving or entering 
Gaza during any kind of closure. Internal closure is generally imposed after terror attacks 
or in an attempt to prevent such attacks, when the Israelis have intelligence indicating an 
imminent terror attack. It can also be imposed at ‘sensitive’ times, such as Memorial Day, 
Independence Day and other Israeli holidays or days politically significant to 
Palestinians, such as the end of Ramadan and al-Quds day.  
 
Thirdly, a total closure refers to the complete banning of any movement, and is a 
system of population control imposed on Palestinians, generally after a terror attack on 
Israel. This type of closure isolates Palestinian villages from each other, and occasionally 
includes a curfew on a town or the entire Palestinian population. It also stops movement 
at the borders to Jordan and Egypt. It effectively places whole groups of Palestinians in 
cantons separated by areas under the control of Israel.  
 
The estimated number of days that Gaza and the West Bank have been under 
internal or total closure varies depending on the report or source. This further emphasises 
that this is indeed a numbers game used to serve whatever political agenda is being 
played. However, it is useful to use one example which shows the broad development of 
this method. It is remarkable that the estimated number of days of closure has only 
increased over time. During the three years of the pre-Gulf War Intifada, i.e. from 
December 1987 to January 1991, the statistics from the Palestinian Authority reveal the 
West Bank was closed for a mere 18 days, and Gaza only 16 days. However, from the 
beginning of the Gulf War and the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the West Bank 
was subjected to 48 days of closure and Gaza Strip was sealed for 90 days.343 There were 
329 days of comprehensive closure between 1993 and 1996 (almost 25% of total days), 
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and 27 days of internal closure in 1996 alone.344 The use of external and total closure is 
therefore dependent on the level of, or threat of, violence originating from Gaza and the 
West Bank, the general political mood in Israeli politics, or the current status of the peace 
process itself.  
 
5. 2. 3 Education and economy – two of many factors influenced 
by the permit system and closure policy  
 
Closures have a wide-range of effects on Palestinian society and way of life. The 
relationship between closure and the Palestinian economy is perhaps the most studied and 
evident. However closure also causes disruption to education. Although these two factors 
put severe restrictions on the future development of the West Bank and Gaza, as well as 
framing the society of a future Palestinian state, it is also worth mentioning some 
consequences that affect Palestinian identity.  
 
As the location of many holy sites, both Muslim and Christian, is inside 
Jerusalem, closure has an enormous effect on religious life. For Muslims, Jerusalem is the 
site of the Haram al-Sharif, containing the Al-Aqsa mosque, the third holiest shrine in 
Islam, and the Dome of the Rock. During the holy month of Ramadan, Muslims typically 
gather for prayers in the Al-Aqsa mosque every Friday, and as a preventative measure 
against terrorism, closure is often imposed every Friday during Ramadan. Israel fears the 
added incentive that Ramadan might provide for a potential terrorist. Saud al-Shawa, a 
Hamas activist in Gaza City, explains: “When a Moslem is killed by soldiers in these 
days he will be getting the bliss of Allah because it is a blessed month where any activity 
is equal to 70 religious activities any other time.”345 For example, restrictions on 
movement were implemented on January 26 1996, just hours before the first Friday 
prayers, and the Israeli army prohibited residents of the West Bank under the age of thirty 
and all Gazans, even if they held valid permits, from entering into East Jerusalem. The 
                                                 
344 Roy, Sara; “Progress, Stagnation, or Regression? The Palestinian economy under the Oslo Accords”, 1 
April 2000, www.cesr.org, accessed 13 May 2001. 
345 Jerusalem Post; “Moslem holy month can be a holy terror for settlers, soldiers” 18 February 1994 
www.jpost.com, accessed 13 May 2001. 
 133 
last day of Ramadan has also been subjected to closure, prohibiting Muslims from joining 
together in Jerusalem for prayers. This is especially hard for Palestinians, knowing that 
tourists and pilgrims from all religions and origins are usually allowed to visit these sites. 
“I have moved from America to settle down where my family once lived. I have crossed 
the Atlantic to get to pray in the al- Aqsa Mosque, I can even see the dome from the roof 
of my house, but I am not allowed to travel the last few kilometres.”346 
 
The Israeli author Amira Hass argues that the restriction of freedom of movement 
and religious rights are not the only consequences of the permit system and closure 
policy. She claims it has contributed to the formation of a new social class and allowed 
corruption to blossom, as it segments an entire society on the basis of whether one has 
access, and the extent of that access, and the ‘privilege’ of freedom of movement.347 As a 
result, a whole network developed where the central questions were: Who knew a person 
who knew a person who could make sure one got a permit? Who would take a bribe in 
order to help?  
 
Amira Hass also points out another significant consequence of the permit system 
and the closure policy; it stole time –time one never could take back. “Time was wasted 
filling out forms and obtaining supporting documents, standing in line, making several 
phone calls a day to check whether the permit had arrived, while never knowing if one 
would receive a permit or even if you did, was it the right permit?”348 This of course 
resulted in never being able to plan your everyday life. Gradually this will result in the 
inability to act spontaneously, and finally the determination to secure the Palestinian 
freedom of movement may very well wear down. 
 
 
                                                 
346 An American Palestinian who moved to East Jerusalem. BBC Panorama, The meaning of Jerusalem, 
BBC Television. 
347 Hass, Amira; “Israel’s Closure Policy: An Ineffective Strategy of Containment and Repression”, Journal 
of Palestine Studies, XXXI, no. 3, 2002. 
348 Ibid. 
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Effects on education 
 
At its best, education allows individuals to acquire skills and knowledge and 
provides political, social, and economic resources to support future well-being. 
Moreover, in the long term, it builds a state – a critical understanding of government, 
economy, and culture, and provides opportunities for individuals to better themselves and 
their society. In the West Bank and Gaza, education will allow the continuous formation 
of a national identity, thus Palestinian schools and universities will clearly have important 
roles to play in the transition to and establishment of statehood. The permit system and 
closure policy severely impair the educational system from functioning properly at all 
levels. The most obvious is perhaps the limitation of movement which prevents students 
and teachers alike from reaching school or university. The education of each individual is 
also affected by the economic restrictions on Palestinian society at large, as well as on 
each individual family, due to the cost of quality education which is essential for human 
development.  
 
Inside Gaza and the West Bank, the median age among a population of over three 
million, is respectively just under 16 and 18,349 meaning that the majority of the 
population is of school/university age. The education in the West Bank and Gaza is 
provided by several sectors: the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA focus on basic and 
secondary education, whereas the private and NGO sectors dominate the pre-school and 
tertiary levels. The Palestinian school system is a two-stream system, literary and 
scientific that consists of primary and secondary grades. After the ninth school year, 
students must choose a stream along which to complete the required twelve years of 
schooling, which ends with the Tawjihi (matriculation) exam; passing is required for 
university or college enrolment.350 Considering that a high percentage of the population is 
of school age, it comes as no surprise that there is a lack of schools in Gaza and the West 
                                                 
349 Gaza average age 15,8 and in the West Bank 18. CIA Fact Book 2007, www.cia.gov, accessed 12 
January 2007. 
350 Palestinian Academic Society for Study of International Affairs; “Statistics on education”, 
www.passia.org, accessed 20 January 2007. 
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Bank. Many schools are overcrowded, and it is not uncommon for students to attend 
schools in shifts.351  
 
The estimated number of universities and colleges that exist in the West Bank and 
Gaza seems to vary according to closure policy and economical restraints, in addition to 
the source. However, in the academic year of 1998/1999 there were six universities and 
three colleges in the West Bank, and two universities and one college in Gaza, serving a 
total of 63,000 students. At that time, the collective number of students in institutions of 
higher learning was continually on the increase. With 22,000 students in Gaza alone, a 
relatively high fraction of the population were students in comparison to that of the Arab 
World and Israel.352 This might seem a paradox, seeing as how closures not only restrain 
the freedom of movement, but also place an economic burden on families, hence it might 
be an indication of the importance of education to the Palestinians, as well as high levels 
of unemployment in both the West Bank and Gaza. 
 
During the first Intifada, the education of an entire generation of young 
Palestinians was routinely disrupted due to regular school and university closures by the 
Israeli military. For example, from 1987 to 1991 it was not uncommon for schools to lose 
as much as half of their class time due to closures and strikes.353 The education system in 
the West Bank and Gaza was transferred from Israeli control to the Palestinian Authority 
in 1994, as a condition of implementation of the Oslo Accords. 354 However, even after 
the signing of the Oslo Accords, Israel has continued to block the pursuit of education 
through regular closures and the arbitrary system of granting permits. In May 1995, for 
example, Israel passed regulations prohibiting the issuing of permits to study in 
Jerusalem to any students who had not previously been registered in an educational 
institute, thus preventing any new students from enrolling for studies in Jerusalem.355 
 
                                                 
351 In the academic year 2005/2006 25 percent of students where enrolled in shifts. Ibid. 
352 Paz, Reuven; Hamas analyses its Terrorist Activity, 21 December 1999, www.ict.org.il, accessed 13 
October 2000. 
353 RAND; “Building a Successful Palestinian State”, www.rand.org, accessed 20 January 2007. 
354 Ibid. 
355 Human Rights Watch; “Israel closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip”, July 1996, www.hrw.org, 
accessed 12 October 2000. 
 136 
The students affected the hardest by closures are those from Gaza who choose to 
pursue their studies at West Bank universities, where they can pursue specific courses 
that are unavailable in Gaza, such as electrical and chemical engineering, sociology and 
political science. Although the Islamic University is located in Gaza with little over 9,000 
students in the school year 1998/99, and Al-Azhar University is also situated in Gaza 
with 12,000 students in the same year, there have still been many who seek their 
education in the West Bank.356 In 1995, an estimated 1,300 students from Gaza were 
enrolled in West Bank universities. Although more students wanted to enrol, all were not 
granted permits by the Israeli authorities.357 Obtaining student permits is often difficult 
and time consuming for applicants, as the average Gaza student spends approximately 
fifteen hours waiting in line at various Israeli civil administration offices. Each time they 
must apply for three necessary permits: to transit Israel, to reside in the West Bank for 
three months, and a renewal for the fourth months of each school semester.358 During the 
first two months of 1995, the second semester permits were cancelled twice. With each 
cancellation, students were forced to start their school year again.359  
 
Closures do not only affect the students; they can also prevent the staff from 
arriving at universities. For example, the ‘spring closure’ that was imposed by Israel on 
February 12, 1996 on the city of Ramallah, blocked the access of 3,000 of Birzeit 
University’s 5,000 students and staff to the campus. Seventy days after the 1995-96 
academic year had already begun, Israel finally responded to the request of 350 permits 
for students from Gaza by the university.360 Even when a permit is granted, students must 
still cope with potential refusals of any permit at any part of the four-tier process, in 
addition to arbitrary confiscations of valid permits by soldiers at checkpoints and blanket 
confiscations of existing permits after security incidents or administrative problems. 
During the 1994-95 academic year, all permits were cancelled on three separate 
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occasions in a single semester, leaving Gaza students who were still in the West Bank, 
vulnerable to arrest.361  
 
There have been reports suggesting that Israel’s use of granting permits is more a 
political tool than a security measure. Supporting this is the fact that the students from 
Gaza who enrolled in the University of Bir Zeit in the West Bank were denied permits for 
the first half of the semester. Halfway through the semester, Israel agreed to grant 
permission to two-thirds of the students, on the condition that they sign a declaration of 
support for the political negotiations that were in progress at the time.362 This indicates 
that the reason for an individual not being granted a permit is not due to security, leaving 
the students to wonder under which premises a permit is granted.  
 
When schools are closed down, or students prevented from attending classes, the 
students are just added to the numbers of stone-throwers, and those who seek a sense of 
purpose to their life join the mosques. In essence, there is a cumulative danger with 
giving too much free time to young people who are restless and frustrated.  
 
The influence of Hamas on students  
 
The Israelis, in general, struggle to find a strong support base for peace 
negotiations at the Universities. Palestinian universities are characterized by a high level 
of national political activity compared to their counterparts in Europe, North America, 
and other parts of the Arab world. The activities of the student unions indeed reflect the 
students’ concerns about the Palestinian political situation, as opposed to tuition or 
student clubs. Even though there has been long-standing support for the Islamists 
amongst the students, it does not necessarily reflect the views of the general Palestinian 
public. Despite this, a student’s support is no doubt significant, since Palestinian society 




is so young.363 The students are therefore the natural leading social and political 
component, and monitoring their political pulse can give indications as to which direction 
the society is heading. The many years of social revolution and fighting have also led to a 
high level of political awareness in young Palestinians, leaving little place for political 
apathy. Therefore, the Palestinian universities function as mirrors reflecting the 
tendencies of Palestinian public opinion in general.  
 
When Hamas was first created in 1987/88, it inherited a substantial tradition 
regarding how to build and advance education. The Muslim Brotherhood had a long 
tradition of promoting education for all social classes, as exemplified by al-Banna, 
himself a teacher, and as part of their fundamental ideology to re-Islamise society from 
the bottom-up. Hamas therefore made substantial investment and built schools and 
universities suitable for all levels of education. A university such as the Islamic 
University of Gaza has long traditions of Islamist politics.  
 
“At the IUG a student council was formed as early as 1979-80 with a nine-
member executive committee. Regular elections where held and the result was 
always the same: the overwhelming majority of votes went to the Mujama-backed 
(the organisations that later became Hamas) Islamic block,” 364  
 
When, during the first Intifada, Israel closed down schools and universities, such patterns 
continued. Hamas would transfer classes to mosques, thus enforcing close relations 
between education and religion. In order to relieve the burden of student numbers, 110 
and 74 licensed non-formal education institutions have been established in the West Bank 
and Gaza respectively, in which 147 are privately owned and 14 are run by charities.365 
This contributes to Hamas’ social welfare system, effectively supplying Palestinians not 
only with a general education, but also with an education taught according to Hamas 
guidelines. Such learning centres are potentially an important recruitment source for 
Hamas’ military wing.  
 
                                                 
363 With the average age in Gaza being just under 16, as already stated. CIA Fact Book www.cia.gov, 
accessed 12 January 2007. 
364 Milton-Edwards, Beverley; Islamic Politics in Palestine, I. B. Tauris Publishers, London 1996, p.112. 
365 Palestinian Academic Society for Study of International Affairs; Yearbook 2000, PASSIA, p.269. 
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The close relationship between education and Hamas has been sustained even 
after the first Intifada, as Hamas, in close competition with Fatah, is often the winner of 
student council elections in universities both inside Gaza and the West Bank. The 
Palestinian students, due to their youthful tendency to be more revolutionary, are often 
more extreme than the rest of society. This partly explains the enormous support for 
Hamas in past elections. However, what is remarkable is that, despite the signing of the 
Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, this trend is still 
constant. Hamas won all the student elections from 1996-1999 at Hebron University, Bir 
Zeit University, the Islamic University of Gaza, and al-Najah University, with the Fatah 
movement as the second largest contender.366 Notably, the only year Hamas lost to Fatah 
was in 1997 at the University of Bir Zeit, by a single seat. However, Hamas regained the 
majority one year later, with an equally narrow win. Fascinatingly, this narrow win 
coincided with the period when Hamas’ level of violence dropped, arguably due to the 
serious crack down by both Israeli and Palestinian Authority police, after a set of suicide 
attacks inside Israel in spring 1996, in addition to the final release of Sheik Yassin from 
an Israeli jail. When this relatively quiet time crumbled in April 1998,367 the next election 
held in 1999 resulted in Hamas gaining a solid win against Fatah at the University of Bir 
Zeit elections, with 23 seats to Fatah’s 19.368 It is therefore tempting to speculate that the 
Israeli enforced closure and hindrance of students from studying could in turn result in a 




The West Bank and Gaza have faced discernible economic hardship since the 
occupation of the territories following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. However, the entities 
have not necessarily faced fewer challenges to their future stability and viability since the 
signing of the Oslo-Accord in 1993. The Oslo Accord was regarded by the world as a 
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367 The killing of the Awadallah brothers started a series of revenge attacks.  
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step towards the eventual resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has been argued that 
the Oslo Accord has brought many changes and a positive stabilisation of the economy. 
Palestinians hoped for a more prosperous economic future with the signing of the Oslo 
Accord in 1993. The hopes grew even stronger with the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority the following year. However, an opposing argument was that the Oslo Accord 
institutionalised the Palestinian economy to become even more dependent on Israeli 
politics. Oslo also legitimised the use of the closure policy, and there was a drastic 
increase in the number of days Gaza and the West Bank were constrained by closure, 
resulting in severe economic hardship and deprivation.369 The economic hardship that 
followed suddenly became a price to pay for peace, instead of a reason for sustaining the 
conflict. According to data compiled by INGOs, NGOs, local government, and various 
research groups, the post-Oslo economic demise of Palestine far exceeds the severity of 
any pre-Oslo Palestinian economic decline. The United Nations has estimated that the 
cumulative economic loss to the Palestinian economy, as a result of the closure policy 
and permit system alone, was $6.5 billion from 1993 to 1996, i.e. $4.4 million a day. The 
Palestinian Authority estimates a daily loss of $8-$9 million.370 Naturally, the Oslo 
Accord may not be the single cause for the present economic situation in Palestine. 
Although it should be acknowledged that there was a slowdown in the economy prior to 
the signing, Oslo did not allow the Palestinian economy to rejuvenate itself. Instead, 
Israel imposed closures and restriction on the Palestinian population—due to Israeli 
security anxiety—hence leading to job losses, and restrictions in exports to Israel and the 
international market, as well as in trade within the West Bank and Gaza, in order to 
enhance imports from Israel and abroad.     
 
Economic dependency: the import/ export dimension 
 
When enforcing the closure policy, the commercial crossing points along the West 
Bank and Gaza Strips’ borders with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt are closed, having a severe 
                                                 
369 Roy, Sara; “Crisis Within: The Armed Struggle for Palestinian Society”, Critique, no. 17, 2000. 
370 Roy, Sara; “Progress, Stagnation, or Regression? The Palestinian economy under the Oslo Accords”, 1 
April 2000, www.cesr.org, accessed 13 May 2001. 
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impact on the Palestinian import and export trade. Furthermore, it paralyzes many 
manufacturing processes that depend on imported materials, which naturally in turn affect 
their export rate. The trade imbalance between Palestine and Israel has grown over time. 
In 1987 the ratio of imports to exports was three to one, whereas in 1997 it was more like 
four-and-a-half to one. In 1998, goods were imported to the value of USD 2374 million, 
while the total value of exports was estimated at USD 673 million.371  
 
With respect to export, the numerous restrictions and conditions placed on 
Palestine have forced the Palestinians to market their limited amount of export abroad 
through Israeli exporters and export agencies, for a lower profit than they would 
otherwise achieve. Due to this added cost, the product is less competitive, and the 
unpredictable closures make it difficult to rely on the product, hence many export 
agencies favour Israeli products. Israel has also restricted trade and capital movements 
between Gaza and the West Bank and Arab countries, and despite an increase in trade 
since 1997, this represents less than seven percent of total trade. This has resulted in the 
isolation of the West Bank and Gaza from their traditional and most natural markets.372 
While placing these regulations on international exports, Israel also enforces restrictions 
which regulate the export of goods from the West Bank and Gaza to Israel. This is 
especially applicable in the industrial and agricultural sectors, where Israel has sought to 
create a barrier against the flow of inexpensive Palestinian goods to Israeli markets, 
which would otherwise undermine Israeli production and economic growth. Israel 
initiated this procedure as early as 1967, when they made the import, export and internal 
transportation of all goods to and from the West Bank and Gaza conditional upon the 
permit system, resulting in an asymmetrically co-dependent relationship between the 
Israeli and the Palestinian economy.  
 
The Israeli government rarely grants permits for the establishment of industries 
competing with Israeli products. Even if granted, the Palestinian businesses seeking to 
                                                 
371 Ibid. 
372 Reuveny, Rafael; “The Political Economy of Israel-Palestinian Interdependence”, Policy Studies 
Journal, Vol. 27, issue 4, 1999. Compared to a steady export rate of 85 percent from the West Bank and 
Gaza to Israel in the years 1992-1999. Roy, Sara; “Progress, Stagnation, or Regression? The Palestinian 
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export or import through Israeli ports face transaction costs on average 35 percent higher 
than for Israeli firms in the same industry.373 This is because Palestinian importers, who 
are unable to obtain a permit, cannot physically go to release goods from Israeli ports, 
and must, therefore, employ costly Israeli shipping or clearance agents to obtain their 
shipments and arrange for transport.374 The impact of this policy becomes obvious when 
about 90 percent of Gaza and the West Banks’ imports originate in Israel. In addition, the 
export rate from the West Bank and Gaza to Israel was steadily around 85 percent from 
1992-1999. Furthermore, in 1992, 88 percent of all imports to the West Bank and Gaza 
came from Israel, and in 1997 this development had not changed much.375 Conversely, 
the participation of Gaza and the West Bank in Israel’s foreign trade has been small. In 
1992, merchandise imports to Israel totalled $18.8 billion, only one percent of which 
came from Gaza and the West Bank. Israeli exports in 1992 reached $13.1 billion, and 
about eight percent went to the West Bank and Gaza.376 Israeli products freely enter 
Palestinian markets, without restrictions or import duties.377 Moreover, the extensive 
bureaucratic procedures for trade, the numerous security checks, and permit requirements 
have resulted in an economic isolation even between the West Bank and Gaza. The share 
of internal Palestinian trade has diminished in the years 1994–1996 by over 20 percent. 
Internal trade fell from 8.03% of total Gaza trade in 1995 to 2.4% in 1996.  
 
With respect to Israel, Palestinian exports to Israel represent a minor two percent 
of Israel’s total imports and merely eight percent of Israel’s total trade, reflecting a higher 
dependency on exports compared to imports,378 consequently the economic effects of 
Israeli-Palestinian trade dissociation are smaller on Israel than on the Palestinians. One of 
the intentions of the Oslo Accords was to enable the West Bank and Gaza to slowly build 
an economy that could finally sustain an independent state. The numbers cited above do 
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not give the whole picture, but clearly show that the economy of the West Bank and Gaza 
has become more dependent on Israel rather than less so. These numbers also indicate 




As a result of the permit system introduced with the new closure policy in March 
1993, many workers from the West Bank and Gaza lost their jobs. Furthermore, due to 
the shortage of viable economic opportunities inside Gaza and the West Bank, they were 
also unable to find work inside the Palestinian areas. Therefore, as a direct result of the 
new closure policy, the number of Palestinians working inside Israel dropped by almost 
50 percent. In Gaza the unemployment rate rose to 55 percent and in the West Bank to 13 
percent.379  
 
The Gross National Product (GNP)380 of the West Bank and Gaza far exceeds its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)381, thus indicating a reliance on external sources of 
income. Although the following table only covers 1992 to 1999, it is as a useful example 
of this.    
 
Table 3: Real and real per capita GDP and GNP for WBGS from 1992 - 1999382 
  









1992 3,728.55 5,003.68 1,999.76 2,683.66 1,864,500 
1993 3,196.55 3,892.25 1,619.33 1,971.76 1,974,000 
1994 3,551.90 3,996.65 1,680.18 1,890.56 2,114,000 
1995 3,956.48 4,203.99 1,764.32 1,874.69 2,242,500 
1996 3,893.17 4,082.07 1,633.73 1,713.00 2,383,000 
                                                 
379 These figures do not include those who have work permits but are unable to reach their jobs in Israel due 
to regular closures. Roy, Sara; “De-Development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society since Oslo”, 
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of who own these factors. 
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1997 4,107.30 4,408.64 1,608.18 1,726.17 2,554,000 
1998 4,484.00 5,475.00 1,547.00 1,889.00 2,611,092 
1999 4,686.00 5,726.00 1,552.00 1,896.00 3,069,551 
 
Furthermore, the table indicates a steady increase in population size. This growth, 
combined with a lack of viable economic infrastructure, illustrates that the need for 
employment abroad is fundamental, due to the scarce resources in Palestine. The increase 
in GNP indicates a reliance on Palestinian nationals working abroad in the form of 
salaries earned, whether in Israel or foreign remittances, fostering extreme economic 
dependency at the cost of internal economic development. 
 
External payments are normally spent on basic necessities rather than invested in 
the country. The lack of internal investment contributes to an underdeveloped economy 
and a prolonged dependence on external sources of income. Although the Palestinian 
economy succeeded in creating more than 300,000 new jobs during the Oslo years of 
1995-2000,383 this growth was not sufficient to curb unemployment. This was partly 
because the Palestinian labour force had grown by more than four percent per annum 
after 1993, with fertility rates in Gaza around seven children per woman and around five 
in the West Bank.384 Therefore, during the Oslo period, unemployment in Gaza remained 
high, varying from 15 percent to 32.5 percent between 1993 and 2000, compared with 10 
percent to 23.8 percent in the West Bank.385 Tens of thousands of Palestinians had no 
other option to support themselves and their families other than to continue seeking 
employment in Israel. Another incentive was the wages, as in Israel the wages were 
double that in Gaza and 30 to 50 percent higher than those in the West Bank.386 It is 
estimated that every Gazan who works in Israel is able to feed ten people on their 
salary.387 However, this work is not reliable since the work permits are cancelled each 
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time Israel enforces a total closure, leaving Palestinians unemployed until Israel slowly 
eases the restrictions. An example is the total closure enforced in 1996. Prior to this 
closure, 35,000 Palestinians held work permits in Israel. The total closure left 60-70 
percent of the Palestinian labour force in Gaza unemployed and 40-50 percent the 
workforce in the West Bank unemployed.388 A year later, in June 1997, Palestinians had 
still not truly recovered, and there was an unemployment rate of 17 percent in West Bank 
and 25 percent in Gaza.389  
 
Although economic activity resumes after closure, the severe economic 
consequences of general closure, particularly total closure, have a long-lasting impact, 
especially on the already deprived Gaza Strip, directly affecting the population’s standard 
of living. This strain on the Palestinian economy creates a situation where the number of 
families living below the poverty line is rapidly increasing. According to the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics, the poverty line is defined as a household with two adults 
and four children living on $650 per person per year, hence less than $2 per day. Between 
1995 and 1997, the number of poor Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank increased 
from 20 to 40 percent.390 
 
The high level of poverty and unemployment as a consequence of the permit 
system and closure policy are utilised by Hamas to further strengthen their organisation 
and place in Palestinian society. The ideological idea and traditions underlining the 
social-economic beliefs of Hamas will be examined next. The manner in which Hamas 
reacts, adopts, and reinvents itself on an operational level, when confronted with the 
constraints presented by the permit system and closure policy, will subsequently be 
studied.  
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5. 2. 4. The reaction of Hamas as a multifunctional organization 
 
One of the reasons it is a major challenge to counter the violent operations 
performed by Hamas, is because of the complexity and diversity or the organisation. It is 
not merely a military group, nor just a political one. Hamas is more than just an 
organisation which masterminds suicide bomb attacks and violence against Israel. It is 
more than just a group that enjoys grassroots support from the deeply religious or those 
who subscribe to its doctrinal position and ideology. Hamas is a multilayered 
organisation, within which its socio-political dimension plays a vital role. Hamas utilises 
deep and horizontal roots in Palestinian society and is keenly aware of the Palestinian 
hardships, while sharing the community concerns and aspirations. It is primarily through 
Hamas’ humanitarian services, as opposed to political and military doctrines, that many 
Palestinians initially find the organisation so appealing. However, the boundaries 
between Hamas’ social, political, and military activities are blurred, particularly since 
Hamas leaders use mosques, kindergartens, and youth clubs as forums for spewing anti-
Israeli propaganda and gaining support for violence against Israel.391  
 
It is this complex setting that makes it problematic to evaluate effective counter 
measures against Hamas. Hence, addressing the socio-political characteristics of Hamas 
is important for understanding how Israel’s closure policy and permit system affect 
Hamas. Also explored here is how Hamas might utilize these counter terrorism measures 
to exploit the economic hardships that the closure policy and permits system place on 
Palestinian society. This section will also consider the operational limitations on Hamas 
that the closure policy and permit system represent. The relationship between Palestinians 
in the West Bank and Gaza will briefly be studied, in order to evaluate how this 
relationship has influenced Hamas. How the closure policy and permit system has 
affected Hamas’ modus operandi will then be examined.  
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Socio-political aspects of Hamas 
 
Hamas’ social-political aspects are based on Islam and have developed over time. 
The organisation has been heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, which claimed 
that one had to save the Islamic soul before saving the land, and has therefore focused on 
solving social problems. In Islam there is a strong ethic concerning social charity work. 
Indeed, one of the five pillars of Islam is zakat, (alms, tax, and charity).392 The Koran 
does not explicitly state the size of a donation, but states one should give what can be 
spared in order to help the less privileged. These ideas are manifested in the Hamas 
Charter, where Hamas claims to be a humanistic movement, which “takes care of human 
rights and is guided by Islamic tolerance when dealing with the followers of other 
religions.”393 Accordingly, the best way to withstand the ‘tyranny of the enemy’ is to 
build a unified society distinguished by solidarity, making charitable organisations a 
cornerstone in such society.  
 
As previously mentioned, the poverty rate in the West Bank, and particularly 
Gaza, is high, and the lack of a public social benefit system is evident. In such an 
environment, Hamas thrives. One out of six Palestinians receives some sort of social 
benefit from Hamas.394 These services may include health care, education and training, 
housing assistance, charity/welfare, technical assistance with respect to human rights and 
legal aid. Through these services, Hamas builds a foundation from which it can claim 
legitimacy and gain popularity. Furthermore, it is through these services that Hamas has a 
finger on the collective Palestinian pulse. By keeping in touch with the concerns of the 
poor and working classes, they retain their influence in terms of religious conduct, 
political choices, and beliefs. Moreover, it allows Hamas to adjust its tactics and 
constantly ‘represent’ the Palestinian people.  
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However, these charity organisations provide an additional function, namely 
funnelling money. It has been speculated that around 95 percent of Hamas’ budget 
finances social service activities. The estimated budget is in the region of $40-70 
million.395 Reportedly, 80 percent the budget comes from countries such as Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. Israeli officials have even tracked funds from Muslim groups 
in the U.S. and Britain.396 It is mainly the Palestinian Diaspora and Islamic associations 
and other charity organisations in the Arab world that give large sums of money to 
Hamas. “This success was due largely to the Islamic ethics of these societies and the 
honesty and integrity with which they conducted their activities.”397 After the outbreak of 
the first Gulf war, many Arab states re-directed their financial support from the PLO, 
who had supported Saddam Hussein, to Hamas which was seen as a virtuous 
organisation. This development continued also after the establishment of the PA, which 
proved to be highly corrupt. Obviously not all of the money is used for charitable work, 
although it is not exactly clear how much goes to support their military wing. This often 
means that the donor does not know whether the money is going to support military 
operations or social welfare.  
 
The fact that Hamas is a multilayered organisation often places them in a win-win 
situation. Although Hamas takes advantage of the poverty stricken population to carry 
out its political agenda of an Islamic state, its military operations are proclaimed to be 
justified on the basis that the suffering of the Palestinians should be compensated through 
violent retaliation. A result of this pragmatic view, even if Hamas’ military wing should 
experience hardship as a result of Israel’s counter terrorism methods, Hamas, as an 
organisation, will, in the long-term, benefit from this as they will gain sympathy from the 
local population . And vice versa; when the socio-political part of Hamas gains support, 
the military wing also reaps the benefits. In this way, Hamas, as a whole organisation, 
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manages to sustain its legitimacy by switching between ideological concepts of da’wa398 
and jihad.  
 
At the core of Hamas lie the charitable institutions and societies including 
mosques, classes that teach Islam, zakat (alms tax) committees, medical clinics, relief 
societies, orphanages, schools, universities, cultural societies, and sports clubs. The 
growing distrust towards the Palestinian Authority and the lack of economic growth 
continued to escalate during the second Intifada, thus increasing Hamas’ support network 
and influence.  
 
“It [Hamas] operates a special wholesale market in Samaria where products are 
sold at low prices and staples are provided free of charge. Hamas operatives also 
provide medical services and visit families to check on their financial situation. Its 
student organization runs day care centres and distributes free meals during 
holidays. Hamas’ charitable organization supports 6,700 in the Nablus area 
alone.”399 
 
The social network provided by Hamas enables it to remain in touch with the poorer 
segments and working classes, and to influence their religious conduct, political choices, 
and beliefs. As Kupperwasser, an Israeli intelligence analyst, says: 
 
“All of Hamas’ welfare and ceremonies and education and health care have one 
aim; to make people ready to participate in terror acts. As long as they convince 
Palestinians to look at suicide bombers as heroes and martyrs, instead of the 
roadblock to peace, Hamas is going to be successful.” 400 
 
With such a broad and multifaceted network, Hamas makes each and every 
incident advantageous in the long-run. When Hamas violently attacks Israel, ‘in 
resistance to the occupation’, it normally gains instant support for its actions. Some 
Palestinians will not necessary support the violence, but at least there is a sense of 
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something happening, someone is doing something. A teacher at Bir Zeit University 
elaborates: 
 
“I will tell you frankly, when you have a terrorist activity, the bulk of the people 
are happy. You have so much abuse, humiliation, dehumanisation of people, that 
any act that hurts the enemy has the immediate impact of cooling off. The blood 
of the enemy –it’s almost a cannibalistic attitude. Palestinians feel helpless. Any 
activity, including terrorist activity, is something to say ‘We are still armed.’ It is 
a reminder.”401  
 
The violent attack will then have the opposite effect in the short-term. Total closure is 
usually implemented by Israel after a terror attack, and the Palestinians experience the 
economic and social hardship that follows and therefore hold Hamas responsible. “As a 
result, the man in the street began to believe the Hamas’ military operations were 
responsible for his sufferings,”402 says Ghazi Hamad, the editor of the Hamas newspaper 
al-Watan. Support for attacks against Israelis dropped from 57 percent in November 
1994, to 46 percent in February 1995, to 33 percent a month later, and to 21 percent in 
March 1996, all dates after major bomb attacks inside Israel. Not only does the support 
for Hamas drop after such violent attacks. After a series of suicide bombings in the 
Spring of 1996, only 32 percent of the population were opposed to Israeli and Palestinian 
Authority reprisals against Hamas.403 However, these phases of decreased support for 
Hamas are usually brief, since Hamas will always provide financial, social and religious 
help to Palestinians suffering from Israeli counter terrorism methods. Therefore, even if 
the support for the military wing of Hamas decreases for a period, the support for Hamas 
as a whole organisation will increase in the long-run, and ultimately Hamas’ military 
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Hamas’ operational adaptations 
 
The limitations and control of movement that the permit system and closure 
policy present have led to certain negative consequences, as well as positive opportunities 
for Hamas. Hamas has encountered this challenge by becoming extra creative and more 
inventive in carrying out missions. During the restriction of movement, Hamas has 
sought other means of circumventing border security. First, Hamas has taken advantage 
of the desperate need of Israeli employers for cheap labour, opening up an opportunity 
for Hamas to smuggle in its members disguised as Palestinian workers. Occasionally, 
Hamas has not even gone to the trouble of pretending, but instead paid its way across the 
boarder. This, for example, happened in March 2000, when five Hamas members armed 
with explosives, paid an Israeli living in one of the settlements in Gaza, 2,500 NIS in 
order to be smuggled into Israel proper.404  
 
Secondly, in order to help Israelis identify the origin of cars and passengers, a 
colour-coded system on the license plates has been implemented; Gazans have white 
tags, West Bank Arabs have blue ones. Soldiers and police rarely stop and search cars 
with yellow plates, as those cars belong to Israeli residents.405 However, a large organised 
crime scheme for smuggling stolen Israeli cars into Gaza and the West Bank exists, and 
Hamas will buy these vehicles in order to drive unhindered over the boarder. Behind this 
extensive ploy is the prevalence of the Russian mafia, which arrived with the huge influx 
of Russian immigrants in 1990.406  
 
However, other suppliers exist; around one million Israeli-Arabs are eligible for 
yellow plates. On March 4, 1996, Ramiz 'Abd al-Khadar al-Baydth got a ride out of the 
closed Gaza Strip with an Israeli Arab relative, who was not searched at the Qarni border 
checkpoint, because the car bore the yellow license plate. He made his way to a Tel Aviv 
shopping mall, where he detonated approximately 20 kilograms of explosives that he had 
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wrapped around his body. The bomb killed 13 people, wounded 126 others, and was 
claimed by Hamas.407 The participation of the Israeli Arabs was taken one step further, 
when, on September 5, 1999, a car bomb went off, killing only the two Arab passengers 
who were both Israeli citizens.408 Although the lethality of this attack was not high, this 
incident created a great deal of anxiety. The Israeli Arabs make up around 20 percent of 
the population, and have lived in Israel since they were granted citizenship in 1948.409 
The very idea that the bombers had not been from Gaza or the West Bank, but were in 
fact Israeli-Arabs, had an enormous psychological effect on the citizens of Israel. The 
very notion that the Israeli-Arabs, who are Israeli citizens and live within the Israeli 
society, could be their enemy, was a bitter pill to swallow. Israelis were also bewildered 
about how to protect themselves against such attacks in the future. “There is a security 
problem in the fact that these people are turning against a state which is supposed to be 
their own,” said Ephraim Sneh, Israel’s deputy Minister of Defence at the time.410 All the 
restrictions and rules that apply to Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza do not 
affect the Israeli-Arabs, leaving them relatively free to forge ties with Hamas and avoid 
the frequent crackdowns on the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank and Gaza. As for 
Hamas, they have found yet another way of circumventing the permit system and closure 
policy.411 
 
There is another group of individuals who traditionally enjoy greater freedom of 
movement, even under the permit system and closure policy, namely women. The 
success of suicide bombers depends upon an element of surprise, as well as accessibility 
to targeted areas or populations. Both of these criteria have been easier for women 
suicide bombers to fulfil. Women have been used in conflicts in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, 
Chechnya, Turkey, and Israel. Reportedly, the first female suicide attack in Israel was on 
August 21, 1995, when a bomb exploded on the no.26 bus in Jerusalem killing five 
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people and injuring 107. The attack was carried out by Sofian Jabarin and claimed by 
Hamas.412 However, it was not until January 2002, when Wafa Idris detonated her bomb 
in a shopping mall, killing three people, that a debate on the use of women in suicide 
bombings was reopened, and a serious discussion on the religious legitimacy of this kind 
of act started.413   
 
In their Charter, Hamas has defined the role of women in the ‘liberation struggle’ 
to be “no less important than the role of men.” However, it seems that the emphasis is on 
her role as a mother, in raising the children “to perform their religious obligations and 
preparing them for their contribution to the Jihad that awaits them.” Therefore “woman is 
the maker of men, and her role in guiding and educating the generations is a major 
role.”414 Speaking on January 2002 on the behalf of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin 
“categorically renounced the use of women as suicide bombers.”415 In March 2002, after 
the second bombing, he stated: “Hamas was far from enthusiastic about the inclusion of 
women in warfare, for reasons of modesty.”416 However, on January 14, 2004, Hamas 
broke with the Yassins guidance. A woman, Reem al-Reyashi, killed four Israeli soldiers 
at a checkpoint. The factor that made this operation especially shocking was that Reem 
was a mother, and the first mother to become a suicide bomber. After this suicide attack, 
Yassin defended this act as a “significant evolution in our fight. The male fighters face 
many obstacles. Woman are like the reserve army –when it is a necessity, we use 
them.”417 This statement shows how Hamas understands the limitations the permit system 
and closure policy place on their operations, and they adjust their tactics in order to 
continue their jihad. Not only is it easier to smuggle women through Israeli border 
crossings and checkpoints418, but it has a greater psychological effect. “The use of female 
suicide bombers by Palestinian militant groups is designed to embarrass the Israeli 
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regime and show that things are so desperate that women are fighting instead of men.”419 
In this manner, the attack does not only increase its shock factor, but it also gets increased 
media coverage.  
The West Bank and Gaza dimension 
 
Although Hamas have proven to be inventive when trying to find alternative 
operational modi, the closure policy and the permit system have represented certain 
challenges with respect to obtaining a close relationship between the leadership and 
members of Hamas from the West Bank and Gaza. One vital aspect in a successful 
organisation, and especially a terror organisation, is the unity and good communication 
between its leader and it members. Due to Israeli intelligence methods, this 
communication and cooperation has to be based on human to human relations. Naturally, 
with the restriction of freedom of movement that follow the closure policy and the permit 
system, this becomes a challenge and could result in disagreements and lack of direction. 
The very fact that one cell in the West Bank cannot rely on the expertise of another cell in 
Gaza, could conceivably force the organisation to alter their structure. It is plausible that 
this has lead to more autonomous cells, which, although bound to approval from central 
command, act more independently. The limitation of drawing on each others’ strengths 
could result in a reduced capacity to carry out acts of terror, since the cell needs to devote 
time and resources to providing logistics, instead of solely focusing on operational 
planning. An example of this development arose in the October 1998 issue of Hamas’ 
monthly Filastin al-Muslimah, where an article gave the green light to various Hamas 
groups in the West Bank to initiate independent operations.420 On August 10, 1999, 
Akram Alkam from Bethlehem rammed his car into a group of Israeli soldiers, injuring 
eight soldiers before he was shot dead. The driver did not have any formal affiliation with 
Hamas, but eventually Hamas did take credit for the operation.421 Such attacks have an 
extra physiological effect on Israel, and clearly show the effectiveness of independence. 
One of the psychological aspects which makes terrorism so powerful, is its randomness 
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both in the timing and the target. Not knowing who is behind the attacks adds to the list 
of uncertainties, and heightens the terror.  
 
Another possible consequence of the limited cooperation between the different 
cells imposed by the permit system and closure policy, is the increase in cooperation 
between different organisations. The focus resides on being able to continue with their 
terror campaign, with less emphasis on group identity. This development was particularly 
evident under the second Intifada, where terror attacks in Israel were coordinated through 
a common leadership known as the Islamic and National Leadership of the Intifada.422   
 
However, the closure policy and the permit system are not the only factors that 
have contributed to the difficulties of unity and cooperation. With the geographical 
separation and the different politics practised in the past in the West Bank and Gaza, the 
two populations have been moulded somewhat differently with respect to socio-
economics, culture, and religion. Although Hamas is a Palestinian organisation, the fact 
that it was founded in Gaza has influenced the development of the group. The Palestinian 
people were quickly divided into two camps; the West Bank and Gaza. These two areas 
have played a different role in the planning and execution of terror attacks, with 
alternating strengths between the areas at different times. Understandingly, the dynamics 
in the relationship between Gaza and the West Bank have been affected by Israel’s 
closure policy and permit system, and as such it provides the backdrop to Hamas’ 
operations.  
 
In order to understand the dynamics of Hamas’ relationship between the West 
Bank and Gaza, it is necessary to look at the broader socio-political issues that have their 
roots in the region’s history. The West Bank was under Jordanian control until July 31, 
1988, during which it was exposed to monarchical rule, and interacted with other Arab 
states, and developed a growing economic infrastructure.  
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“The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank constituted an integral 
part of the Jordanian Islamic Movement, which for many years had been alienated 
with the Hashemite regime. […] The alignment with the Hashemite regime 
facilitated the Muslim Brotherhood’s penetration of the religious establishment in 
the West Bank. By the mid-1980s a significant portion of the positions in West 
Bank religious institutions were held by the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, 
compared with their counterparts in the Gaza Strip, the Muslim Brotherhood in 
the West Bank represented a higher social economic profile –merchants, 
landowners, and middle class officials and professionals.”423  
 
Gaza, on the other hand, was under Egyptian rule, and it experienced isolation and 
neglect, with little or no economic prosperity. These elements have contributed to how 
the people have developed in terms of isolation and exposure to Israel as well as with 
other Arab states. This issue has played a factor in the economic hardship and growth in 
the territories, which again have influenced the growth of Islamism and nationalism, and 
finally Hamas as an organisation.  
 
However, the historical and geographical differences between the two Palestinian 
populations have over time also influenced their view of each other. Palestinians in the 
West Bank often look down on their brothers and sisters from Gaza, and consider Gaza as 
one large crime ridden refugee camp where people are uneducated, backwards, strictly 
religious, radical and corrupted by the ‘outside’ PLO leadership.424 Conversely, 
Palestinians from Gaza have traditionally believed that Palestinians from the West Bank 
lack essential qualities, being less religious, less radical, and less devoted to the 
Palestinian cause. These differing views have, in part, influenced the policy of Hamas, 
most notably in terms of leadership. In the West Bank, it was generally believed that 
Hamas’ leadership in Gaza was more closely linked to the external leadership in Jordan 
and Syria, than with the leadership in West Bank. The latter was in turn considered by the 
Gazans to have less of an understanding of the political mood and the hardship that 
formed their lives and motivated Hamas’ members.  
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The divide and lack of movement between the two divisions, mainly as a 
consequence of the Israeli closure and permit policy, have influenced the direction that 
Hamas’ politics and actions have taken. One expression of the difference between Hamas 
in Gaza and Hamas in the West Bank is shown when considering where violent elements 
are sterner. In Gaza, the Islamists have always maintained a resilient stronghold and had 
more radical political views,425 and up until 1996, it was in Gaza that most of the suicide 
bombers were recruited and despatched. However, this changed with the extensive crack-
down and hermetic closure of the Strip following the 1996 Spring bombings, and with the 
‘understanding’ that was instituted after the Palestinian elections in 1996 between Arafat 
and the political arm of Hamas. The ‘understanding’ entailed that the al-Qassam Brigade 
should not ‘embarrass’ the Palestinian Authority by launching attacks on Israel from the 
Palestinian Authority-controlled self-rule areas.426 This restriction was nevertheless no 
hurdle for the recruitment practices, demonstrating the flexibility and the extent of 
Hamas’ reach. Hamas operatives in Gaza used students in the West Bank to recruit 
potential suicide bombers exclusively from Area B villages.427 An Israeli investigation 
carried out in 1996 within the Al Fawwar camp in Hebron, which housed no more than a 
1,000 people,428 showed that 30 to 40 men actively volunteered to carry out suicide 
attacks.429 This ‘understanding’ was still valid until the second Intifada and was often 
heard in Arafat’s speeches. This example of coordination and cooperation is one of many. 
The return of Abu Marzul to Jordan after release from US custody in May 1997, and the 
releases of Rantisi and Sheihk Yassin from an Israeli jail in April 1997 and September 
1997 respectively, led to closer political coordination between the two leaderships in 
Gaza and the West Bank.430 This coordination resulted in a threefold agreement. First, 
there was to be no conflict or retaliation against the Palestinian Authority. Israel should 
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not gain strength due to internal weakness. Secondly, armed action should only be 
retaliatory and mainly aimed towards soldiers and settlements. Thirdly, in order to reform 
Hamas into a regional player, financial support from other Arab and Muslim powers 
needed to be a priority.431  
 
Alternative ways of acquiring weapons  
 
One effect of the permit system and closure policy on Hamas’ operations is the 
difficulty in acquiring weapons, forcing Hamas to be inventive in order to obtain 
weapons and explosives. Historically, Hamas is used to exploiting the surrounding 
resources, and with creative thinking, therefore generating new weapons and explosives. 
In Gaza, Hamas used to find old landmines from the 1973 war, extract the black powder, 
and reuse it in newly manufactured IEDs.432 However, lately, Hamas has single-
handedly, or in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, established an extensive 
network inside Gaza, to manufacture, amongst other things, mortars. Israeli security 
services arrested Sa’adi Ibrahim Azam Ashi, an owner of a metal plant in Jabalya refugee 
camp, who alleged that the de facto leader of the network was General Razi Jabali, 
Gaza’s Chief of Police. An Israeli security officer claimed that the production included a 
final stage at the Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza, where explosives were added to 
the weapons under the supervision of top Palestinian Authority security officers.433 
Discoveries of other weapon production sites include a pipe bomb factory in Balata 
refugee camp in the West Bank434 and a mobile bomb laboratory contained in a car in 
Nablus.435 Additionally, Hamas can obtain weapons and ammunition from Israeli 
providers. In August 2002, Oded Mulai, a resident of Adora in Judea, was charged with 
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selling weapons and bullets to Hamas in the West Bank.436 On December 28, 2002, an 
Israeli truck driver was arrested at the Karni crossing in Gaza, after tens of thousands of 
bullets and weapons were found in his truck.437 
 
Other means of smuggling while closure is in effect is through contacts in Sinai. 
The Israelis, together with Bedouin trackers patrolling the area, caught, for the first time 
in a decade, two gunmen trying to enter near Har Harif (midway between Gaza and Eilat) 
in February 2002. The two gunmen were carrying two Kalashnikovs, an Uzi, a pistol, and 
several rounds of ammunition. Due to intelligence and the weapons they were carrying, 
the Israeli government was confident that they had been planning a terror attack.438  
 
Another example of an innovative solution of acquiring weapons and explosives 
is seaside smuggling, as demonstrated in May 2000 when the Israelis intercepted a 
Lebanese vessel called San Torini.  
 
“The San Torini was on its way to Gaza with dozens of sealed plastic barrels 
filled with an assortment of Katyusha rockets, Strella anti-aircraft missiles, RPGs, 
mines and a large amount of weapons and ammunition…The San Torini intention 
was not to slip past the heavily patrolled waters, but to dump the barrels at sea and 
have them either wash up on the Gaza shores or be picked up by fishermen.”439  
 
It is generally believed that Ahmed Jibril (PFLP-GC) was responsible for this shipment. 
However, this is not the only attempt to supply Palestinians with weapons using the 
coastline as an entry area.440 Israel intercepted a much more sophisticated and complex 
operation in January 2002, when it stopped the ship “Karine-A” some 500 nautical miles 
off their coastline in international waters. Karine-A had left the Iranian island of Kish 
carrying light weapons such as grenades, assault rifles, ammunitions, but also Sagger 
guided anti-tank missiles, LAW anti-tank missiles, long-range mortars, mines and short-
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and long-range Katyushas. The captain of the ship was revealed to be a senior member of 
the Palestinian Naval Police, and the ship itself was owned by the Palestinian Authority. 
In addition, a connection between the Palestinians and Hizballah was established during 
this event as one Hizballah member was found on board the ship.441 This incident has 
been used by many Israeli politicians to demonstrate they have no serious partner for 
peace, as well as reconfirming the political argument that there is no chance an Israeli 
government would be willing to grant a Palestinian state, without having exclusive 
control of its external borders, including the coast of Gaza.442  
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5. 3 Deportation 
 
In general, deportation is not solely a counter terrorism measure. Throughout 
history, it has also been used as a tool for dealing with unlawful immigrants. In this 
section, the method of forcing Palestinian individuals out of the country or transferring 
them to the confinement of Gaza, will be addressed in the context of counter terrorism. 
Notably, during the first Intifada, deportation was used quite frequently. However, the 
mass deportation of December 1992 had a significant impact and will therefore be the 
main feature of this chapter. The effect of this pre-emptive measure was broad; it shifted 
the international opinion of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict in the favour of the 
Palestinians, Hamas learned the value of a good media campaign, a closer relationship 
between Hamas, the PLO and Hizballah developed and finally UN resolution 799 was 
written which demanded the return of the deportees. In summary, this counter terrorism 
method did not have the intended effect. This is partly due to the fact that Israel was 
under considerable pressure to allow many of the deported leaders of 1992 to return, thus 
the whole point of deportation failed. In addition, the deportation facilitated Hamas’ 
development of an international leadership, which contributed to a more violent turn in 
their politics.   
 
As mentioned previously, deportation was already used as a method of counter 
terrorism before the December 1992 deportation. However, it has proven difficult to 
obtain data from official Israeli or Palestinian reports on how many people were deported 
and to where. Although, the data from human rights organisations also varies to a degree, 
the numbers are in approximation with each other, and a pattern is evident. According to 
the human rights organisation B’tselem, there where eight deportations in 1987, 32 
deportations in 1988 (i.e. during the first year of the Intifada), none in 1990, eight in 
1991, and finally, the deportation of 415 Islamists in 1992.443 Several of these incidences 
are worth considering. As early as January 1988, the leader of Islamic Jihad, Fati al-
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Shqaqi and Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Auda were deported from Gaza to Lebanon.444 As this 
did not hinder their ability to coordinate extremist cells within Gaza; they merely shifted 
their seat from Gaza to Syria and continued their activities. 445 Furthermore, the 
deportation altered the way they organised themselves. Arguably, in Lebanon they could 
operate Islamic Jihad cells more freely, since they were no longer under the scrutiny of 
the Israelis. Additionally, the move of the Islamic Jihad leadership to Syria facilitated the 
establishment of a Syrian headquarters and increased the Iranian involvement in the 
organisation significantly.446  
 
Another deportation came in response to the stabbings of three Israelis in Jaffa on 
December 14, 1990. The attack was part of Hamas ‘war of knifes’ campaign and as a 
result, the Israelis arrested over 1,000 suspected extremists.447 One of the outcomes of 
these arrests was the deportation of four Hamas leaders from Gaza to Lebanon on January 
8, 1991.448 None of them were formally charged, and their common feature was their 
previous arrest records. Fadel Haled Az-Zaabud Zaher (brother of Mahmoud Zahar, a 
well known Hamas spokesperson in Gaza) was a teacher at the Hamas affiliated Islamic 
College in Gaza, as well as a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Mustapha 
Yousuf Abdallah Lidawi and Mustapha Ahmed Mohammed Kanua both came from the 
Jabalya refugee camp. The last deportee, Imad Haled Namek El-Alami, a Gazan 
engineer, was previously the principal author of Hamas leaflets and worked closely with 
Sheikh Yassin.449 This deportation also had unintended ramifications. Mustapha Yousuf 
Abdallah Lidawi settled in Lebanon and ran Hamas’ office there.450 Mustafa Kanua, a 
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member of the Hamas Political Bureau, settled in Syria where he represented Hamas 
from the end of 1993.451 Imad Haled Namek El-Alami took residence in Amman, but as a 
result of the Jordanian 1995 crackdown and deportation of Hamas members, moved to 
Teheran where he stayed until 1998. He finally settled in Damascus, where he headed the 
group’s interior committee.452 The idea behind the deportation was to remove the 
leadership in the hope that the remaining organisation would crumble. Instead, this 
deportation provided Hamas with an effective external leadership able to coordinate 
Hamas politics, military actions and provide crucial finances. Despite the numerous 
political disputes between the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ leaderships, the deportation made 
Hamas more robust despite the loss of key leaders. 
 
Although deportation was not commonly enforced between the signing of the 
Oslo Accords and the outbreak of the second Intifada, there has been the odd exception. 
In March 1996, when Israel had suffered the loss of Prime Minister Rabin and a series of 
suicide bombings inside the Green Line, which was orchestrated by Yehiya Ayyash ‘the 
Engineer’, who was a famous bomb builder and an operator for Hamas, Israel decided to 
deport several suspected Hamas members. Israel included the male family members of 
suicide bombers (two of them being Ayyash’s brothers), in order to end the myth of 
Ayyash.453 Besides this incident, the policy of expelling family members of suicide 
bombers, initially introduced by Peres in 1996, was not implemented until 2000.454 At the 
time, in light of a wave of terror attacks, the security agencies in Israel were in need of a 
new deterrent to change the minds of potential suicide terrorists. The belief that the 
suicide bomber would fear causing damage to his family raised, once again, the idea of 
deporting family members. The main focal point of this chapter is, however, the 
December 1992 deportation of 415 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad members to ‘no-
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mans-land’, north of Israel’s self-defence security zone.455 In many ways, this incident 
was a key turning point for Hamas and the Islamic Jihad as organisations, even in terms 
of legitimacy, and created long-lasting effects both in terms of the tactics and the strategy 
adopted by the Islamic movements. In particular, the incident provides insight into how 
such movements operate when transforming adversity to their advantage, and 
furthermore, adopting and surviving Israeli multi- counter terrorism methods. 
 
5. 3. 1 The 1992 Deportation 
 
In December 1992, at the time of the deportation, the first Intifada had just entered 
its fifth year. This particular deportation transpired during an uncertain time when Israelis 
as well as Palestinians did not know the form or direction of the future peace talks. Due 
to the PLO’s transparent support for Iraq and Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, there 
was a marked uncertainty among Israelis about the credibility of PLO as a negotiating 
partner in a peace process. Meanwhile, in Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas was steadily 
increasing its support, partly due to an improved financial footing. The prospect of peace 
seemed highly fragile, especially after Hamas’ escalation of terrorist attacks that autumn, 
seemingly related to the increased Iranian support for Hamas.456 The previous year, 
Hamas had established its official office in Tehran. Additionally, when a delegation from 
Hamas went to Tehran for a meeting with the revolution’s spiritual guide, Ali Khameni, 
in November 1992, they returned with a signed draft agreement, promising Iranian 
financial and military support, as well as political facilities and Hamas’ own radio station 
situated in Southern Lebanon.457 This Iranian-Hamas agreement has been cited as crucial, 
as it precipitated more acts of violence, most notably the kidnapping of Sgt. Toledano, 
one of many tactical attempts to halt the peace process.  
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The main event that triggered the decision to deport Hamas and Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad members, was the disappearance, kidnapping and later execution of Master 
Sgt. Nissim Toledano. He was kidnapped while travelling from his home to his base in 
Lod on December 13, 1992 and held in captivity in the West Bank.458 The attack shocked 
the Israelis, due to its cunningness, and Israel reacted immediately by hermetically 
sealing Gaza and the West Bank, while the Israelis carried out house to house searches 
resulting in 1,200 arrests.459 Within a few hours of the kidnapping, Hamas claimed 
responsibility for the abduction, in a letter demanding that Israel “…release Sheikh 
Ahmed Yassin in exchange for the freedom of this officer.”460 Despite a public plea from 
the detained Sheikh Ahmed Yassin not to kill Sgt. Toledano, his body was found by a 
Bedouin woman two days later, just east of Jerusalem.461 Outraged by the murder of a 
father of two and the previous deaths of six other IDF soldiers in machinegun attacks that 
same week, the incident was perceived by the Israelis as a challenge; was the government 
capable of keeping their armed soldiers alive? This created intense tension which 
manifested itself in angry demonstrations that swept the country. With the support of 90 
percent of the population, the current Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin ordered on 
December 17, 1992 the expulsion of 415 Palestinians accused of being ringleaders of 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, for a period of two years.462 Wedged between the Lebanese 
army on the one side and the IDF/SLA on the other, the deportees lived in the so-called 
‘no mans land’ near Marj al-Zuhour,463 in Israeli occupied south Lebanon.464 As a 
consequence of international pressure Israel agreed with the United States in January 
1993 to reduce the period of deportation to one year. On September 9, 1993, the 
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deportees were returned to the West Bank and Gaza. Eight of them remained in 
Lebanon.465  
 
5. 3. 2 International attention, domestic Palestinian politics, and a 
new permanent relationship  
 
The deportation created a fierce debate both in Israel and among the Palestinians 
themselves. Within Israeli political circles, one side supported by Peres and led by then 
Deputy Transport Minister Nawaf Musaliha, argued that the incident might “just [be] the 
thing that will lead to more youths to join Hamas”466 while the other side spearheaded by 
then Prime Minister Rabin, declared that the crackdown would be a severe blow to 
Hamas operational skills; “I know this is not a long-term blow. To fight terror and 
violence you must keep dealing blows, and I think this was one of the most serious blows 
Hamas has been dealt by Israel.”467 Nevertheless, as explained by a member of Hamas, 
the deportation was regarded not as a setback, but rather as a major victory: “The Israelis 
have done us a big favour. We are the winners in all of this.”468 As the situation unfolded, 
he was proven right. The expulsion made them heroes among Palestinians, as they won 
international sympathy and attention, particularly through UN resolution 799 that called 
for a swift return of all the deportees.469 This incident, with the condemnation from the 
UN, allowed Hamas to show the international community Israel’s unjust treatment of 
Palestinians, and it also hindered further Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Meanwhile, 
Hamas’ military action became much more sophisticated and deadlier due to close links 
with the Lebanese Islamic organisation, Hizballah.  
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The deportation attracted the full attention of the international media and created a 
unique opportunity for Hamas to highlight their cause in an uncontested fashion. For the 
very first time, the world heard Hamas speak directly to an audience. The 396470 
Palestinian deportees in southern Lebanon were not only members of Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad, but many were also integral parts of the Palestinian intelligentsia, with reputable 
occupations such as doctors, engineers, professors, businessmen, journalists and Islamic 
scholars. In practical terms, the deportation served to undermine the Israeli projected 
image of Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Instead, well-spoken and pragmatic clergy 
articulated the position of Hamas to the world. On humanitarian grounds, and during 
Christmas celebrations, the media projected individuals living in poor freezing 
conditions, forced away from their homes and family. In a desperate effort to remind the 
international community of the reason Israel had deported these people in the first place, 
the Israeli Broadcasting Authority TV showed a clip made by Hamas three weeks prior to 
the deportation, when they were still in Gaza. This showed Rantisi, in contrast to giving 
his joyful wishes of a Merry Christmas on a world broadcast, as an angry leader who 
called for death; the death of Israel, the death of Jews, and even the death by martyrdom 
of his own disciples in the jihad against the infidels.471 Nevertheless, these images were 
too late and had a very limited effect, especially since Hamas increasingly became adept 
at exploiting the media and international sympathy to their own advantage.  
 
Furthermore, through Hamas’ headquarters in Amman, contact was made with 
five permanent members of the UN Security Council. These contacts eventually led to 
UN resolution 799 that reinforced the de facto legitimacy of Hamas and called for the 
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swift return of all deportees.472 However, Israel stated that the UN resolution totally 
ignored the grave background that led the government to act. Therefore, Israel opposed 
the UN’s decision with the support of a Supreme Court ruling arguing that the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949473 did not apply as the Emergency Defence law of 1945 took 
precedence. Israel finally yielded to intense criticism and pressure, as it accepted the 
return of 197 members in December 1993.474 Interestingly, among them was Jibril 
Rajoub, who later became the head of the Palestinian Authority Preventative Security 
Apparatus ex-officio, in charge of confronting Hamas and enforcing security in the West 
Bank. Also, 65 militants were sent directly to jail, including Rantisi, Shama’ah and 
Duhan, who were transferred straight into administrative detention.475 In September 1993 
half of the expelled 396 deportees returned to Israel, and by December 1993 the second 
half returned. Eighteen decided to stay in Lebanon to avoid being arrested.476 
 
Domestic Palestinian Politics 
  
The deportation also had a tremendous effect on internal as well as external 
politics within both Israeli and Palestinian society. The Israeli Major General, Danny 
Rothschild, argued that the deportation was largely meant to undermine Hamas’ socio-
economic activities, especially at a time when the movement was gaining strength. 
Before the deportation, Islamic groups claimed half of the 420 mosques in Gaza, and 
profited from essential support from allied Gulf States after the Gulf War, as well as 
substantial economic support from Iran.477 The PLO, on the other hand, was near to 
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losing its support base and was suffering from economic restraints. Rothschild argued 
that by deporting the leaders of Hamas, Fatah would have an opportunity to re-launch 
itself as a socio-economic organisation and eventually take over the Hamas support base. 
However, according to him, this failed because the PLO was on the verge of 
bankruptcy478 due to the loss of Gulf State financial help ending when they sided with 
Iraq during the Gulf War.479  
 
“Arafat ordered a belt–tightening which curtailed not only the high living of many 
senior PLO bureaucrats and diplomats, but also the expenditure on such items as 
schools, hospitals, and social welfare. Its welfare department, based in Amman, 
provided payments to the families where a member was killed as a martyr (a one-
off payment of $1500), wounded, arrested or deported ($120 a month stipend). 
This meant providing welfare payments to over 90,000 Palestinians families.”480  
 
With the PLO forced to minimise or completely halt the social network system as well as 
the individual support to these families, an opportunity for Hamas was created with their 
increased financial assistance from Iran and other Gulf States, to extend their support 
network. 
 
Combined with the opportunity to support the Palestinians financially and the 
sympathy the deportation had created, Hamas’ popularity steadily grew in Gaza and the 
West Bank and had the opposite effect than that desired by the Israelis. The financial 
situation and the deportation case forced the PLO and Hamas into each other’s arms, as 
the two parties, for the first time, issued a joint leaflet condemning the deportation.481 
Besides, Hamas has had a pragmatic view regarding cooperation with the PLO. One 
Hamas leader, Imad Falougi, stated that: “If there is a direct confrontation [between 
Hamas and PLO/Palestinian Authority], that will mean civil war. And there will be no 
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winners.”482 It also brought all the different military factions together under an agreement 
that they were going to improve the coordination and cooperation of all their military 
actions in an effort to pressurise the Israelis into letting them return.483  
 
Furthermore, there were those who speculated that the growing public role of 
Hamas functioned to increase its legitimacy and gradually build itself up as an alternative 
to the PLO.484 However, Hamas clearly stated it did not desire to compete politically with 
the PLO, as it argued the need for unifying their forces against Israel. Their relationship 
was never a close one. The Hamas-Iran alliance was a cause of tension.485 An arena 
where this tension was evident was the half-hearted meetings which were held between 
them. The PLO was typically content with the political signals this participation gave to 
the public, providing an image of being the leading initiating organisation. Hamas, on the 
other hand, regarded these meetings as disappointing due to their lack of any concrete 
results.486 This period assured a delicate PLO-Hamas relationship where each party was 
careful not to over-antagonise or undermine the other. However, Hamas did, together 
with all the deportees’ families, pressurise the PLO to include the safe return of all the 
deportees during the peace talks held in Washington within the framework of the Madrid 
process.487 As for the Arab delegates that attended the peace talks, they all suspended 
their meetings with Israel. 
 
During the deportation, Hamas members learned how to fit quickly into the new 
political situation and had their chance to show their true adaptable nature. Prior to the 
deportation, due to travel restrictions and the geographical facts on the ground, the 
different members had scarcely met. However, as a result of the deportation, they, 251 
suspected extremists from the West Bank and 164 from Gaza, were all brought together, 
out of sight of the watchful eyes of Israel. Hamas, drawing on a long tradition established 
                                                 
482 Paz, Reuven; Islamic Palestine or Liberated Palestine?, 20 July  2001, www.ict.org, accessed 17 
September 2001. 
483 Mishal and Sela; “The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence” , Colombia University 






by the Muslim Brotherhood, were at the forefront of creating a structural environment 
where an organisational strategy was their main concern. This has been described by 
former deportee, Hatem al-Kafisha, who showed that the organisation of everyday life 
was highly advanced: 
 
“Elections were like caucuses, and every 20 deportees had one representative. The 
emir of the camp was Mohammed Shama’ah and his deputy was Adnan Miswada 
from Hebron. Abdel-Aziz Rantisi was elected spokesman. […] Thirteen 
committees were established, among them: engineering, health, information, 
storage, supply, guarding, archives, field work, cultural and education.”488  
 
They were now given all the time they needed to discuss freely and share their individual 
experiences with each other, using the opportunity to plan new tactics and strategies, 
collating all the various ideas and forming personal bounds. 
 
A new and enduring relationship 
 
When darkness fell and the journalists were transmitting their reports home, 
members of Hizballah would come with food, blankets, and moral support. This lay the 
foundations for a long-lasting relationship between Hamas and Hizballah. It enabled them 
to develop logistical support and draw upon each others’ knowledge and experience. The 
two organisations were united against a common enemy: Israel. Hizballah had more 
experience in battlefield tactics, while Hamas was eager to learn. This was later evident 
in Hamas’ new adoption of military strategy and tactics. Another factor which forged a 
closer relationship was the logistical assistance extended by Iran. The close association 
that developed between Hamas and Hizballah led to Hamas learning new ways of making 
bombs, emulating car and roadside bombs, as well as methods to recruit and train 
operational members. Hamas absorbed the psychological lessons from using new tactics, 
especially the importance of suicide bombers, which were previously used by Hizballah 
in forcing the IDF to withdraw to the security zone in 1985.489 Hamas was taught how to 
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use the media in their favour, including the procedure of videotaping the suicide bomber 
before the mission.490 The rationale behind this tactic was to create maximum attention 
and terror, as these videotapes were distributed and showed after each operation. This 
was a tactic used by Hizballah in order to bring the war into Israeli homes through 
television. The practice stirred up emotions and raised more general questions: why were 
they sending their sons and husbands to Lebanon to die?  
 
This exchange of operational tactics became standard practice soon after the 
detainees had returned to Gaza and the West Bank. The consequence of this shift in 
tactics came with Hamas’ first suicide bomb on April 16, 1993, at a roadside café in the 
town of Mehola, a farming settlement in the Jordan Valley. Hamas operative Tamam 
Nabulsi drove a van into a parked bus and detonated it, killing two passengers on the bus 
and injuring five.491 Nevertheless, it was not until 1994, after the return of most 
deportees, and as a reaction to Dr. Baruch Goldstein’s massacre in Hebron, that Hamas 
launched a series of suicide attacks. On April 16, 1994, Hamas chose Ra’id Zaqarna from 
Qabatiya, the West Bank, to drive a stolen car with yellow Israeli license plates and park 
it between two Egged buses, only to detonate himself. The bomb was constructed by 
Ayyash ‘the Engineer’, and it was rather primitive, made up of seven cooking gas 
canisters hooked to an explosive charge of five antipersonnel hand grenades and a home 
made brew, consisting of 20 kilograms of explosives. The following explosion killed nine 
and wounded 55.492 On April 13, 1994, Amar Salah Diab Amarna from Yabed in the 
West Bank, entered a bus in Hadera and detonated another of Ayyash’s bombs of two 
kilograms of explosives which was attached to his body. The bomb killed six people and 
injured 30.493 More importantly, these attacks showed the influence of Hizballah on 
Hamas. This was clearly symbolised in a statement claiming responsibility for the attack, 
which was made by a group called Hizballah-Palestine. Hamas publicly warned of the 
beginning of a new tactical era where the killing of civilians inside Israel would be a 
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norm. When then Lieutenant General Barak, who later became Prime Minister, was 
questioned about this devastating cooperation, he simply said, “I say that we will deal 
with that when we come to it. Let’s wait and see. It is more feasible that they [Hizballah] 
will be among Palestinians in Lebanon or outside Lebanon.”494 He later stated, when 
realising that Hamas and Hizballah indeed joined forces, that: “we can use the Air Force, 
tanks, bombs against him [Hamas]. If he [Hamas] survives that, and returns [to the Gaza 
and West Bank after two years], we will consider deporting him [Hamas] again.”495 
Obviously, he underestimated the situation and did not grasp the international pressure or 
the willingness of a Shia group to help a Sunni group with a common enemy.  
 
Ironically, the outcome of the 1992 deportation was positive for Hamas. It 
strengthened the organisation, forged bonds between extremists in Gaza and the West 
Bank, and formed a long-lasting relationship with Hizballah. This relationship led to an 
effective media policy and allowed Hamas to develop their new tactic, suicide bombings. 
In the end, the deportation created a golden opportunity for an expansion of Hamas’ 
popularity, something that neither Israel nor the PLO had initially desired or wanted. 
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5. 4 House demolition 
 
The demolition of houses might not appear to be an obvious counter terrorism 
measure. The aim of this section is to demonstrate how Israel uses this method directly in 
an attempt to prevent terrorism, and indirectly to create a favourable political situation 
which supposedly enhances their overall security situation.  
 
Israel’s policy of the demolition of houses and destruction of land and other 
properties can be divided into two groups. First, houses must be demolished which do not 
have a permit. Secondly, houses and other properties which stand in the way of the Israeli 
army must be destroyed for military/security needs. The justification for the latter 
argument is providing security for the numerous settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, 
hence the IDF demolishes houses that are either situated too close to settlements, to 
military compounds or to road-networks that the settlers use. Regardless of the reasoning 
behind these measures, the practice of house demolition is closely related to the 
establishment of Israeli settlements, and hence it is a highly political and controversial 
measure.496 Although this section will not discuss the wider and more complex issues of 
Israel’s settlement policy, it is necessary to address the connection between house 
demolition and the settlement policy, in order to grasp the broad scope of this measure.  
 
Another intent of the Israeli military practice is to demolish houses that belong to 
the families of suicide bombers or of others who have aided and abetted a suspected 
terrorist. In this section, the implementation of this measure during the first Intifada and 
the peace process will be studied. Furthermore, this section will illustrate that this counter 
terrorism measure is intended to work as a deterrent to potential suicide bombers, to 
make them consider the consequences of their actions on family members. To fully 
understand the extensive effects and the seriousness of house demolition on Palestinian 
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society, it is worth addressing the value that a family home has in Palestinian society. 
Finally, the effects on Hamas and their ability to adapt will be examined.  
 
Although every Israeli government since 1967 has practiced house demolition in 
some capacity as a clear demonstration of power, there are very few academic articles 
which discuss the effect of this practice on Palestinian society or on the respective 
reaction of Hamas. Most academic articles address the policy together with the Israeli 
settlement policy and do not separate the two. Admittedly, as shown in this section, these 
issues are closely connected and difficult to separate. Nevertheless, it is useful to 
approach these issues and explore how house demolition is implemented for different 
purposes, albeit for the same overall security reasons. This section therefore relies on 
research performed by human rights organisations, either Israeli, Palestinian or 
international organisations and newspapers.   
 
5. 4. 1 The framework 
 
Historically, the practise of house demolition stems from the British policy which 
was established during their Mandate period and rooted in the Emergency Defence 
Regulation 119 (1) of 1945.497 At that time, the method was frequently applied in counter 
terror raids against armed Palestinian militias, called fedayeen. After the West Bank and 
Gaza came under Israeli control in 1967, the demolition of houses became a tool against 
general opposition, but particularly the PLO. However, this practise ceased in 1985, only 
to be quickly re-implemented two years later with the outbreak of the first Intifada. It was 
then used against individuals and their families who were suspected of violence against 
Israel. Today, Israel legitimises this measure by interpreting Hamas’ actions as a declared 
war on Israel, thus allowing the use of methods inherited from the British. Within these 
rules, the demolition or sealing of houses is an extra-judicial administrative procedure 
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that requires no proof by any judicial body that the individual committed a penal 
offence.498  
 
Deep emotions are stirred when a house is demolished. With population growth 
rates of 3.7 and 3.1 percent in Gaza and the West Bank respectively in 2005499, combined 
with a high poverty rate500, the value of having a family home is significant. The 
consequence of economic hardship, limited access to land, and the practice of granting 
very few building permits, is that the average household is made up of 6.84 persons, with 
the smallest household composed of one person living alone and the largest composed of 
24 persons.501 Considering these numbers, the strain on a family, as well as on the 
society, when a house is demolished, becomes evident.  
 
However, house demolition does not only have economic and practical 
consequences, but it also has a psychological effect on the individual family and on the 
society as a whole. These deep-rooted feelings go back to times when houses were left 
behind as a result of the 1948 and 1967 wars. Historically, Palestinians have always 
worked the land, even if the land belonged to other Arab landowners or to the Jews, 
creating a strong emotional tie to the land. The echo of al-Nakba ‘The Catastrophe’, 
which was the result of the war in 1948, is never far away. It reinforces the importance of 
owning a home and symbolizes the Palestinians desire to staying put and not to be easily 
removed from their land. These historical events are closely tied to today’s struggle of 
independence and the aspiration of a viable Palestinian state. Therefore, family homes 
hold a special status in Palestinian society, and demolition is considered a particularly 
severe punishment. This is even evident in a Palestinian saying; when a Palestinian wants 
to express extreme ill-will towards somebody, he simply tells him “yikhrab baytak”, 
‘may your house fall down.’502 The Israelis clearly understand the true significance that a 
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family house holds in Palestinian social psychology and therefore use it to its full 
potential.  
 
5. 4. 2 Illegally built houses 
 
In the West Bank, before 1971, it was Jordanian law, “Town, Village, and Buildings 
Planning Law No. 79”, which regulated the building progress and planning of towns. Even 
under this law, it was difficult to obtain building permission. This law still sets the premise 
for granting building permits in area C of the West Bank today. Some of these requirements 
and restrictions are as follows: 503  
 
- it is forbidden to grant a building permit where no approved planning scheme 
exists 
- Palestinian residents are not allowed to build on Israeli state-owned land. This 
presented a problem, because many Palestinians have lost millions of dunams in 
order to meet Israel’s military needs.  
- Palestinians are required to prove full ownership of the land before they can 
build on it. For most Palestinians this is virtually impossible because many of the 
landowners left the West Bank in the wars of 1948 or 1967, and thus sufficient 
records are lacking.  
 
In addition to this law, the Israeli military commander issued in 1971 an order dealing with 
planning and building. The new order empowered the Israeli government to cancel all 
existing building plans, and ensure that any future plans would require an Israeli permit. The 
authority which issued such permits was transferred to a committee which was ultimately 
under the responsibility of the Supreme Planning Council, consisting of only Israelis.504 
Consequently, the Palestinians were denied their chance of representation and any influence 
over further planning schemes. Furthermore, the order opened up the possibility of 
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exempting any person from the obligation to obtain a permit required under the Law.505 
Effectively, this resulted in a separate system for the Israeli settlers and the Palestinians. 
This policy was changed during the Oslo peace process, but in effect legitimised in the Oslo 
Accords due to the fact that the West Bank was organised and divided into three areas of 
authority – areas A, B and C. This system is still practised today in area C of the West Bank.  
 
In Area C, Israel retains responsibility of both civil affairs and security issues, and 
consequently enjoys full control over land, security, people, and natural resources. This 
area encompasses more than 70 percent of the West Bank,506 and includes all the Israeli 
West Bank settlements, Israeli military areas, the main roads, and the vast majority of 
Palestinian rural areas. In these areas, the planning, development, and construction, as well 
as the demolition of houses built without permits, currently lies under the sole authority of 
Israel. This policy forces Palestinians to apply to the Israeli government for permission to 
build homes, and this policy was legitimised by connecting it to the peace process.507 
Therefore, technically speaking, one could argue that Israel is within its rights to destroy 
any home in Gaza and the West Bank which has been built without the proper 
documentation and an Israeli building permit. However, the process of obtaining such a 
permit is long, complicated and often ends with refusal, which has led many Palestinians 
to build houses illegally. As stated by the Israeli Civil Administration Office, the Israeli 
“policy is not to approve building in Area C.”508  
 
The Palestinian Authority was given responsibility for civil affairs in Areas A and 
B, covering only 30% of the West Bank territory, but containing 97.6% of the Palestinian 
population. This also means that the Palestinian Authority is in charge of town planning 
and therefore oversees new house construction.509 Therefore, it is a natural assumption that 
the building of new houses in area A and B should not represent a problem. However, areas 
A and B are not continuous, but are instead fragmented into 227 separate enclaves, each 
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surrounded by Area C.510 One of the main obstacles for the Palestinians is that the size of 
the area within the jurisdiction of the Palestinian towns is not sufficiently large to meet their 
growing populations in theses two areas. During the first 50 years of the Israel’s existence, 
the Palestinian population has grown seven-fold. However, the amount of land allocated 
for housing construction has remained almost unchanged.511 Thus, the population density 
in the Palestinian sector grew considerably, and the lack of available land to build lawful 
housing was basically scarce. One solution has been to build on top of already existing 
houses. Or alternatively, Palestinians are forced to build without a permit.  
 
When Palestinians do build houses without obtaining a permit, it leaves them 
vulnerable to Israel’s repercussions, which often include issuing an order to demolish the 
house. Typically, the demolition orders are completed in Hebrew and do not specify the 
location or the nature of the violation.512 Families living in areas east of Hebron have 
even reported to the human rights organisations that they received papers ordering them 
to leave their premises, not addressed to a named person, but to the polesh (intruder in 
Hebrew). The practise is often as follows: the first ‘stop work’ order is sent out, and 
although generally not even received, is delivered to a site and states a date when the case 
can be argued before the Inspections sub committee of the High Planning Council.513 
Almost invariably, this is followed by a second order that warns that the property will be 
demolished after seven days at the owner’s expense. Any petition to the Israeli High 
Court must be presented within 30 days. Nothing further happens until the arrival of the 
troops and bulldozers; which may occur after seven days, or indeed after many months or 
years.514 The family have no other option but to wait until the Israelis arrive, because the 
military, supported by the court, will not allow the family themselves to destroy their 
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house, presumably because this will weaken the deterrent effect of the demolition.515 
Furthermore, when the soldiers finally do arrive, they usually gather the neighbourhood 
and family, forcing them to watch the destruction. Normally when the Israelis are 
demolishing a house, they do so with the help of a bulldozer. However, explosives are 
widely used. As a military source said: “Blowing up a house has a greater psychological 
deterrent effect. When you feel the ground tremble under your feet you think about it for 
a long time.”516  
 
It has proven difficult to obtain data on the exact number of houses which have been 
demolished due to a lack of a building permit. Different sources operate with various 
definitions, and the numbers include different geographical areas. Although the specific 
numbers should be considered with caution, providing some numbers would still be 
informative for giving an indication of the frequency of this practise. Amnesty 
International’s report from 1999 states that at least 2,400 Palestinian homes were 
demolished in the West Bank alone between 1987 and 1999, i.e. approximately 200 per 
year.517 Assuming that the average number of residents per house was equivalent to the 
average occupancy in the West Bank at the time (which has on average fluctuated around 
six residents per house518), it is estimated that more than 14,400 Palestinians have lost 
their homes over the past twelve years as a result of building without a permit. This 
implies that almost one percent of the population in the West Bank has been affected by 
the Israeli house demolition policy.519 In addition, there are those who have had their 
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5. 4. 3 Demolition for security reasons  
 
Although Israel states that the practise of demolishing houses built illegally is 
purely a security policy, it seems obvious that this policy is closely connected to their 
settlement policy. As discussed earlier, the settlement policy is a security measure in 
itself and can therefore be interpreted as a counter terrorism method. Therefore, the 
distinction between the pretexts for demolishing houses is less clear. Despite this, it is 
useful to separate the practice of destroying houses for security reasons into two 
categories.520 First, the practice serves to expand Israeli settlements and protect them 
more efficiently, and secondly, the measure functions to prevent terror activity, by 
affecting either the family of suicide bombers or those who facilitate terror.  
 
House demolition and the Israeli settlement policy 
 
The great difficulties experienced in obtaining a building permit in the West 
Bank, especially in area C, are clearly connected to the Israeli settlement policy. 
However, in addition to this practise, Israel also destroys houses which they claim 
represent a security risk for the settlements and those who live within them. Examples of 
such houses are those situated too closely to the settlement’s perimeter, or those that 
prevent the construction of a road network which connects settlements together and to 
Israel proper. The demolition of these houses illustrates an even clearer correlation 
between the method of house demolition and the Israeli settlement policy.  
 
Israel has become increasingly interested in incorporating larger areas of the West 
Bank and Gaza. Between 1972 and 1992, Israel built more than 122 settlements, housing 
107,200 Israelis in the West Bank, and ten settlements housing 124,000 Israelis in East 
Jerusalem. In contrast, Israel only built 16 settlements in Gaza, whose population by 1992 
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did not exceed 4,800.521 With the Oslo process, Israel tightened its territorial grip over the 
West Bank, by building more than 49 new settlements and increasing the settler 
population from 246,000 to 350,000 between 1992 and 1999, whereas the settler 
population in Gaza increased by less than 2,300 during the same period.522 
 
Palestinian homes are demolished under the pretence of strengthening, expanding, 
or creating new Israeli settlements in the West Bank. There are several ways Israel 
ensures the settlers’ security. Perhaps the most obvious is the destructions of houses, land 
and other properties, which the authorities claim were used or could be used by 
Palestinian armed groups to shoot or launch attacks against the settlements. This category 
may include any house or property near Israeli settlements or army positions. Even 
though Israel claims that the destruction is performed to prevent future attacks on the 
area, such demolitions are also frequently carried out in retaliation against Palestinian 
attacks and as a form of collective punishment on the inhabitants of a given area. In some 
cases, the destruction also serves the purpose of removing Palestinians from areas where 
Israel has a particular interest in seizing control of the land, notably near Israeli 
settlements and army positions, with a view to subsequently expanding Israeli 
settlements. Israel also demolishes houses where they claim attacks on settlements or 
settlers were carried out or properties which were used for cover during Israeli military 
operations. This also includes the destruction of properties in order to clear the army’s 
line of sight in areas considered as sensitive, to create buffer zones around likely targets, 
and to clear areas in order to build fences or military installations.  
 
Furthermore, it is not only the settlement per se that needs to be secure, but also 
the settlers’ freedom of movement within and between settlements. Therefore, security 
needs can include the construction or expansion of roads that connect the settlements to 
each other or to Israel proper. Bypass roads are intended to enable the movement of 
settlers and of the military forces protecting the settlements. When building these roads, 
the Israeli authorities seldom take into account the interests or needs of the Palestinians. 
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The explanation that a house designated for demolition lies alongside an existing or 
planned road is very common.523 Given the spread of Israeli settlements, settlers’ roads 
and army positions throughout the densely populated West Bank are immediately 
adjacent to Palestinian refugee camps, towns and villages, so that virtually every building 
or plot of land could be considered a threat and therefore military target for demolition.524 
It is worth mentioning that the by-pass roads that connect settlements in the West Bank 
exceed 276 kilometres in length, while the planned roads are estimated to be an 
additional 452 kilometres. With the safety buffer zone of 50 to 100 meters on each side, 
the construction of these by-pass roads requires the confiscation and destruction of 
approximately 10,920 hectares of Palestinian land, most of which is agricultural.525 By-
pass roads encircle every major Palestinian city and community in the West Bank, and 
thus create boundaries which limit the expansion and development of the Palestinian 
communities which they encircle, and consequently, further disconnect Palestinian 
communities from each other. 
 
Furthermore, this policy has political value in a potential final peace agreement. 
As David Bar El stated on Israeli Television, “if we don’t keep this territory clean [naki] 
at the end of the day there will be irreversible facts on the ground that will reduce our 
‘manoeuvring space’ …as we enter into negotiations.”526 This indicates that house 
demolition and the approval of building permits are part of a wider economic and 
political agenda. The settlements and the measures Israel enforces in order to provide the 
settlers with security, influence the development of a peace process and the negotiations 
over final-status arrangements. 
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Houses connected to terror activity 
  
The second justification for conducting house demolition under the pretence of 
security is to prevent terror activity, and as such it is classed to be a punitive measure. 
The most obvious use of this method is in circumstances where the house belongs to a 
family of a suicide bomber, but this method is also used against families that have aided 
or abetted a terrorist and hence promoted terror. Additionally, the houses which have 
been used as shelters or for operational planning are targets.   
 
Punitive demolitions of houses belonging to Palestinians suspected of 
involvement in suicide bombings and other attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers 
have become routine. However, this policy was re-introduced after Hamas carried out its 
first suicide attack in 1993. At that time, suicide bombing represented a new development 
in Hamas’ strategy, and it signalled a change in the severity of its fighting. As a result, it 
left the Israeli people in a state of heightened fear, angst, and despair, looking towards 
their leaders for answers, reassurance, and action. With the significant military power of 
Israel, it was hard to accept that they could not secure their nation from a single 
individual. Their dissatisfaction was shared by then Deputy Defence Minister Ori Orr, 
when he said “it can’t be that a man who blows up a bus believing he will go to heaven 
doesn’t know that his family will not just set up a mourner’s tent and continue living its 
life as normal.”527 Thus, Israel re-implemented the policy of destruction of houses 
belonging to the deceased bombers’ families, as well as any suspects that may have 
supported the bomber in his mission. Then Chief Commander for the West Bank, Major 
Genernal Ilan Biran, stated that; “The house of each family of a suicide [bomber], or one 
who intends to commit suicide, will be destroyed, and the surrounding area will be 
severely punished. This will be the case in every village and town. We shall act 
mercilessly.”528 The Israeli authorities state that the intention behind this policy is not to 
punish the families of suicide bombers and others involved in the attacks, but rather to 
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deter potential attackers, who may refrain from getting involved in attacks knowing that 
their families will be made homeless and suffer because of their actions. As Simon Peres 
said, “we have no choice but to make the father responsible for the son and to tell the 
father that if someone from your house goes out to commit a suicide [attack], don’t just 
think he will go to paradise. Your house is in danger. It will be sealed; it will be 
damaged.”529 However, the method might not always have the desired effect: “I am proud 
that my son is a fighter for his country and for God. We will build a bigger and better 
house.”530 Moussa Rainmat killed three people in his suicide attack at the Apropo cafè in 
Tel Aviv in April 1997. The court ordered the destruction of his family house, as a 
deterrent. The family viewed it as enforcing collective punishment: “For us, Moussa is a 
hero and a martyr. We are proud of the act he carried out, and the demolition of his house 
only gives us more conviction to continue with the struggle. If they continue with the 
collective punishment they will find a lot like Moussa.”531   
 
Traditionally in Palestinian society, after a death in the family, a mourning tent is 
put up in front of the house signalling a state of mourning. However, seeing as this 
tradition could help the Israelis identify the family of the bomber (leading to the 
demolition of the home), the Palestinians have stopped this practice. Nevertheless, this 
did not stop the Israelis from identifying the bombers’ houses. Instead Israel started DNA 
testing the victims and carrying out their counter terrorism methods upon confirmation of 
the suicide bomber’s DNA. Israel also demolishes the houses that belong to individuals 
who are under arrest for aiding and abetting an attack.532 Additionally, this method is 
often used against families of persons ‘wanted’ by the security forces that are suspected 
in an act of terror, regardless if it is a suicide bombing or if the suspected person is in 
Israeli custody or not. However, it seems that Israel practises this form of policy with 
some inconsistency. It seems that this method does not apply to acts of terror committed 
by Jews, but only strictly applied to Palestinians. The houses of members of the Jewish 
underground, the family of Dr. Baruch Goldstein, who killed 29 Palestinian worshipers 
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and wounded 250 others in Hebron’s Haram al-Ibrahimi mosque and synagogue in 1994, 
as well as the killer of late Prime Minister Rabin, still stand and are not on any demolition 
lists.533  
 
Although deterrence is clearly the general intention behind this policy, the Israelis 
have stated additional reasons for implementing this measure. One of these reasons is that 
the destruction of a home is merely a military necessity. Israel’s rationale is that plans of 
an attack originated in a particular house and could therefore be regarded as a military 
base.534 Another rationale is the protection of innocent people from the potential injury of 
explosives hidden by terrorists in the suspected houses.535 One fact that clearly 
contradicts the Israeli justification for demolishing houses is that no such consideration 
has been made when Jews are the perpetrators. Another issue is the timing of demolition, 
which actually varies widely. If Israel indeed considers demolition as the destruction of a 
military base, then why not destroy it as quickly as possible in order to hinder its future 
usage? This does not entirely make sense as Israel claims it wants to hinder other 
inhabitants from being hurt by weapons or explosions that may be left behind. Why not 
act immediately? Why not just perform a thorough house search instead of destroying it? 
It might indicate that the implementation of this policy is part of a counter terrorism 
measure clearly steered by the political and social atmosphere at the time, and closely 
interlinked with the settlement policy and the complex idea of land for peace. For 
instance, on the July 30, 1997, Hamas sent two suicide bombers to the Mahane Yehuda 
market in Jerusalem, killing 15 people and wounding 168 others. According to B’tselem 
data Israel demolished 29 houses in August, compared to seven houses in July, two in 
June, and 16 in May.536 Shlomo Dror, then spokesman for the Israeli civil authority in 
Gaza and the West Bank, explained this sudden increase in numbers: “We had delayed 
[demolitions] to try to give some chance for the negotiations between us and the 
Palestinians and to try to stop tension between us. After the bombing in July 1997, 
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everything changed, all the reasons we had before did not exist anymore.”537 This is 
clearly an example of how measures with the intent to counter terrorism are influenced by 
politics.  
 
5. 4. 4 Hamas’ efforts against demolition 
 
In relation to Israel’s development of new counter terrorism methods, Hamas 
finds alternative ways of lessening their effects. Hamas does this by implementing 
various kinds of safety measures in order to hinder the family home of their martyr from 
being demolished or minimising the effectiveness of such demolition.   
 
One of these safety measures is to ensure that a suicide bomber does not carry any 
ID papers, and removing the label of their clothes, and in some cases even the 
fingerprints. This is done in an effort to hide the identity of the bomber.538 This makes it 
difficult for the Israelis to trace the suicide bomber to a cell or to a geographical area, 
which again makes it a challenge to apply counter measures towards the family or 
accomplices. However, Hamas’ efforts were not sufficient in the long-run. In 1998, the 
Israelis introduced DNA testing for every suicide bomber, thus enabling them to identify 
the bomber, not only quicker, but also more accurately.539 In addition to pinpointing the 
family’s home faster, the DNA testing allowed the Israelis to obtain current intelligence 
on Hamas’ organisational structure, and to enforce strict border controls immediately 
around the geographical area where the bomber came from.  
 
Another strategy that Hamas has introduced to lessen the effectiveness of Israeli 
policy, is the reassurance that it will care for the family of any suicide bomber. This 
promise is symbolised with the financial compensation the bomber receives. In 2003, it 
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was reported that a family received a one-time payment of $10,000 from Hamas.540 
Hamas’ broad social network allows them to follow through on their promise to care for 
the family. Families of suicide bombers are entitled to $10,000, while those whose homes 
are demolished receive a sum of up to $25,000 dollars.541 It serves as a powerful signal to 
Palestinian society that Hamas is an organisation that keeps its word and supports all 
Palestinians who are willing to join them. With this reassurance from Hamas, the 
deterrence value of demolishing the bombers’ home is minimised. However, regardless 
of whether Hamas provides financial help to rebuild or not, as a result of the way Hamas 
is organised, with its extensive social network and its link to the military wing, Hamas 
would indirectly benefit from the poverty and despair that results from house demolition. 
This brings the concepts of da’wa and jihad to full circle. 
 
 Nevertheless, it is plausible that the practice of house demolition, in other 
circumstances, can affect Hamas’ tactics. Rather than deploying suicide bombers, Hamas 
has resorted to other tactics to set off the bombs, such as remote controls, timers, and cell 
phones. However, these types of devices are not as accurate or reliable, thus risking 
premature explosions, difficulties with situating the bomb to cause maximum damage, 
detection, or an Israeli counter controlled explosion. Therefore, despite the risk of Israeli 
retaliation to suicide bombs, Hamas has not stopped this modus operandi, nor is it likely 
that they will any time soon. A suicide bomb, as a delivery vehicle, is the method which 
proves to be one of the most accurate and destructive, causing maximum havoc and fear 
compared to the input. Although the planning and preparation might represent a greater 
challenge, a planned escape route after the operation is not required. Besides, the 
psychological effect that a suicide bomber has on its audience is unprecedented. Israel’s 
counter terrorism policy of demolishing houses therefore has a limited deterrence effect 
on Hamas’ operations, seeing as how Hamas’ financial policy of providing for the suicide 
bombers family only strengthens their position in Palestinian society and does not prevent 
recruitment. Even if the demolishing of houses should have the deterrence effect that 
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Israel wishes, Hamas as an organisation would ultimately benefit from the despair and 
poverty this method irrespectively seems to induce.   
 190 
 
5. 5 Selective killings 
 
Like terrorism, the term ‘selective killings’, which describes the killing of 
opponents, is not a value-free phrase. Israeli officials prefer other phrases such as the 
‘hitting of Palestinian targets,’ ‘neutralizing’ or ‘liquidating’. Initially, selective killings 
were labelled ‘pre-emptive operations,’ then ‘interceptions,’ and more recently, ‘active 
self-defence.’ The Israelis argue that these actions are justified as a counter terrorism 
method. In contrast, the Palestinians call it a policy of assassination, and most human 
rights organisations declare the acts as ‘extra judicial killings’ and argue that the method 
is a flagrant violation of human rights and consequently an unlawful measure. In this 
thesis, these acts will therefore be referred to as ‘selective killings’, so as not to appear 
biased, as the purpose of this thesis is to describe the method itself and its effects.542  
Broadly speaking, there are two different arguments against selective killings: the 
ethical argument, and the pragmatic argument. The main ethical argument against 
selective killings is simple: killing is immoral, and the state killing of a specific 
individual is such a visible action, that the view is enhanced. Another reason why the 
method is considered unethical is that the state becomes the prosecutor, judge and jury, 
and there is no appeal process or chance for the suspects to defend themselves. 
Furthermore, a selective killing demeans the ethical basis of a democratic society which 
emphasises human rights. Interestingly, killing is often considered acceptable on the 
battlefield, but other forms of killing lead to a general decrease in safety and order. 
Selective killings create uncertainty and disturb the fundamental need for safety in 
everyday life, in a manner comparable to the psychological effect of terrorism.  
 
The second argument against the state’s practice of selective killings is pragmatic. 
For instance, the result of a selective killing is unpredictable, regardless of whether the 
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attempt failed or succeeded. Even if the state manages to kill an individual without 
affecting innocent lives, the aftermath could result in a cult of martyrdom and a campaign 
of revenge, which would be the opposite of the desired effect.  
 
The subject of selective killings visibly challenges one’s view on the fundamental 
value of human life, and as such poses important questions with respect to who we are 
and want to be as a people and a state. This might explain why the subject has attracted a 
certain degree of academic interest. Hence, in this section it has been possible to rely on 
academic books, articles, and newspapers as reference sources, as opposed to information 
from human rights organisations. 
 
Since the very foundation of Israel, the targeting of individuals suspected of being 
responsible for the deaths of Israelis has been implemented as a preventative method. 
There have been some examples of selective killings which have had unintended political 
ramifications. A selection of examples will be examined to illustrate the extent of the 
potential aftermath. Regardless of the political risks, Israel has continued to include 
selective killings as a method in its counter terrorism policy. Therefore the aim of this 
section is to understand the underlying intention behind this method. The implementation 
of this method is fundamentally criticised. First, where does the line between 
assassinating individuals actively involved in the operational side of terror activities and 
those who are politically involved in their Hamas membership lie? Secondly, this method 
relies on a security committee to simultaneously serve as prosecutor, judge, and jury, 
without giving a chance for appeal and / or the ability to hold the committee accountable 
for their decisions. Thirdly, in order to avoid civilian casualties, essential for the 
justification of the method, selective killings depend heavily on current and valid 
intelligence, which makes it a vulnerable measure. Finally, this section will focus on the 
manner in which Hamas has taken precautions and managed to adapt the organisation in 
order to protect itself against assassinations.  
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5. 5. 1 Putting the policy into practice 
 
Many years earlier, Haganah used to single out military enemies in order to 
assassinate them. Haganah drew on the expertise of special groups, two of which were 
the Ha-shomer and Mista’aravim units, who laid the foundations for future undercover 
units.543 It is notable that these groups started the practice of dressing like Arabs, and due 
to their knowledge of the Arabic language and Islamic culture, they were able to move 
around easily, gathering information on potential attacks by the Arabs. Their methods 
were typical of clandestine warfare and included the use of selective killings.544 Since 
then, Aman (IDF military intelligence) and Mossad have carried out several targeted 
attacks inside Israel and abroad. Over the past five years, the cases of extra judicial 
executions have typically involved people believed to be central figures in Islamic 
extremist groups and suspected of being responsible for armed attacks against the Israeli 
population. The most famous sequence of selective killings was probably the ones that 
took place after the summer Olympic Games Munich massacre in 1972. The killing of the 
Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics by the ‘Black September’ organisation, catalysed 
a systematic campaign, the “Operation Wrath of God”, to seek out the individuals 
belonging to Black September and all the individuals believed to be involved in the 
planning and operation of the terror attack in Munich. “Operation Wrath of God” was not 
about capturing or imprisoning those responsible. It was purely and simply directed at 
killing the individuals that the Israelis could find and terrorising those they could not. In 
order to accomplish this task, a specialist assassination unit, known as the kidon was 
formed.545 At least nine militants linked to Munich were killed in the ten months that 
followed. 546 Although the operations received strong international criticism, especially 
since Mossad mistakenly killed the wrong individual in Lillehammer, Norway, Israel did 
not end their practise of selective killings.  
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Following a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in October 1994, Yitzhak Rabin 
announced that he had commanded security forces to assassinate terrorist leaders: “We 
must seek out, find and arrest or eliminate those who organise this terrorist activity.”547 
An example of the selective killings executed in foreign countries is the attack carried out 
on 16 April 1988 in Tunis. Mossad killed Abu Jihad in his home. Abu Jihad, also known 
as Khalil al-Wazir, had planned dozens of attacks on Israelis during his long career and 
was second in command to Arafat. 548 Furthermore, in October 1995, Mossad was in 
Malta when they shot and killed Fathi Shikaki, a leader of Islamic Jihad in exile there, 
outside his hotel. Israel neither accepted nor denied responsibility for these killings. 
However, following the deaths, statements by Israeli officials implied that those 
responsible for armed attacks against Israelis might be targets for extra judicial 
executions. The comment from then Foreign Minister Peres was: “Islamic Jihad are 
killers, so it’s one less killer.”549 Additionally, there have been assassination attempts and 
killings of Hamas members that have had severe political consequences. Two of the best 
known cases were the attempt to kill Khaled Meshal in Jordan and the killing of Yehiya 
Ayyash ‘the Engineer’. On September 25, 1997, Israel attempted to kill Khaled Meshal 
who at that time was the head of Hamas’ political bureau in Amman. As he was walking 
in a busy street in Amman, Mossad agents tried to inject a toxin into his ear. However, 
Meshal’s bodyguards intercepted the attempt and chased the Mossad agents into the 
hands of the Jordanian police. Due to Jordanian anger, the Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu felt compelled to release Sheik Ahmed Yassin, who had been imprisoned for 
eight years, and promised to free up to fifty more prisoners as part of a deal to get Jordan 
to return the captured Mossad agents.550 Yassin’s welcome return to Gaza strengthened 
Hamas as an organisation. As well as straining the relationship between Hamas and 
Arafat, the two leaders were now apparently competing for a leading role in Palestinian 
society.   
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Arguably, the most famous Israeli assassination, although never officially 
admitted by Israel, was the killing of Yehiya Ayyash in 1996, ‘the Engineer’, a Hamas 
operative. Allegedly, he had been responsible for many of the major terrorist attacks 
within Israel during 1994-95, and by the GSS’s calculation, he and his Hamas operatives 
had taken the lives of 67 Israelis and injured another 400.551 The political reasoning 
behind Ayyash’s assassination can not be viewed in isolation. With the killing of Rabin 
in November 1995, Rabin’s foreign minister and fellow Nobel Prize winner, Shimon 
Peres, took power. He ordered the army to withdraw from Palestinian cities. The Oslo 
agreement was to be made permanent and irreversible. Rabin’s murder was not to be 
viewed as a victory over the peace process. The election of the Palestinian Legislative 
Council was approaching for the first time ever, and the Palestinian Authority and Hamas 
made some efforts to keep the peace and mend the rift between them. As a goodwill 
gesture, the Palestinian Authority released several senior Hamas leaders from prison. 
There was also talk of secret meetings, where no written agreement existed, but where a 
verbal understanding was reached. Hamas had agreed to refrain from acts that would 
embarrass the Palestinian Authority, and not to ask voters to boycott the elections. 
However, as others doubted Peres’ ability to handle the security situation, he tried to live 
up to Rabin’s famous slogan: “seek peace as if there were no terrorism, and fight 
terrorism as there were no peace.”552  
 
At that time, due to the Oslo Agreement and unwillingness to jeopardise the 
perceived sovereignty of the Palestinian Authority, the general policy was to cooperate, 
even with respect to security. Seeing as the Palestinian Authority had been given security 
responsibilities in Gaza and area A of the West Bank, it changed the Israeli rules of 
supposedly legitimate actions. However, with time Israel realised that the Palestinian 
Authority was not fulfilling its responsibilities and instructed the security forces to 
discreetly operate inside the autonomous areas.553 The intention was that the method of 
selective killings should incapacitate those planning to carry out attacks, who were 
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beyond the reach of other methods such as arrest and administrative detention. 
Undercover units were instructed to eliminate senior activists wanted for initiating, 
planning, preparing and perpetrating terrorist attacks in Israel. In January 1996, Yehiya 
Ayyash was killed by a bomb, two ounces of plastic explosive were planted in his cell 
phone. Upon his death, Israel officially said nothing. However, it is widely believed that 
Shin Bet was responsible. A cry of rage resounded throughout Gaza. The Palestinian 
Health Minister, Riyad Zaanun, speculated on the timing of Israel’s actions: 
“…Ayash’s way was not ours. But his killing is an alarming act of terror that 
came precisely when we’d reached an agreement with Hamas. It’s as if this act 
was deliberately intended to bring the breakdown of the agreements, and it shows 
a lack of respect for the Palestinian Authority.”554  
 
This is a good example of how the Palestinian Authority is often caught in the middle 
between Israel and the demands of supporters of fundamental Islamism. The commander 
of one of the Palestinian Authority’s many security branches, Sami Abu Samhadana, 
agreed with Zaanun’s assessment when saying: 
 
“The peace and quiet we’ve achieved over the past five months hasn’t made any 
impression on them [Israelis]. We’ve tried to safeguard Israeli security by 
persuading Hamas to become a political movement and reach an agreement with 
us. … But then the Israelis shouldn’t be surprised when there are more attacks. 
Because one thing is for sure- they’ll take their revenge.”555 
 
It appears that he was right; Hamas launched three suicide bombings, killing 57 people in 
Israel in the a space of two weeks in February and March 1996.556 However, the selective 
killing did not only result in terror attacks, but it also forced Peres to hold elections in the 
spring of 1996. With the promise to be tough on Arafat, and making sure that the 
Palestinians kept their commitment to fight terrorism, Benyamin Netanyahu, the Likud 
party leader, eventually came to power. Some argue that this is a clear example of how 
the boomerang effects of one counter terrorism measure and the responding acts of 
terrorism, can indeed achieve political change, in this case, a political change which 
moved away from the peace process. On the other hand, it is impossible to know if these 
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attacks would have been carried out regardless of the killing of the Engineer. This debate 
illustrates that there are different views on the advantages and vulnerabilities of this 
method, and will be explored in the next section.  
 
5. 5. 2 Advantages of the method 
 
As a counter terrorism policy, there are some advantages with the use of selective 
killings. First, the main aim of this method is to prevent future terror attacks. This aim is 
based on the belief that the killing of an operational leader will reduce the pool of 
experience and damage the infrastructure of the organisation to such an extent that they 
will no longer have the capacity to carry out another attack in the short-term. Not only is 
the leader killed, but also his skills and network are also gone. Additionally, it will 
disrupt the necessary preparation of an attack; the recruitment and training of potential 
new members, the development of future tactical methods, the acquisition, or production 
of weapons and the prevention of other logistical support activity. 557 Occasionally the 
method is enforced to prevent a specific attack and not necessary to disrupt the 
organization in general. Obviously, this is not effective in the long-term, because 
eventually junior members will learn from remaining senior members or they simply 
learn the hard way, from experience. However, what it does provide is a time lag. In 
contrast, the killing might provide the sufficient motivation necessary for escalating their 
activities.558 Furthermore, as the main goal is to prevent future terror attacks, it is very 
difficult to prove that attacking a particular terrorist target will give protection from a 
new terror act.  
 
Another advantage of using selective killings to counter terrorism is the method’s 
design to limit civilian casualties and appearance of taking a hard line against terrorists. 
This is precisely the opposite of what Israeli counter terrorism methods are often accused 
of, namely collective punishment. Nevertheless, it is debatable if Israel really is interested 
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in taking all precautions to reduce collateral damage, as the tactics of selective killings 
often include the detonation of remote-controlled bombs, the use of tank fire, 
sharpshooters, close-to-point-blank fire at roadblocks, missiles fired from helicopters or 
precision guided munitions from aircraft. Hence the methods often result in a number of 
innocent civilians being hurt or even killed. However, if there is collateral damage and 
killing of civilians, the consequence is normally less disastrous than a typical military 
reprisal. As Dr. Ely Carmon of the Israeli-based International Policy Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism said; “It is the most efficient and moral act of war. You are fighting 
directly those who are involved in terrorism, not bombing indiscriminately or using 
heavy weapons […] Here we have much more control, greater intelligence and the ability 
to act.” 559At the time, Deputy Defence Minister Efraim Sneh claimed that the method of 
selective killing was: “precise, effective, and just.” 560  
 
A further argument for selective killings is that it is a form of punishment against 
those responsible for previous attacks and hence works as a deterrent. Humans naturally 
react to what they perceive as injustice, and have a need for revenge and punishment. The 
idea of punishment is also a cornerstone in deterrence. In this case it is those who are 
responsible for the terror that will pay the price, while the general public will be taught a 
lesson, so called public principles of deterrence. The Minister of Defence, Moshe Arens, 
explained it as follows: “This serves as a message to all terrorist organisations…whoever 
starts something with us, we will finish it for them. This must be made clear to all the 
gangs, terrorist organisations and their leaders.”561 Although seldom an aim in itself, 
another benefit of this method is a lift in morale of the Israeli public. Considering that the 
damage caused by terrorism is not necessarily physical, but rather psychological, a 
successful and daring counter terrorism operation might enhance the public’s sense of 
security. Hence the public can restore their faith in the government and the fact that their 
army is capable of protecting them.  
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Finally, selective killings can demoralise the organisation’s activists and 
supporters enforcing internal upheaval which could even end up in a power struggle. 
Within an organisation, each member usually has their own role to fulfil, and when a 
leader is killed, their role will not be filled immediately. This forces the organisation to 
allocate resources, manpower, and time to restore the situation to the way it was, or even 
to improve their ways for security reasons. The former counter terrorism advisor to the 
Prime Minister and now head of Mossad, Meir Dagen, stated: “The constant need to 
adapt will disrupt the militant’s ability to operate.”562 Furthermore, with the knowledge 
that selective killings often rely on intelligence from an informant, the organisation might 
carry out an internal operation to ‘purify’ the organisation.563 The constant fear of life 
could divert all the attention from operational planning, to defence planning. In turn, this 
could result in de-motivation within the organisation. However, the issue of motivation is 
complex. The practise of selective killings can also increase the motivation for revenge 
and thus counter attack, hence having a boomerang effect. These issues will be explored 
in the next section, in addition to the vulnerable points of the method.  
 
5. 5. 3 The method’s vulnerability  
 
Although the method of selective killings clearly has some advantages, the 
method also reveals vulnerability. First, there is the question of whether killing 
individuals who have non-military or non-operational roles is legitimate. Micheal 
Ignatieff touched upon this issue when attempting to determine if selective killings could 
be a method of lesser evil. He argued that the method could be justified, but only against 
individuals indisputably engaged in terrorist activity against a democratic state, and even 
then only under certain conditions:  
 
“(a) where less violent alternatives, like arrest and capture, endanger […]  
personnel or civilians; (b) where information exists that the targets in question are 
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planning imminent attacks that cannot be stopped in any other way; and (c) where 
all reasonable precautions are taken to minimise collateral damage and civilian 
harm.”564   
 
Ignatieff’s first criterion is essential in justifying the method as a lesser evil, and in most 
cases where assassinations have been carried out, the targeted individual held a 
operational role such as instigating the attack, deciding on the method of attack, 
recruiting, and training suicide bombers. Nevertheless, Yitzhak Rabin, then Minister of 
Defence, argued that the selective killings of terrorist leaders should not merely be 
limited to operational leaders:  
 
“My understanding of terror is simple: there is no solution based on a single blow, 
there is no campaign that can solve the problem. What is needed, using 
preventative strikes and other methods, is to reduce vulnerability. The second 
element is to mete out the maximum punishment to perpetrators and their 
handlers. I am not referring here to personal terror against someone, but rather to 
a viewpoint. We must strike not just at the field and operational level, but also the 
command, control, and financial systems.”565  
 
However, this opinion may vary, depending on how a terrorist organisation is regarded. 
For instance, an organisation can be considered a single entity, as believed by Yitzak 
Rabin, but could contain a violent wing responsible for terror attacks, to help achieve the 
organisation’s common goal. According to this view, there is no reason to differentiate 
between individuals who have a non-military or non-operational role or not, because they 
are all working to enhance the organisation’s capacity to perform terror attacks. However, 
an organisation can also be regarded as more complex, and the accountability of actions 
is less clear or absolute. For example, one individual can belong to the administrative 
branch thus holding a non-military role, but may also be responsible for providing the 
military branch with money for a specific attack. Hamas is not only a movement 
engaging in terror; they are also a socio-political movement. Furthermore, it becomes 
even more complicated when an individual involved in terror activity is simultaneously 
politically active; a politician or employee of the political establishment. Cabinet Minister 
Tzipi Livni claimed that: “Some of the Authority people have become part of the terrorist 
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organisations.”566 West Bank General Intelligence Chief Tawfik Tirawi was suspected of 
assisting in recruiting, arming, and dispatching terrorists to perpetrate attacks in Israel. 
Lists of potential suicide bombers’ names that Israel had handed over to Tirawi with the 
demand they be arrested by the Palestinian Authority, were instead used by Tirawi to 
warn the terrorists.567 Before the al-Aqsa Intifada, Darwazeh, a Hamas bomb maker, 
became acquainted with members of Arafat’s Force 17 security unit as they guarded his 
cell at the Jeneid prison, in the West Bank city of Nablus. When he was released, he paid 
them to watch over his bomb making lab in Nablus, an arrangement that continued until 
Darwazeh was assassinated by Israel in July 2001.568 On October 28, 2001, four Israeli 
women were gunned down at a crowded bus stop in the city of Hadera. Islamic Jihad 
claimed responsibility, but the two men who carried out the shootings were in fact active 
members of the Palestinian police force.569 Muhammed Dahlan was the chief of the 
Preventive Security Service in Gaza, but was also suspected of being responsible for the 
bomb targeting a school bus just outside Kfar Darom on November 20, 2000, an incident 
that led to the death of two adults and serious injury of several young children. 
Additionally, Israeli security sources accused Dahlan’s deputy, Rashid Abu Shabbak, of 
preparing the bomb. In retaliation for the Kfar Darom attack, the Preventive Security 
headquarters in Gaza was targeted, and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon openly called for 
Dahlan’s assassination. Whether this threat was real or just a warning to satisfy the anger 
of the Israeli public is difficult to determine. These examples illustrate the complexity of 
the situation and the vulnerability of the selective killing method.  
 
 
Another weakness of this counter terrorism method is the possibility of an 
international outcry in its aftermath. As Boaz Ganor points out, selective killings of 
terrorists usually draws international criticism, especially from countries that identify 
with the terrorists’ cause or sponsor the organization, but also from other countries that 
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consider this type of counter terrorist activity illegitimate, in violation of international 
norms, and in contradiction to criminal law.570 Hence, the response can influence regional 
stability. The killings are often executed on foreign soil or in non-sovereign areas, which 
could lead to diplomatic consequences or military complications if the combat force 
requires a rescue operation, which in turn might cause military conflicts between hostile 
forces. This was indeed the case when Israel attempted to kill Hamas member Khaled 
Meshal in Jordan. This operation had grave international and political consequences. Not 
only did Israel run the risk of compromising its international relations with Canada, but it 
also jeopardized its relationship with Jordan. The Mossad agents had arrived in Jordan 
with false Canadian passports. This was a violation of Israel’s commitment not to use 
Canadian passports and documents when committing intelligence operations. As a result, 
the Canadian ambassador to Israel was called in for consultation.571 This failed attempt 
resulted in a strained diplomatic relationship with Jordan, who had signed a peace deal 
with Israel only two years earlier. King Hussein told the Israeli government that if they 
did not provide the antidote to the chemical agent used in the attack, and if consequently 
Mash’al died, “Jordan would take many other measures”572, including putting the Mossad 
agents on trial for murder, as well as suspending diplomatic relations. The Israelis 
obliged immediately.  
 
A third vulnerability of selective killings as a counter terrorism method is that it 
depends heavily on good and current intelligence. Successful operations require accurate, 
preliminary, and real-time intelligence. Arguably the best tool for gathering intelligence 
is Palestinian collaborators. Because of the success that Israel has had in gathering 
intelligence from Palestinians, it has continually tried to increase its network of informers 
in areas under Palestinian Authority control. 573 One anonymous Palestinian official said: 
“There is a tremendous pressure on the Palestinians to collaborate. As closures continue 
and the economic hardship increases, some people crack and give in to Israeli 
                                                 
570 Ganor, Boaz; The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle; A guide for decision makers, Transaction Publishers, 
London, 2007. 
571 Omaar, Regeh; “The Mash’al affair –Israel pays a high price”, Middle East International, 10 October 
1997 
572 Ibid. 
573 Time; “The work of assassins: from both sides of the Intifada”, Time Magazine, 15 January 2001. 
 202 
blackmail.”574 In 1994, B’tselem estimated that there were about 6,000 collaborators on 
the payroll of the Shin Bet during the first Intifada.575 Although collaborators provide 
good intelligence, the informant is often exposed and neutralized shortly after the actual 
selective killing. The state may therefore have to pay the price of losing a valuable 
source. One of the policies implemented by Israel to protect collaborators is to provide 
them with Israeli residency permits and relocate them to Israel. Considering there were 
6,000 collaborators during the first Intifada, potentially 30,000 to 50,000 people were 
relocated to Israel.576 It is not likely that the Israeli authorities intend to absorb this 
number of Palestinians. However, intelligence is not always reliable, and there have been 
situations where the Israelis have acted on bad intelligence and mistakenly killed the 
family of the target or killed more innocent civilians than calculated.577 Increasingly, 
more and more innocent bystanders are killed as a result.578 There are several possible 
reasons for this increase. It could be a result of a more indiscriminate modus operandi, a 
growing tendency of the terrorists to hide and mingle among the civilian public, simply 
bad intelligence, or a sign that the security committee has become more anxious and is 
less likely to wait for the right moment to strike. 
 
This lack of control mechanism is an important criticism of selective killings and 
also shows the vulnerability of this method. Because the method depends so heavily on 
intelligence and secrecy, the committee which selects and validates all of the targets 
consists of people with power, i.e. the Prime Minister, the Chief of Staff and the head of 
the General Security Services.579 Effectively, this makes them prosecutor, judge, and jury 
at the same time. Due to the sensitivity of the method, the only time they have to account 
for their judgements is in the democratic political elections, when they have to defend 
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and legitimise their decisions to the general public.580 Notably, only individuals with an 
Israeli citizenship can vote, leaving out numerous Palestinians who might have a different 
view on the actions of the Israeli government. Therefore, this practice means the Israelis 
must trust the security committee blindly, and it offers no channels through which the 
Palestinians can be heard. The committee does not undergo any verification or offer 
adequate assurances that the method is used according to proper guidelines, or 
implemented with appropriate safeguards. The committee states that they cannot provide 
evidence used for targeting militants, as that information could endanger the lives of the 
intelligence sources. Consequently, this method simply depends on the authority’s 
strength of character and values of the society they are defending. As always, and 
especially in this situation, it is vital for the general public to guide their leaders and serve 
as a control mechanism.  
 
Finally, as mentioned previously, there is a risk that selective killings will result in 
motivating the organisation and therefore subsequent revenge attacks, often referred to as 
“the boomerang effect”. According to this theory, a serious blow to a terrorist 
organisation is likely to be followed by an escalated response by the terrorists; hence 
nothing will have been gained from the counter terrorism method. The consequences of 
the killing of Yehiya Ayyash are often explained according to this theory. However, 
whether this boomerang effect actually exists is a matter of debate. Those who argue 
against it, claim that it is not the motivation which is the ultimate factor in deciding 
whether or not to execute an attack, but rather the group’s operational capability. Meir 
Dagen, now director of Mossad, elaborated as follows:  
 
“There is always the wrong assumption that there is an unlimited source of 
manpower. A person who has operational capabilities, who has the ability to 
motivate and the experience is not something that can be built in one day. If you 
eliminate by killing, or arresting or deporting such a person, you are damaging the 
operational capability of the terror organisation.”581  
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He subsequently declares that he does not believe that the ‘boomerang effect’ exists, but 
rather that the “terrorist organisation invented the boomerang effect to generate a 
deterrent balance against Israel […] and the attacks would have been perpetrated in any 
case, although perhaps at a different time and in a somewhat different fashion.”582 Others 
argue that the validly of the boomerang effect is not as clear cut, and although 
differentiating between the organisation’s motivation and capability, they argue that these 
factors vary depending on the type of the organisation: “organisations whose motivation 
to perpetrate terrorist attacks at a particular point in time is higher than their capability to 
act upon that motivation (usually smaller groups with limited resources […]) and 
organisations for whom motivation is the factor that limits their attacks at a given time, 
rather than capability (usually larger groups […]).”583  
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Regardless of whether the “boomerang effect” exists, there are supporters of the 
counter terrorism measure who consider the continued violence between Israelis and the 
Palestinians as a long-term struggle, with no expectation of peace in the short-term. This 
means that they do not fear retribution, as they feel this violence would happen in any 
case, and that there is no real prospect of genuine peace negotiations. 
 
5. 5. 4. Hamas’ reaction  
 
The use of selective killings before the second Intifada prompted several reactions 
from Hamas. First, seeing as the practise depends heavily on intelligence, they are 
increasingly suspicious of unfamiliar faces and awkward accents. If they spot someone 
looking marginally out of place, they begin harassing the stranger with questions about 
his home village.585 When Israel changed its practise and started recruiting and relying on 
collaborators, Hamas’ frustration and anger turned towards these collaborators. Both the 
nationalistic groups, like Fatah, and the Islamic groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, 
demanded that the Palestinian Authorities take action and arrest and punish the 
collaborators, or else they themselves would take action.586 Additionally, they appealed to 
the general public to turn in suspected informers.587 This often resulted in a power 
struggle between the Palestinian Authority and the Islamists.588  
 
Seeing as Israel appeared to target key members and leaders, Hamas’ response to 
the selective killing of Damascus-based Khaled Mashaal, was to instruct the organisation 
not to disclose the name of his successor. Furthermore, there is some indication that 
Hamas, for a period, decided to have an interim collective leadership, effectively making 
it harder to pinpoint crucial members.589 Additionally, certain members even obtained 
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Although the selective killings created a sense of uncertainty and chaos, and the 
feeling that the Palestinian Authority was not able to provide security for its public, it did 
not end the terror attacks. Hamas is a large organisation, and although Israel may cripple 
Hamas’ tactical capacity and prevent terror attacks in the short-term, it is believed that 
the killing of selected members does not lower its capability significantly, and only 
increases its motivations for further attacks. Sheikh Ahmad Yassin said: “Israel planted 
the violence by killing innocent people, now Israel is harvesting the reaction.”590 
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5. 6 Administrative detention   
 
Administrative detention is defined as “the internment of a person by executive 
order without charge or trial”,591 during which no criminal charges are filed and where 
there is no intention of bringing the detainee to trial. Administrative detention can be the 
end result of single arrests. However, in many cases, administrative detention is the 
consequence of a mass arrest operation, and generally carried out after a bomb attack. 
The practice of mass arrests will be briefly addressed in this section, and the intentions of 
this counter terrorism method and the way it is practised, will be examined. The number 
of detainees subject to the policy of administrative detention is difficult to ascertain, 
possibly due to the political sensitivity of such numbers. However, it is still feasible to 
gain insight into the overall development of this measure, as outlined here. Additionally, 
some aspects of the juridical process will be included, to highlight some of the criticisms 
of this method. Finally, the manner in which Hamas has used their organisational skills 
and taken advantage of the time during imprisonment will be discussed.  
 
Israel’s counter terrorism method of administrative detention has created an 
academic debate on the legality of this method, and many articles have been written with 
an emphasis on human rights and international law. Seeing as this thesis does not seek to 
evaluate the legality of Israel’s counter terrorism methods, reports from, and testimonies 
collected by human rights organisations, will be included in order to describe the practise 
of this method and the effect on Hamas.   
 
In Israel, administrative detention is imposed on people suspected of harming the 
security of the state and of the public within the Green Line, in the West Bank and in 
Gaza. The use of this method by the Israeli military authorities is not a new practice. 
Administrative detention applied in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank is based on Article 
108 and 111 of the Defence Emergency Regulations which was enacted in September 
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1945 by the British authorities then governing the Mandate of Palestine.592 After Israel’s 
conquest of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, a state of martial law was declared in order 
to consolidate Israeli gains and effectively police the Palestinian population. This was 
followed by the issuing of the first Military Orders which are still in place 34 years 
later.593 It is under these Military Orders, and not the Detention Law, that the vast 
majority of Israel’s administrative detentions are carried out, together with the Military 
Order 1229 of 1988 of the West Bank, and Military Order 941 of 1988 of Gaza.  
 
5. 6. 1 Arrests 
 
Even after the 1993 peace agreement between Israel and the PLO, the Palestinians 
in Gaza and the West Bank have not been safe from indiscriminate arrests, as the 
violence and planning of terror attacks by Palestinians has also increased. By virtue of 
Articles 78 and 81 of Military Order 378, a soldier in the Israeli army has the legal right 
to search premises and arrest upon suspicion without a warrant.594 The net result of being 
part of a mass arrest is often administrative detention. Military Orders do not require 
judicial review of an administrative detention order, and set no minimum period during 
which an appeal must be heard.595 Military Order 378 also allows detention of up to 90 
days without access to a lawyer. Access to family can be denied for an ever longer period 
of time.  
 
After an attack on Israeli civilians, the government usually arrests a large number 
of Palestinian suspects, in the hope of finding the people responsible for these attacks, to 
show both the Palestinians and the Israeli citizens that these attacks are not acceptable 
and that the perpetrators will be held responsible, even if they have to turn every stone to 
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find them. Following the Afula attack in 1994, Israel arrested 362 Hamas members 
within two days. After the series of suicide bombings in February and March 1996, Israel 
arrested at least 1,000 Palestinians from the West Bank. After the suicide bomb in 
Jerusalem in September 1997 carried out by Hamas, about 500 Palestinians were arrested 
in the West Bank, and a further 1,200 Palestinians in 1998 on security grounds alone.596 
 
Although many Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank now live under the 
Palestinian Authority administrative jurisdiction, it is Israel who is responsible for the 
internal security in the West Bank areas B and C. The Israelis can therefore impose 
curfews freely, search houses and arrest and detain Palestinians. Furthermore, an 
amendment to the Military Order 378 issued in 1994 authorized Israel to extend its 
powers to Area A, where the Palestinian Authority were meant to have sole responsibility 
for internal security.   
 
5. 6. 2 Intention and practice 
 
Israel claims that it uses administrative detention only as a security measure, 
“intended to enhance public order and safety by removing a person in question from a 
location in which he is expected or deemed likely to commit acts damaging thereto.” 597 
Additionally, the use of administrative detention is only to be implemented when “normal 
legal measures or less severe administrative measures have failed and there is therefore 
no other way to ensure security.”598 Nevertheless, many administrative detainees have 
never been issued a restriction order prior to detention. Although, in some cases the 
complete opposite has occurred, in that detainees have been given a restriction order after 
being released from administrative detention.  
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“Khaled Deleisheh was detained administratively for four and a half years, from 
March 1989 to September 1993. Upon his release, he was given a six-month 
administrative order which prohibited him from leaving his town, El-Bireh, and 
prohibited him from leaving his home after sundown. Upon the expiration of this 
restriction order, in April 1994, Mr. Deleisheh was again detained.”599 
 
This practice makes it difficult to determine whether administrative detention is a 
preventive or punitive measure. According to then Chief Staff of IDF, Lipkin-Shahak, 
administrative detention is not meant to be a deterrent.600 In the High Court of Justice, Y. 
Kahan claimed: “The purpose of administrative detention... is not to impose a punishment 
on a man for his actions, committed in the past, but to prevent the anticipated danger he 
poses in the future.”601 
 
It is precisely the prevention of future actions which prevents administrative 
detention from being substituted with a criminal trial. How can an individual be punished 
for something he has not yet done? The criminal justice system is essentially designed to 
punish individuals for past crimes. However, Israel consistently justifies administrative 
detention as a means to confine individuals who have committed crimes, but who cannot 
be tried under the normal framework of a criminal court, because the security forces do 
not wish to publicly disclose their evidence or witnesses for security reasons. This is the 
very nature of administrative detention, which is based on confidential material kept from 
the detainee and his lawyer, and only disclosed to the presiding judge. The law regulating 
administrative detention itself permits the President of the District Court, who is the 
authority entrusted by law, to review the legality of the detention orders, to: 
 
“…accept evidence without the detainee or his representative being present and 
without disclosing the evidence to them if, after studying the evidence or hearing 
submissions, even in their absence, he is satisfied that disclosure of the evidence 
to either of them may impair state security or public security.”602  
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The content of the confidential material determines the period of detention and its 
extension thereafter. Although the detainee supposedly can appeal the detention 
judgement, in practice this is difficult to do successfully as the detainee is not given a 
meaningful opportunity to defend himself/herself, seeing as the evidence is generally 
classified. The reliance on secret evidence, which the defence is not allowed to argue or 
protest against, demonstrates a total and unquestioning trust in Shin Bet. The danger is 
that the delegation of judgement from the court will fall into the hands of the intelligence 
services. In protest against the juridical proceedings, many Palestinian detainees have 
boycotted their right of appeal.603 
 
The very reason for detaining an individual is that they constitute a danger to 
security. Following this logic, it is with the removal of the individual from society, that 
the individual no longer poses a threat. Nevertheless, this threat is precisely the argument 
that the military uses when applying for extensions of individuals already under 
administrative detention. For example, in the case of Khaled Deleisheh, who has been in 
detention since March 1994, both the military court judge and the High Court of Justice 
accepted the contention that Deleisheh represented a danger to the area, even when in 
detention, and extended his detention time.  
 
“The petitioner is a senior activist in the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine] in Judea and Samaria. His activities - both when he is free and in 
administrative detention - are not just political. The classified information reveals 
that, even during his detention, the appellant engages in hostile activities, in 
addition to political activities, which lead to, or are likely to lead to, violence and 
danger to the security of the place.”604  
 
This suggests that ‘danger to security’ is a broadly used term. The way in which 
administrative detention is used in practise, even suggests that this term includes having a 
particular political opinion, although Israel has emphasized that this is not the case. 
“Everyone agrees that the political opinions of a person, however much they may be 
contrary to the opinions of the government and the overwhelming majority of the public, 
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cannot constitute a basis for denying his freedom.”605 Furthermore, this is complicated 
further by the fact that Hamas is not only a military organisation, but also serves as a 
socio-political organisation. A member of Hamas is not necessarily both violent and a 
danger to the security. However, military judges ignore this by claiming that “political 
subversion is equally dangerous - if not more dangerous - than regular terrorism.”  
 
After the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the ‘political opinion’ of an 
individual also included views on the peace process. First, Ahmad Qatamesh, from 
Ramallah, was arrested in 1992 and was handled by the criminal legal system. During the 
trial in 1993, the judge ordered that he be released on bail, arguing that the prosecutor had 
failed to provide evidence against him justifying his continued imprisonment. He was 
therefore scheduled for release ten days later. However, at that time, the Israeli military 
authorities decided instead to place Ahmad Qatamesh under administrative detention for 
six months. He stated that the general prosecutor offered to release him if he publicly 
supported the Middle East peace process. He refused to do so, believing that his political 
view was not enough to detain him. Ahmad Qatamesh's administrative detention order 
was renewed nine times. He was eventually released in April 1998, when he changed his 
mind about signing a pledge. His declaration was televised stating that he would not be 
connected to violent activity against Israel. By that time, he had been detained for five 
and a half years. Signing a declaration of non violence can function as a ticket to 
freedom. Administrative detainee Walid al-Ghoul, a Gaza resident, claimed that he was 
required to sign the following statement, as a condition to release:  
 
“I undertake to refrain from all violent and terrorist activity. I understand that my 
signature on this document is a condition for my release from prison. In addition I 
know that my release will take place as part of the peace process negotiations, 
which I support, between Israel and the PLO to implement the Declaration of 
Principles signed on 13.9.93.”606  
 
Al-Ghoul agreed to sign the first paragraph. However, he was not willing to sign the 
second, because he opposed the Oslo Process and because as a detainee, his political view 




should have no bearing on his detention. Al-Ghoul was not released.607 Unlike Gaza 
detainees, none of the West Bank administrative detainees have been released in the 
context of the Oslo Accords, and therefore no releases have been made based on the 
signing of such a statement. 
 
5. 6. 3 The numbers game 
 
“Yeah, yeah, yeah,” Yitzhak Mordechai, the Israeli Defence Minister, speaking in 
the Knesset, “Administrative detention is not very nice. I agree. I know something 
about democracy and the rule of law and all that. But it is so effective a tool in 
fighting terrorism that we simply cannot, should not even think of giving it up.”608   
 
Hence Israel still continues to hold detainees. However, the numbers vary over time with 
the political mood. 
 
Administrative detention was implemented shortly after the 1967 war, and the 
number of administrative detainees in 1970 was reportedly 1,131.609 According to the 
Mandela Institute, between 1970 and 1979, 920 Palestinians were placed under 
administrative detention, but the numbers were reduced in the early 1980s as a result of 
international pressure.610 After the implementation of the Israeli Cabinet’s self- 
proclaimed ‘Iron Fist’ policy in August 1985, Israel made use of this measure again. With 
the outbreak of the first Intifada, administrative detention was a well established counter 
terrorism method. Israel acknowledged that 3–4,000 detainees, out of a total of 18,000, 
were held under administrative detention and arrested during the first year of the first 
Intifada.611 However, since then it has been difficult to assess how many detainees have 
been held at any given time. Human rights organisations, the Palestinian Authority, as 
well as the Israeli government publish different numbers. This numbers game is partly a 
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result of different definitions and classifications, but it is also used to serve the political 
agenda. Detainees are viewed as a bargaining tool in the peace process in order to 
advance Israeli security. Justice Barak claimed that: “it is sufficient for me to say that the 
detention of the Appellants, when it comes to advance and protect State security, is 
lawful detention.”612 Often as a symbol of goodwill, Israel will release some detainees, or 
in response to Palestinians behaving unsatisfactory, there will be waves of mass arrests 
and the numbers of detainees will increase.613 However, the focus of this section is on the 
use of administrative detention as a counter terrorism method, hence the numbers of 
individuals will only be used as a tool to examine the developing trends. The significance 
of the analyses of this measure is not diminished without the knowledge of the exact 
numbers of individuals being held at any given time. 
 
During the negotiations of the Oslo Accords, both sides broadcast that Israel 
would release more Palestinian prisoners in the near future. On September 13, 1993, the 
day the Declaration of Principles was signed, it was stipulated that Israel held almost 300 
Palestinians in administrative detention,614 and there were no references in the Accord 
regarding the release of any detainees. By October, the detainees were feeling neglected, 
which, combined with government statements such as: “Releasing prisoners depends on 
the progress of the Peace Process”615, did not help their uneasiness. With the signing of 
the Cairo Agreement on May 4, 1994, the release of detainees became more frequent. 
However, at the same time, the number of new detainees also rose steadily, as a result of 
more arrests. There were particular events which caused an increase in the numbers of 
detainees, usually the mass arrests after terror attacks. After the two bombings that killed 
13 Israelis in Afula in April 1994, 500 Palestinians were arrested, and the number of 
administrative detainees tripled in ten days.616 With the four suicide bomb attacks in 
Israel in February and March 1996, the number of detainees rose again and continued to 
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do so throughout 1997.617 It was not until 1998 that the number of Palestinians held in 
administrative detention began to decline. From 1999 to October 2001, the average 
number was less than 20. Nevertheless, the legal basis for administrative detention 
remained the same, which enabled Israel steadily to increase the use of the method, as 
demonstrated during the second Intifada. 
 
5. 6. 4 The juridical process 
 
The Minister of Defence has the authority to issue administrative detention orders 
in Israel and East Jerusalem, whereas military commanders can issue the same orders in 
Gaza and the West Bank (except for East Jerusalem, which was annexed by Israel in 
1967). Military commanders are ordinarily empowered to detain individuals for periods 
of up to six months. However, prior to the expiry of the term, the detention order is 
frequently renewed and extended by additional six month periods, a process which can be 
continued indefinitely. Moreover, as a result of the October 1994 suicide bombing in 
Dizengoff Street, Israel prolonged the period of incommunicado while in detention. For 
six months after the bombing, lawyers of Palestinian detainees reported that it had 
become the norm, rather than the exception, to be denied access to detainees for 25-30 
days and that detainees were being held for 40 to 140 days without access to their 
families.618 
 
Since the signing of the 1993 peace accords, Israel has been transferring detainees 
from centres located in Gaza and the West Bank to ones inside Israel619, and a special 
detention facility was even set up at Ketziot.620 The combination of this policy and 
Israel's use of closure has had a profound impact on prisoners. First, lawyers from Gaza 
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and the West Bank are unable to visit their clients in Israel without going through the 
complex permit application process, and furthermore, during total closures, they cannot 
even enter Israel. This means that in practice, only Israeli attorneys are able to visit their 
Palestinian clients, leaving hundreds of Palestinian detainees without legal representation 
or at least representation they feel comfortable with. Additionally, Israel does not allow 
Palestinian attorneys, regardless of whether they hold a permit, have East Jerusalem 
identity cards and licenses issued by the Israeli Bar Association or by an official Israeli 
governmental body such as MATAK, to visit detainees in Israeli prisons.621 Secondly, the 
closure creates complications for family members trying to visit detainees. Even when a 
total closure is not in place, and family members (usually women, since it is far more 
difficult for men, particularly young ones, to obtain permits) are able to obtain permits, 
the trip to Israel is nevertheless much more time-consuming and challenging than to a 
facility in the West Bank. Moreover, it can be difficult to obtain prompt information 
about detainees' conditions or their whereabouts.  
 
Israel did review their laws and the use of administrative detention which resulted 
in an amendment on June 6, 1999. It stipulated that a detainee should stand before a judge 
during the first ten days of detention. The order stated that it was in the judge’s power to 
cancel the administrative detention order, to confirm it, or reduce the period. If the order 
was confirmed, an automatic review should take place after three months. It was also 
legislated that at detention hearings, the government may withhold evidence from 
defence lawyers on security grounds. Furthermore, it was decided that the detainee has 
the right to appeal the ruling before a court martial, and lastly before the High Court of 
Justice.622 Hence it would appear that these amendments are making the method more 
lenient. However, military officers still have authority to issue orders that contradict the 
judge’s ruling, and they are not obliged openly to show the evidence in court, leaving 
detainees still fumbling in the dark while trying to defend themselves.623 Each 
administrative detention order contains an explanation of the reason for detention. The 
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reason provided is normally standard: “being a Hamas activist whose activity threatens 
the security of the area.” Or simply “being a senior activist.” 624 This explanation is often 
the only information provided to the detainee regarding the reason for their 
imprisonment.   
 
It has become more evident during the Oslo Period, that the length of detention 
has increased, and the length has not changed since the juridical review in 1999. An 
increasing number of detainees are given multiple consecutive detentions, with over forty 
percent of them detained for more than one year. Of these, eleven detainees have been 
held in administrative detention for over three years, without ever knowing when they 
might be released. B’tselem, a human rights organisation, supports these findings and 
claims that over half of the administrative detainees have had their detention order 
extended at least once.625 This is a worrying trend for two reasons. First, it is during the 
detention that the detainee is interrogated. In such interrogations, the Security Service 
systematically uses methods of torture or causes other types of ill-treatment.626 The fact 
that an extension of detention follows after an interrogation, suggests that this measure 
may be used when interrogators fail to obtain a confession from which they could base a 
criminal indictment. The case of the detained Khled Jaradat serves as an example. In his 
case Shin Bet confirmed to the courts that he was not suspected of being involved in any 
violent activities. Nevertheless, Khalid Jaradat was re-detained in 1998, only a week after 
his release from an eighteen-month long administrative detention. He stood before the 
Israeli High Court of Justice three times, the latest time on July 19, 1999, and in each 
case the Court dismissed his appeal after examining the confidential report. This time his 
detention period was extended for the fifth time. The uncertainty of not knowing a release 
date is very emotionally draining for the detainees and their families. Tzahi Hanegbi, 
former Israeli Minister of Justice stated: “To be imprisoned without knowing why, 
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without being able to find out what the charges against you are—what could be worse? 
But security makes it necessary, no matter how unpleasant.”627  
 
5. 6. 5 Hamas takes advantage  
 
Hamas has again shown its ability to adapt to circumstances by managing to take 
advantage of this preventative and punitive counter terrorism method. The detainees are 
all held in special centres. These detention centres also work as a training ground for 
Hamas.628 Here individuals from Gaza and the West Bank, who most likely would never 
meet, often form a close bond. Due to the screening based upon affiliation to an 
organisational structure, similar to the internment system used in Northern Ireland, 
Hamas and other Palestinian groups have the opportunity to share and learn from each 
others experience, invent and exchange new tactics, as well as to recruit new young 
members. By comparing their experiences and analyzing their mistakes, the prisoners are 
able to advise their successors on how to avoid falling into Shin Bet’s traps. Networking 
also takes place which results in the re-formation of terrorist cells and the continuation of 
violence on the outside. The Hamas infrastructure within the centres was so well 
organised that its command centre periodically operated out of Israel's prisons, with the 
detainees passing instructions via their visitors. The main method of message 
communication among the security prisoner population is the ‘ashgar’. The ashgar is a 
written message transmitted on transparent paper, usually written in cramped handwriting 
on both sides of the page. The thinness of the paper makes it possible to fold several 
times.629 
 
Moreover, the prisoners not only formed a community on the inside. The families 
of prisoners were united on the outside of the prison as well. Whole organisational 
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structures were created to take care of the families who had family in prison.630 
Essentially, the organisation aimed to take good care of its members. This is a vital part 
of Hamas’ charity work, but also its recruitment method. Once released, the detainees 
wrote booklets on how to prepare potential future detainees for interrogation and the 
probable incarceration to follow. These publications described in detail the methods used 
to break the detainees, and suggested ways of countering them. They also warned that 
prison cell mates might be informers and described how the Israelis went about recruiting 
Palestinian newcomers to work for them.631  
 
While inside, members of Hamas take advantage of their organisational strengths, 
largely inherited from the practices of the Muslim Brotherhood. The emphasis is on 
providing both political and religious education. Husam, a former detainee, describes his 
internment as ‘a political prison’, where inmates received political indoctrination from 
fellow inmates, sang banned nationalistic songs, and celebrated Palestinian political 
holidays. “We are a political people, inside prison and outside. All our experience is 
politics.”632 He further said that; “We had many books inside that they don’t have outside 
the prison. Your family can bring you books and change the first pages, make it the 
Koran or something so the policeman looks and says okay. We read all about the 
revolutions in the world.”633 The detainees come to the centre as illiterates and leave with 
a broad education. Each day a symposium is held to discuss the content of that morning's 
newspaper, and many inmates like Husam study English and Hebrew; “You must learn 
your enemy’s language to know what he says.”634 However, politics and language are not 
the only things that are taught. Prisoners who have attended officers’ courses in one of 
the Arab states give lessons on the use of explosives, arms, topography and field craft, 
military tactics and history.  
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This multifaceted educational system results in the detainees leaving the centre 
more self-assured and committed to their cause, than when they arrived. “When you lock 
up hundreds of angry people together and lump in the hard men with the kids and the first 
offenders, it doesn’t take a genius to predict the consequences.”635 Because they keep in 
contact with the outside through notes smuggled in by family members, when they return, 
they are quickly reabsorbed into the Palestinian underground.636 Ironically, individuals 
who have served time in a detention centre can obtain a higher social status in their own 
society as they served their time like a man, and suffered for their organisation and their 
people. Furthermore, one effect is certain; due to the conditions and political 
environment, the detainees who entered with just a mild dislike for the Israelis, leave with 
hatred. “Even if I were to be imprisoned fifty times I would not give up the struggle for 
Palestinian national rights. Jail has a great effect on your personality when you are young. 
It made me stronger.”637 
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5. 7 Interrogation methods  
 
In a war between states, and particularly in the fight against terrorism, information 
is a vital factor. The academic literature on counter terrorism places emphasis on the 
importance of current and accurate intelligence. The methods which are used during 
interrogation in order to obtain the information are therefore very significant. This 
presents the following dilemma: breaching the human rights of the suspected terrorist 
with respect to torture and physical harm, versus the possibly of obtaining vital 
information that could allow security forces to prevent terrorism and save human lives. In 
most societies, the question of whether physical pressure or torture should be used during 
interrogation is theoretical, as part of a moral discussion. However, this has been an issue 
throughout Israel’s various governments and illustrates the sensitivity of the use of the 
method and difficult relationship between the government and the entire executive 
branch, and between the legislative and the judicial branches. Then deputy Defence 
Minister Ephraim Sneh explained:  
 
“It's very nice to have a very liberal legislation. It's good in Scandinavia, in 
Western Europe, maybe North America. But in this part of the world, where we 
fight so bitterly with terrorism, it's such a burden that it's almost irrelevant to the 
reality that we live in.”638 
 
Torture is not generally acceptable in a democratic society, but if a counter terrorism 
policy is required and has to be developed, this issue can cause quite a dilemma for the 
government. This is also reflected by the kind of terminology used to describe torture. As 
Israel acknowledges this, it uses the term ‘physical pressure’ to describe its various 
interrogation methods, while the Palestinians and the international community would 
refer to it as torture. Perhaps, this might explain why torture is frequently discussed in 
academic circles. This section relies on academic books and articles as a source of 
information, in addition to testimonies and reports by human rights organisations based 
                                                 
638 Hockstader, Lee; “Israel’s Court Bars Abuse of Suspects”, www.washingtonpost.com, accessed 7 
September 1999. 
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on statements from individuals who claim to have been tortured, in order to explore 
which kind of methods Israel has been, and presumable still is, practicing.   
 
5. 7. 1 The Landau Commission 
 
In May 1987 the Landau Commission was created, named after its chairman, 
former High Court Chief Justice Moshe Landau. The need for such a committee came as 
a consequence of the ‘Nafsu Episode’. Izat Nafsu was an IDF army lieutenant convicted 
in 1980 of treason.639 He had had contact with a terrorist organisation who had tried to 
threaten him and force him into working for them. Nafsu refused to give in to their 
threats, but did not report his meeting with the organisation’s representative to his 
superiors.640 In April 1987 Nafsu appealed his conviction of treason to the Supreme 
Court, which ruled that Shin Bet had used unethical interrogation methods to obtain 
Nafsu's confession and that Shabak officers had presented a false testimony to the 
military tribunal that had convicted him.641 The Supreme Court emphasised the need to 
define rules for interrogation procedures, and as a result, the Commission was 
established.  
 
Their task was to examine how a human rights-based society should respond to 
the prospect of using non-lethal torture in highly charged situations and to define the 
“boundaries of what is permitted to the interrogator and mainly what is prohibited to 
him.”642 On October 30, 1987, the commission concluded that there were three ways of 
solving the dilemma of preserving the very existence of the state and its citizens, and 
maintaining a democracy;  
 
“‘The first is to allow the security services to continue to fight terrorism in ‘a 
twilight zone which is outside the realm of law’. The second is ‘the way of the 
                                                 
639 Shabak, www.fas.org, accessed 8 April 2007.  
640 Ganor, Boaz; The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle; A guide for decision makers, Transaction Publishers, 
London, 2007. 
641 Federation of American Scientists; “Shabak” www.fas.org, accessed 8 April 2007.. 
642 Uildriks, Niels; “Torture in Israel”, Human Rights Review, Vol. 1, Issue 4, 2000. 
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hypocrites: they declare that they abide by the rule of law, but turn a blind eye to 
what goes on beneath the surface.’ And the third, ‘the truthful road of the rule of 
law’ is that the ‘law itself must insure a proper framework of the activity’ of the 
security services in seeking to prevent terrorist acts.” 643  
   
However, there is a fourth solution, which the Commission did not take into 
consideration; i.e. not to allow torture under any circumstance, even if a terror attack 
might occur as a consequence. The commission work was concluded with their 
guidelines, the so called ‘Landau Rules’. Here they stated that “pressure must never reach 
the level of physical torture or maltreatment of the suspect, or grievous harm to his 
honour, which deprives him of his human dignity”.644 However, they further concluded 
that Shin Bet could not thwart terrorist acts efficiently without using pressure during 
interrogations. Thus, the use of moderate physical force should be allowed, if non-violent 
psychological pressure does not achieve its purpose, especially when ‘pressure’ could 
deter greater evil in events they called ticking bomb cases.645 Effectively, this sanctioned 
the use of ‘psychological pressure’ and ‘moderate physical pressure’. A secret appendix 
specifies what is permitted646 and grants Shin Bet employees immunity from criminal 
liability if they are acting “in good faith and in a reasonable manner in the course of 
carrying out their duties”.647  
 
Before exploring and analysing the legal aspects and some of the moral dilemmas 
a democracy faces with respect to interrogation methods in an effort to counter terrorism, 
a description of kinds torture Israel has previously permitted is necessary.  
 
                                                 
643 Dershowitz, Alan; Why Terrorism Works, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002, p.150. 
644 Uildriks, Niels; “Torture in Israel”, Human Rights Review, April-June Vol. 1, issue 4, 2000. 
645 A ticking bomb case is when the security services know that an attack will happened in the near future, 
but have no further information or intelligence regarding when, where and how such an attack will occur. A 
detailed discussion of the concept of ticking bomb cases will follow. Uildriks, Niels; “Torture in Israel”, 
Human Rights Review, April-June Vol. 1, issue 4, 2000. 
646 Morris, Benny; Righteous Victims, John Murray, 1999, p.601. 
647 Human Rights Watch; “Human Rights Watch Submission to the United Nation Human Rights 
Committee”, July 13 1998, www.hrw.org, accessed 27 October 2004. 
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5. 7. 2 Practices 
 
Reports by human rights organisations often make a link between the occurrence 
of torture and the fact that suspects of political crimes can be held in administrative 
detention. While being held in administrative detention the interrogators operate in a 
context of near absolute power. Amnesty International claims that between 270 and 1,900 
annual administrative detention orders were issued from 1996 to 1998.648 The Israeli 
human rights group B’tselem estimates that the security services interrogate 
approximately 1,000 to 1,500 Palestinians a year, using methods that constitute torture in 
85 percent of the cases.649 Based on testimonies collected by these human rights 
organisations, there appear to be three main intentions with using torture as an 
interrogation method. First, the security services want to prevent a terror attack, 
especially in situations with a limited timeframe and referred to as ‘ticking bomb’ cases. 
Secondly, they wish to obtain a written confession, to be used as evidence (sometimes the 
only evidence) in the military courts. The detainees may end up incriminating 
themselves, and they are frequently pressured into giving information about others, who 
in turn can be convicted on the basis of third-party confessions. Since there is often a lack 
of other evidence, such confessions can be vital in getting convictions.650 Thirdly, 
according to B’tselem, the security services also torture individuals who are not even 
suspected of any crimes, possibly to persuade them to become collaborators.651  
 
Specific methods of physical pressure 
 
Despite the fact that the Landau Report guidelines have never been made public, 
thousands of Palestinians have described certain methods, in testimonies to human rights 
                                                 
648 Amnesty International; “Administrative detention: despair, uncertainty and lack of due process”, 
www.amnesty.org, accessed 13 October 2000. 
649 B’tselem; “Torture”, www.btselem.org, accessed 8 April 2007.  
650 Amnesty International; Five years after the Oslo Agreement: Human Rights sacrificed for “security”, 
www.amnesty.org, accessed 11 October 2000. 
651 Hockstader, Lee; “Israel’s Court Bars Abuse of Suspects”,  www.washingtonpost.com, accessed 7 
September 1999. 
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organisations and in Israeli courts652, which include “moderate physical pressure” and in 
some court hearings the security services have actually confirmed their use. These 
methods include:653 
 
Tiltul (Hebrew) Hazz (Arabic) – means violent shaking, where the detainee is held by the 
collar to forcefully and repeatedly shake the suspect's torso back and forth, causing the 
neck and head to dangle and vacillate rapidly. According to expert opinion, this method 
often causes serious brain damage, harms the spinal cord, causes the suspect to lose 
consciousness, vomit and urinate uncontrollably, and suffer serious headaches.654  
 
Shabe - a combination of methods including prolonged sleep deprivation while shackled 
in painful positions, hooding (a type of sack covering your head, which often smells of 
old vomit and urine, so the detainee loses the sense of time and place) and exposure to 
continuous disorderly music, played at an extremely high volume (Shin Bet says this tool 
hinders the suspects from communicating with each other). Two examples of these 
positions are ‘kindergarten chairs’ and ‘pipe-shackling’. The former entails the use of 
small chairs with low backrests, where the height of the seat is twenty centimetres or 
eight inches off the ground, and where the seat is tilted forwards towards the ground. The 
detainee’s hands are tied behind the chair, and placed inside the gap between the chair’s 
seat and the back support, and the detainee is forced to sit like this for days at a time. The 
latter method involves shackling the detainee to an immovable object fixed to the wall, 
forcing him to remain hunched over, unable to stand upright or sit down for long periods 
of time. Normally detainees are interrogated and deprived of sleep for five days at a time 
and allowed to sleep during Friday and Saturday (the shabbat). 
  
Gambaz (‘the frog’) - the detainee is forced to squat, on the tips of the toes with the arms 
tied behind the back, for a long period of time. Beating is the punishment for losing 
balance.  
                                                 
652 Especially the case of The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al. versus The Government of 
Israel et al. from 1994.   
653 Human Rights Watch; “Israel’s Interrogation of Palestinians from the Gaza and West Bank”, 1994, 
www.hrw.org, accessed 11 October 2000. 
654 Uildriks, Niels; “Torture in Israel”, Human Rights Review, April-June Vol. 1, issue 4, 2000. 
 226 
 
Khazana (in Arabic, ‘closet’) - the detainee is held in a cupboard-sized room for days.  
 
Psychological pressure - includes threats of death, indefinite detention, being driven to 
insanity, maiming, or sexual abuse to themselves or family members. One practice is 
described as the ‘gas pedal’, where the interrogator sits on his desk and rests his boot on 
the crotch of the detainee, whose hands are cuffed behind him. The interrogator then 
presses his foot down when the detainee does not cooperate. This often follows with 
threats that it makes them sterile.  
 
Other methods of torture, such as beating, exposure to extreme temperature differences, 
refusal to use the toilet and severe sleep deprivation, have all been denied by the Israeli 
authorities, but are frequently reported by detainees. Detainees also report having 
suffered severe time restrictions for eating or going to the toilet (or even refused). At 
some interrogation centres, to add to the humiliation, they are forced to do both 
simultaneously in the rank toilet stall.655 
 
The moral dilemma  
 
The Israeli Supreme Court supported the findings of the Landau Commission 
when they ruled in 1994 that ‘physical pressure’, including the methods described above, 
were not unlawful. According to the state of Israel, these methods did not constitute 
torture. One of the reasons that allowed such a ruling, is that the ambiguousness of the 
term. The Geneva Convention Against Torture defines torture as being:  
 
“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
                                                 
655 This is continually stated by all the major human rights organisations reports that have gathered several 
interviews and compared them over time. Human Rights Watch; “Israel’s Interrogation of Palestinians 
from the Gaza and West Bank”, 1994, www.hrw.org, accessed 11 October 2000, and Amnesty 
International; “Administrative detention: despair, uncertainty and lack of due process”, www.amnesty.org, 
accessed 13 October 2000. 
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person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person action in a official 
capacity.”656 
 
In 1994, the Supreme Court upheld the right of Shin Bet to use ‘special measures’ and 
‘force’ on Palestinian prisoners, with accordance to the Landau Commission rules. The 
meaning of ‘increased physical pressure’ was not specified, and it is still unknown what 
these pressures actually included. These authorisations were given by a special 
ministerial committee, headed by the Prime Minister, and they were renewed every three 
months.657 Having to obtain permission from the ministerial committee was meant to 
restrict these methods, especially with respect to violent shaking. However, it is debatable 
as to whether the practice was actually “restrictive”, as highlighted by Prime Minister 
Rabin in 1995 when he said that shaking had been used as an ‘exceptional’ measure, 
against 8,000 detainees.658 Due to the increase in terror attacks, the ministerial committee 
agreed in 1996 to increase the length of its permissions from three months to six. One of 
the major reasons for this continuation was the security services’ persuasive argument to 
the ministerial committee on August 6, 1996, where they reported that 48 terrorist attacks 
had been foiled in the past six months as a result of ‘special’ interrogation methods, 
including the practice of violent shaking.659  
 
In 1999, the Supreme Court re-viewed the interrogation methods, and they 
revoked or diminished the hardship of several of them. First, violent shaking was not 
included as a legal interrogation method. Human rights groups and attorneys representing 
individual detainees claimed the practice of shaking was the harshest, and they 
continually challenged the practice before the Israeli Supreme Court. The second method 
of interrogation, which was declared illegal, was the frog position. The court deemed this 
                                                 
656 U.N. General Assembly; “Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment”, 12/10/1984, www.un.org, accessed 12 October 2000.  
657 Ganor, Boaz; The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle; A guide for decision makers, Transaction Publishers, 
London, 2007. 
658 Uildriks, Niels; “Torture in Israel”, Human Rights Review, Vol. 1, issue 4, 2000. 
659 Amnesty International; Five years after the Oslo Agreement: Human Rights sacrificed for “security”, 
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method as humiliating and damaging to human dignity. Furthermore, the court did not 
accept the use of placing a bag over the suspect’s head while awaiting interrogation, 
because it could cause suffocation and is unnecessary in preventing suspects from having 
eye contact with each other. Notably, the latter ruling did not include covering the eyes. 
Also, the court added that sleep deprivation should not be enforced and finally, the court 
prohibited the playing of loud music.660  
 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court still recognised that there might be cases where 
an interrogator was convinced that the only way of securing information to save the lives 
of others, was through physical pressure. If an interrogator violated the rules and engaged 
in ‘torture’, the court was prepared to accept arguments as a plea in mitigation, even 
though the court would not excuse or justify the torture itself, as it remained a criminal 
act. 661 At the same time, the Court also stated that if the suspect was harmed in any way 
during an interrogation conducted according to the instructions, the interrogator could not 
be held accountable in court.662 With this recognition, the court sought to reconcile that 
there had been cases, in Israeli history, where physical methods of interrogation had 
actually saved lives, with a prohibition against torture under all circumstances. This 
ruling opened a debate as to what was legal in the case of a ‘ticking bomb’.  
 
In a so called ‘ticking bomb’ case, the security services have a lead regarding a 
future terror attack, but do not have sufficient intelligence to prevent it. Torture then 
becomes a choice amongst unreasonable alternatives:  
“The classical hypothetical case involves the train engineer whose breaks become 
inoperative. There is no way he can stop his speeding vehicle of death. He can 
either do nothing, in which case he will plough into a busload of schoolchildren, 
or he can swerve onto another track, where he sees a drunk lying on the rails. 
(Neither decision will endanger him or his passengers). There is no third choice. 
What should he do?”663  
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661 Michael Ignatieff; The Lesser Evil, Edinburgh University Press, Ltd, Edinburgh, 2004, p.140. 
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Lipkin-Shahak, former Chief of Staff, had no doubt about the effectiveness of applying 
physical pressure in ‘ticking bomb’ cases. However he pointed out another dilemma:  
“ I have no doubt that a “ticking bomb” justifies interrogations that employ 
physical pressure, if that is the only way to prevent the “ticking bomb” from 
exploding and killing innocent civilians. The question is whether this is a “ticking 
bomb” when, how, do you know, and this is the dilemma… Maybe it will go on 
ticking for two more months and you have a month to prevent the explosion? 
Therefore, the dilemma is extremely complicated.”664  
Once a society has opened up to the idea of using physical pressure, the limitations on its 
usage can become complicated. For instance, what is an acceptable number of dead or 
injured people, in order to allow torture, or physical pressure, on one person? Once the 
method of torture is sanctioned, even if only in ‘ticking bomb’ cases, the situation might 
be used as an excuse to widen the practice. How near in the future must this alleged terror 
attack take place, in order for it to be classified as a ‘ticking bomb’ case? “Authorising 
torture is a bad and dangerous idea that can easily be made to sound plausible. There is a 
subtle fallacy embedded in the traditional ‘ticking bomb’ argument for torture to save 
lives.”665 Consequently, a broader definition of what constitutes a ‘ticking bomb’ case 
might be applied, to enable the systematic use of physical pressure in counter terrorism. 
Furthermore, the following argument is often used “pain is a lesser and more remediable 
harm than death; and lives of a thousand innocent people should be valued more than the 
bodily integrity of one guilty person.”666 Should it? Once a society authorises torture, it 
will become more difficult to limit its use in the future. These questions have led to the 
policy of regulating the practice of torture through the judicial process, rather then 
maintaining an unrealistic ban. Professor Dershowitz argued:  
 
“The real issue, therefore, is not whether some torture would or would not be used 
in the ticking bomb case – it would. The question is whether it would be used 
openly, pursuant to a previously established legal procedure, or whether it would 
be done secretly, in violation of existing law.”667  
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His suggestion was to construct a legal system, where police authorities would apply to a 
judge for a ‘torture warrant’. Anyone found torturing outside the terms and conditions of 
the warrant would be guilty of a criminal offence. However, does the law have enough 
power to control process? Derzhowitz’s suggestion was partly carried out by Israel from 
1992-1995, with the establishment of the ministerial committee and the requirement of 
showing just cause. Although the committee transferred some of the responsibility from 
the interrogating officer to the committee, it did not answer any of the questions raised 
above, nor did it define the boundaries and limitations.   
 
Professor Aharon Barak, the president of the Israeli Supreme Court, summed up 
the legal aspect and the moral dilemma, when he commented on Israel’s court verdict of 
1994: 
 
“We are aware that this decision does not ease dealing with that reality [of 
terrorism]. This is the destiny of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, 
and not all practices employed by its enemies are open before it. Although a 
democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it nonetheless has 
the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of Law and recognition of an individual’s 
liberty constitutes an important component in its understanding of security. […] 
Deciding these applications weighed heavy on this Court. […] We are not isolated 
in an ivory tower. We live the life of this country. We are aware of the harsh 
reality of terrorism in which we are, at times, immersed. Our apprehension that 
this decision will hamper the ability to properly deal with terrorists and terrorism, 
disturbs us. We are, however, judges.”668 
 
Again, Professor Barak’s statement illustrates the battle between the legal aspect and the 
moral dilemma that the use of physical pressure or torture represents to a democratic 
society. Even thought the intended result of these methods is clear; to prevent further 
terror attacks, the consequence for a democracy might be a skewed view on the value of 
human life.  
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Does it work? 
 
 
The way torture is legitimised and the intention behind it is as a preventative 
counter terrorism method. However, one of the many arguments against the 
implementation of torture is that torture does not work. The information given is tainted 
and thus useless, and many confessions are false because the individual will say anything 
in order for the torture to stop. Nevertheless, it can be argued that sometimes torture does 
work. Besides, one could contend that no method of crime prevention is always 
successful. However, when discussing the effectiveness of torture in the framework of 
counter terrorism, the very best result is a very short-term victory. In a campaign of 
terrorism, preventing one attack may simply result in the planning of another terror 
attack. However, would it make any difference if the imminent terror attack was with the 
use of weapons of mass destruction?  
 
When examining the predicament of whether or not a liberal democracy should 
implement torture as a counter terrorism method, there are several important moral 
dilemmas which are in conflict with each other. A liberal democratic society has several 
duties.669 First, a responsibility for the safety and security of its citizens. This might 
require the use of torture if that is the only way to prevent a terror attack. Secondly, to 
preserve civil liberties and human rights. This will require renouncing torture as a 
legitimate part of the legal system. Some would argue that although torture might be 
necessary in a given situation it could never be right and as such should be used, but not 
be legitimized by the court and the legal system. However, this contradicts with the third 
duty: to be an open society in order to be held accountable for its actions. Citizens cannot 
carry out their duty to approve or disapprove of governmental counter terrorism policy if 
they are unaware. Which duty is to be chosen when they clearly are in conflict with each 
other? 
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 232 
“If we do not torture, we compromise the security and safety of our citizens. If we 
tolerate torture, but keep it off the books and below the radar screen, we 
compromise principles of democratic accountability. If we cerate a legal structure 
for limiting and controlling torture, we comprise our principled opposition to 




It is faced with these choices that Israel’s collective consciousness of feeling under siege 
and constantly lacking security will play an enormous part in deciding what to choose. 
Particularly in the past, but even today, Israelis enjoys a special relationship of trust with 
their security services which might make them less suspicious of methods and less 
scrupulous when it comes to holding them accountable. 
 
However, the damage of torture is not only affecting the individual who feels the 
pain or the society which implements it, it also damages the decision maker and the 
interrogator psychologically. No one should have to decide when torture is or is not 
justified, and no one should be ordered to carry it out. Michael Ignatieff argues that: 
 
“Torture exposes agents of a democratic state to an ultimate moral hazard. The 
most plausible case for an absolute ban on physical torture in every circumstance 
is related precisely to this issue of moral hazard. An absolute prohibition is 
legitimate because in practice such a prohibition relieves a state’s public servant 
from the burden of making intolerable choices.”671 
 
Democracies have choices; but the real question can be whether or not they can survive 
the choice of introducing torture.  
 
 
5. 7. 3 Possible consequences for Hamas  
 
A key requirement for counter terrorism being successful is information which 
can lead to the break up of terrorist cells or prevent terror attacks. The use of physical 
pressure or torture during interrogations plays a role in obtaining this kind of information. 
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Hamas is aware of this and has implemented certain measures to minimise the security 
risk that Israeli counter terrorism methods pose on their operational ability and 
organisational structure.   
 
The most obvious way of minimising the risk of being tortured, is of course by 
not getting caught in the first place, which is an obvious result if a suicide bomb attack is 
successful. In addition, in the event that a suicide bomber is intercepted and apprehended, 
it is likely that the individual will have limited knowledge of the organisation as a whole. 
Moreover, their operational commitment might be boosted, knowing what awaits them if 
caught. They will not surrender, even when they know they will die, because instead of 
being in Israeli custody and exposed to torture, they perceive the outcome as a more 
honourable way to die, namely in battle.  
 
One way of limiting the damage from any released information, is by structuring 
the organisation to meet the threat. This can be done by creating autonomous cells that 
act independently, but who take orders from the central leadership when necessary. 
Above all, Hamas has to stick to the ‘need to know’ principle. Interrogation is a struggle 
against time, and torture is a method of shortening this time period. The interrogators, 
especially in a ticking bomb case, need information quickly. The terrorist on the other 
hand, wants to endure and prolong the time for as long as possible, in order to obstruct 
the security services from preventing the terror attack, and to provide more time for his 
cell to take the necessary precautions. Hamas understands that in order for time to be 
gained in such situations, they need to prepare and train their members psychologically. 
For example, Hamas publishes leaflets on how to deal with Israeli pressure while in 
detention.  
 
Furthermore, Hamas plays on the feelings of loyalty, because no one wants to 
disappoint fellow members or the organisation as a whole. This places an emphasis on 
honour and the ability to withstand the pressure as a true man. The focus on loyalty is 
also reflected in the way in which Hamas deals with traitors. Hamas has established a 
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group672 to collect information about collaborators who work for the Israelis, and to 
enforce an internal jihad within the Palestinian society. With the knowledge that any 
punishment by Hamas will be far worse than Israelis, a detainee’s determination might be 
increased. This type of punishment creates its own set of deterrent values and therefore 
challenges the effects of Israeli torture. 673 Colonel Talal Dweikat of the Palestinian 
General Intelligence proclaimed: “If the collaborator thought of his family, he would 
never have accepted [becoming an informant].”674 Hamas’ intimidation and torture 
methods are often more effective, since they are more brutal and frequently fatal. There 
have been instances where the body of a collaborator has being dragged behind cars and 
damaged beyond recognition. Normally, hospitals refuse to treat the injured collaborator, 
and families are not allowed to bury the body in a cemetery. Furthermore, families will 
loose their jobs, sisters will not get married, and collaborators’ children will always be 
stigmatized as the devil’s.    
 
However, evidently, the torture reconfirms the hatred that Hamas and the 
Palestinian society feel towards the Israelis. Experience of torture could be used by Hamas 
in propaganda. Showing evidence of torture, creating lectures where personal experiences 
are shared, are easy tactics. Domestically, this could ultimately lead to a future 
radicalisation and increase the recruitment pool. Internationally, it could create an outrage 
against the Israelis, which again could influence Israel’s politics.  
 
Above all, an individual who has suffered physical pressure or torture will most 
likely question values others have on human life. Negative personal experience will 
always crystallise feelings of disgust. One victim of torture remembered: “what was 
worse than the memory of the pain was the moral shock of seeing other human beings 
reducing him to a carcass of meat. Torture destroyed, once and for all, the trust necessary 
for living among fellow human beings.”675  
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6. Israel’s counter terrorism methods, 2000-2006 
 
“Hamas is not a few hundred. It's a popular movement. It is rooted in the society. So if you kill those few 





This chapter will examine closely some methods in the repertoire of Israel’s 
counter terrorism policy used by the Israeli government during the period 1992 to 2000. 
This is an interesting time period because it was the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada and 
marked the end of the peace process years. The outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada did not 
leave Israel as surprised and ineffective as did the pervious Intifada. This time Israel had 
learned its lessons and started implementing counter terrorism measures early. Israel also 
understood that the battle was not only fought in the streets, but also in the media, and her 
policy considered the impact of the media when some of the counter terrorism methods 
were implemented. However, by 2002 most of the counter terrorism methods that were 
used during 1992-2000 were re-enforced. Some of these had changed their character 
somewhat in addition to the introduction of a new method: the construction of the fence. 
The aim of this chapter is to give an update on how these same counter terrorism methods 
were consequently practised. Furthermore, many of these methods had the same impact 
on Palestinian society and Hamas as they had during 1992-2000. It is not the aim of this 
chapter to repeat this impact, but rather to explore whether the methods changed, and, if 
so, how.  
 
This chapter will follow the structure of chapter 5: the first counter terrorism 
method to be examined is the permit system. However, this time, seeing as the permit 
system and the closure policy are so interlinked, they will be studied together. As explored 
in chapter 5, the permit system and closure policy have a variety of different consequences 
for Palestinian society, and Hamas in particular. These range from being an obstacle to 
receiving education, difficulties with family reunions, and general freedom of movement. 
For Hamas these policies mean that it is more of a challenge to acquire weapons, to 
                                                 
676 According to Ghassan Khatib who is a former peace negotiator and Palestinian activist. Todd Shields 
and D.W. Miller; “Crusade of terror”, U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 117, no. 17, 1994, p.44. 
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smuggle terrorists into Israel, and to co-ordinate its operations. However, the main 
consequence of the permit system and the closure policy was the devastating effect it had 
on Palestinian society. Seeing as Hamas is a multifaceted organisation, the poor conditions 
strengthen Hamas’ position in Palestinian society.677 That is why this chapter will concern 
itself with the economic effects the permit system and closure policy have on Palestinian 
society. This chapter will then study how Israel has re-enforced counter terrorism methods 
such as deportation, house demolition, selective killings, and administrative detention. 
However, this chapter will not examine what kind of interrogation methods Israel has been 
using throughout this time period. The reason for this is that there has been no official 
change in its practise. Yet, it is likely that the number of ‘ticking bomb’ cases has increased 
in parallel with the increase in violence, and thus one might speculate what that entails with 
respect to the use of physical pressure or torture. Nevertheless, at this time, there are hardly 
any systematic reports that can clarify this, and therefore it becomes a challenge to examine 
the development of this counter terrorism method.678 Instead, this chapter will examine a 
new controversial method which Israel introduced in 2002, when it started building the 
fence as a separation barrier between the West Bank and Israel. This chapter will include 
this method and will explore the reasoning behind it, its effectiveness, and consequences 
for Palestinian society, and debate what this might entail for the future.  
 
However, before exploring these methods, it is important to have some 
background information in order to understand the social-political situation within which 
they exist. Therefore, these initial remarks will include a brief introduction to the al-Aqsa 
Intifada.  
                                                 
677 This is already eluded to throughout this thesis, but will also be further explored in chapter 7.  
678 It is worth noting that B’tselem did publish one report concerning methods of interrogation in April 
2007 which has the working title: “Utterly Forbidden; the torture and ill-treatment of Palestinian detainees” 
and are to be found on their web site: www.b’tselem.org.  
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The al-Aqsa Intifada  
 
The Palestinian Intifada was sparked off by a controversial visit by Israeli 
opposition leader Ariel Sharon, with a Likud party delegation, on September 28, 2000, to 
the Temple Mount, the site of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, and a place disputed by 
Israelis and Palestinians. The compound is the holiest site in Judaism, and the third 
holiest site in Islam for the majority of Muslims. The stated purpose of Sharon’s visit to 
the mosque compound was to check complaints by Israeli archaeologists that Muslim 
religious authorities had vandalized archaeological remains beneath the surface of the 
mount during the conversion of the Solomon’s Stables area into a mosque. Sharon’s 
impending visit was officially announced and approved in advance by many Palestinian 
officials including Arafat himself, though prior to it some people on both sides protested, 
because of his controversial political stance. His visit was condemned by the Palestinians 
as a provocation and an incursion, as were his armed bodyguards that arrived on the 
scene with him. Critics claim that Sharon knew that the visit could trigger violence, and 
that the purpose of his visit was political; Sharon won the February 2001 elections in a 
landslide. On September 29, 2000, the day after Sharon’s visit, following Friday prayers, 
large riots broke out around Old Jerusalem and in the days that followed, demonstrations 
erupted all over the West Bank and Gaza. However, this new wave of violence had much 
deeper causes, most notably the frustration of Palestinians with the failed peace process 
and the deteriorating economic situation in the territories. In essence, the Oslo peace 
process failed because the Israelis did not trust the Palestinian Authority to fulfil its 
security obligations and halt terror attacks, and the Palestinians remained convinced that 
Israel would never voluntarily cede the West Bank and Gaza. Sakhr Habash, a member of 
Fatah’s Central Committee, gave an interview to the Palestinian Authority newspaper 
where he commented on the reason behind the outbreak of the Intifada:  
 
“The Intifada did not break out in order to improve our bargaining ability in the 
negotiations, nor as a reaction to Sharon's provocative visit to Al-Haram Al-
Sharif: this was only the spark. It was accumulated in the depths of our people and 
was bound to explode in the face of Barak’s government because of the political 
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problem that was put off for more than a year and a half -- the problem of 
independence.”679 
 
In comparison to the first Intifada, the new uprising is dominated by armed 
actions against the Israeli army, the settler population, and Israelis living inside the 
‘Green Line’. Whereas the first Intifada was characterised by mass civil mobilisation, the 
al-Aqsa Intifada is an uprising that rests upon the participation of a minority, even though 
it has support from the majority. From the start, Fatah took the lead in the uprising, and a 
national and Islamic high committee was established to coordinate the activities of all 
groups. However, with time, Arafat’s party no longer had control over the revolt, which 
was increasingly characterised by operations led by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. If Ehud 
Barak’s government had already put huge means into tackling the Intifada, the accession 
to power of Ariel Sharon in February 2001 considerably intensified the repression. Prime 
Minister Sharon generalised the policy of extermination of Palestinian activists, through 
numerous selective killings, and large-scale military operations into autonomous 
Palestinian zones. The huge offensive of the Spring of 2002, in response to a wave of 
suicide bombings that left many Israelis dead at the beginning of the year, targeted the 
structures of the Palestinian Authority and its leader Yasser Arafat. Sharon had decided to 
render the Palestinian leader irrelevant. All the West Bank cities were reoccupied and the 
army proceeded with the systematic destruction of the infrastructure and of the material 
and social fabric of Palestinian life.  
 
Following Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat’s death in late 2004, Mahmud Abbas 
was elected president of the Palestinian Authority in January 2005. A month later, Israel 
and the Palestinian Authority agreed to the Sharm el-Sheikh Commitments in an effort to 
move the peace process forward. In September 2005, Israel withdrew all its settlers and 
soldiers and dismantled its military facilities in the Gaza Strip and four northern West 
Bank settlements. Nonetheless, Israel controls maritime, airspace, and most access to the 
Gaza Strip. A November 2005 Palestinian Authority-Israeli agreement authorised the 
                                                 
679 Palestinian Facts; “What started the al-Aqsa Intifada”, www.palestinianfacts.org, accessed 15 April 
2007. 
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reopening of the Rafah border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, under joint 
Palestinian Authority and Egyptian control.  
 
Hamas was a latecomer to the al-Aqsa Intifada. For four months, the uprising was 
mostly dictated by Fatah, especially by its vanguard Tanzim organisation. Hamas only 
fully entered the uprising when Sharon was elected as Israel’s Prime Minister in February 
2001. Despite the fact that Hamas had carried out attacks inside Israel before Sharon took 
office, it was after he won the election that Hamas took the qualitative turn towards 
suicide bombings in Israel. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, Hamas led the Palestinian 
resistance movement in terms of the volume of attacks, and the number of Israelis they 
killed.680 Hamas increased its popularity by 60 percent in the first three years of the al-
Aqsa Intifada, emerging as a powerful equal to Fatah in parts of the West Bank and 
exceeding them in Gaza.681 In March 2005, Hamas joined its main secular rival, Fatah, 
and eleven other Palestinian organisations in endorsing what came to be known as the 
Cairo Declaration, whereby it agreed to halt attacks on Israel for the rest of the year, 
participate in the coming Palestinian parliamentary elections, and to commence 
discussions about joining the PLO. In January 2006, Hamas won a majority 74 out of 132 
parliamentary seats in the Palestinian Authority parliamentary elections.682 The political 
success of Hamas was a strategic accomplishment for the organisation; it legitimised their 
claims as representatives of the Palestinian people and brought international attention to 
their victory. The victory of Hamas also marked the triumph of Islamic fundamentalism 
over national secularism. The Palestinians’ move away from a secular-nationalist 
ideology and towards one that promotes jihad, is a dangerous situation for Israel. Due to 
its label as a terrorist organisation, the main difficulty for the newly elected Hamas 
government will be in dealing with Western policy makers. The Hamas government faces 
grim political consequences, as many Western democracies also adhere to a doctrine of 
not negotiating with terrorists. In doing so, they have cut off economic aid and political 
                                                 
680 Esposito, Michele K.; “The Al-Asqa Intifada: Military Operations, Suicide Attacks, Assassinations, and 
Losses in the First Four Years”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXXIV, no. 2, 2005. 
681 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, www.pcpsr.org, accessed 3 May 2007. 
682 Pina, Aaron D.; “Fatah and Hamas: The New Palestinian Factional Reality,” CRS Report for 
Congress, 3 March 2006, www.fas.org, accessed 8 December 2006. 
 240 
support to terrorist regimes. In Palestine, this may only serve to intensify, and further 






6. 1 Permit system and closure policy 
 
 
 As explored previously, the extensive permit system and closure policy has 
numerous effects on the Palestinian society. These effects include; restrictions on family 
reunifications, the prevention of families visiting others under administrative detention, 
the creation of an economic as well as social differences between the West Bank and 
Gaza, the sense of pressure on the Palestinians to become informers, an influence on the 
Palestinians’ right to an education, but most of all, in everyday life, a restriction on 
everyone’s freedom of movement. In addition to these significant consequences, the 
permit system and the closure policy affect the Palestinians’ economy on a large scale. It 
is this situation that will be examined here, as it ultimately creates a condition in which 
Hamas attracts local support due to its social politics. Therefore, this section will begin 
with an update on the practise of the permit system and the closure policy during the 
years from 2000 to 2006, followed by an assessment of the economical consequences for 
the Palestinian society. However, it becomes increasingly clear that the outbreak of the 
al-Aqsa Intifada has also contribute to the decline of the economic development during 
this time period. It is therefore difficult to separate which developments are linked to the 
Intifada and which developments are solely due to the permit system and closure policy. 
This section will not attempt to make such a distinction, because arguably they are 
interconnected, and isolating one factor will only present one part of the total picture. 
Furthermore, the limitations which the permit system and closure policy have on Hamas’ 
military operations, have not changed during this period, although seeing as the closure 
policy has intensified, it has only represented a tougher challenge for Hamas. However, 
since these limitations were studied in detail in chapter 5, the aim of this section is to 
focus on the economical effects and its impact on Hamas as an organisation. Therefore, in 
this section the manner in which Hamas and its Islamic NGO’s have positioned 
themselves in the Palestinian society will be examined.  Finally, this raises the question 
whether or not the permit system and closure policy are merely security measures or if 
they are political tools? Although, there is no concrete answer to this, one argument will 
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be explored which suggests that the permit system and closure policy can be viewed in 
different lights.  
 
An update on the permit system and closure policy 
 
In response to the severe violence that accompanied the beginning of the al-Aqsa 
Intifada, Israel imposed a total closure on the West Bank and Gaza on October 8 2000 for 
several months prohibiting Palestinians from moving between the West Bank and Gaza 
and Israel, and between the West Bank and Gaza. The total closure was finally lifted, but 
the general closure has remained in effect since then and Israel has also periodically 
imposed total closures.683, When Israel previously lifted the total closure, there were 
many Palestinians who entered Israel in search for work, even if they did not have a 
working permit. This situation has apparently changed. B’tselem reports that the 
perimeter fence around the Gaza is now guarded by military forces, who have a tendency 
to open fire whenever they identify someone trying to smuggle themselves through the 
fence and into Israel. As a result, very few Palestinians now enter Israel from Gaza 
without a permit. In the West Bank, Israel is constructing a fence, which has greatly 
reduced the possibility of avoiding the closure of the West Bank, and soldiers and Border 
Police stationed in the ‘seam zone’684 have further minimized violations of the closure. 
 
In addition to closure, Israel has enforced curfews. Although curfews were 
enforced even before the al-Aqsa Intifada, their usage has been increased, especially 
during Israel’s numerous large-scale military operations. A curfew often means a total 
lockdown of a Palestinian town. During curfews, Palestinian residents remain under 
sustained house arrest, 24 hours a day, in some cases for days and weeks on end. Curfews 
                                                 
683 It is difficult to obtain information on how many days a total closure was imposed throughout this period 
when, however, in 2005, Israel imposed a total closure for 132 days, and for 78 days during the period 
January-July 2006. B’tselem; “Crossing the Line: Violation of the Rights of Palestinians in Israel without a 
Permit”, March 2007, www.btselem.org Accessed 15 April 2007. 
684 The fence runs so far inside the West Bank, that large areas of fertile farmland and whole Palestinian 
villages have become caged between the fence and the Green Line, in enclaves usually referred to as ‘seam 
zones’. 
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may be lifted briefly for a few hours to allow residents to get food, water, and supplies, 
however, businesses are closed, the streets are empty, and life tends to come to a 
complete standstill. Lifting the curfew allows the civil administration to maintain utilities 
and provide services before the curfew is re-imposed. What does present a problem is 
that the IDF often re-impose the curfew without notice to the population or Palestinian 
Authority.  
 
There have been claims that the IDF spreads deliberate confusion over when 
closures will be lifted and for how long. These claims are based on incidences when the 
Israeli government radio has reported that the curfew was lifted until 6 pm, whereas 
soldiers on the ground were re-imposing the lockdown at noon. At other times, army 
jeeps with loudspeakers have driven through the streets at 2 pm telling people to return 
home within ten minutes, when the relaxation of the curfew had previously been 
announced to end at 5 pm. Soldiers at the checkpoint will announce one curfew time, 
while the District Coordinating Office will state another.685 This inconsistency causes 
chaos as civilians rush to return home and creates constant insecurity. In the spring of 
2002, following an escalation of violence, the IDF launched ‘Operation Defensive 
Shield’ and ‘Determined Path’ which transformed many towns and villages into restricted 
military zones, with residents sustained, often for 24-hours, or for days at a time. At 
times, almost 900,000 West Bank residents in 74 communities were under curfew.686 
This freezes the society and halts any productions, hinders everyone from going to work 
or school, and makes it difficult to obtain any form of permits for after the lifting of the 
total closure.  
 
Furthermore, there is still no clear policy regarding the number of Palestinians 
who get working or travel permits, nor does there seem to be an official procedure for 
applying for one. Not only is a permit cancelled when a total closure is imposed, but 
Israel sets a quota, which changes from time to time, on the number of Palestinian 
                                                 
685 Hanieh, Adam; “ West Bank Curfews Politics by Other Means”,  24 July 2002, www.merip.org, 
Accessed 8 February 2007. 
686 American Friends Service Committee; “A siege on Palestinian life”, www.afsc.org, Accessed 19 
December 2006. 
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workers permitted to enter Israel. When the quota is met, no more permits are granted, 
even to persons who meet the required conditions. Usually the individuals are not told 
whether they did not obtain the permit due to something in a personal file, or if the quota 
simply was full. Therefore many Palestinians are still facing uncertainty in their everyday 
lives, which makes it hard to plan for a future.  
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At the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the entry of workers without permits 
from the West Bank and Gaza into Israel fell drastically. Furthermore, when the total 
closure was imposed on October 8 2000, the movement of workers from Gaza into Israel 
ceased completely. Entry of workers into Israel from the West Bank stopped almost 
totally during the first two weeks of the closure, after which a limited number of workers 
entered without permits, the numbers varying.688 As discussed previously, due to the 
difficulties with obtaining a work permit for Israel and the high rate of unemployment in 
the West Bank and Gaza, many Palestinians have resorted to work in the settlements. 
However, since the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the employment of Palestinians by 
the Israeli settlements has almost totally stopped. Before the al-Aqsa Intifada, B’tselem 
estimated that around 110, 000 Palestinians worked in Israel and the settlements, i.e. 22 
                                                 
687 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics; “Percentage of Palestinian workforce employed in Israel”, 
www.pcbs.gov.ps, Accessed 20 December 2006. 
688  How many permits are given varies. An estimates fluctuates from 5, 000 to 20, 000, changing from 
period to period and depending on the source of the estimate. “Despite the Closure, 20,000 Palestinians 
Enter Israel to Work,” 9 November 2000, www.haaretz.com Accessed 18 December 2006. 
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percent of the Palestinian workforce in the West Bank and Gaza.689 There seem to be two 
primary reasons for this decline; firstly, the internal closure that prevents workers from 
leaving their homes and reaching the settlements. Secondly, many settlements prohibit 
Palestinians from entering their communities due to security reasons.690  
As part of the disengagement plan that was implemented in 2005, the Israeli 
government  has decided to gradually decrease the number of entry permits issued to 
Palestinians, and that, in the beginning of 2008, no Palestinians will be allowed to enter 
Israel to work.691 This decision has only contributed to an already devastating economic 
situation in the West Bank and Gaza.  
 
6. 1. 1 Economic effects 
 
The economy of the West Bank and Gaza is relatively small and unusually 
vulnerable to external shocks. A further decline in the social and economic situation of 
the West Bank and Gaza, took place as a result of the al-Aqsa Intifada, which was in 
itself a reaction to the continual social and economic hardship in Palestine following the 
Oslo Accords. During the last quarter of 2000, the Palestinian border with Israel was in 
effect closed for 72 days, restricting Palestinian exports and imports and impeding 
Palestinian workers from reaching their place of work, and thus their source of income, in 
Israel, Israeli Settlements and Industrial Zones.692 Moreover, internal movement within 
Gaza and the West Bank was restricted. According to UNSCO 2001 Report, “severe 
internal closure” was in effect for 52 days in the West Bank and 10 days in Gaza and an 
additional “partial” internal closure was in place for 40 days in the West Bank and 75 
days in Gaza.693 These closures affected Palestinians from all factors of life, 
businessmen, merchants, farmers, and so forth, restricted from reaching their workplace, 
                                                 
689 B’tselem; “Restriction of Movements”, www.btselem.org Accessed 18 December 2006. 
690  B’tselem; “Crossing the Line: Violation of the Rights of Palestinians in Israel without a Permit”, March 
2007, www.btselem.org Accessed 15 April 2007. 
691 Ministry of Finance; “General Information” June 2005, www.mof.gov.il, Accessed 18 December 2006.  
692 UNSCO; The Impact on the Palestinian Economy of the Recent Confrontations, Mobility Restrictions 




or selling their goods thus reducing their income. Consequently, there has been less 
demand for goods and services produced in the domestic economy, generating a further 
decrease in production and employment. The most direct economic hardship was the loss 
of an estimated 75, 000 Palestinian jobs in Israel; thus affecting 750, 000 workers and 
family members.694  
 
The massive losses to the Palestinian economy were estimated at USD 186.2 
million during the 22-day period of closure between 28 September—19 October 2000.695 
These losses are catastrophic to an economy where an annual gross domestic product is 
dependent on external incomes and resources. As of September 2001, the economic 
situation in Palestine had not become any better. On the contrary, further deprivation, 
confrontation, closures and restrictions define the current situation. In October 2001 
following the events of the assassination of the Israeli Minister for Tourism, Rehavan 
Zeevi by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) who claimed 
responsibility, Israel intensified the imposition of the strict buffer zone along the northern 
and north-western borders of the West Bank, tightened internal closures, especially in the 
West Bank, and increased the number of military incursions into various Palestinian 
towns and villages. 696 Despite the fact that confrontation and violence have had a 
destructive impact on the Palestinian economy, it is the Israeli closure policies that are 
the most damaging. 
 
The World Bank had already warned in 2004 that Palestinians were suffering “the 
worst economic depression in modern history”.697 The bank attributed this situation to the 
Palestinian loss of so much agricultural land to Israeli settlements, and to the fence, their 
reduced ability to export goods because of closures and travel restrictions, and the 
inability of many people to reach workplaces. The World Bank warned that unless 
Israel’s restrictions on the freedom of movement and goods were overhauled, the 
“disengagement” would have “very little impact” on Gaza’s economy and “would create 




697 World Bank; “Palestinian Economy and the Prospects for its Recovery”, December 2005, 
www.worldbank.org, Accessed 20 December 2006. 
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worse hardship”.698 The consequences of Israel’s permit system and closure policy are 
evident, as shown in figure 2.  
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According to the trends in Real GDP (Figure 2), it is clear that Israel’s methods have a 
devastating effect on the Palestinian society. Notably there are two periods which stand 
out. The first period is between 2000 and 2001, this was a period of severe crisis caused 
by the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada and the enforcement of total closure and the 
suspension of Israeli revenue transfers. The second period is from 2003 to 2005, when the 
GDP per capita stabilized and gradually increased. This development occurred despite of 
Israel’s large-scale military operation ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ and ‘Operation 
Determined Path’. However, the stabilization and increase in GDP per capita must be 
seen in the context of the Israeli release of revenue transfers. Furthermore, figure 2, also 
illustrates the sharp decline of GDP per capita in 2006. This is probably a consequence of 
the Israeli and international ban, in an attempt to deal with the Palestinian Authority as a 




                                                 
698 Ibid. 
699 World Bank; “West Bank and Gaza; Economic Developments in 2006 –a first assessment”, March 
2007, www.worldbank.org, Accessed 20 April 2007. 
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Unemployment and poverty 
 
Since the outbreak of al-Aqsa Intifada, there have been various factors that have 
influenced the Palestinian economy. Obviously there is the Intifada itself, the total 
closure that followed, the decrease of work permits given, the Israeli siege on Palestinian 
towns and villages as a consequence of large-scale military operations, are all factors 
which effect the unemployment rate and therefore the poverty rate.   




















As illustrated in figure 3, the unemployment rate in the West Bank and Gaza in the third 
quarter of 2006 was around 24 percent. However, the unemployment rate only shows the 
number of people seeking, but not finding, work. As discussed previously, due to the  
unpredictable process of obtaining Israeli working permits, and not actually being able to 
get to work as a result of closures, there are many Palestinians who have simply given up 
looking for work. If these individuals are included, it is estimated that the unemployment 
rate is around 30 percent.701 Unemployment is particularly high among young people; 
around 39 percent of persons aged 20-24 were unemployed in the first quarter of 2005702 
                                                 
700 Ibid. 
701 B’tselem; “Crossing the Line: Violation of the Rights of Palestinians in Israel without a Permit”, March 
2007, www.btselem.org Accessed 15 April 2007. 
702 32.3 percent in the West Bank and 53.7 percent in Gaza. World Bank; “Palestinian Economy and the 
Prospects for its Recovery”, December 2005, www.worldbank.org, Accessed 20 December 2006. 
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and in the age group 25-29, nearly 26 percent were unemployed.703 Given the low wages, 
the average daily wages per worker are NIS 78.2 and NIS 68.8 in the West Bank and 
Gaza respectively, a person who has a job is not ensured a proper livelihood.704 The low 
wages, combined with the high level of unemployment result in many Palestinians living 
below the poverty line. It is difficult to measure the number of people living in poverty, 
as statistics have different criteria, and there does not seem to be any data collected 
though the years for comparison to get a sense of the development. Still, B’tselem made 
some estimates from 1999 to 2004, which, although might not be coherent with other 
statistics from specific years, do offer a sense of direction and also illustrate the 
differences in the development between the West Bank and Gaza.   
 

















The al-Aqsa Intifada and the closures and permit restrictions that followed have seriously 
influenced the number of people who are living in poverty. The CIA fact book claims that 
around 45 percent of those living in the West Bank are living in poverty, in Gaza the 
numbers are around 63 percent.706 The World Bank estimates that the poverty rate for 
both the West Bank and Gaza for 2006 was 67 percent.707 This illustrates the long term 
                                                 
703 20.5 percent in the West Bank, 37.1 percent in Gaza. Ibid. 
704 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics; “Average daily wages 2006”, www.pcbs.gov.ps, Accessed 20 
December 2006.  
705 The poverty line here is calculated based on daily per capita income below $2.1. B’tselem; “Restriction 
of Movement”, www.btselem.org, Accessed 18 December 2006. 
706 CIA Fact Book; “Gaza Strip” and “West Bank”, www.cia.gov, Accessed 18 December 2006. 
707 World Bank; “Palestinian Economy and the Prospects for its Recovery”, December 2005, 
www.worldbank.org, Accessed 20 December 2006. 
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effect of the permit system and the closure policy, and it shows that despite the gradual 
decrease in intense violence during the al-Aqsa Intifada, the poverty level has not 
followed suite, instead it has only increased, irrespective of the emergency donor aid that 
the Palestinian Authority has received. This situation only amplifies the Palestinian 
dependency on Israel and leaves many Palestinians desperate for a livelihood in order to  
support themselves and their dependents, thus forcing many of them to enter Israel 
without a permit. Again, it is difficult to obtain the specific numbers of Palestinians who 
enter Israel without a working permit. However, according to the World Bank, in 2005 
there were around 18, 800 Palestinians who had Israeli working permits, furthermore,  
18, 600 Palestinians were in Israel without a permit, almost the exact number.708 The 
figures published by the Israelis on the number of Palestinians apprehended without a 
permit in 2005 was 148,417.709 Minister of Internal Security, Avi Dichter stated that from 
January to June 2006, Israel has caught 51, 000 Palestinians in Israel without a valid 
working permit.710  
Import/export  
 
As a consequence of the closure policy, commercial crossing points along the 
West Bank’s and Gaza’s borders with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt are closed which severely 
damage the Palestinian import and export trade, which is illustrated in  Figure 5. 
Futhermore it also paralyzes many manufacturing processes that depend on imported 
materials. These effects are an especially heavy burden because of the Palestinian 
economy’s great dependence on foreign trade, which comprises some 80 percent of the 
                                                 
708 Ibid. 
709 It should be noted that the figures relate to the number of times a person was caught, and some persons 
were caught more than once. Boarder Police;  “Summary of 2005 Work Year – Border Police,” 
www.police.gov.il, Accessed 20 December 2006.  
710 Gidon Alon, “Dichter: From Beginning of Year 51,000 Persons Staying Illegally in Israel have been 
Caught,” 15 June 2006, www.haaretz.com, Accessed 19 December 2006. 
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GDP.711 Furthermore, the closing of crossing points also harms the internal trade between 
the West Bank and Gaza.  
















Although the Israeli armed forces left Gaza in 2005 as part of the disengagement 
plan, Israel continues nevertheless to have complete control over the movement of goods 
to and from Gaza. Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel has required that all 
exports from Gaza, and almost all imports to the Strip, must cross through the Karni 
Crossing. This crossing is subject to strict procedures and inspections, which are rather 
time consuming. Additionally, when Israel receives warning of attempts to smuggle arms 
or attackers through the crossing, or is faced with other security reasons, Israel closes the 
crossing partially or completely. When this occurs, Palestinian manufacturers and 
merchants have virtually no way of conducting foreign trade. They are unable to plan and 
commit to a time schedule, they pay large sums for storing the goods due to the delay in 
crossing, and they suffer extensive losses on goods that spoil before reaching their 
destination.713  
                                                 
711 World Bank; “Palestinian Economy and the Prospects for its Recovery”, December 2005, 
www.worldbank.org, Accessed 20 December 2006. 
712 World Bank; “West Bank and Gaza; Economic Developments in 2006 –a first assessment”, March 
2007, www.worldbank.org, Accessed 20 April 2007. 
713 B’tselem; “Crossing the Line: Violation of the Rights of Palestinians in Israel without a Permit”, March 
2007, www.btselem.org Accessed 15 April 2007. 
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The increase in unemployment and poverty, and import and export restrictions, and the 
general decline of the Palestinian economy, all show that the Israeli permit and closure 
policy has an adverse effect on the daily lives of people within the West Bank and Gaza. 
Many families are left to depend on charities and aid, in order to survive.  
 
6. 1. 2 Hamas 
 
The al-Aqsa Intifada has made the humanitarian situation in the West Bank and 
Gaza significantly worse. Two months into the Intifada, the Palestinian Ministry of Social 
Affairs, Intissar al-Wazir, stated there were about 200, 000 people in need of emergency 
assistance.714 The economic hardship felt among the civilian population is a double edged 
sword, as it also promotes radicalism among the young, who constitute more than half of 
the West Bank and Gaza population. Families without a source of income reduce their 
consumption to the bare minimum for survival, and they live on savings, if they exist. 
The longer the crisis continues, the number of families without an income and without 
savings increases, and these people must, therefore, rely on the support from extended 
family, charity work and the Palestinian Authority. As mentioned previously, the 
Palestinians discovered that the Oslo Accords, the peace process and the establishment of 
Palestinian Authority did not result in economic growth, and hopes of a better future were 
not fulfilled. In the year 2000, 45 percent of the Palestinians said that their living 
situation had deteriorated in the wake of the peace process. 41 percent stated that the 
situation had not changed at all.715 To some extent, this lack of development, and the 
general decline in the Palestinian economy, resulted in Hamas’ position being 
strengthened, as well as confirming its pessimistic opinion of the Oslo Accords. A 
member of the Palestinian Oslo team negotiations, Hassan Asfour, said: “The closure 
                                                 
714 Press statement by Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs, 25 November 2000,  www.pmic.gov.ps, 
Accessed 29 March 2007. 
715 United Press International; “Palestinians support fighting despite hardships”15 November 2000, 
www.upi.com, accessed 15 November 2000.  
 253 
policy, for the time of Oslo onward, has created unemployment, bitterness, and despair 
that have driven thousand of Palestinians into the arms of Hamas”.716  
 
These developments occurred at a time when the Palestinian Authority’s ability to 
provide social services was collapsing. Many Palestinians have become sceptical to the 
Palestinian Authority’s handling of financial affairs, and it was, and still is, widely 
believed that corruption within the Palestinian Authority is not only common, but also 
widespread. An opinion poll released on June 16 1997 showed that 63 percent of 
Palestinians believed that the Authority was affected by corruption, and 57 percent 
expected it become even more so in the future.717 However, Hamas has been able to fill 
the empty role as a result of the weakened Palestinian Authority. A few days after Hamas 
won the election in January 2006, Attorney-General Ahmed al-Meghani, who had been 
appointed by Abbas to straighten out the financial situation, announced that an 
investigation by the Palestinian Authority had established that at least $ 700m had been 
“squandered or stolen” in resent years, with large amounts “transferred into personal 
accounts here and abroad.”718 The corruption was so pervasive and deeply rooted that the 
total amount of plundered funds “may be billions of dollars.”719 The contrast between the 
modest life styles of Hamas’ leaders and the more opulent preferences of many of the 
PLO, and between the integrity and efficiency of the Islamic social welfare apparatus on 
the one hand and the corruption on the other, were among Hamas’ most potent assets. 
Hamas argues that financial aid given to the Palestinian Authority is eaten up by Arafat’s 
many security services and fills the pockets of the ‘political winners of Oslo’, instead of 
strengthening the social network. Hamas spokesman, Mushir al-Masri, addressed the 
findings of al-Meghani and stated that “One of Hamas’ top priorities is to chase and bring 
to justice all the corrupt officials who stole public money and amassed huge wealth.”720  
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Hamas uses this situation to argue its case against the Oslo Accords and show 
their particular pessimism towards the peace process in general.721  “People see how the 
Palestinian Authority cheats and extorts and becomes rich. … What is the point of trying 
to do the right thing when the only reward for doing so is more suffering?”722 This 
situation alienates people from the Palestinian Authority, and instead, Hamas welcomes 
them with an excessive social network, which is grounded and legitimised in history, 
tradition and religion. Hamas also receive a natural respect from the Palestinians in 
general, since Hamas is considered a true ‘insider’. Hamas did not flee during the Intifada 
years, instead they shared the hardship and took lead in resisting the Israelis. 
“As long as Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Authority fail to translate Israel-
Palestinian peace negotiations into tangible territorial achievements and economic 
benefits, Hamas will be able to continue playing its role as the guardian of Islam 
and the champion of authentic Palestinian aspirations.”723 
 
Furthermore, Hamas relies on a long tradition of charity, an idea which came from the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas also maintains a reputation of being fair and unselfish in 
financial matters,724 as opposed the Palestinian Authority, who are considered with 
growing mistrust as corrupt and self serving.  
 
According to Sara Roy, in 1999, Islamic institutions “comprised anywhere from 
10-40 percent of all social institutions in the Gaza Strip and West Bank” and “directly 
reached tens of thousand of people and impacted hundreds of thousand more”. 725 It is 
generally believed that Hamas is far more influential within the social welfare sector than 
any other Palestinian political organisation, including the Palestinian Authority. Although 
there are no official or exact figures on the number of Hamas social welfare 
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organisations, it is believed the number lies somewhere between 70 and 100.726 After the 
outbreak of the al-Aqsa and the bankruptcy of the Palestinian Authority, the Islamic 
NGO’s and charitable organisations are the major service providers, covering about 60 
percent of the total beneficiaries from regular and emergency programs. In second place 
is UNRWA, who reaches around 34 percent, and the Palestinian Ministry of Social 
Affairs who manage to cover around 6 percent.727 In May 2004, it was estimated that one 
in every six Palestinians received social services in various forms from Hamas.728  
 
Although there is no doubt that Hamas is popular in the Palestinian society (the 
election result in January 2006 proved this), it does not automatically follow that this  
popularity transcends in to recruitment for Hamas’ military operations. It has not been 
proven that Hamas’ handouts are conditioned on political or military support. In her 
research, Sara Roy found that “all heads of Islamic institutions interviewed adamantly 
maintained that anyone, regardless of their social-economic, religious or political 
background, could participate in their programs”.729 The independent Palestinian 
legislator Abu-Amr echoed this view: “Hamas will not jeopardise their social institutions 
in this manner. That is their strength their existence.”730  
 
However, Hamas faces additional challenges in the future. Following the 
establishment of the Hamas government in March 2006, Israel has decided to stop 
transferring the tax money initially collected for the Palestinian Authority, back to 
them.731 Without this major source of revenue, the Palestinians fell into a severe fiscal 
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crisis and now have difficulty paying the salaries of the 150,000 employees, which about 
one-quarter of the population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is dependent on.732 
Furthermore, the Palestinian population will undoubtedly feel an economic hardship 
since the international community does not recognise the Hamas led government, 
meaning that they too freeze all aid to the Palestinian areas.  
 
 




Knowing that closure results in a decrease in economic growth for the individuals 
and the society as a whole, and that such a lack of development is creating an 
environment where Hamas is thriving, why does Israel persist with this method? Even 
Rabin and Peres would partially agree with Tore Bjørgo’s study on the root causes of 
terrorism, where he highlights the link between lack of economic development and 
terrorism;  
 
“they [Rabin and Peres] arranged for financial aid, which was coordinated with 
the Prime Minister Bureau, for the purpose of raising the standard of living in 
Gaza and justified that aid by stating that it was a part of the fight against 
terrorism.”733 
 
Despite being aware of these effects, the Rabin government was still enforcing the permit 
system and closure policy. Why? Could the answer lie in that the Israeli government, as a 
democratic government, has to be seen as actively doing something to hinder terrorism, 
and constantly seeking to increase security and protect its people? Maybe the answer can 
be found in the more complex process of a peace process? When entering a peace 
negotiation, it can be useful to have “freedom of movement” and “an increase in 
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economic prosperity”, as tools in order to trade. Is the permit system and closure policy 
first and foremost a political tool instead of a security measure?  
 
If indeed the implementation of the closure policy and the permit system prevent 
terror attacks, thus creating security for Israel, then this action would be a logical one. It 
is reasonable to assume that these measures do prevent the execution of some terror 
attacks, and have a limited and short term deterring effect. However, in the long term it 
has been shown that Hamas, possibly due to its multifaceted organisation, becomes more 
popular, creates dependencies, and is able to channel anger and despair toward the 
Palestinian Authority and Israel, thus planting seeds for the next cycle of violence. Awad, 
who lives in Gaza exemplified:  
 
“I was marching in the demonstrations here against terrorism, I felt sad when I 
saw the mothers and fathers of those killed in Israel [by the suicide bombers]. But 
when I saw my kid was dying, and I saw the Israelis were behind it by refusing to 
let him cross their land, it gave me proof they are still living the mentality of the 
occupation, not the mentality of peace. In those days, if anyone had come to me 
and asked me to be a suicide bomber, I would have done it. And I am one who has 
supported the peace very much!”734 
 
It is peculiar that even Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami realises this effect of the 
permit system and closure policy, when he said that the limitations of movement in Gaza 
and the West Bank have turned the areas “into a boiling pot which just feeds the violence 
further…”  
 
Furthermore, although these measures have implemented now for a considerable 
number of years, they do not seem to have affected terrorism significantly. Time has 
shown that neither the permit system nor the closure policy can keep a sophisticated and 
determined terrorists out of Israel, and they do very little to deter and disrupt the terrorist 
infrastructure itself. This was exactly the case on February 14 2001. A 35 year old 
Palestinian from Gaza, who had worked for the Egged bus company for five years 
transporting day-labours from Gaza to Israel, drove into a group of soldiers and civilians 
waiting at an IDF hitchhiking post in the busy ‘Tempo’ intersection close to Holon, south 
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of Tel Aviv, killing eight and wounding 17. The driver had been security cleared two 
weeks prior to this incident. Hamas claimed responsibility for the terror attack, although 
there was some speculation as to whether it was a separate spontaneous action.735 
 
 Even if this and other terror attacks were truly actions of separate individuals, 
there are other incidents where the terrorist groups already have ‘soldiers’ ready and 
waiting inside Israel, so they can take action even when a closure has been imposed. The 
most important and longest closure is known as the ‘spring closure’, since it was imposed 
in January 1996 and lasted, intermittently, until July the same year.736 On January 5, the 
Israelis closed the borders to Gaza, in fear of retaliation for the assassination of Ayyash 
‘the Engineer’, and continued to close down Gaza and the West Bank on February 12. 
This closure was then extended for three, days due to security concerns related to the end 
of the 40 mourning period for the killing of Ayyash, which ended on February 24737. The 
very next day, suicide bombings in Jerusalem and Ashkelon were carried out by Hamas, 
killing 25 and injuring 80.738 The government immediately placed Gaza and the West 
Bank, including the self-rule areas, once again under closure. Exactly one week later, on 
March the 3rd, while the closure was still in effect, another suicide bombing on a bus in 
Jerusalem claimed 19 lives and injured ten people. This terror attack was also claimed by 
Hamas.739  It was followed by a fourth suicide bombing in a shopping area in Tel Aviv on 
the subsequent day, leaving another 12 people dead and 126 injured.740 These attacks 
shook the state of Israel, and prompted some of the most restrictive measures ever carried 
out during closure. The Israeli government declared Gaza and the West Bank, including 
the self-rule areas, military zones. For the first time, this resulted in an internal closure 
where movement within the West Bank was also prohibited. In addition, 465 towns and 
villages of the West Bank were separated by Israeli military checkpoints, effectively 
placing more than 1, 3 million residents under town arrest.741  
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“Closure doesn’t prevent terror attacks”, says Likud MK and former Shin Bet 
official, Gideon Izra. “In the last two years [1994/1995], no Palestinian with a work 
permit has even been connected to a terror attack. Closure is simply a means of 
punishment.”742 And this is how the Palestinians perceive it, a collective form of 
punishment, despite closure being widely regarded as a remedy for terrorist attacks by 
most Israelis. 743 The argument that closure works as a form of collective punishment, 
rather than a security measure, was highlighted by the closure used after the Baruch 
Goldstein massacre. Under international law, the Israelis have a responsibility to not only 
protect the citizens of Israel, but also the citizens living in Gaza and the West Bank. On 
February 25 1994 the settler Baruch Goldstein entered the Hebron Haram al-Ibrahimi 
mosque, which also serves as a synagogue, with an M16 automatic rifle, killing 29 
worshipers and wounding 250 others.744  The Israeli soldiers that were guarding one of 
the exits, heard the shots, but panicked and instead of helping Palestinians out of the 
mosque, closed the door. Goldstein was killed when the crowd finally overmanned him 
and beat him to death with a fire extinguisher and their bare hands.745 The Israeli 
government reacted to the carnage in Hebron by placing the 120, 000 Palestinians 
residing in the town, under curfew, and Israeli patrols operated under shoot-to-kill orders 
to contain the riots which broke out all over the place. But amazingly, Kiryat Arba, the 
home of the fanatical followers of Kahane and the unrepentant friends of the assassin, 
was not placed under curfew.746 Israel did, however, impose a closure on the Palestinians 
of Gaza and the West Bank after the massacre, even though the victims had all been 
Palestinian. This was supposedly done in order to protect the settler population against 
the possibility of Palestinian reprisals. Yet in the cases of Palestinian attacks against 
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settlers, Israel had not previously restricted settler movement in order to protect the 
Palestinian population against potential reprisals. In March 1994, Rabin spoke at a 
Labour party conference and openly admitted that 120, 000 Arabs were being “held 
hostage by 400 Jews”.747 
  
Then the West Bank Preventative security service Chief, Jibril Rajoub, stated: 
“the Palestinian Authority could do more if Israel lifts the closure and give the Palestinian 
people hope, and that it would lead to the peace process being renewed.”748 Regardless of 
the motivation behind this statement, it is notable that the permit system and closure 
policy are perceived as tools used in a highly complicated political process. Another 
example illustrating that these measures are not merely used for security, but are valuable 
as political tools in the peace process, is when Israel sealed off Jericho for six days after 
the Jerusalem bus bombing claimed by Hamas, on August 21 1995, which killed five and 
wounded 60. The alleged reason was that the Palestinian Authority refused to hand over 
two Hamas activists suspected of being involved in the Jerusalem operation. Largely on 
the basis of evidence supplied by Israeli security, the Palestinian Authority had not only 
arrested the suspects, but, on August 24 1995, acting with extraordinary speed, decided to 
sentence them in one of Arafat’s new state security courts. The two were tried at night 
without defence and sentenced to seven and twelve years respectively for ‘hurting the 
interest of the Palestinian Authority.’749 Israeli security suspected that the quick 
sentencing was a Palestinian Authority strategy, designed to avoid extradition procedures. 
This is possible, but as the then Israeli justice minister, David Liba’I noted, once the two 
had begun to serve their sentence, it was the Palestinian Authority’s right to turn the 
Israeli request down. So the Israelis changed their reason for imposing the closure; the 
closure was not imposed because of the two activists had already been sentenced, but 
because there was a third Hamas activist who was ‘wanted’, at large in Jericho.750 “Every 
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day the Israelis have a different reason for the closure” 751 said the Palestinian Authority’s 
head of Preventative Security in Jericho, Jibril Rajub at the time. 
 
Israeli journalist Amira Hass expressed her view on the permit system and closure 
policy:  
“With time, what had originally been an ad hoc military-bureaucratic measure 
crystallized into a fully conscious Israeli strategy with a clear political goal: 
separation between the two peoples with an appearance of political separation, 
but with only one government—Israel—having any effective power to shape the 
destinies of both.”752  
 
In her view, these counter terrorism measures are about taking control; not only control 
over security, but also more importantly control over financial development, state 
development and Palestinians as individuals and as a society. This control will have 
social ramifications that will effect the development of the Palestinian society in years to 
come, and it will give Israel certain control of its own political outcome. One can assume 
that Israel uses these measures with three ulterior motives; firstly, it creates the illusion of 
security, that the state is not powerless against terrorism, but has a policy on how to deal 
with the threat. It has a minor short-term effect, a threat will be sealed in a confined area. 
However, most likely it is only kept there, thriving in an atmosphere where it will only 
come back with a stronger force. Secondly, closure can be used as punishment to enforce 
a political situation that may change the political playing field into Israel’s favour, which 
further constitutes the third issue; the measures play a small, but delicate role in a highly 
complex peace process. Thus, the permit system and the closure policy can be used as 
tools in a situation where Israel can achieve three goals with two measures.  
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6. 2 Deportation  
 
Up to several years before the al-Aqsa Intifada, the use of deportation as a 
punitive action, dropped significantly in comparison to the years after the first Intifada. 
With the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada and the increase in violence, Israel again 
reinforced the policy of deportation; first, as a consequence of the siege of the Church of 
Nativity, Bethlehem, and secondly, as a continual policy to move individuals from the 
West Bank to Gaza. It is these two practises will be examined further in this section. 
Furthermore, this section will also show how the deportation of 415 Islamists to Lebanon 
still has ramifications to this day, which initially became evident during the al-Aqsa 
Intifada.  
 
The Church of Nativity 
 
From March to April 2002, Israel carried out ‘Operation Defensive Shield’, large-
scale Israeli military incursions into the West Bank. As part of ‘Operation Defensive 
Shield’, Bethlehem was invaded in an apparent effort ‘to root out militants’.753 On 1 April 
2002, Israeli tanks surrounded Bethlehem. In early May, Bethlehem was the last West 
Bank city which had occupying forces still present in the wake of the operation. On 2 
April 2002, approximately 200 Palestinians fled from the Israeli forces into a church. 
Israel sieged to the church for 39 days, during which many civilians and policemen left, 
some of whom were taken into Israeli custody. By early May 2002, of the people still 
present in the Church were 39 Palestinian men wanted by Israel, various civilians, clerics 
and policemen, including the Governor of Bethlehem Muhammad al-Madani, and 11 
people who sneaked into the Church on 2 May i.e. ten foreign activists of the 
International Solidarity Movement and Carolyn Cole, a photographer of the Los Angeles 
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Times.754 The negotiations over how to end the siege were arduous and broke down 
several times. Besides the Palestinian and Israeli negotiation teams, those involved 
included clerics from the Church of the Nativity and officials from the USA, the EU and 
the Vatican. Finally, an agreement was reached to end the siege. The details of the 
agreement were never made official, but it did result in the transfer of the 39 Palestinians 
from the Church on May 10 2002.755. 26 of them were taken to Gaza and the remaining 
13 by bus to the airport, where they flew to Cyprus. In contrast, the Palestinian policemen 
and civilians were released. Later the same day, the ten International Solidarity 
Movement activists were removed from the Church by Israeli police. The EU tried to 
come up with a solution for the 13 deportees in Cyprus, and on May 21st they finally 
found host countries for 12 of them. Italy and Spain took three each, Greece and Ireland 
took two each and Belgium and Portugal took one each. However, the 13th man, Abdallah 
Daoud, described by Israel as “the most wanted of the wanted”, proved to be more 
difficult to find a host country. He was eventually received by Mauritania on 25 
November 2002.756 The total length of these deportations are unclear, however, since 
then, the EU has extended the 12 Palestinians’ permits and enabled them to stay within 
their designated EU states. According to human rights organisation, al-Haq, as of April 
2006, the twelve Palestinians continue to live spread out across Europe.757 
 
 
Deportation from the West Bank to Gaza  
 
A few months later, in the summer of 2002, in an attempt to fight the increasing 
violence, Israel decided to force family members of terrorists to transfer from the West 
Bank to Gaza. Israel did not call it deportation, but instead presented the measure as 
‘assigned residence’. The intention was that by targeting these families, Israel would be 
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deterring future attacks. It was argued that even a Palestinian who did not care about his 
own life, would be disconcerted by the harm that could be brought upon his family in the 
event of an attack.758 On March 9 2002, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon instructed security 
forces to begin preparations for expelling the families of suicide bombers from the West 
Bank to Gaza and told them: “do not hesitate, this will contribute to deterrence”.759 On 1 
August 2002, the military commander of the West Bank issued Amendment No. 84, 
modifying Article 86 of the Military Order No. 378 (1970), in order to allow for 
expulsions to the Gaza Strip. Article 86 (B) (1), as amended, gave the military 
commander the power to require a person “to live within the bounds of a certain place in 
the West Bank or Gaza.”760 
 
The first example of this type of deportation happened towards the end of the 
summer of 2002 and shows how deportation is practised. On July 17 2002, two suicide 
bombers killed five people and injured close to 40 near the old bus station downtown Tel 
Aviv.761 Consequently, several arrests were made and in July 2002, Israel arrested 21 
family members of the suicide bombers. Among them was Kifah Ajouri, brother of the 
wanted Ali Ajouri, and Abd-al-Naser Asida, brother of the wanted Nassr Asida.762 On 4 
August, the Military Commander issued a new order to expel Intisar Ajouri, the sister of 
Kifah and Ali Ajouri who had been in detention since she was arrested on 3 June that 
year, for up to two years. The three Palestinians appealed this decision, but it was rejected 
by the Appeals Committees, however, on 13 August they appealed to the High Court, 
which issued an interim order preventing their removal to the Gaza Strip until further 
notice. However, on 3 September 2002, the Court delivered its judgment which accepted 
Israel’s argument that this was a measure of ‘assigned residence’ rather than forcible 
transfer, and confirmed the deportation of Intisar and Kifah Ajouri to Gaza for two years 
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with a re-evaluation after six months,763 but blocked that of Abd-al-Naser Asida who was 
not deemed a sufficient threat.764 On 4 September 2002, Kifah and Intisar Ajouri were 
taken to an Israeli military base in the West Bank, where they were given half an hour to 
say goodbye to their families before they were expelled to Gaza. They were given 1,000 
shekels each, blindfolded and driven into the Gaza Strip in two armoured vehicles before 
being dropped off in an orchard on the edge of the Israeli settlement Netzarim. They did 
not know where they were, but met Gaza Palestinians who helped them reach the offices 
of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights in Gaza City. During the first four months, 
the Ajouri siblings lived in a Red Cross bomb shelter in Gaza City, until they obtained 
better housing provided by the Palestinian Authority.765  
How extensively this method is used, is not certain, as the government do not 
publicise the number of people they have deported. But, although the human rights 
organisations operate with different numbers, they are approximately the same. 
According to human rights organisation al-Haq, as of April 2006, a total of 28 
Palestinians have been deported from the West Bank to Gaza, and B’tselem states that 32 
Palestinians have been deported. They further indicate that the use of this method was at 
its peak in 2002 and 2003, but has then since declined. This is in accordance with the 
number of suicide attacks which dropped significantly in 2004 and has continued to do 
so.766  
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6. 2. 1 The intention behind the method 
 
Along with the legalisation of deporting individuals from the West Bank to Gaza, 
came several restrictions that revealed the intentions behind this method. The Israeli High 
Court explicitly stated that deterrence alone was not a lawful basis for deportation. 
Furthermore, the High Court also emphasises that, “one may not assign the place of 
residence of a person who is not innocent and did carry out acts that harmed security, 
when in the circumstances of the case he no longer presents any danger.”767 This 
restriction applies regardless of if the transfer would deter others from committing similar 
acts. The judgement clearly states that deportation is only lawful as a preventative 
measure. The Attorney-General stated that expulsions would only be legal where there is 
clear evidence that the person endangers state security, and that the order will prevent the 
danger and not just a blood relation of such a person.768 However, once the element of 
prevention exists, the choice of method for deterrence might be taken into account. On 
the basis of these regulations enforced by the High Court, it might be difficult to 
understand the Court’s decision to deport Intisar and Kifah Ajouri. All the allegations 
against them were related to past acts when they assisted their brother, who is now dead. 
The state did not consider if the two sisters constitute a future danger, nor is the matter of 
future danger mentioned in their judgment. In the hearing before the Military Appeals 
Committee in Intisar case, an Israeli security agent even admitted that he would not 
recommend placing Intisar in administrative detention.769 The argument that the relatives 
were actively involved in harming state security was only raised at a later stage, after the 
hearing before the High Court had begun.  
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Besides arguing that the deportation per se is against the Geneva Conventions, 
critics of the High Court judgment raise many other issues that cast doubt over the 
intention behind this method. Assuming that these individuals are a danger to the security 
of Israel, why not charge them and let them stand trial? Why does Israel want to deport 
them rather than place them in administrative detention where they are constantly 
monitored? For the critics it seems odd that Israel chooses to deport them from the West 
Bank, an area where Israel has almost total control, to Gaza, where the individuals are 
much harder for the Israelis to survey. These questions lead to the assumption that 
deportation is in fact not a preventative method for securing Israel security, but rather the 
intention is to punish the individuals in order to work as a general deterrent. Justice 
Minister Meir Sheetrit, when commenting on the expulsion policy, said: “People ought to 
know that if they perpetrate a terrorist attack, their families and supporters will be truly 
hurt.”770 This kind of argument is supported by the fact that deportation to Gaza is 
perceived as a punishment by the Palestinians. Although the court legally defines Gaza 
and the West Bank as a ‘single territorial unit’771, in practice, due to Israel’s closure and 
permit policy, it does not function as a unit, and the chances of seeing relatives outside of 
Gaza are slim. The prospect of being deported to Gaza, instead of abroad, struck a cord 
amongst the Palestinians. For example: a father from Hebron who feared that his son was 
on the verge of committing a suicide operation, reported him to the Israelis. He claimed 
he did so in fear of the rest of his family being expelled to Gaza by the Israelis.772 This 
reaction to the deportation policy is of course welcomed by the Israelis and illustrates 
their intentions with this counter terrorism method. Then Foreign Minister Ehud Barak 
claimed that: “Deportation is not a punishment. It is a deterrent to further attacks.”773 
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6. 2. 2 The ramification of the 1992 deportation seen in al-Aqsa 
Intifada 
 
As discussed previously in section 5.3 in this thesis, the deportation of 415 
Islamists in 1992 had serious ramifications for the Israeli society, and it also contributed 
to the development of Hamas as a military organisation, its relationship with the 
international press, but the incident further influenced the politics in the Palestinian 
society. Although many of the consequences of this incident were seen in the years 
immediately after it, the total extent of this deportation did not become clear after Israel 
withdrew from Lebanon at the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada.  
 
The relationship between Hamas and Hizballah came into light again with the 
Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000. Hizballah had again appeared on 
the Palestinian arena; for a period they were working tightly with the Islamist within the 
West Bank and Gaza itself. In an interview with Al-Hayah al-Jadidah on April 9 2001, 
Jamal Mansour, an Hamas leader from the West Bank, acknowledged that “the 
experience of Hizballah has been a unique experience that has enriched the struggle 
experiences of our people . . . Hizballah has become a symbol and not just a mere 
affiliation in the Palestinian arena.”774 Hizballah’s deputy secretary, General Naim 
Qassem, confirmed this mutual relationship when he stated: “It is our duty to be by [the 
Palestinians’] side and offer them all types of support”.775 During this time their 
relationship was evident inside the West Bank and Gaza, symbolized by the yellow 
Hizballah flag often seen among the crowd of protesters at the time, alongside Hamas’ 
green flag. Hizballah-owned TV station ‘al-Menar’ is not only the second most popular 
TV station in the West Bank and Gaza, but often it is the first to deliver cutting edge 
news on a new Islamic attack. Since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a new trend has 
commenced; the growing cooperation of all parties, both the Islamic and non-Islamic, and 
the even to some degree the Palestinian security forces, in the armed struggle against 
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Israel.776 This has created an environment where Hizballah has found it easier to “broker 
unity among various Palestinian groups and to recruit Palestinians inside the territories to 
undertake Hizballah-led terrorist activity of their own.”777  One example was the third 
attack which took place since the al-Aqsa Intifada and was claimed by Hizballah- 
Palestine: a bombing in Petah Tivka, injuring five on May 6 2001. Both Islamic Jihad and 
Hizballah-Palestine claimed the responsibility for one of the largest suicide bombings 
during the al-Aqsa Intifada, known as the ‘disco bombing’ in Tel Aviv on June 1 2001, 
killing 21 and injuring 120. Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbullah's leader, phoned Islamic 
Jihad leaders in the territories afterwards to offer his personal congratulations on the 
successful blow against the ‘Zionist enemy.’778  
 
Furthermore, there are other modus operadi which are typical Lebanese tactics, 
which were hardly used in Israel prior to the al-Aqsa Intifada. Two examples of such 
tactics are roadside attacks, which have shown complexity and organisational skill779, and 
the bombing and destruction of an Israeli Merkava III tank.780 Moreover, the Israelis 
knew they had cause for concern in February 2001, when they discovered a Hizballah 
cell led by Colonel Masoud Ayad, which was part of Force 17 (as in Arafat’s personal 
security service). This showed not only the deep integration between Hizballah and the 
Islamic partners, but also between Hizballah and the Palestinian Authority.781  
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6. 3 House demolition 
 
Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel has responded to Palestinian 
attacks in several different ways. They have conducted large-scale military operations 
into the West Bank and Gaza, including the destruction of homes and places of business. 
They have increased the security around settlements and their military camps, meaning 
they have also demolished houses around them so that these areas become easier to 
defend. During the period of 2000-2006, Israel has also started the construction of a 
separation fence. As a consequence of this defensive action, Israel has demolished houses 
and agricultural land. Additionally, several years before the al-Aqsa Intifada, the number 
of suicide bombers had increased and hence so did the use of the demolition, although 
Israel had not used this method much since 1998. However, as a response to the increase 
of suicide bombers during the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel re-instated this policy.  
 
This section will give an introduction to how the policy of house demolition has 
played a part in Israel’s counter terrorism policy since the outbreak of al-Aqsa Intifada. 
Because the hindering or deterring of suicide bombers is seen by the Israelis as a 
particular challenge, this section will focus on how the policy of house demolition plays a 
role in countering suicide bombers. Although the exact number of houses which are 
destroyed by this practice is difficult to obtain, it is possible to get an impression. This 
section relies on B’tselem’s figures which are probably not exact or correct, but give a 
useful indication of the scale of the use of this method.  
 
 As discussed previously, during 1992 to 2000, house demolition was used to 
remove houses that Palestinians had built illegally, i.e. without a building permit. This 
method was especially implemented in the West Bank and corresponded with a time 
when very few building permits were given. It is estimated that approximately 1,300 
Palestinian homes have been demolished in the West Bank in the past six years, due to 
the lack of the required building permits.782 Furthermore, the vast majority of Palestinian 
requests for building permits in Area C are still being rejected. According to B’tselem 
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337 Palestinians submitted building permit applications in the West Bank during 2003, of 
which 290 were rejected.783 Even though this practice was continued during 2000-2006, 
the number of rejections have decreased. Different human rights organisations have 
suggested that this is because Israel now carries out the majority of house demolitions as 
a result of ‘security concerns’, instead of ‘building without a permit’. Additionally, Israel 
has carried out large-scale military operations including the demolishing of houses, hence 
there has been no ‘need’ to demolish houses under the pretence that they were illegally 
built.784  
 
6. 3. 1 Security reasons 
 
The ‘security reasons’ essentially include the protection of settlements and the 
road network that settlers use, the military camps, the construction of a separation barrier 
with the building of a fence and the attempts to reduce violence by destroying houses 
which militant might take refuge in or use as a base often done under large-scale military 
operations. It is estimated that between 2000 and 2004, around 60 percent, meaning 
around 2, 500 of demolished houses, are demolished under this pretext, affecting around 
24, 000 people living in the West Bank and Gaza.785  
 
Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel has employed a policy of house 
demolition, uprooting of trees, and destruction of agricultural areas in the West Bank and 
Gaza. The policy is implemented in areas near the Israeli settlements, on both sides of the 
bypass roads along which the settlers travel, and near army positions, and along the 
Egyptian border. An IDF Spokesperson explained the policy as follows: 
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“The roads in Judea and Samaria [West Bank] and in Gaza constitute one of the 
main friction centres where intensive combat events have taken place in the last 
few months. The IDF is, of course, required to deal with these combat events and 
to provide protection to these who use the said roads, both soldiers and 
civilians.”786 
 
These comments indicate that this policy is part of Israel’s defence strategy. Part of this 
strategy is the creation of so called ‘security strips’ around places where Israeli civilians 
or security forces are situated. One example of this was the demolishing of houses in the 
Rafah refugee camp in Gaza in January 2002. The Egyptian border area is densely 
populated, and Rafah’s refugee camps lie along the border, which contain Israeli army 
posts. B’tselem assesses that the IDF demolished houses and destroyed agricultural land 
along a 16, 5 kilometres strip near the border. The width of the strip varied, in some 
locations, 350-500 meter wide, in other places, 40-50 meter wide strip.787 The former 
Chief of Command in the South, Yom Tov Samiah, explained that,  
 
“these houses should have been demolished and evacuated a long time ago, 
because the Rafah border is not a natural border, it cannot be defended… Three 
hundred meters of the Strip along the two sides of the border must be evacuated… 
Three hundred meters, no matter how many houses, period.”788  
 
Regarding the same operation, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon stated:  
 
In Rafah, the system is to smuggle through tunnels, and these tunnels are deep – 
from twelve to eighteen meters. Israel has to take all the necessary steps to stop 
the smuggling of weapons… No doubt the narrow corridor that we have there 
does not allow us to stop it.”789 
 
House demolition in Gaza has also been carried out around the road network which leads 
to the military post Morag, around the Israeli settlement of Kfar Darom and the border 
surrounding the Israeli Netzarim settlement. In the latter, the IDF destroyed a 500-700 
meter wide strip of land. Furthermore, along 700 meters of road leading from the 
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settlement to the sea, the IDF destroyed a 400 meter strip on both sides of the road. The 
IDF also built a one-and-a-half kilometre road for the settlers that go directly to the Karni 
crossing. On both sides of this road, the army uprooted trees and destroyed crops along a 
strip of around 300 meters.790 However, the most intensive large-scale destruction of 
houses and land took place under the Israeli military offensives. The first major military 
operation of this nature was carried out in March 2001. Code named ‘Operation Bronze,’ 
the plan was designed to bulldoze Palestinian land, quarantine troublesome areas, restrict 
Palestinian movement and strengthen Israeli settlements.791 From February 2002 through 
to October 2004, the IDF conducted 13 major operations and incursions into Palestinian 
population centres, of which ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ and ‘Operation Determined 
Path’ were conducted in February to May 2002. During both operations, the Israeli 
military systematically damaged or destroyed homes, commercial properties, educational 
institutions, and hospitals. The largest single demolishing operation carried out by the 
Israeli army was probably in the Jenin refugee camp, in the north of the West Bank, in 
April 2002. In the space of a couple of days, the army completely destroyed the al-
Hawashin quarter and partially destroyed two other quarters of the camp, making about 
4,000 people homeless. The army said that the destruction in the refugee camps was 
justified by the presence of members of Palestinian armed groups.792 The IDF 
Spokesperson stated that, “The purpose of these exposing acts is not to punish the 
Palestinian populations, but rather to provide a solution for a specific and defined security 
need.”793 It might have contributed to increased security for the settlements and the Israeli 
soldiers, but the destruction of houses and agricultural land has only contributed to an 
already grave economical situation. The total Palestinian losses from the damage are 
estimated to be between $3, 2 billion and $10 billion.794 Due to the closure policy and the 
limited number of Israeli working permits issued, the agricultural sector has become one 
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of the few sources of income for many people who living in Gaza. Therefore, when the 
agricultural land is destroyed, it only worsens the situation, especially for those who lose 
their house and their income.  
 
In addition to house demolishing being used as a tool to protect the settlements 
and their road network, and the large scale military operations that followed in the al-
Aqsa years, house demolishing was also a consequence of a defensive action Israel 
undertook in 2002. Sharon’s government decided to start building a fence which would 
serve as a separation barrier. The fence is in average sixty meters wide and is projected to 
be 703 kilometres long. In areas where the construction of the fence has been completed, 
military orders have created a buffer zone of 150-200 metres on the Palestinian side in 
which new construction is prohibited.795  With the start of the construction of the barrier, 
Israel began to issue demolition orders and demolish homes in Palestinian communities 
near the fences route. According to Amnesty International, Israel has issued about 280 




On July 31 2002, a suicide bomber attacked the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 
killing nine and wounding 85. Hamas took the credit for the bombing. The same day, at a 
meeting of the Political-Security Cabinet, an official decision was made to renew the 
policy of demolishing houses belonging to the family of suicide bombers and those who 
aid them.797 In practice though, this policy was not renewed untill October 2001, during 
the IDF’s operations in Area A in the West Bank. The first house demolishing in 
response to a suicide attack during al-Aqsa Intifada, took place already on October 23 
2001 in Qalqiliya. The IDF demolished the home of Hassan Khutari, who undertook the 
suicide bombing at the Dolphinarium in Tel Aviv in July of that year. The next day, in 
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Tulkarm, the army demolished the home belonging to the family of Raid al-Karmi, who 
was suspected of killing two Israeli civilians. That same day, during IDF operations in 
Beit Rima, they demolished three houses, in which Palestinians suspected of attacks on 
Israelis, lived. 798 Since then, Israel has continued with house demolishing as a response 
to suicide attacks, and it is estimated to constitute around 15 percent of the total number 
of houses which are demolished.799 
 


















The decision made by the Political-Security Cabinet, and the reports made by the 
media, give the impression that Israel’s policy is directed only against Palestinians who 
are directly involved in attacks that caused many Israeli casualties. However, Israel’s 
policy is much broader than that. Although the use of this method during 1992-1998 was 
not strictly limited to the suicide bombers’ family homes, during the al-Aqsa Intifada it 
became more apparent that Israel demolished houses belonging to individuals irrespective 
of their level of involvement in the attacks, the planning, the dispatching of the bombers 
or general assistance. For example, on September 17 2003, the IDF forces demolished the 
house in which Mahmud Ali lived. According to a statement of the IDF Spokesperson 
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that day, “he was involved in three attempts to dispatch suicide-terrorists.” On 5 October 
2003, the army demolished the house in which Amjad Abidi lived, after which the IDF 
Spokesperson announced that “he was involved in assisting in many terrorist attacks.”801 
Additionally, it seems that this method is no longer restricted to fighting suicide bombers, 
but now also includes other kinds of attacks on Israel, regardless of if there are any 
fatalities or not. According to B’tselem’s figures, 66 percent of the demolitions were 
directed at the families of suspects who carried out attacks, while 34 percent were 
directed at those involved in other ways and 40 percent of the demolitions were in 
response to attacks in which no Israeli was killed.802 
 
 There are two other issues that have become more apparent during the al-Aqsa 
Intifada; the destruction of houses surrounding other houses already scheduled for 
demolision, and the issue of pre-warning demolition orders. In many instances, the IDF 
also destroyed houses adjacent to the house originally targeted. These cases involved 
both apartments in the same building as the suspect’s apartment, and adjacent buildings. 
Although destroying only one apartment in an apartment building might be challenging 
for the Israelis, previous policy has been to seal the house rather than to destroy it. 
Additionally, the fact that there have been so many of theses cases, makes this practise 
stand out. B’tselem estimated that since the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the IDF 
demolished 295 adjacent homes, i.e. about one-half of all homes demolished, in which 
1,286 persons lived.803 Furthermore, contrary to the practice in 1992-1998, and since the 
policy was renewed in 2001, the IDF has generally not issued demolition orders, and has 
not warned the occupants before demolishing their homes. Al-Haq reports that the IDF 
gave prior warning in only seventeen cases, representing three percent of the total.804 As a 
result, the occupants cannot appeal the decision, or prepare to remove valuables from the 
house or make other living arrangements. Most of the demolitions take place at night, and 
the occupants are only given a few minutes to remove their possessions from the house. 
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Israel justifies its failure to give prior warning on the grounds that the warning is “liable 
to endanger our forces, and cause the action to fail, because warning will enable the 
enemy to booby-trap the houses scheduled to be demolished, ambush our troops taking 
part in the action, and the like.”805 However, Israel has publicly stated that they have 
reinforced the house demolition practice as a consequence for suicide bombings. By 
doing this, Israel also send a warning, meaning that in some cases, families have 
anticipated that their house will be demolished. Thus, the soldiers arrive at the house 
marked for demolition and are surprised to find that the occupants have already removed 
the contents. As previously argued, Israel has stated that they want the family, and often a 
random audience, to watch the destruction as an added deterrent value, but which in this 
case, the Israelis will not successfully obtain.  
 
An assessment of the method  
 
 
The method of house demolishing has a variety of consequences for the 
Palestinians. The initial trauma of losing their home is only the first issue that the families 
have to cope with. The family unit is disrupted, as some families are forced to split up 
and live separately; their living conditions decline sharply as a result of the family’s loss 
of property; and family members suffer from feelings of being uprooted and of 
instability. Moreover, research on the psychological effects indicates that house 
demolitions have a substantial post-traumatic effect, felt primarily by children. Serious 
financial difficulty also follows, a situation which is hard to improve due to Israel’s 
closure policy and working permit system. As a remedy to this situation, Hamas has a 
policy of supporting the families of suicide bombers. In the second Intifada, the provision 
of financial aid almost became a competition between Hamas, reportedly Arafat and 
Saddam Hussein. Allegedly, Arafat extended financial help to the families and relatives 
of Palestinians killed or injured during the second Intifada. The sums ranged between 
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$5,000 and $25,000 for each family.806 Additionally, the Palestinian Authority and 
Saddam Hussein have given substantial economic support to families whose sons or 
daughters had been killed or detained by the IDF, or died as suicide bombers. At an event 
organized by the pro-Iraqi Arab Liberation Front (ALF), four families each received a 
check for $10,000 in honour of their sons’ deaths. According to Palestinian sources, at 
least fifty families from the Hebron region benefited from Saddam's generous 
handouts.807 The Palestinian Authority reportedly intercepted a sum of $420, 000 from 
Saddam Hussein, which was on its way to families of Palestinians killed in the second 
Intifada.808 A Palestinian Authority official stated: “They [Hamas] are spending a lot of 
money. They are also paying more than Arafat. That's why their power is growing. 
People see that Hamas has more money, so they turn to it for assistance.”809 
 
As previously shown, this method has been used in an effort to counter suicide 
attacks, and the underlying intention behind this method is that harm to family members 
will deter Palestinians from attacking Israelis. Attorney Shai Nitzan, former head of the 
Special Functions Division in the State Attorney’s Office, argued before the High Court 
that house demolitions are “intended, among other reasons, to deter potential terrorists, as 
it has been proven that the family is a central factor in Palestinian society.”810 Although 
Hamas’ policy has most likely decreased the deterrent value of Israel’s house 
demolishing method, there was a consensus among Israeli officers that “harming families 
has been proven to be an effective policy.”811 In its attempt to prove the deterrent value, 
the defense establishment announces occasionally that Palestinians have turned in 
relatives out of fear of their house being demolished. Examples of this is include; firstly, 
an arrested seventeen-year-old who told Shin Bet in July 2002 he had been approached 
by  Islamic Jihad wanting him to be a suicide bomber, but had refused because he was 
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afraid his family home would be destroyed.812 Secondly, in August 2002 a Palestinian 
woman turned herself in to Israel Defence Force troops at a checkpoint near Jenin. She 
claimed that she was afraid that her parent’s home would be demolished if she went 
through with her intended suicide attack.813 Thirdly, in the April of 2003, Hamas terrorist 
operatives in Tul Karem planned a suicide attack in an Israeli civilian area during the 
Passover holiday. During IDF operations in Tul Karem, several members of the terror 
cell were apprehended, who released the name of the potential suicide bomber to Israeli 
authorities. Following pressure applied by his family members, who feared that their 
home would be destroyed as a result of the bombing, the potential suicide bomber turned 
himself into the IDF authorities at a nearby checkpoint.814 Fourthly, on the 21st of 
October, 2004, IDF forces demolished the houses of two terrorists, who were responsible 
for the terrorist attack on Highway 6, in June, 2003. In this terror attack, a young girl, 
named Noam Leibowitz, was murdered and three of her relatives were injured. The house 
of another wanted Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist, Tarek Ahmad A-Karim Hassin, who 
was also involved in this attack, was not demolished due to the fact that his relatives 
assisted in his arrest and the seizure of the weapon which was used.815 Despite examples 
like these, the effectiveness of this policy has started to decline. This was one of the 
issues that Brigadier General Ariyeh Shalev studied, when he wrote a book examining the 
effect house demolishing had on the level of violence during the first Intifada. He found 
that the number of violent events did not diminish following house demolitions, and at 
times even rose.816 This has contributed to doubts among defence officials and politicians 
whether or not this measure prevents terror attacks. In an interview with a senior defence 
establishment official, he said that: “in most cases, certainly where residents of the 
refugee camps are involved, our measures do not work. As for those who carry out the 
suicide attacks, the supply is greater than the demand.”817  
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On 17 February 2005, Shaul Mofaz, the former Israeli Minister of Defence, 
approved the recommendation of a military committee to end punitive demolitions of 
Palestinian houses. Moshe Yaalon, former IDF Chief of Staff, asked the committee to 
examine whether the practice accomplished its stated goal of deterring Palestinian 
involvement in attacks on Israelis. The committee found no proof of effective deterrence 
and they considered that the method was more likely to fuel hatred than serve as a 
deterrent.818 However, the Ministry did not exclude the re-introduction of the measure 
should the security situation become drastically worse.  
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6. 4 Selective killings  
 
Although there was a decline in selective killings after 1996, the method was 
nevertheless used as a tool by the Israelis, and its use in fact increased with the outbreak 
of the al-Aqsa Intifada. Between September 2000 and December 2002, 443 Israeli 
civilians were killed in terror attacks.819 This escalation quickly demanded a dramatic 
response from the Israeli government. The al-Aqsa Intifada had begun like the first 
Intifada; with large-scale clashes between Israeli soldiers with heavy military machinery 
and Palestinian rioters with stones in their hands. However, the second uprising, inspired 
by the Israeli withdrawal of southern Lebanon in May 2000 as a direct consequence of 
Hizballah’s tactics, quickly changed its modus operandi to that of a Lebanese-style 
guerrilla warfare. From the shelter of anonymity given by a crowded street, Palestinian 
gunmen and suicide bombers mounted attacks on soldiers and civilians alike. The IDF 
tried to break the Palestinian resistance by sending its troops in to suppress crowds of 
demonstrators. However, this led to the death of many Palestinians and resulted in some 
of the most disturbing media images of the uprising, which created a public relations 
disaster for Israel. The international community was clearly horrified. The UN Security 
Council, among other international institutions, were extremely critical of the IDF for its 
excessive use of force, a criticism that was based, in part, on the extensive media 
coverage of the region.820 In order to curb the violence, while simultaneously lowering 
the tone of criticism, the IDF re-adopted a policy of selective killings. In a media 
environment that allows the broadcast of military operations as they unfold, the selective 
killings policy promised fewer civilian casualties and less provocative video footage in 
comparison to the original response. Regardless of the attempt to improve the PR, the 
method of selective killings also resulted in strong international criticism of Israel which 
reinforced the international sympathy for the Palestinians.  
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Additionally, there was a domestic dispute over how to use the method. The 
military put pressure on the politicians to include several Palestinian Authority politicians 
on the target list, which lead to an argument in the Israeli Security cabinet.821 When 
Sharon was elected, he solved the situation by promising to continue pursuing the more 
restrained policy, while changing its strategic focus and allowing for an increase in the 
selective killings of the militant field commanders.822 In an attempt to install the policy of 
selecting killing with a degree of legitimacy, the Judge Advocate General of the IDF, 
Menachem Finkelstein, issued in February 2002 three conditions governing the use of the 
method. Firstly, the Palestinian Authority must ignore appeals for the arrest of the target. 
Secondly, the Israeli security services must conclude that it would be impossible to affect 
an arrest without the Palestinian Authority’s help. Thirdly, the killing must be carried out 
only to prevent an imminent or future terrorist attack and not out of revenge or as a 
reprisal.823 The Israeli High Court supported these conditions and on January 29 2002, 
the Court stated their opinion when they rejected calls for an end to the policy of selective 
killings.824 It seemed that the Israeli public agreed with the Court; a poll conducted in 
July 2002 by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University found 
that 70 percent of the Israelis that were questioned supported the policy of selective 
killings.825 Furthermore, in December 2006, the Israel Supreme Court rendered the 2002 
decision, effectively meaning that the Israeli security forces could continue carrying out 
selective killings on the condition that every incident was examined separately.826 
 
6. 4. 1 Incidences of selective killings and the aftermath  
 
During the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israeli military forces killed dozens of suspected 
terrorists 
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affiliated with Islamist terror organisations. The exact number of Palestinians that were 
assassinated varies depending on the source. According to the Journal of Palestine 
Studies, during the first four years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israelis assassinated a total 
of 273 individuals and killed an additional 170 bystanders during assassination 
attempts.827  The Israeli human rights organization, B’tselem reported that from 29 
September 2000 through to 14 March 2006, 338 Palestinians were killed, although only 
215 Palestinians were the actual targets of selective killing.828 According to the Journal of 
Palestine Studies, during the al-Aqsa Intifada, the IDF killed 119 Hamas members, 96 
affiliated with the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade or al-Fatah, 35 PIJ members and 23 from 
either the PFLP, PA intelligence or another affiliation.829 The UN’s Human Rights Watch 
estimated that in 2005, over 20 Palestinians were killed in selective killings.830  
 
Sheikh Salah Shahada, a founding member of Hamas, was one of those who Israel 
selected as a target during the al-Aqsa Intifada. In July 2002, Israel used an F-16 jet to 
drop a one-ton bomb on the apartment block where he was staying. Shahada was killed in 
the explosion, as were 15 other people including seven children, and more than 140 
people were injured and twelve houses were destroyed.831 With so many casualties, it 
clearly did break the intent of minimising ‘collective punishment’. This resulted in an 
international condemnation and a domestic outcry as 300, 000 Palestinians turned up for 
the funerals of the dead.832  
 
Yet the most famous case was probably the killing of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. First, Israel 
attempted to kill him in September 2003, when Israeli F-16’s dropped a quarter-ton bomb 
in the Gaza Strip. This incident was perceived to be retaliation for a Hamas attack on a 
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ship in the Israeli port of Ashdod. Hamas’ attack killed ten Israeli civilians, but was 
actually designed to kill several hundred more. The incident provoked the Israeli 
government into targeting all of Hamas’ leadership.833 On September 10 2003, only three 
days later, Israel also tried to kill Mahmud Zahar, who was a veteran Hamas member.834 
This time Israel bombed Zahar’s home, however, ended up killing his son and bodyguard 
instead. The Israelis were more successful in their efforts when they on March 22 2004, 
launched a Hellfire missile into the al-Sabra neighbourhood in Gaza City, 835  killing 
Sheikh Yassin and seven others as he was leaving a Gaza mosque after the early morning 
prayer.836 Three years earlier, he had commented on Israel’s selective killing policy 
stating that:” [If] I am killed there will arise a thousand like me.”837 Due to Hamas’ well 
structured organisations with clear rules on how to elect a new leader, his death did not 
impact Hamas’ operational capability in the short term. Yassin was replaced with Dr. 
Abd al-Aziz Rantisi only a few days later. Rantisi announced that Hamas had opened a 
special account with Israel, calling the selective killing of Yassin a declaration of war on 
Islam.838 However, Rantisi became Israel’s new victim of the selective killing measure 
and was killed on April 17 2004, when Israel fired seven rockets from an Apaches 
helicopter directed at his car. The revenge for Yassin’s death never came to pass. 
 
Despite having removed two important members of Hamas, the Israelis did not 
halt their selective killing policy, instead they aimed their efforts towards other members 
of Hamas, and even carried out operations abroad. In September 2004, Izz el-Deen al-
Sheikh Khalil was killed when a bomb ripped through his car in Damascus, where he had 
lived since his 1992 expulsion from Israel to Lebanon. Khalil was a senior Hamas 
operative in Damascus where he helped plan major suicide attacks in Israel and was 
responsible for smuggling arms into the Gaza Strip from Egypt. Although Israel never 
took responsibility, it was widely suspected that Mossad orchestrated it. Israel still 
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believes Hamas leaders operate freely in Syria. Deputy Defence Minister, Zev Boim, 
stated that “Syria is responsible for terrorism against Israel and will not be immune to our 
counter-terrorism activities”.839 Israel also turned their attention towards Adnan al-Ghoul, 
who, besides from being a bomb maker, supposedly was the leader of Hamas’ militant 
brigade, the ‘Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades’. He and his assistant Imad Abbas were both 
killed on October 21 2004, when an Israeli helicopter fired missiles at the car in which 
they were travelling.  
 
Arguably these killings were done on the basis of four considerations. Firstly, 
although this might result in an increase of terror acts, Hamas was already viewed as 
radical and Israel assessed that it could not become even more so. Secondly, by 
restricting the method of selective killings only to the lower or middle level operatives, it 
might give the Hamas leadership the impression that they were untouchable. Thirdly, 
Rantisi was considered to be the most significant opponent to the Palestinian Authority, 
thus his death would strengthen the Palestinian Authority vis-à-vis Hamas. Fourthly, it is 
believed that these assassinations were a political move by Sharon, who was on the verge 
of launching his ‘Gaza first’ pullout plan. The killings were intended to stop Palestinians 
from believing that Israel was acting out of weakness, to cripple Hamas’ operationally so 
that it could not use Gaza as staging area for attacks in Israel, and to ensure the potency 
of Israel’s military deterrent, even after withdrawal.  
 
6. 4. 2 Consequences and considerations  
 
Some critics believe that this method is a medicine much worse than the sickness. 
Andrew Silke points out that as long as the terror organisation enjoys local support and is 
viewed as their representative, the method of selective killings will not halt the use of 
terrorism. He argues that it is not that the killed individual is not important, but rather due 
to the boost of support and sympathy, which ultimately leads to an increase of 
motivation.  
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“When Israel kills Hamas members and imposes other sanctions on Palestinian 
communities, it increases the sense of perceived injustice –particularly in cases 
where there is high loss of innocent life- driving more recruits into extremist 
groups and facilitating increased sympathy and support for these groups not only 
within the West Bank and Gaza but further a field among the nations of the 
world.”840  
 
Ghassan Khatib, director of Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, seconds this 
and explains: “It is a harmful policy and will backfire. It doesn’t deter the people. The 
Israelis are just fuelling the Intifada.”841 In some ways they are right. These killings 
raised international attention and condemnation, as well as enforcing a hatred of the 
Israelis throughout the Middle East. Funeral marches in Gaza were an impressive, and 
staged, show of force by Hamas. According to a poll taken by the Palestinian Center for 
Research and Cultural Dialogue, after Yasin’s and Rantisi’s death, 31 percent of 
Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank would vote for Hamas, compared to only 27 
percent for Fatah, meaning Hamas was for the first time the most popular movement in 
the West Bank and Gaza.842   
 
The method of selective killings even influenced the Egyptian-led truce negations 
in November and December of 2002 between Fatah and Hamas. These talks resulted in a 
paper suggesting a unilateral truce (hudna) for one year on a trial basis. In return, it was 
asked that Israel declare an immediate end to its selective killings policy or at least 
commit to doing so if the terror attacks stopped. The Israelis, however, did not comply, 
which resulted in Hamas rejecting Egypt’s appeals to put military activities on hold, and 
instead the opposite happened as Hamas declared an intention to resume military action. 
Rantisi explained that a unilateral declaration to end military attacks “means a victory for 
Sharon’s brutal policies… [and] will be understood by Israel as a declaration of 
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defeat.”843 The termination of the selective killing method was also used as a prerequisite 
for a ceasefire, prior to the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit in February 2005.844 However, as a 
reaction to a suicide bombing in Netanya, and the rocket and mortar firing on Jewish 
targets inside Gaza in July 2005, Israel reassumed their selective killings and killed 
Hamas’ military commander Said Siyyam.845  
 
With the killings of Yasin and Rantisi, Hamas entered a new phase. The death of 
Rantisi was possibly the most serious loss, despite Sheikh Yasin’s great influence and 
prestige. Yasin was already ill and old and not expected to live long. Therefore, his death 
could even be considered a gain for Hamas, seeing as it sparked a negative reaction in the 
international community and influenced their view on the legitimacy of Hamas. On the 
other hand, by killing Rantisi, Hamas lost a skilful organiser, a leader, and a good 
speaker, who held an unquestioned legitimacy as being one of the original founders of 
Hamas.  
 
Following the attempted assassination on Rantisi, Hamas’ spokesman and head of 
the movement’s political leadership issued instructions to his activists not to travel in 
private cars, through fear of Israelis attempting to kill them in the process. “Injuring the 
mujahaddin became very easy for the Zionist adversary and its agents because of 
improper use of vehicles. In the past 26 hours Israel has succeeded in killing six activists 
from the Izzadin al-Kassam Brigade by targeting their cars.”846 Furthermore, Hamas, 
knew the value of being the man in the street, and took extra precautions as a result of the 
selective killings. They were less visible, constantly changing their whereabouts and 
routine and no longer so accessible to the media and those outside of their close circle.847 
Some Hamas members have even asked the Palestinian Authority to take them into 
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custody for their own safety.848 Hassan Youssef was one of the Hamas leaders who took 
many precautions due to the selective killing policy. He scheduled meetings at the last 
minute and held meetings in the back streets of Gaza. The window to his office usually 
faced into an interior courtyard, and he kept the window covered so Israeli helicopters 
could not fire missiles through the windows.849 
 
The constant killings of individuals representing the ‘old school’ also arguably 
paved the way for a new and younger generation of leaders. This generation grew up 
during the first Intifada, experienced the disappointment of the unfulfilled desires of the 
peace process and became active in the al-Aqsa Intifida. It is therefore not difficult to 
assume that the new leadership is more radicalised. At the same time, there is some 
evidence that the new generation is more pragmatic, since it has been involved in peace 
talks, as in for example Egypt, and has agreed to a ceasefire. It should not be assumed 
that the elements of radicalisation and pragmatism exclude one another. This combination 
is possible with Hamas’ ideology of tasber [sic] and da’wa.  
 
To the Israelis, the operational benefits from killing militant leaders are believed 
to outweigh the political cost of Palestinian and international outrage. The Israeli 
government spokesman at the time, Avi Pazner, commented in the aftermath of Sheikh 
Yasin’s and Rantisi’s killings: “By eliminating this threat to peace we will improve 
chances for a better Middle East. We are convinced that in a few days the situation will 
calm down.”850 The Israelis claimed that these selective killings had two particular 
effects; firstly, the media images of blown-out Israeli buses and dead civilians made the 
international community become more sympathetic towards the Israelis, rather than the 
Palestinians, and minimized the international criticism. Secondly, it is argued that the 
increase of terror attacks was only short term and selective killings are a highly effective 
pre-emptive method. There is nearly a consensus among Israel’s defence officials that 
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selective killings are the “most effective and least injurious way” to deter Palestinian 
terror attacks.851 Because there is not an unlimited pool of operatives and leaders, and 
once the know-how is eliminated, the organisation will be affected in the long run, 
regardless of a sudden and short term increase in terror acts. Israeli officials believe that 
selective killings have a particularly severe impact on tightly compartmentalised groups 
like Hamas, the elimination of key figures in the group’s hierarchy can throw its 
operations into chaos, as cells find themselves cut off from each other and are unable to 
re-establish contact: “There are no headquarters, files, computers, radio equipment or 
organizational memory […] removing one activist can handicap or destroy a cell.”852 
Such actions also reduce the initiative of the terrorist, making them defensive. Israeli 
Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, has explained: “The plan is to place the terrorist in varying 
situations every day and knock them off balance so that they will be busy protecting 
themselves.” 853 
 
Despite these arguments, an example from the past highlights the question of 
effectiveness, with the luxury of hindsight.  General Aharon Yariv, the originator of 
‘Operation Wrath of God’,854 gave this opinion:  
 
“I’m not sure that assassinating a leader here or there will bring us anywhere 
nearer to peace. But if it a clear case that by removing this personality you can 
deal a mortal blow to your enemy that will bring him to the table, that’s 
something else. But that doesn’t happen very often.”855  
 
It can be argued that even though ‘Operation Wrath of God’ did succeed in killing 
leaders, operational members and influential members of Black September and the PLO, 
it did not have a long term success. Despite the fact that terror attacks did drop and Black 
September after 1979 was not a force to be reckoned with, the situation did not improve 
in the long term. Instead Israel felt compelled to invade Lebanon twice, in the late 1970s 
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and early 1980s, in an effort to destroy the PLO and its bases.856 There were no signs of 
the PLO being deterred by the selective killing method used forcefully by the Israelis.  
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6. 5 Administrative detention  
 
 
The use of administrative detention saw a decrease from 1998 to 2001. This was 
probably due to the relatively low level of terror attacks in the same period. However, 
with the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada, and the increase in terror attacks, Israel once 
again used administrative detention as a tool to counter terrorism. When this method was 
re-introduced, little changes had been made with regard to why it was implemented, or in 
terms of how it was carried out. Due to the large extent that this method was used, the 
effect on Palestinian society and Hamas intensified, and apparently, the effects were of 
the same nature as those previously discussed in chapter 5. Therefore, in order not to 
repeat oneself, the aim of this section is not to analyse the effects on Palestinian society, 
but simply to provide an update on the few changes Israel has made regarding the 
implementation of administrative detention.   
 
An individual could either be detained as a consequence of a large sweep of 
arrests, or Israel would specifically detain one individual they deemed to pose a security 
threat. Prior to the al-Aqsa Intifada and the peace process, Israel would often use its 
undercover units to infiltrate villages and to arrest and question individuals. In this way, 
the Israelis were able to mingle with the Islamists and make more precise arrests. 
However, due to the peace process and the outbreak of the Intifada, such operations 
became increasingly difficult as Palestinians became more suspicious of individuals who 
did not fit into the fabric of Palestinian society. For example, there are speculations that 
the two Israelis who were lynched by an angry crowd in Ramallah on October 12, 2000, 
were indeed members of an elite undercover unit present to arrest Palestinian 
demonstrators.857 Israel had to adjust to the new security situation and change its tactics. 
With the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel started launching large-scale military 
operations into the West Bank and Gaza, and would arrest people using a fish-net 
method. An example of this was the ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ which was launched 
on March 29, 2002, in response to a terrorist attack during the Israel Passover holiday. 
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Israeli soldiers imposed curfews and moved from house to house looking for suspects. 
When it ended on April 21, over a period of one year 4,258 Palestinians had been placed 
under administrative detention.858 According to Defence Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, 
the information gained from the interrogation of these detainees helped Israel thwart 86 
percent of attempted bombings.859 Furthermore, during ‘Operation Defensive Shield’, 
Israel claimed to have arrested or killed all Hamas terrorists in the West Bank who had 
mastered the formula for making homemade explosives, which would have meant a 
serious blow to the organisation. Yet, Hamas bomb makers from Gaza soon infiltrated the 
West Bank and began producing explosives, revitalizing the organisation.860 Many of 
those detained as a result of this military operation were then released, and other 
individuals were detained as a consequence of ‘Operation Determined Path’, which was 




The Israelis have a policy of administrative detention in order to curtail terrorist 
attacks. The use of administrative detention was reduced significantly prior to the al-Aqsa 
Intifada, but was dramatically increased shortly afterwards. It has proven difficult to 
attain how many individuals have been detained and for how long. The fact that, due to 
the nature of the large-scale arrests, many are detained for a short period of time does not 
help. Therefore, if one is to look at the yearly statistics, it is not known whether or not 
these statistics include these variables. However, having said that, it is still useful to 
present some numbers, as these will indicate a trend. Until September 2000, the number 
of administrative detainees was four. By the end of 2000, this number became 17. 
Towards the end of 2001, there were 45 administrative detainees, and as previously 
mentioned, in October 2002 this number had dramatically decreased to 1,050. It seems 
that the number of detainees increased as the level of violence increased; by the end of 
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2004 there were over 850862 and Amnesty International reports that, as of March 14, 
2006, over 600 Palestinians were being administratively detained.863   
Some changes in the practice  
 
When Israel re-introduced this method during the al-Aqsa Intifada, it did so 
without any major changes. However, some changes have occurred, which include the 
number of days a detainee can be held before seeing a judge, the deportation of some 
detainees to Gaza, and the changing practise regarding visitation.  
 
Under Israeli military regulations a Palestinian can be detained for up to twelve 
days without the Israeli military informing the detainee of the reason for his/her arrest 
and without being brought before a judge. Military Order 1500, issued on 5 April 2002, 
increased this period of time to 18 days. Furthermore, the army is also not obliged to 
inform the detainee’s family of their arrest or the location of their detention.864 
 
A new practise regarding administrative detention was initiated during the al-Aqsa 
Intifada, which was connected to the expanded practise of the counter terrorism method 
of deportation. As previously explored, during the al-Aqsa Intifada Israel introduced the 
practise of deporting individuals to Gaza. At the end of 2003, 21 administrative detainees 
had been deported to Gaza. However, the extent of this practise is unclear. The 
deportations were called ‘assigned residences’ and were implemented through Israeli 
military regulations. Deportation, abroad or to another region of the West Bank or Gaza, 
following detention can be ordered as a result of either a military or High Court ruling or 
as a political compromise.865  
 
Additionally, Israel also changed its practise regarding visitation. Until the 
outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada, family visits to prisons took place without any particular 
                                                 
862 Addameer; “Administrative Detention”, www.addameer.org, accessed 15 April 2007. 
863 Amnesty International; “Administrative Detention”, www.amnesty.org, accessed 2 January 2007. 
864 Addameer; “Administrative Detention”, www.addameer.org, accessed 15 April 2007. 
865 Ibid. 
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difficulty or restriction. The difficulties began the month after the Intifada started, when 
Israel imposed many restrictions on movement, primarily in the West Bank. By the end 
of October, family visits had ceased completely. Although the possibility of visitation is 
slowly being loosened again, Israel has started imposing age restrictions, which differ 
from time to time. Until July 2005, Israel did not permit visits to prisoners by sons, 
daughters, brothers, and sisters who were between 16 and 35 years of age.866 This 
sweeping restriction was removed in January 2006, and requests by these persons are 
now handled in the special framework relating to “persons forbidden entry on security 
grounds.”867 Palestinian detainees are therefore isolated from the outside world and their 
families 
 There seems to be continued support for using administrative detention as a 
method in Israel’s counter terrorism policy. Meir Dagan, the director of Mossad, offered 
his view on the effectiveness of administrative detention:  
 
“I think there is no choice. It is not possible in the State of Israel to operate 
without administrative detention. It is one of the best tools that we have for 
making use of intelligence information without revealing it to the other side.”868 
 
 
Chief Staff of the IDF, Lipkin-Shahak seconds Meir Dagan’s view and states:  
 
“It is obvious to you that administrate detention prevents an attack, frustrates an 
attack. Therefore, I see it as effective and appropriate even today. But here too, it 
is necessary to talk about the appropriate degree.”869 
 
These statements refer to the destruction of the organisation as a consequence of having 
members placed in administrative detention, as well as the intelligence gained from the 
detainees which will lead to the decrease of the organisation’s capacity. However, as 
explored in chapter 5.6, the question is whether this decrease in short-term capacity is 
worth the strengthening of the Palestinians’ motivation for resistance in the long-term.  
 
                                                 
866 B’tselem; “Barred from Contact; Violation of the Right to Visit Palestinians Held in Israeli Prisons”, 
September 2006, www.btselem.org, accessed 15 April 2007. 
867 Ibid. 
868 Ganor, Boaz; The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle; A guide for decision makers, Transaction Publishers, 
London, 2007, p.222. 
869 Ibid. 
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6. 6 The fence 
 
The idea of a fence separating Israelis and Palestinians is, in some respects, an 
admission of failure, a product of a realization that terrorism cannot be eradicated. 
Additionally, the fact that it is being built, is a consequence of the end of a peace process 
which did not result in a final settlement. Israel has stated that the intention of building 
the fence is as a defensive action which is aimed at preventing terrorists from entering 
Israel proper. Furthermore, Israel emphasises that it is only meant as a temporary 
measure, and should not be interpreted as a permanent boarder between Israel and a 
sovereign Palestinian state. This is, however, precisely what the Palestinians fear will 
become the outcome of this measure. The fence also has other functions for the Israelis in 
addition to being a defensive action. There is also the issue of the settlement policy, 
securing that a future Israeli state is a Jewish state, and it also raises the question of a 
two-state solution. For the Palestinians, it severely limits their freedom of movement 
which again influences their economic development, weakens family ties and results in 
loss of land. All of these issues will be discussed in this section. Furthermore, this section 
will illustrate that the consequences the fence might have for Hamas are much the same 
as those resulting from the closure policy. However, seeing as the fence sparks the debate 
of the two-state solution, the position of Hamas will briefly be addressed in this context.  
 
Firstly, however, it is important to clarify what is meant by the term ‘fence’. In 
this thesis, the term ’fence’ should be understood as a generic term for a physical barrier 
that will assume different forms in different locations. In places where Jewish and 
Palestinian population centres are close to each other, it might be a high concrete wall 
that will not only prevent terrorist infiltration, but also give protection against light arms 
fire. In other places, it will be an electronic fence. The way this fence is constructed will 
be discussed after an introduction on how the idea of its construction initially came about.  
 
 
The idea of dividing Arabs from Jews is not a product of the al-Aqsa Intifada, 
however, it is an old idea that originated from the British government’s 1937 Peel 
Commission report on Palestine. A decade later, the 1947 UN partition resolution called 
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for the establishment of Arab and Jewish states in Palestine, linked by some form of 
economic union. However, in modern times, it was Yitzhak Rabin who was the 
intellectual father of the current fence. After the introduction of suicide bombers as a 
tactic, Rabin established the Shahal Commission in 1995. The purpose of the 
Commission was to discuss how to build a security barrier separating Israelis and 
Palestinians.870 A fence was constructed around Gaza to coincide with the handover of 
control to the Palestinians, under the Oslo Accords. However, the work of the 
Commission died with Rabin in November 1995. The notion of disengagement was 
revived, when Ehud Barak came to power in 1999. His campaign slogan was “We are 
here and they are there”.871 But, ironically, it was not until Sharon was elected that the 
building of the fence took place. Sharon was known to be committed to the settlement 
policy, and as such had long agreed with the settlers that a fence would create a de facto 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and would mean abandoning those settlements that 
ended up on the wrong side. However, in February 2002, after one year in office, Sharon 
declared his support for the barrier. Any resistance that existed in the government, was 
swept aside after twelve suicide attacks in the following month which left 80 killed.872 On 
April 14 2002, Sharon announced that the government had decided to establish “security 
buffers zones” between Israel and the Palestinian territories. Construction began two 




About three percent of the actual fence consists of concrete, as a physical barrier, 
a wall, whereas the rest of the construction is a chain-link fence equipped with 
monitoring sensors and surveillance equipment. This fence might cover an area of five 
kilometres in width and include physical obstacles, monitoring systems and security 
                                                 
870 Forgione, Fabio; “The Heaven Behind the Wall; A story of ‘security human rights violations”, 
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services kept on high alert. In areas where the construction of the fence is complete, 
military orders have created a buffer zone of 150- 200 metres on the Palestinian side in 
which new construction is prohibited.874 Passage into Israel is supposed to be only 
possible through check points. In May 2006, out of a projected total of 703 kilometres, 
362 kilometres of the Wall had been constructed and a further 88 kilometres was under 
construction.875  
                                                 
874 UN OCHA;  “Preliminary Analysis of the Humanitarian Implications of the April 2006 Barrier 
Projections,” 7 July 2006, www.ochaopt.org, Accessed 9 January 2007. 
875 Al-Haq; “The Wall in the West Bank”, www.alhaq.org, Accessed 8 February 2007. 
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Map 1: The black boarder indicates where the fence was completed in 2004 and 




The maps outlining the position of the fence surprised many, as they showed that 
the wall was not following the ‘Green Line’, the 1967 border between the West Bank and 
Israel.877 Instead, it deviates from this line in such a way that it encircles Palestinian 
                                                 
876 Israel Ministry of Forgein Affairs; “Security Fence”,  www, mfa.gov.il Accessed 14 February 2007.  
877 Al-Haq estimates that only 20 percent of the fence does follow the Green Line. Al-Haq; “The Wall in 
the West Bank”, www.alhaq.org, Accessed 8 February 2007. 
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towns and villages, cutting off communities and families from each other, separating 
farmers from their land and Palestinians from workplaces, education and health facilities 
and other essential services. The total route of the fence runs for some 700 km, twice the 
length of the Green Line, which is 320 km long.878 In some places the fence is built up to 
20 km east of the Green Line, and because much of the fence runs so far inside the West 
Bank, large areas of fertile farmland and whole Palestinian villages have become caged 
between the fence and the Green Line, in enclaves usually referred to as ‘seam zones’. In 
October 2003, they were declared as special military areas for an indefinite period of 
time. At the time, the area included about 9 Palestinian villages, populated by 5,200 
persons, and ten Israeli settlements, inhabited by 22, 000 settlers.879  Palestinians who 
live in these ‘seam zones’ now require permits, which are valid for a year, from the 
Israeli authorities, to continue to live in their homes.880 If this permit is not obtained, it 
means that the family lives in an illegal building which could be the target of house 
demolishing. Additionally, Palestinians living on either side of the fence must obtain 
Israeli permits to pass through a designated gate in the fence.881 According to the UN, as 
of September 2006, approximately 40 percent of applications were denied.882 As a 
consequence, the day to day life of Palestinians has been even further complicated, as 
their limited freedom of movement affects travelling to work, seeing family, access to 
heath facilities and schools.  Human rights organisation, al-Haq, confirms that there is an 
increasing tendency to grant permits only to registered land owners and their direct 
descendants. This results in the exclusion of most of the workforce in labour-intensive 
Palestinian agriculture. Furthermore, those who actually do obtain a permit, face several 
obstacles; the specific gate which the permit is intended for may be far away, have 
limited and irregular opening hours, and farm vehicles or tools are frequently not allowed 
to pass, severely restricting the movement of agricultural produce.883 As a result, more 
and more land in the ‘seam zone’ is not being cultivated. In accordance with the law 
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which applies in the West Bank, land not registered or cultivated for three consecutive 
years can be declared ‘state land’ and ultimately confiscated. According to al-Haq and 
Amnesty International, much of the land in the ‘seam zone’ has already been declared 
‘state land’ by the Israeli authorities.884 
 
6. 6. 1 The purpose of the fence – security or final border? 
 
Due to the fact that the fence is a physical barrier segregating Arabs who live in 
the West Bank from the Israel’s proper, there are concerns that Israel’s purpose of 
building this fence is not to enhance security, but rather to make ‘irreversible facts on the 
ground’ that would ultimately lead to a permanent boarder. Israel maintains that the 
construction of the barrier is a temporary measure with the main purpose of protecting the 
Israeli civilian population, in reaction to numerous suicide bombing attacks originating 
from the West Bank.  
 
During the al-Aqsa Intifada, it became clear that the bombers home was often in 
close proximity to the target. There are several examples of this; for instance, in the 
beginning of 2003, three individuals on separate occations went seven miles from 
Tulkarm in the West Bank to commit three murders in the Israeli town of Netanya, and 
on another occasion, seven individuals travelled two miles from Bethlehem to Jerusalem 
to murder eight others.885 Head of Boarder Police, Israel Yitzchak, spoke about the 
expectations this fence would fulfil: “With this fence, we’ll be able to stop 100 percent of 
terrorist infiltrations.”886 Many Israelis shared his optimistic calculation. An opinion poll 
in 2003 showed that 83 percent of Israelis were in favour of the construction of the fence, 
                                                 
884 Al-Haq; “The Wall in the West Bank”, www.alhaq.org, Accessed 8 February 2007 and Amnesty 
International; “Road to nowhere”, www.amnesty.org, Accessed 15 April 2007. 
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and 63 percent believed that the fence would significantly reduce terror.887 Those who are 
in favour point out that the fence around Gaza has been a successful preventative measure 
in the al-Aqsa Intifada. According to Avi Dicher, head of Shin Bet, not one suicide 
bomber has entered Israel from Gaza since the al-Aqsa Intifada.888 Many Israelis regard 
this as a proof that a fence can stop terrorism. And figures produced by the IDF confirm 
that the fence has been an effective defensive action which has not only deterred terrorist 
organisation from carrying out attacks, but also prevented attacks. In the course of the 11 
months that passed between August 2003 and the end of June 2004, the IDF reported a 
over a 90 percent drop in the number of terrorist attacks: an average of 26 terrorist attacks 
a year prior to the construction of the security fence, compared to three terrorist attacks a 
year after the security fence was constructed.889 Additionally, it was not only the number 
of attacks that had decreased, but also the fatalities; a drop of over 70 percent in the 
number of fatal casualties i.e. an average of 103 people killed a year prior to the 
construction of the security fence and the establishment of the buffer zone, compared to 






                                                 
887 The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research; “Peace index –the fence”, www.tau.ac.il/peace/, 
Accessed 8 February 2007. 
888 Baskin, Geershon; “Walls and Fences: Consequences for Israel and Palestine”, Palestine-Israel Journal 
of Politics, Economics and Culture, Vol. 9, Issue 3, 2002. 
889 Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies; “The Security Fence 
and the Buffer Zone as a Successful Obstacle to Terrorism”, July 2004, www.terrorism-info.org.il, 
Accessed 9 February 2007. 
890 Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies; “The Security Fence 
and the Buffer Zone as a Successful Obstacle to Terrorism”, July 2004, www.terrorism-info.org.il, 


















































































































































Effectiveness of the Fence
The fence substantially improves the ability of the Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF) to prevent the infiltration of terrorists and criminal elements into Israel.
IDF presence in PA, 
Fence construction begins
 
One conclusion that can be interpreted from this figure is that the fence is most effective 
in intercepting terror attacks, however, the number of incidents where the IDF managed 
to intercept is high showing that the fence did not discourage the terror organisation from 
wanting to carry out operations. In contrast, Israel managed to raise the barrier so high 
that the terror organisations no longer had the capacity to penetrate the fence. The fact 
that the security forces managed to intercept these suicide bombers, means that the 
terrorists are usually arrested and thus there is the opportunity to interrogate them in order 
to learn more about their organisations, which again could lead to more arrests, 
confiscation of weapons and perhaps ultimately, to a future reduction in their capacity. 
Furthermore, it dramatically reduces the Palestinians’ advantage in the media war. The 
construction of the fence, contributes to the end of televised pictures of Israelis fighting 
terrorists on the West Bank with tanks and helicopter gunships, which gave sympathy for 
the Palestinians.  
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One way for Hamas to continue sending suicide bombers through the fence into 
Israel, is to rely on women to smuggle explosives or become suicide bombers themselves. 
Although, this has been done in the past, it is not an unproblematical approach, as it 
challenges a religious and cultural view, and by doing so it risks public support. Other 
ways in which Hamas could continue their military resistance activity, is to recruit Israeli 
Arabs to be suicide bombers, although this scenario does not solve the problem of how 
they would obtain the explosives. It is possible that the reason the fence has lead to a   
reduction in suicide attacks, is that Hamas has chosen to change its modus operandi to, 
for example, using mortars and Qassam rockets. The Qassam is designed to fly over the 
barrier and strike Israeli targets on the other side. The Qassams were first fired at Israeli 
civilian targets in October 2001, however, due to their short range, all landed inside the 
Gaza Strip. But Hamas managed to improve their rockets and the first Qassam to land in 
Israeli territory was launched on February 10, 2002, and on March 5, 2002, the Qassam 
struck for the first time an Israeli city –Sderot. Reportedly, the total number of Qassam 
rockets launched exceeded 1, 000 by June 9 2006.892 
 
 
Despite the statistics supporting that the fence significantly reduces acts of 
terrorism, the Palestinians have different views on the purpose of the fence. Essentially, 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains a dispute about land. The Palestinian position on  
the border issue is simple: the international borders between the states of Palestine and 
Israel shall be the armistice cease-fire lines, in effect on June 4, 1967. The Palestinians 
fear that this security measure is simply a method to create ‘facts on the ground’ with 
which Israel can bargain should it again enter negotiations to resolve its conflict with the 
Palestinians, and the Palestinians argue that the route of the fence just proves this point. 
Israel is moving the fence to include several West Bank settlements and other areas the 
Israeli army wants to patrol. The construction of the fence did spur a political debate in 
Israel on the futility of retaining remote settlements in the West Bank. Sharon did 
indicate he would make concessions and evacuate certain settlements in the West Bank. 
A list of 17 settlements to be evacuated was published in the Israeli press, but these 
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settlements were smaller, isolated ones. 893 Even so, Israel did unilaterally withdraw 
settlers from Gaza as part of the disengagement plan, as well as small areas of the 
northern West Bank, amounting to around 8, 500 settlers or almost two percent of the 
entire settler population. Nevertheless, settlers continue to move into the West Bank, 
which in 2006 contained approximately 445, 000 settlers, resulting in an increase in the 
total number of settlers after July 2004.894 
 
Palestinians also made the point that a fence that costs so much to build, it is 
estimated that about $1, 5 billion has been allocated for the first two stages of the 
project,895 cannot be a temporary fence, and because of the route it follows, creates a 
permanent boarder. However, the Israelis upheld their position by arguing two aspects; 
firstly, since Israel does not agree with the status of the ‘Green Line’ as the borderline 
between Israel and Palestine in a future two state solution, but rather argues that borders 
have still to be negotiated in future peace agreements, the route of the barrier 
consequently does not violate any Israeli obligations.896 Secondly, even if the ‘Green 
Line’ served as the borderline between the two future Israeli and Palestinian states, the 
route of the barrier would not constitute a political statement of Israel’s future territorial 
claims, since the barrier is solely built for security reasons and the route defined on this 
basis, and not for political reasons. Furthermore, if the ‘Green Line’ were the route of the 
barrier, it would in fact be politically motivated.897  
 
The two-state solution 
 
Although Israel states that the fence is temporary, and not a political fence, many 
of the Israelis in favour of the fence have interpreted the barrier as an act of recognition 
by Israel, that a two-state solution is inevitable. The concept of the two-state solution was 
re-introduced at the start of the peace process, however, no final agreement has been 
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reached during these negotiations. Although the concept is widely supported in Israel, a 
poll showed that 78 percent of Israelis are in favour,898 others in Israel oppose it, 
especially members of the political extreme right wing. Their view is that Israel should 
consist of the biblical Israel, which includes parts of Syria, the West Bank and Gaza, and 
believe that only when Jews rule over this land, the Messiah will return. Nevertheless, 
annexing the West Bank and Gaza is not an option that the right wing embraces either, 
because this would result in a enormous demographical shift, which ultimately could 
result in Israel no longer being a Jewish state. Therefore, one could argue that apart from 
security, demography has been the second most important factor contributing to Israeli 
support for the fence. More and more Israelis have started to realize that if partition does 
not happen soon, within a decade Jews will be a minority in a de facto bi-national state. 
Before Ehud Olmert became Prime Minister, he stated:  
 
“There is no doubt in my mind that very soon the government of Israel is going to 
have to address the demographic issue with the utmost seriousness and resolve. 
More and more Palestinians are uninterested in a negotiated two-state solution, 
because they want to change the essence of the conflict from a struggle against 
‘occupation’ in their parlance, to a struggle for one-man-one-vote. That is, of 
course, a much cleaner struggle, a much more popular struggle –and ultimately a 
much more powerful one. For us, it would mean the end of the Jewish state.”899  
 
To remain Jewish and democratic, Israel needs to avoid absorbing areas or population 
groups that will undermine its Jewish majority. Despite the million immigrants who came 
to Israel from the former Soviet Union in the last decade, and despite government 
subsidies that encourage ultra-Orthodox Jews to have more children, the percentage of 
Jews among Israeli citizens dropped from 82 percent in 1985 to 78 in 2000, amounting to 
3,8 million in 1985 and 4,9 million.900  In contrast, there are today more than eight 
million Palestinians in Greater Palestine; 1,4 million in Israel, 1,4 million in Gaza, 2,4 
million in the West Bank and 3,6 million in Jordan. In 30 years or so, they will double to 
16 million, not counting the relatively large concentrations of refugees in Lebanon and 
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Syria.901 The idea of disengagement from Gaza and the limited withdrawal from the West 
Bank were efforts to halt the development towards bi-nationalism. It became clear during 
the 17th Knesset election, held on March 28 2006, that the majority of Israeli leaders and 
the public preferred Israel to be an ethnic-Jewish state, even at the cost of withdrawing 
from parts of the West Bank and Gaza.902 The disengagement suggested that the 
Palestinians were now free to construct their state on the territory from which the Israelis 
had withdrawn.  
 
On 8 March 2006, two weeks before the Israeli general election, then Acting 
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, stated that “the course of the fence - which until now 
has been a security fence - will be in line with the new course of the permanent 
border.”903 Then Justice Minister Tzipi Livni said in November 2005 that the separation 
fence would serve as “the future border of the state of Israel.”904 These clear statements 
by the two top officials in the current Israeli government demonstrated their intent to 
bring Israel’s border in line with the fence.   
 
The PLO has since 1988 accepted the concept of a two-state solution, and this 
became clear with the signing of the Oslo Accords. However, Hamas’ approach was 
different; Hamas’ Charter implies an outright rejection of the very idea of a two-state 
solution.905 The Charter presents a “historic” vision with the goal of total liberation of 
Mandatory Palestine, but in practise it has implicitly accepted the goal of a two-state 
solution, to be reached by negations, in keeping with the UN resolutions. If such a 
solution cannot be reached, Hamas has long maintained its only option is “resistance 
against occupation until liberation.” Hamas co-founder, Ismail Abu Shanab, has even 
admitted that: “we cannot destroy Israel. The practical solution is for us to have a state 
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alongside Israel.”906 But Hamas refrains from declaring any short-term strategy, which is 
why Hamas was opposed to the Oslo peace process.  
 
In June 2006, all the Palestinian organizations, except Islamic Jihad, signed a 
document calling for a political settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on the 
creation of a Palestinian state beside the state of Israel. The document restricted the area 
of armed resistance to the West Bank and Gaza only, and left the question of official 
recognition of the state of Israel unanswered. It appears to be a decision which enjoys 
public support. According to a 2006 poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media & 
Communication Centre in the West Bank and Gaza, “46, 6 percent of respondents favour 
a two-state solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict.”907 But what kind of state can this 
become for the Palestinians? These areas are subjected to high rates of unemployment, 
poverty, economic stagnations and highly restricted freedom of movement of goods and 
people, which the Israeli counter-terrorism method has significantly contributed to.   
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7. Have these sets of counter-terrorism methods 
worked? 
 





Unlike conventional warfare, a decisive victory in the fight against terrorism is 
rare. Therefore it might be difficult to ask the true purpose of counter terrorism, and  
assessing the effectiveness of a country’s counter terrorism procedure becomes a 
challenge.  Is it considered a success when the number of terror attacks decline? Is it still 
considered a success when the number of terror attacks increases the following year? Or 
when the lethality of each attack drops? Is it a success when the Israeli public fears 
terrorism less then before? Or is it when terrorism no longer is regarded by the 
Palestinian public as a legitimate method to achieve political goals? When addressing if 
the counter terrorism methods explored in this thesis have been successful or not, it is 
insufficient to merely consider the drops in the number of terror attacks. Although this 
type of quantitative indicator is useful, qualitative indicators will also be considered in 
this thesis in to try to show the bigger picture. These factors combined will give an 
indication as to whether Israel’s counter terrorism policy results in an effective counter 
terrorism equation.   
 
There are several quantitative indicators that expose the effectiveness of a counter 
terrorism method. The reduction in a terrorist organisation’s capacity can be broken down 
in several indicators; the freedom of movement, how well organised they are, how 
resilient they are to the loss of a leader, their ability to recruit and train new members, 
how well they adapt to counter measures and their ability to obtain financial means and 
weapons. However, ultimately a reduction in one of these abilities will be reflected in 
their capability to carry out attacks in the long term. Therefore in this thesis, the main 
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criterion within the quantitative indicator that will be assessed, is the overall number of 
terrorist incidents. Hereunder, in order to capture the asymmetry of terror attacks, 
reductions or increases in the lethality of the attacks will also be assessed, as this might 
indicate the extent of the terrorist organisation’s capacity.  
 
In addition to these quantitative indicators, there are several qualitative indicators 
which expose the effectiveness of counter terrorism methods. These include the morale of 
the people suffering from terrorism, decisions of terrorists to alter their modus operandi, 
decisions to alter their targets, the degree of willingness to pursue methods other than 
terrorism, the level of motivation and degree of local support for the terror organisation 
and the morale within the terrorist group. This thesis will focus on three indicators, to 
assess their effectiveness as counter terrorism methods; Hamas’ decision to alter its 
modus operandi, its change of the operational theatre, and the battle over hearts and 
minds. With respect to the latter, the Israeli public’s attitude towards terrorism and the 
peace process will be explored and degree of local support for Hamas amongst the 
Palestinians and their attitude towards the peace process in general.  
 
Finally, this chapter will attempt to draw a conclusion as to whether the Israelis 
have been successful or unsuccessful with their counterterrorism efforts according to the 
quantitative and qualitative indicators. 
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7. 1 Quantitative indicators of effectiveness  
 
Intuitively, quantitative indicators are a logical method of determining whether or 
not terrorist incidents have increased or decreased, and are an initial source of 
information to determine whether or not counterterrorist measures have been successful. 
Quantitative indicators can be used to measure counterterrorism’s effectiveness using a 
time-series analysis.909 The logic of this approach is simple, and stems from the idea that 
the main goal of a counter terrorism policy is to reduce the amount of terror violence. 
Therefore, if the level of terrorist activity is plotted over time and against a particular 
policy indicator, it should be possible to decide whether the policy is, or is not, effective.  
 
 This method, however, relies heavily on statistics, which presents several 
challenges. In general there will always be issues regarding the availability and quality of 
the data, but this becomes even more apparent in social sciences with respect to 
measuring human behaviour and cause and effect. Statistics are more difficult to use for 
illustrating changes in human intentions, feelings or wishes. Furthermore, statistics do not 
take into account other social issues, such as political mood, ideology, resentment and 
hatred. Therefore it is more problematic measuring effectiveness of the counter terrorism 
methods by merely relying on statistics. A successful counter terrorism policy results not 
only in a reduction of the number of incidents or fatalities, it can also be measured using 
other parameters such as fluctuations in local support, or changes in morale amongst the 
terrorist- targeted public, the operational theatre and so forth. These indicators are more 
qualitative and harder to generate statistics from. However, when a quantitative method is 
used carefully, without drawing unqualified conclusions, and combined together with a 
qualitative method, it can give an indication of whether a counter terrorism policy is 
effective or not.  
 
                                                 
909 For an example of this method see Hewitt, Christopher; The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Politics, 
University Press of America, Lanham, 1984.  
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This section will rely on statistics from the MIPT Terrorism Knowledgebase. 
MIPT integrates data from the RAND Terrorism Chronology and RAND-MIPT 
Terrorism Incident databases; the Terrorism Indictment database; and DFI International’s 
research on terrorist organisations. There are two reasons for only including statistics 
from MIPT here; firstly, it is relative easy to explore how they have solved the challenges 
mentioned above, as their definitions are stated on the website, and secondly, there is the 
obvious advantage that the numbers originate from a single source.  
 
It is important to be aware of the methodogical challenges that arise when using 
these statistics. First of all, there must be clear definitions, of for example, terrorism, 
terrorist groups and the constitution of a terrorist attack. Furthermore, how should acts 
that no one has claimed responsibility for be classified? Also, as mentioned in the 
introduction, terrorist organisations often behave in a ‘non-linear’ fashion. This means 
that time-series data alone might give a skewed picture of the effectiveness of a counter-
terrorism method, in that there are fewer ways of controlling for the influence of other 
factors. Another problem is that it is impossible to know how many incidents were 
actually stopped by Israelis before the incidents took place. For instance, the Israelis may 
have thwarted a greater number of incidents in 2005 than in 2004, although the total 
number of incidents in 2005 increased. Moreover, the data on attempted and thwarted 
terror attacks is limited, and thus it is difficult to obtain a correct picture.910 Despite these 
shortcomings, examining the quantitative indicators can reveal interesting trends, some of 




                                                 
910 As an example, from September 2000 through May 2004 there were 274 attempted terrorist attacks, out 
of which only 142 bombs actually blew up. The remaining 132 bombers were captured by Israeli security 
personnel before they acted. Kimhi, Shaul and Shemuel Evan; “Who are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?” 
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, no. 4, 2004. 
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Overall Level of Terrorist Incidents 
 
When trying to determine if a counter terrorism policy has been successful, it is 
natural to turn to statistics in order to see if the amount of terror incidences has decreased 
over time. If this is the case, it is tempting to conclude that the counter terrorism policies 
have been successful. In this respect, there have been ‘ebbs and flows’ in the number of 
general terrorist attacks from 1992 through to 2006.  
 
Figure 8: Terror incidents in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza, 1987-2006:
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When commenting on this development, it is important to remember there are many 
different kinds of groups responsible which have contributed to this development. 
However, seeing as Hamas is the main focus of this thesis, it is useful to isolate the 
incidences Hamas has been responsible for. 
 
Figure 9: Incidents by Hamas, 1989-2006:
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These incidents also include suicide bombers, but if the suicide bombers are separated 
from the data, the curve looks as follows: 
 


















                                                 




These statistics give several pieces of information. Firstly, it is possible to see 
when the amount of incidents reached its high. During the years of the peace process, the 
years 1994 and 1998 stand out, in which the number of incidents were 24 and 20 
respectively. However, it is not until the al-Aqsa Intifada, that a sharp increase of 
incidents is apparent, with a peak in 2002 with 108 incidents and in 2006 with 414. It is 
also worth noting that the level of violence during the al-Aqsa Intifada was much higher 
than during the first Intifada (1987-1993). The first Intifada had a total number of 154 
incidents, with an average of 22 incidents a year. In contrast, during the al-Aqsa Intifada 
through to the end of 2006, the total number of incidents is 803, with an average of nearly 
115 incidents a year. This verifies that the level of violence was significantly higher 
during the al-Aqsa Intifada years. This data alone suggests the following; that either the 
Israelis altered their counter terrorism policy in 2000/2001 and the change was not as 
successful as the previous counter terrorism policy, or that the counter terrorism policy 
during the peace process years was not successful in the long term.   
 
Secondly, by purely evaluating the number of terrorist incidents, year by year, it 
appears that the terror incidents dropped as the signing of the Oslo Accords approached. 
This development could indicate that the Israeli counter terrorism methods were much 
more successful in 1993 than in the previous years. However, with 24 incidences in 1994, 
13 of which Hamas was responsible for, 1994 was one of the most violent years in that 
timeframe. This development suggests that despite the success of Israel’s counter 
terrorism in 1993, it did not decrease the terrorist organisations capacity in the long run. 
It was during this period Israel introduced measures like the permit system, the closure 
policy and demolishing houses belonging to the family of suicide bombers, and by the 
end of 1993, most of the 415 deported Islamist had returned. However, it is also likely 
that the counter terrorism methods used in 1993 did not prove to be effective against 
suicide bombings, which were introduced as a common modus operadi in 1994.  
 
Thirdly, it is also notable that the second highest peak of incidences during the 
peace process years came after a relatively long period of few incidences. This period 
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ended in 1998, when there were a total of 20 incidences, of which Hamas was responsible 
for three. These statistics alone indicate that Israel’s counter terrorism measures which 
were introduced in 1996 and continued in 1997, managed to reduce the terrorist 
organisation’s capacity throughout 1997.  
 
Fourthly, the curve clearly shows that it was not until the outbreak of the al-Aqsa 
Intifada that the number of incidences significantly rose and reached its first peak in 
2002, with 108 incidences, Hamas was responsible for 34 of those. Israel responded in 
the same year by carrying out two large scale military operations, ‘Operation Defensive 
Shield’ and ‘Operation Determined Path’ which led to the siege of large areas of the West 
Bank. The year 2002 was also the year when Israel re-introduced the selective killings 
measure and deportation, and increased its use of administrative detention, in addition to 
the initial construction of the fence. According to the numbers, these counter terrorism 
methods seemed to have been successful, as the violence started to drop in 2003 and were 
at an all time low in 2004, with the numbers of incidences in Israel at 27. However, these 
measures did not seem to have a long lasting effect as the number of incidences increased 
again and reached an all time high in 2006, with the number of incidences in Israel was 
414.  
 
Fifthly, it is interesting that Hamas has at times played the leading role in the 
development of terror incidences, but at other times has been more moderate. In 1994, 
1995, 1996 and 1997, Hamas was responsible for around half of the attacks in Israel, 
suggesting they were at the forefront of the fight against Israel. However, in 1998, the 
year when Israel experienced a peak with 20 terror incidences, and in 1999 and 2000 had 
14 and 19 incidences respectively, Hamas’ activity was very moderate; carrying out 
respectively three, one and no attacks. Throughout 2001-2003, Hamas did not play the 
major role, although they were definitely active. This changed to some extent in 2004 and 
2005, when Hamas again strengthened its position by carrying out 209 and 183 terror 
attacks respectively in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as in Israel. This changed 
drastically in 2006, the year they won the election, when they were responsible for 36 of 
the 440 attacks which took place in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel. This shift indicates 
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that Israel’s counter terrorism measures were very effective against Hamas throughout 
1998-2000, had a moderate effect throughout 2001-2003, and were ineffective in 2004-
2005, only to become very successful again in 2006. On the other hand, the periods when 
Hamas is more moderate coincide with instability and Hamas needing to re-evaluate its 
strategy, especially after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada. Therefore the lull in terror 
attacks does not necessary reflect an effective counter terrorism policy, but rather the 
need for assessing internal strategies.  
 
Finally, the data suggest that suicide bombings were the main modus operandi 
during the peace process years. This changed in 1998, when only one out of the 20 
incidences was a suicide attack out. From then on, despite the increase of suicide 
bombers in 2001-2003, this was not the main modus operandi. Furthermore, it is 
interesting to see that during the peace process it was Hamas who was responsible for 
most of the suicide attacks, and that this changed during 2001-2003. It is difficult to draw 
any conclusions about the effectiveness of counter terrorism methods against ’suicide 
bombing’ as a method. However, in 2002 there were 42 suicide bombers and the 
following year this was reduced by more than 50 percent, and in 2004 the number was 
again reduced by half.914 This could suggest that the counter terrorism measures which 
were especially intended to counter suicide bombers, such as the building of the fence 
which started in 2002, the demolishing of houses belonging to the families of suicide 
bombers and the deportation which was re-introduced in 2002, were successful and had a 
long term effect.  
 
Injuries and Fatalities 
 
A second quantitative indication of whether a counter terrorism strategy or policy 
has proven successful or not, is a decline in the number of casualties and deaths due to 
                                                 
914 In 2003 the number of suicide bombers were 16 and in 2004 the number was 7. MIPT Terrorism 
Knowledgebase, www.tkb.org, Accessed 24 April 2007. 
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terrorist incidents. Using the same data as in figure 8, but presenting only the numbers of 
injured and the fatalities in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, the curve looks as follows: 
 


















































In this context, it is also useful to present the data which demonstrate the number of 




                                                 
915 MIPT Terrorism Knowledgebase, www.tkb.org, Accessed 24 April 2007 
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There are several observations that can be made from these statistics. Firstly, the 
years during which the terrorism was most deadly can be determined. During the years of 
the peace process, it was 1994 and 1996 that were most deadly as 67 and 65 individuals 
were killed respectively, based on the number of fatalities within Israel. During the al-
Aqsa years, the year 2002 was worst, with 329 individuals killed. With respect to 
fatalities inside the West Bank and Gaza during the peace process years, the year 1994 
clearly stands out with 40 individuals killed. During the al-Aqsa years, it was the year 
2002 that had the most fatalities with 209 individuals killed. By simply considering this 
data, it seems that the counter terrorism measures were much more effective during the 
peace process years. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that 1994 and 2002 were the 
most deadly years in both areas. This can either indicate that there were many incidents in 
Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza during these years, or that the capacity of the 
terrorist organisation was particular strong during those years, either due to increased 
support or due to a lack of effective counter terrorism measures. It is also interesting that 
the years which were most deadly were also the years when the numbers of incidents 
were at their highest. Additionally, with respect to Israel’s counter terrorism measures, it 
was precisely in 1994 that suicide terrorism was introduced as a common modus 
operandi, which clearly represented a challenge for Israel, and it took a while to counter it 
                                                 
916 MIPT Terrorism Knowledgebase, www.tkb.org, Accessed 24 April 2007 
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effectively. 2002 was the year in which Israel launched an extensive counter terrorism 
policy, which naturally would have taken time in order to have an effect.  
 
Secondly, the number of fatalities should be viewed in connection with the 
number of suicide bombers. By doing this, it would seem that the years 1994-1996 had 
the highest rate of suicide bombers during the peace process years, and 2002 in the al-
Aqsa Intifada years. It is therefore also possible that the high fatality rate is connected to 
whether suicide bombers were used or not as a modus operandi.  
 
Thirdly, it is worth mentioning that during the peace process years, it was in 1994 
and 1996 that Hamas was at its most deadly, killing respectively 61 and 60 individuals. 
During the al-Aqsa Intifada years, Hamas caused the highest number of fatalities in 2002, 
by killing 185 individuals. This corresponds with the general trend, as the highest 
numbers of fatalities were in 1994, 1996 and 2002. Additionally, 2002 was a peak year 
with respect to the incidents of suicide bombers that Hamas were responsible for, i.e. 
eleven suicide bomber operations. Furthermore, the year 1994 in which Hamas was at its 
most deadly, also corresponds with the fact that the number of incidents peaked in this 
year. However, this was not the case in the years 1996 and 2002, meaning that in these 
particular years, Hamas carried out fewer attacks, but these were much more deadly. This 
indicates that although the counter terrorism methods were successful in decreasing the 
number of terror attacks, they were in fact more deadly. This example illustrates the 
challenges in answering whether a counter terrorism policy is successful or not, as it will 
depend on how, as in this case, Israel defines success.  
 
Fourthly, the data show that the years with the highest number of injuries inside 
Israel were 1997 during the peace process years, and 2002 during the al-Aqsa Intifada 
years, when 442 and 1, 498 individuals were injured respectively. Inside the West Bank 
and Gaza, most people were injured was 1994 and 2002, closely followed by the year 
2005, when 256, 330 and 302 individuals were injured respectively. The peak in 2002 is 
not so surprising, considering this was also the year with the highest number of fatalities 
and the year with the highest number of incidents. However, 1997 is perhaps more 
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interesting. The peak of total number of injuries corresponds with the years in which 
Hamas caused the highest number of injuries. In 1997 and 2002, Hamas injured 428 and 
612 individuals respectively. Again, it is the year 1997 that is the odd one out, since it 
does not correspond with the most deadly years i.e. 1994, 1996 and 2002, nor the years 
during which they carried out the highest number of incidents, i.e. 1994 and 2004. A 
possible explanation for this is that the terrorist organisation consciously decided to 
continue spreading fear, but realised they could achieve this without killing quite so many 
individuals. Perhaps a more likely reason is that despite the decline in its capability, the 
terrorist organisation wanted to carry out terror attacks even though it knew that its 
bombs were not as powerful. If this was the case, it means that the counter terrorism 
methods indeed managed to reduce the capability of the terrorists.   
 
Finally, a decline in the number of injuries or fatalities will not necessarily 
correspond with a decline in the overall number of terrorist incidents, as one incident may 
injure a wide number of individuals. For this reason, in order to assess the effectiveness 
of counter terrorism, it is important to look at “the number of deaths related to the 
number of incidents.”917 Using that approach, there is a remarkable decline in the average 
number of fatalities per terrorist incident in Israel from 2001 through to 2005. The ratio 
of fatalities to incidents for each of the major terrorist organisations peaked in 2002, and 
each declined significantly in the years following, despite increases in the number of 
incidents during the same period. This data suggests that Israel have not only been 
successful in countering the volume of attacks, but that they may have been able to thwart 
the effectiveness of the attacks, which again indicates that they have succeeded in 
reducing the terror organisation’s overall capability.  
                                                 
917 Bonner, David; “United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism”, Terrorism and 
Political Violence, Vol. 4, no. 4, 1992, p.200. 
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7. 2 Qualitative indicators of effectiveness  
 
A second method of analysing a nation’s counter terror measures is the 
assessment of their qualitative effectiveness. Due to the very nature of these types of 
indicators, they are difficult to quantify. The quantitative indicators give information on 
the effectiveness of counter terrorism in the light of statistics. However, the counter 
terrorism policy might have other consequences for a terrorist organisation that will not 
be illustrated in this data, hence it is useful to assess both the quantitative indicators 
together with the qualitative indicators. As mentioned previously (chapter 7.1), three 
indicators will therefore be examined here to assess the effectiveness of counter terrorism 
methods; Hamas’ decision to alter their modus operandi, its change of the conflict 
theatre, and the battle over hearts and minds. This last indicator will reveal the Israeli 
public’s attitude towards terrorism and the peace process, and finally the level of 
motivation and degree of local support for Hamas amongst the Palestinians in general.  
 
Alterations in the modus operandi 
 
One method of evaluating how counter terror measures have had an impact on an 
organisation is to look for alterations in terrorist modus operandi. However, before 
drawing any conclusions, it is important to realise that a terrorist organisation changes its 
tactics for many different reasons. The change of tactics can be influenced by both 
internal and external factors. Internal factors might for example include a political shift 
within the organisation. The members of the organisation may calculate that in order to 
obtain their goals, they need to shift their tactics, whether it is a temporary change or a 
lasting one. This could involve increasing their level of violence (i.e. suicide bombers) or 
reducing it (i.e. an end to the use of bombs), depending on how the organisation reads 
into the political situation and what they want to achieve. Such change can also be as a 
result of a self confined ceasefire, or as a result of internal de-moralisation. The external 
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factors that might result in a change of modus operandi include pressure from the local 
population that the organisation supposedly represents, an agreed ceasefire with the 
‘enemy’, or a change of the organisation’s capacity in that it has been either weakened or 
strengthened.  
 




































As illustrated in figure 13, Hamas started using armed attacks as its main tactic, 
however by 1994 this was replaced by suicide bombing. According to the statistics, this 
could imply the following; that either Hamas did not have the intention of carrying out 
suicide bombings during 1991-1994, or that Israel’s counter terrorism policy was very 
                                                 
918 MIPT Terrorism Knowledgebase, www.tkb.org, Accessed 24 April 2007 
919 MIPT Terrorism Knowledgebase, www.tkb.org, Accessed 24 April 2007 
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effective in countering suicide bombings, but less effective at hindering armed attacks. 
However, when combed with the knowledge of Hamas as an organisation,920 the main 
reason why armed attacks were used as a tactic is that the organisation did not have the 
intention nor the capacity to conduct suicide bombing on a large scale before 1994.  
 
In general, it is interesting that Hamas used kidnapping as a modus operandi in 
1992-1994, but did not use this tactic again until 2001 and 2005. Kidnapping can require 
a larger organisational structure and a strong codex of secrets, in order to hold the 
individual captive for a longer period of time. Additionally, when using kidnapping the 
organisation balances on a fine line between receiving support from the local community 
or in contrast condemnation, by the simple fact that it is easier to identify and sympathise 
with one single person. Not to mention the fact that the pressure from the international 
community and the Israeli government becomes stronger for the same reasons. The aim 
of kidnapping has often been to secure the release of Israeli prisoners, and it might be that 
Hamas has managed to obtain that goal by using other means.   
 
During the peace process, the overall use of bombing as a modus operandi was 
quite low, however, this tactic became more popular with the outbreak of the al-Aqsa 
Intifada and its use dramatically increased in 2004 and 2005. This could indicate that 
bombings as a tactic were successful. It could also be an indication that the other methods 
were costly, or difficult to implement, or that the Israelis became successful at thwarting 
armed attacks, assassinations and kidnappings, but were less successful at stopping 
bombings.  
 
The change in tactics indicates organisational adaptation or adjustments, and the 
range of the various tactics is in itself a testament to the capability of Hamas. It also 
shows the diverse number of tactics the counter terrorism policy is faced with. 
 
                                                 
920 See also chapter 5.3 Deportation. The tactic of suicide bombing was learned from Hizballah as an 
aftermath of the deportation of 415 Islamist in 1992. Furthermore, Hamas claims that they had no intention 
in suicide attacks as a tactic before the 1994 Baruch Goldstein masaqare in Hebron.  
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Change of the operational theatre 
 
One of the goals of counter terrorism might include moving the operational 
theatre as far away from the ‘home’ as possible. This goal is also one of the principles in 
Israel military doctrine, explored previously in chapter 3. In this manner, the government 
achieves two things; firstly, it might reduce the fatality rate among its citizens. Secondly, 
it reduces the psychological impact terrorism has. As mentioned previously, one of the 
reasons why terrorism has such an impact is that it brings the violence into its own 
backyard, and which ultimately might enhance the demand amongst the public to make 
political concessions in favour of the terrorist organisation. In order to assess whether the 
Israeli counter terrorism policy has been successful in changing the operational theatre, it 
is again necessary to refer to figure 8, here copied once more in.  
 
Figure 8: Terror incidents in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza, 1987-2006:
921
 
                                                 

























































This figure implies that the main theatre of the conflict over time has moved from 
inside Israel to the inside of the West Bank and Gaza. This trend seems to begin in 1998, 
when 20 incidences occurred in Israel compared to 31 in the West Bank and Gaza. This 
development was fully noticeable from 2000-2005, but in 2006 it shifted again, when 414 
incidences occurred inside Israel in comparison to 26 inside the West Bank and Gaza. 
These numbers alone might suggest that the Israeli counter terrorism methods have been 
very effective from the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada. However, there could also be an 
alternative explanation for this change. Seeing as the numbers of Israeli settlements have 
increased throughout the years, it is possible that the terrorist organisation was 
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specifically selecting these settlements as their targets. This could have been done in 
order to place the question of the legitimacy of the settlement in the forefront, so that the 
Israelis would question the ‘cost’ of having settlements inside the West Bank and Gaza. 
Another explanation is that Israel immediately imposed total closure when the al-Aqsa 
Intifada broke out. Depending on the interpretation, this could either mean that Israel 
became more effective at upholding the closure policy, or, despite the fact that the 
terrorist organisations are accustomed to this method, it might have proven difficult to 
adapt to this measure considering the large numbers of incidents. In addition to enforcing 
the closure policy, Israel started building the separation barrier in 2002. This could have 
contributed to the change in the operational theatre.  
 
Nevertheless, this change is not reflected in the number of fatalities. The data in 
figure 5 also indicate that the fatality rate inside Israel is more or less the same as inside 
the West Bank and Gaza, and this is despite of the drastic increase in terror incidents 
inside the West Bank and Gaza. This could imply that the counter terrorism policy 
reduced the terrorist organisation’s capacity to conduct large scale attacks, but were 
unsuccessful in hindering the number of attacks. If so, this suggests that the terrorist 
organisation was not demoralised by Israel’s counter terrorism attacks, but rather 
determined to continue their attacks, regardless of the limited fatality rate.  
 
Hearts and minds 
 
As public support is critical for any terrorist organisation, it is also vital in any 
long-term counter terrorism strategy. “Counter-terrorist forces can win the battle but 
loose the war, if citizens are afraid to use public transportation or to go to crowded 
places.”922 The winner of the battle over hearts and minds is according to Boaz; “the side 
that is more successful in reinforcing the endurance of its population”923 Therefore, the 
effectiveness of counter terrorism operations can also be evaluated based on the cost in 
                                                 




morale, both among their own population but also the cost in moral among the population 
which supports terrorism.  
 
Terrorism has certain elements which specifically affect the targets in a 
psychological way, which again naturally influences the morale of the target population. 
From a counter terrorism policy point of view, there are several ways to reduce this 
psychological effect. This section will, therefore, start by exploring these dimensions. In 
an effort to assess the effectiveness of Israel’s counter terrorism, the morale of the Israeli 
–and Palestinian public will be examined further. However, measuring a public’s strength  
in morale entails some challenges, as morale is not something to be measured 
quantitatively. Still, one solution is to use the social attitudes towards the peace process 
and the general political views, as a barometer of the morale in the general population. 
Therefore, this section will use opinion polls and the direction of the political situation as 
indicators of the effectiveness of Israel’s counter terrorism methods.  
 
Psychological aspects of terrorism 
 
The terrorist organisations rely on the psychological effect a terror attack has, and 
as such these attacks represent a type of psychological warfare. Terrorists know that they 
are incapable of defeating the military forces of the country they are fighting, and 
therefore the focus is directed towards gaining the attention of the civilian population. If 
public reaction to terrorism was rational, there would be little fear among Israelis. As a 
result of the various efforts made by intelligence services, military, and secret-police, 
Israeli authorities and the Israeli public themselves, terrorism leads to on average 54 
deaths924 in Israel each year. In comparison, this is two or three times the number of 
ordinary murder victims. Furthermore, over 200 people on average commit suicide, in 
recent years approximately 425 people have died annually in traffic accidents. All in all, 
terrorism is clearly not as deadly as one might envision.925  
                                                 
924 From 1987 until 2006 there have been 1073 killed in terror attacks in Israel.  
925 Ironically, the toll rose after the Oslo accords. From the signing in 1993 to the outbreak of the second 
Intifada, a total of 205 Israeli civilians and ninety-seven soldiers were killed, and 2, 244 civilians and 1, 
376 soldiers wounded. The first year of the Intifada took the lives of 177 Israeli Jews and 566 Palestinian 
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But terrorism plays on emotions, it nourishes fears and steals from the promise of 
normality, and it disrupts everyday life so as to harm the target country’s ability to 
function. This threat undermines the ability of the civilian population to live a normal 
life. In order to have an effective counter terrorism procedure, it is evident that the 
civilian population has to learn to cope with terrorism and not be mentally affected by it. 
If they become seriously affected, two things can happen: 1) the people become so scared 
that they will demand a change in politics, 2) the people start to think that the terrorists’ 
claims might be legitimate, and thus ‘give in to terrorism’.926 Therefore the aims of such 
a program should be to internalise awareness among the civilian population that terrorism 
is something that ‘has to be lived with,’ yet without accepting its existence. The program 
should enable pupils to learn about terrorism, understand the operational strategy of 
terrorists, their motives and objectives.  
 
Israel has understood this aspect, and therefore decided to educate and include the 
general public in order to counter terrorism. Everyone in Israel accepts having their bags 
searched before entering malls, universities, and other public areas. Israelis are trained to 
be aware of packages left in public places and are alert to suspicious activities. This 
mentality has helped both to counter terrorist attacks, as well as increased the sense of 
security among the public, with the simple fact that they feel empowered. Much of 
Israel’s success in thwarting terrorist bombings can be attributed to public awareness.927 
The majority of explosive devices placed in public sites such as bus stations, 
supermarkets, and shopping centres have been discovered by civilians who were able to 
alert the police before the bombs went off. Public alertness has been encouraged by 
police advertisements on television and in other media, but the main reason for this high-
level of awareness has undoubtedly been due to the Israeli public’s identification of the 
struggle against terrorism. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Arabs. In comparison, the death toll from traffic accidents rose to just over 500 a year. Shipler, David K.; 
Arab and Jew –Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land, Penguin books, 2002, p. 12. 
926 Hoffmann, Bruce and Morrison-Taw, Jennifer; “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism”, 
1992 www.rand.org, accessed 6 May 2007. 
927 Merari, Ariel; “Israel’s Preparedness for High Consequence Terrorism”, BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-
30, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2000, www.bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu, 
accessed 6 October 2003. 
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In the battles over hearts and minds, there is the terrorist organisation who is 
trying to de-moralise the targeted population on the one side, and the government which 
is trying to strengthen the morale of its population on the other. Regardless of which side 
one is on, the media plays a critical role. In modern democratic societies, mass media 
plays several different roles, it conveys information to the public, interprets events, and 
brings (or removes) issues to the public agenda. Under these circumstances, the media 
plays a substantial role in influencing and shaping public opinion, and hence 
governments’ decisions. The media also serves as a mediator between the public and their 
leadership. Furthermore, the media has the capacity to multiply the impact of terrorist 
activities and convey their message in a way that terrorists are themselves incapable of. 
Terrorist organisations use the media in three different ways. Firstly, the terrorist 
organisation uses the media to spread pre-recorded materials, i.e video testaments of 
suicide terrorists. These testaments can also be used as a recruitment tool in order to 
recruit new suicide bombers. Moreover, such videos also instil fear and intimidate the 
targeted population, while reminding the target audience that the security services were 
unable to prevent their actions.928 Secondly, terrorist organisations also grant interviews 
with the media. This is often done so as to provide a platform for them to convey their 
message simply and directly.929 Thirdly, the coverage of public demonstrations, such as 
parades and funerals, serve as a constant reminder of the terrorist organisation’s presence, 
which again increases the anxiety of the targeted population.930  
 
This is naturally another side to this situation, in that the media has its own 
interests. The media considers terror attacks a good news story that sells well. Therefore 
efforts are made to cover attacks as quickly, and in as much detail as possible, often 
broadcasting live footage from the scene of the incident, which are continuously replayed 
afterwards. Consequently, their interests often correspond. However, the media has a 
clear opportunity to utilize its resources to lessen the effectiveness of terrorism by 
                                                 
928 Pries-Shimshi, Yael; “Creating a Citizenry Prepared for Terrorism: Education, Media, and Public 




creating hostility towards terrorist organisations, compelling decision-makers’ attention 
to the subject of terrorism, and raising public awareness of terrorism. Additionally, the 
media can therefore frame terror attacks as a (rather unfortunate) element of everyday 
life, rather than a life-stopping event for the targeted population. This can weaken the 
terrorists’ goals and strengthen the counter terrorism policy.  
 
A barometer on Israeli social attitudes  
The Israelis’ attitude towards the Oslo peace process can be used as one indicator 
of their overall morale. The Oslo Peace Index is a project run by the Tami Steinmetz 
Center for Peace Research, and started in June 1994. Its purpose is to monitor how the 
Israeli public - Jews and Arabs - perceives the relations with the Arab states and the 
Palestinians and to measure the attitude toward the Oslo peace process. These attitudes 
are illustrated in figure 14 




































Oslo Peace Index 
 
Interesting this figure shows that the support for the Oslo peace process seemed to be 
relatively steady from 1994 to 1999. This support was present despite of the introduction 
of suicide bombings as a tactic in 1994 and the general peak of numbers of incidents in 
1994 and the continuing terror attacks until 1997. Furthermore, the decrease in the 
number of incidents from 1997 to 1999, did not seemingly have any effect on the attitude 
towards the peace process, if anything there was a slight reduction in support. This might 
be due to the difficulties of keeping the morale and hope up for a long period of time. 
                                                 
931 The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research; “The Peace Index”, www.tau.ac.il/peace, accessed 21 
March 2007. 
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This was also the time when the Oslo peace process originally was expected to be 
finalised, but the reaching of an agreement proved unsuccessful. However, overall this 
development would indicate that the morale among the Israelis was relatively high and 
thus the counter terrorism was a success. After the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the 
development of the Israelis’ attitudes towards the peace process was somewhat different. 
In 2001 the Oslo peace Index had fallen 13 percent since 1999 and it continued to 
decline, although a slight increase was detectible in 2005, an increase of four percent, 
before it dropped back down to the level in 2004. It seems that the high level of terror 
incidents did have a de-moralising effect on the general public. However, the slight 
increase of support towards Oslo in 2005 could have reflected a reaction to the death of 
Arafat, who died in November 2004. The Israeli government viewed him as a major 
obstacle for peace, and Sharon had proclaimed that he did not have a negotiator partner. 
Besides, 2004 was also the year where the founder of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and 
his replacement Abd al-Aziz Rantisi died as a result of Israel’s selective killing. 
However, by 2006 Hamas had won the election and the prospect of a peace process had 
deteriorated. 
 
For investigating some of the Israelis’ social attitudes during the al-Aqsa years 
further, the Jaffa Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS) public opinion polls, is a good 
indicator. Much of the Israeli public opinion remained unchanged during the first few 
years of the al-Aqsa Intifada. For instance, the JCSS’s data shows that in 2001, 60 
percent of Israelis believed a Palestinian state would be established within the next five 
years. That number only increased by one percent by 2003.932 Similarly, Israelis’ 
perception of public safety and bureaucratic competence only vary by a few percentage 
points during the first few years of the al-Aqsa Intifada. On the other hand, there was a 
large shift in the Israeli public opinion on the government’s policy on the West Bank and 
Gaza. In 2002, 57 percent of Israelis thought the government policy was “too soft;” 9 
percent thought it was “correct” and 34 percent thought it was “too harsh.” One year 
later, only 29 percent thought the policy was “too soft;” 13 percent thought it was 
                                                 
932 Arian, Asher; “Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2002”, www.tau.ac.il/jcss, accessed 20 
March 2006. 
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“correct” and 58 percent thought it was “too harsh.”933 This shows that, within a one year 
period, nearly one-quarter of the Israeli population started to believe their government’s 
policy in the West Bank and Gaza was “too harsh.” In these surveys, the second largest 
shift in public opinion came when they were asked whether the peace process should be 
abandoned or not, even if it might lead to war. In 2000 this figure was 24 percent; by 
2002 this number had gone up to 27 percent and fallen to 18 percent by 2003. In a one 
year period, between 2002 and 2003, nearly one in ten Israelis changed their mind on the 
issue of whether the peace process should be abandoned. More believed that it should not 
be abandoned.934 
 
These indications suggest that Israelis became much more militant after the 
beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada. 41 percent said they were prepared to make fewer 
concessions to the Palestinians than before the Intifada. During the years of the first 
Intifada, from 1987 to 1993, 20 percent claimed that they had become more militant. The 
rest stated no change.935 Furthermore, these polls show that from 1999 to 2002 92 percent 
were worried that they or a member of their family would fall victim of a terrorist attack, 
compared with 85 percent in 2001, 79 percent in 2000, and 68 percent in 1999. 
Furthermore, 78 percent said that Israeli citizens’ personal security had deteriorated since 
the beginning of the peace process.936 This indicates that the fear factor has risen, hence 
the effectiveness of counter terrorism policy could be assessed as unsuccessful.  
 
A barometer of Palestinian attitudes 
 
The social attitudes among the Palestinian society are equally important when 
assessing the effectiveness of counter terrorism. In this section the changes in Palestinian 
attitudes will be evaluated, based on opinion polls conducted by The Jerusalem Media 
and Communications Center (JMCC) and the Palestinian Center for Public Policy and 
                                                 






Survey Research (PCPSR), with respect to Palestinians’ hopefulness of the future, as well 
as assessing general support for Hamas.  
 
After Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo Agreement in 1993, Hamas’ popularity 
became a barometer of the political discontent with the peace process and with the 
Palestinian Authority. This is clear from the number of terrorist incidents from year to 
year, as illustrated in figure 9. This development suggests that as the signing of the Oslo 
Accords approached, the terror incidents dropped. This could indicate that the Israeli 
counter terrorism methods were much more successful in 1993 than in the previous years. 
However, this is often attributed to the fact that the Oslo Accords brought hope for a 
better future. When the Oslo Agreement was signed in 1993, two-thirds of Palestinians 
immediately supported it.937 Their expectations were high; Oslo was supposed to usher in 
the end of the occupation, the establishment of an open and democratic political system, 
and a quick improvement in economic and living conditions. However, with the peace 
process Israel also enforced a much stricter permit system and closure policy, which 
contributed to the realisation that the Oslo Accords were not going to fulfil the high 
expectations, or at least not immediately.  And in 1994, Hamas was responsible for 13 out 
of a total of 24 incidents. In fact 1994 was one of the most violent years during the peace 
process, which correlates with the fact that this was also the year when Hamas introduced 
suicide bomber as a modus operadi. Additionally Hamas’ capacity had been strengthened 
by the return of the 415 deported Islamists. In response to this development, Israel 
introduced some of its counter terrorism measures, such as the demolishing of houses 
belonging to the family of suicide bombers and selective killings. It would appear that 
Israel’s counter terrorism policy has been successful in decreasing the support for Hamas. 
Palestinian popular approval of the Oslo peace process peaked at 80 percent in early 
1996, with the support for Fatah at its highest, and the support for terror attacks decreased 
to 20 percent. At the time Israeli military withdrawal from towns and villages was taking 
place, and the Oslo Accords seemed to be producing results. What is interesting is that 
despite the loss of popular support, Hamas still goes ahead and continues with its terror 
attacks. Although few incidents occurred in 1997, there was a peak again in 1998, with a 
                                                 
937 Shikaki, Khalil; “Palestinians Divided”, Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, no. 1, 2002. 
 335 
total of 20 incidents, of which Hamas was responsible for three. Notably the increase in 
terror incidences in 1998 conceded with some development in the peace process. In 1997 
the Hebron Agreement was signed and with the signing of the Wye Agreement in 1998 
Israel withdrew from 13 percent of the West Bank. One explanation for the relatively low 
number of incidents during this time period, was the Likud government with Netanyahu 
as Prime Minister and its tough stand on terrorism. Likewise it could be argued the low 
level of violence was not due to Israel’s counter terrorism policy, but rather the terror 
organisations knew that Likud would not pursue the peace process with less sincerity and 
less concessions than the pervious Labour government had. When the Likud government 
showed signs of pursuing the peace process after all, with the signing of the Hebron 
Agreement in 1997 and the Wye Agreement in 1998, the violence rose again in an effort 
to derail the peace process. This development suggests that although the Israeli counter 
terrorism methods were able to successfully decrease Hamas’ support, the policy was not 
effective in curbing Hamas’ motivations or their capability to carry out terror attacks.  
 
The Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC) and the Palestinian 
Center for Public Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) have collected data on  the trends 
in Palestinians’ attitudes during the al-Aqsa Intifada, and the data is available for the 
timeframe between 2000 and 2005. Two questions that JMCC asked the Palestinians 
consistently during 2000 through to 2005 include: “In general how optimistic or 
pessimistic do you feel towards the future?” and “Do you strongly support, somewhat 
support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the continuation of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip?” There were only slight variations in the Palestinians’  
responses to the questions over time. According to the data collected by the centre, the 
Palestinians felt most pessimistic about the future in December 2003. They felt most 
optimistic about the future in December 2005, but the data was relatively unchanged. 
Palestinian responses to the second question also varied, but over time, support for the al-
Aqsa Intifada waned slightly and opposition increased marginally. In contrast, according 
to PCPSR, there was a dramatic shift in Palestinian public support for the groups 
conducting the terrorist incidents. Palestinian public support for the more radical Islamic 
political parties was approximately 17 percent in 2000, before the al-Aqsa Intifada. That 
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figure increased to 35 percent by the summer of 2004.938 During the same period, support 
for Arafat’s secular Fatah party decreased from 37 percent to 28 percent.939  This suggests 
that during the al-Aqsa Intifada the Islamist groups gained more legitimacy and popular 
support with the Palestinian masses.  
 
This increasing legitimacy and popular support can be contributed to the fact that 
Hamas carried out many of the most devastating attacks against Israeli targets during the 
al-Aqsa Intifada. At the same time, the immobilisation of the Palestinian Authority 
institutions, their ineffectiveness in protecting the population from Israeli military 
assaults, and the growing economic hardship, only increased the demands for services 
offered by Hamas. Hamas increased its popularity by 60 percent in the first three years of 
the al-Aqsa Intifada, emerging as a powerful equal to Fatah in parts of the West Bank and 
exceeded them in Gaza.940 The reason for Hamas’ popularity is not difficult to find. At a 
time of unprecedented hardship, humiliation, and despair, as Palestinians see that all they 
have gotten of the historic concessions made by their leadership is massive destruction of 
the dismemberment of their remaining lands, Hamas is seen as the voice of Palestinian 
dignity and the defence of Palestinian rights. As Israel continues its counter terrorism 
policy, Hamas is seen as the force that refuses to capitulate. As explored throughout this 
thesis, Hamas also benefits from its long history of providing extensive welfare 
assistance and services to all Palestinians “without distinction as to religious belief or 
political affiliation.”941 And while high Palestinian Authority officials mostly live in 
varying degrees of luxury and separately from the people, Hamas leaders in contrast live 
among the people and are seen as sharing the hardships; its reputation for clean conduct, 
modesty, and honesty has been pointedly contrasted with the conduct and corruption of 
many Palestinian Authority officials.  
 
                                                 
938 Shikaki, Khalil; “The Future of Palestine”, Foreign Affairs,  Vol.83, no. 6, 2004.  
939 Ibid. 
940 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, www.pcpsr.org, Accessed 3 May 2007. 
941 International Crisis Group; “Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: A 
Legitimate Target?”, Middle East Report, no. 13, 2 April 2003, www.crisisgroup.org, Accessed 6 June 
2003.   
 337 
It is safe to conclude that Israel’s counter terrorism policy was not successful in 
decreasing the support towards Hamas. The most evident example of this is the 
legislative council elections of January 25 2006 when Hamas won 74 out of the 132 
parliamentary seats, comprising 44 percent of the popular vote and 56 percent of the 
seats, while Fatah won 45 seats, compromising 42 percent of the popular vote and 34 
percent of the seats in the council.942  They won the election despite the numerous deaths 
of both political -and military leaders and key operational members, as a result of Israel’s 
selective killing method.  
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7. 3 Final remarks 
 
It is difficult to state whether or not the Israelis’ counter terrorism strategies and 
tactics, as a whole, have been successful or unsuccessful. The quantitative and qualitative 
measures of effectiveness indicate several trends.  
 
First of all, the high level of incidents, fatalities and injuries during the al-Aqsa 
Intifada indicate three possibilities; either that Israel altered their counter terrorism policy 
in the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, that the counter terrorism methods which were 
first implemented during the peace process were unable to reduce the terrorist 
organisations’ capacity in the long run, or alternatively, the nature of the violence had 
changed and the counter terrorism methods where no longer sufficiently effective at 
countering this new threat.  
 
Interestingly, the data does suggest that Israel’s counter terrorism methods which 
were especially tailored to counter suicide bombers, were relatively successful and had a 
long term effect. This was especially true during the al-Aqsa Intifada. Since the building 
of the fence which started in 2002, and methods such as the demolishing of houses 
belonging to the families of suicide bombers and the deportation were re-introduced in 
2002, the number of suicide bombers has decreased. However, this success did contribute 
to the terrorist organisation changing its modus operandi. During the same period, the 
data clearly illustrate that bombings dominated as a preferred tactic.  
 
One of the goals of counter terrorism might include moving the operational 
theatre as far away from the ‘home’ as possible. In this respect, based purely on the data, 
Israel’s counter terrorism policy has been successful. In terms of the battle over hearts 
and minds, the Palestinian public opinion shifted during the al-Aqsa Intifada in favour of 
the more radical, Islamic organisations. Likewise, during this timeframe, there were no 
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solid decisions by the terrorist organisations to abandon their strategies. This indicates 
that the organisations did not disintegrate, but that they remained active. Israeli public 
opinion remained relatively unchanged, but a significant proportion of the Israelis 
believed that their government’s actions were “too harsh.”  
 
There is little reason to assume that any of the tactics the Israelis have used will 
undermine the will of resistance fighters in the long run. Therefore, Israel’s counter 
terrorism policy is a clear indication that successful tactical measures are not necessarily 
strategically successful. In order for tactical measures to be successful, there must also be 
a parallel strategy that addresses the root causes of the conflict. 
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8. Conclusion   
 
“One thinks that every problem has a solution. Well, this problem doesn’t have a solution.  




The main focus of this thesis is to examine Israel’s counter terrorism methods and 
to debate its effectiveness. For this reason, terrorism as a concept has been examined and 
the study has revealed that terrorism is a violent method used to achieve political goals. 
One of the main aspects of terrorism is it psychological effect on the targeted population. 
Additionally, although this thesis has not explored the root causes of terrorism in great 
detail, it has acknowledged that one of the preconditions of terrorism can include poor 
social-economic situations, disputes over land area and/or sovereignty and a lack of 
recognised human rights. This characterisation of terrorism alludes to what a counter 
terrorism policy should include. Counter terrorism should be understood as a series of 
methods designed to decrease a terrorist organisation’s capacity and its intention to 
perpetrate terror attacks. Obviously, seeing as the incentive of terrorism is found in the 
political sphere, terrorism can most likely be resolved in this setting. However, this might 
include having to resolve a controversial issue at the cost of a heavy political concession. 
Therefore, the main aim of counter terrorism cannot be total eradication of terrorism, but 
rather a reduction in the damage caused by terrorism. In an effort to clarify the goals of 
the Israeli counter terrorism methods, Yitzhak Rabin stated that: “The goal we set 
ourselves in the campaign against terror is not one of elimination, but to minimize our 
vulnerability and delivery of the strongest possible blows against terrorists…”944  
 
By drawing upon certain historical aspects of Israel’s security issues, this thesis 
has shown how Israel uses its military doctrine of war in order to set guidelines for its 
counter terrorism policy. By studying the evolution of Israel’s counter terrorism strategy, 
                                                 
943 Aaron Auerbach 
944 Ganor, Boaz; “Israeli Counter-Terrorist Policy: 1983-1999” 1 January 1997 www.ict.org.il, accessed 13 
March 2001. 
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this thesis has revealed three factors which have continuously been included in this 
strategy;  offensive -, defensive -, and punitive actions.  
 
In order to explore the consequences and effectiveness of Israel’s counter 
terrorism methods, this thesis has included an assessment of eight measures enforced by 
Israel. Although, as shown in this study, the categorisation of these eight measures is not 
always evident, it is arguable that three of the measures can be defined as defensive 
actions (the permit system, methods of interrogation and fence), three of the measures as 
punitive actions (the closure policy, deportation, and house demolishing) and two of the 
measures as offensive actions (the selective killings and administrative detention).  
 
By viewing the counter terrorism equation, the  
 
“principle dilemma in fighting terrorism is the fact that the more successful one is 
in carrying out actions that damage the terrorist organisation’s ability to perpetrate 
attacks, the more we can assume that their motivation will only increase.”945  
 
Thus an effective counter terrorism policy needs to decrease a terrorist organisation 
capacity, and their intentions. By studying the scope of these counter terrorism measures, 
it becomes clear that although these measures do reduce the capacity of Hamas and as 
such have prevented certain attacks or incapacitated Hamas’ military wing for a short 
period, they have had a limited effect in the long run. This was confirmed by assessing 
the effectiveness of counter terrorism with qualitative indicators. By adapting to 
constraints, reinventing ways to perpetrate attacks, and developing strategies to minimise 
the effect of Israel’s counter terrorism method, Hamas has proven a good example, 
illustrating the flexible and diverse nature of such organisations. One reason for Israel’s 
counter terrorisms limited long term effects is the fact that Hamas utilises both its socio-
political and violent jihad aspects, which are made possible by its overall ideological 
concepts of tasber and da’wa.  
 
                                                 
945 Ganor, Boaz; The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle; A guide for decision makers, Transaction Publishers, 
London, 2007, p. 41 
 342 
However, the Israel’s counter terrorism methods have consequences far beyond 
reducing the terrorist organisation’s capacity. The Palestinian society as a whole has been 
affected by these methods, and one consequence of Israel’s counter terrorism policy has 
been the creation of a totally dependent, unproductive and captive Palestinian economy, 
with total Israeli control of trade, natural resources (land and water), urban planning, 
investment, movement of individuals and goods, and the Palestinian boarders. 
Furthermore, most of the Palestinian families have had one family member arrested, 
detained, pressured and/or killed as a consequence of Israel’s measures. These 
consequences deepen the root causes for terrorism and increase the motivation to 
continue resistance. This was confirmed when assessing the effectiveness of counter 
terrorism by using qualitative indicators. The aforementioned consequences have 
provided Hamas with sufficient political legitimacy to continue terror. Hamas’ 
popularity, not military activity, is its real strategic and future asset. The indefinite stream 
of suicide bombers has kept Hamas’ image strong as the hard fighting resistance 
movement that does not capitulate even in the face of a full on war against Israel. When 
asked if there are any conditions under which Hamas will freeze its armed struggle, Abd 
al-Aziz Rantizi answered “An end of the occupation –nothing else. Until the occupiers 
leave, we’ll continue our struggle.” 946 As long as the Palestinians feel that they are 
without hope of a meaningful withdrawal, the resistance will remain the most popular 
alternative. Although destroying Hamas as an organisation is difficult, it is not 
impossible, but destroying the idea of resistance is. 
 
In answering what constituted a successful counter terrorism policy, then IDF 
Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon, clarified: “If we end the confrontation in a way that makes 
it clear to every Palestinian that terrorism does not lead to agreements that will improve 
their strategic position.” 947 The politics of Hamas’ acts of terror and Israel’s counter 
terrorism methods will most likely be sustained until a legitimate solution for peace is 
reached. Until then, the central issue is political positioning. The intermediate solution for 
Hamas might be to consolidate its position amongst Palestinians, utilising its ideology of 
                                                 
946 Shafi, Haider Abdel: ”Interviews from Gaza”, Middle East Policy Journal, Vol. IX, no. 4, 2002. 
947 Haaretz; “Haaretz interview with IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon” 29 August 2002 
www.haaretz.com, assessed 29 August 2002. 
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Jihad. The intermediate solution for the Israelis might in turn be management and 
containment. However, the use of terror and counter terrorism methods “can polarise 
relations between communities and destroy the middle ground of political bargaining and 
compromise”.948 Thus, assuring that the conflict continues without any real hope of a 
lasting solution.  
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